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ABSTRACT 
This research was inspired by a particular business problem – the search for an 
optimal model of strategy-making process in Severstal, a major Russian metals 
and mining company going through a period of rapid growth and transformation.  
The research reports on the results of a longitudinal explorative case study 
based on two distinct empirical projects. The first project addressed strategy 
process nature, participants, roles of corporate centre, time perspective and 
impact of the external environment. Its results highlighted the importance of 
CEO leadership and personal traits, which became the principal focus of the 
second empirical project.  
 
The key empirical contribution of the research was definition of "leader-focused 
decentralisation" as a particular approach to strategy-making in a multi-business 
group. This approach combines decentralized, bottom-up, business units-led 
generation of strategic proposals and initiatives with a crucial role of a company 
leader as a deeply involved decision-maker, presiding over a small and lean 
corporate centre with minimal corporate rules and bureaucracy. In Severstal‘s 
case, the "leader-focused decentralisation" approach to strategy was a good 
match to its volatile yet rewarding external environment. 
 
The suggested model can be seen as an empirically-derived step towards a 
theoretical synthesis of "activist" vs. "detached" views of corporate centre roles 
in relation to strategy process in multi-business firms. It exhibited some 
distinctive features which were not yet described in other contexts, including co-
existence of strong entrepreneurial leadership and organisational 
decentralisation. From a practical standpoint, the research highlighted 
weaknesses and limitations of existing strategy-making model and offered a 
background for the discussion of ways to develop it in the future.    
 
 
Keywords: Strategy Process, Corporate Centre, Leadership, Configurations, 
Decentralisation, Multi-Business Group, Russia 
ii 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS 
 
I would like to express my deepest gratitude to my excellent supervisory panel, 
Professor Andrew Kakabadse and Professor Mark Jenkins, for their demanding 
and yet thoroughly encouraging guidance in my DBA journey.    
 
My special gratitude goes to Andrew for introducing me to the universe of 
scientific pursuit and helping to advance in theory and practice of corporate life. 
It was a great honour to be guided by such an exceptionally knowledgeable and 
wise mentor, a true embodiment of Cranfield School of Management motto 
―Knowledge into Action‖.  
 
Thank you to the Cranfield faculty and particularly to Barbara Birtles, one of the 
most efficient managers I have ever met, for the incredible support we have 
been receiving from her all these long years. Thank you also to Deborah 
Hiscock for her great help with style and formatting.  
 
I dedicate this work to my grandfather Ivan, for his continuous support and 
encouragement and unwavering confidence in the success of this endeavour.  
 
 
 
 
 
iii 
DISSEMINATIONS TO DATE 
 
Conference papers 
 
―The evolving role of corporate centre in strategy-making process: an empirical 
investigation of a major Russian multi-business corporation‖.  Report at the 
Strategic Management Society ―Intersections of Strategy Processes and 
Strategy Practices‖ Conference. Levi, Finland, March 2010.  
i 
CONTENTS 
ABSTRACT ....................................................................................................................................... i 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS ................................................................................................................. ii 
DISSEMINATIONS TO DATE .......................................................................................................... iii 
LIST OF FIGURES ............................................................................................................................iv 
LIST OF TABLES .............................................................................................................................. v 
1. Linking document .................................................................................................................. 1 
INTRODUCTION ......................................................................................................................... 1 
Research objective ................................................................................................................ 1 
THE RESEARCH STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF RESEARCH QUESTIONS ............................... 5 
OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE ................................................................................................ 9 
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND DESIGN ...................................... 12 
KEY FINDINGS .......................................................................................................................... 17 
Characteristics of “leader-focused decentralisation” in Severstal: Summarising conclusions 
from the Empirical Projects ................................................................................................. 32 
DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS AND RELATION TO LITERATURE ............................................ 34 
Relating the research findings to strategy process concepts from the literature review .. 34 
Relating the research findings to the leadership literature ................................................ 43 
Severstal’s “leader-focused decentralisation” as a distinct approach to strategy process in 
a multi-business firm ........................................................................................................... 60 
AREAS OF CONTRIBUTION....................................................................................................... 68 
Contribution to Practice ...................................................................................................... 68 
Contribution to Public/Political Domain ............................................................................. 70 
Contribution to Empirical Knowledge and Theory .............................................................. 71 
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH .................................................. 79 
Limitations of the Research ................................................................................................. 79 
Opportunities for Further Research .................................................................................... 80 
2. Project I: Systematic Literature Review .................................................................................. 83 
INTRODUCTION ....................................................................................................................... 83 
Research Problem ............................................................................................................... 83 
Positioning the research...................................................................................................... 83 
Literature Perspectives on the Topic and Potential Contribution to Knowledge ............... 85 
Review Objectives ............................................................................................................... 89 
REVIEW METHODOLOGY ......................................................................................................... 90 
ii 
Overview ............................................................................................................................. 90 
Review Panel ....................................................................................................................... 92 
Search Strategy ................................................................................................................... 93 
Selection Criteria ................................................................................................................. 96 
Data Extraction .................................................................................................................. 100 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS .......................................................................................................... 101 
Overview ........................................................................................................................... 101 
Search Results ................................................................................................................... 102 
Literature Characteristics .................................................................................................. 103 
FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE ........................................................................................ 111 
Concepts of strategy process ............................................................................................ 111 
Methodology of Strategy Process Research ..................................................................... 118 
Strategy Process and Organisational Context ................................................................... 120 
Strategy-As-Practice Perspective ...................................................................................... 127 
Strategy Process and External Context ............................................................................. 127 
Time Perspective of Strategy Process ............................................................................... 131 
Models of Strategy Process ............................................................................................... 136 
The Role of the Corporate Centre in Strategy Process in a Multi-business Corporation .. 138 
DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS ..................................................................................................... 151 
Identifying the Knowledge Gap in the Literature .............................................................. 151 
The Choice of the Study Design and Methodology ........................................................... 155 
Empirical Research Design ................................................................................................ 159 
Findings from the Literature Informing the Research Structure and Questions .............. 161 
Reliability and Validity ....................................................................................................... 166 
IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT 2 (EMPIRICAL PROJECT I) ........................................................ 168 
3. Project II. Role of the Corporate Centre in Strategy Process: An Empirical Investigation .... 169 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 169 
Interview analysis .............................................................................................................. 169 
Documentary Evidence ..................................................................................................... 175 
Data Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 177 
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................................... 190 
Corporate Centre Involvement, Function and the Level of Centralisation ....................... 194 
Nature of the Strategy Making Process ............................................................................ 201 
Evolution of Strategy Process and Corporate Centre Role Over Time .............................. 205 
iii 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 210 
IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EMPIRICAL PROJECT II .................................................................... 214 
DISCUSSION OF RELIABILITY, VALIDITY AND GENERALISABILITY .......................................... 216 
4. Project III. A Deeper Look: The Role of CEO Leadership and Personal Traits in Shaping the 
Strategy Process ........................................................................................................................ 219 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS ........................................................................................ 219 
Introduction to the Empirical Project II (DBA Project III) .................................................. 219 
Interview Analysis ............................................................................................................. 222 
Data Analysis ..................................................................................................................... 224 
DISCUSSION ........................................................................................................................... 234 
Step 1. Setting the Scene: Elaborating upon the Conclusions of Project I, Further Exploring 
the Characteristics of “Leader-focused Decentralisation” ................................................ 234 
Step 2. A More Detailed Look at the Role of CEO Leadership and Personal Traits in Shaping 
Strategy Process ................................................................................................................ 239 
Step 3. Participants’ Perception of Strengths and Weaknesses of the “Leader-focused 
Decentralisation” Strategy Process ................................................................................... 251 
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS ............................................................................................... 260 
Characteristics of “Leader-focused Decentralisation” in Severstal: Summarising the 
Conclusions from Empirical Projects I and II ..................................................................... 265 
Leader-focused Decentralisation in a Nutshell ................................................................. 270 
REFERENCES .............................................................................................................................. 275 
APPENDICES .............................................................................................................................. 286 
Appendix 1 - Key takeaways from the literature .................................................................. 286 
Appendix 2 - Interview Protocol............................................................................................ 297 
Appendix 3 - Interview analysis: an illustrative example ...................................................... 300 
Appendix 4 – Summary of Project II interviews analysis ...................................................... 308 
Appendix 5 – Summary of Project III interviews analysis ..................................................... 315 
Appendix 6 – A brief history of Severstal .............................................................................. 322 
Appendix 7 – Russian Economic and Institutional Environment in 2000-2009 .................... 333 
  
iv 
LIST OF FIGURES  
Figure 1. Illustrative summary of key literature topics covered in the Literature Review ......... 10 
Figure  2. A brief overview of research design ............................................................................ 16 
Figure  3. Temporal development of Severstal’s strategy process: Context-embedded drivers of 
changes and observed changes .......................................................................................... 43 
Figure  4. Literature Mapping ...................................................................................................... 84 
Figure  5. Systematic Review Process Model .............................................................................. 91 
Figure  6. Timing of Studies ....................................................................................................... 106 
Figure 7. Focus of the enquiry - Strategy Process in an emergent market multi-business firm 
with concentrated ownership structure .......................................................................... 164 
Figure 8. Outline of Empirical Research Procedure .................................................................. 169 
Figure  9. Data analysis and synthesis process .......................................................................... 182 
 
  
v 
LIST OF TABLES 
Table 1. Overview of projects, research questions and key outcomes ........................................ 6 
Table 2. Summary of conclusions of Empirical Project I, including breakdown by stages .......... 18 
Table 3. Overall periodisation of strategy process development and the corporate centre role 
from the Empirical Project I (as inferred from the periods reflected for every major 
thematic construct) ............................................................................................................ 23 
Table 4. Summary of conclusions of Empirical Project II ............................................................ 25 
Table 5. Review Panel ................................................................................................................. 92 
Table 6. Keywords ....................................................................................................................... 94 
Table 7. Search Results ................................................................................................................ 95 
Table 8. Selection Criteria ........................................................................................................... 97 
Table 9. Assessment Criteria ....................................................................................................... 99 
Table 10. Search Results ............................................................................................................ 102 
Table 11. Distribution of Journal Papers by Literature Theme ................................................. 104 
Table 12. Distribution of Books by Literature Theme ............................................................... 105 
Table 13. Key Authors ............................................................................................................... 107 
Table 14. Study Type ................................................................................................................. 107 
Table 15. Industry Type ............................................................................................................. 108 
Table 16. Study Location ........................................................................................................... 108 
Table 17. Study Publication Distribution ................................................................................... 109 
Table 18. Study Data Structure ................................................................................................. 110 
Table 19. The Model by Goold and Campbell ........................................................................... 143 
Table 20. The Model by Ward et al ........................................................................................... 146 
Table 21. Characteristics of Interviews ..................................................................................... 173 
Table 22. Summary of conclusions, including breakdown by stages ........................................ 184 
Table 23. Overall periodisation of strategy process development and corporate centre role . 188 
Table 24. Summary of Conclusions of Empirical Project II ........................................................ 225 
 
 
1 
―The experience of all my life tells me that there is no such thing as optimal centralisation or 
decentralisation. There is a particular strategy, and in line with demands of this strategy, we make practical 
decisions on particular issues‖ 
Severstal CEO, December 2010 
 
Chapter 1 
1. Linking document 
INTRODUCTION 
Research objective 
This study was inspired by a particular business problem – the search for an 
optimal strategy-making process in Severstal, a major Russian metals and 
mining company going through a period of rapid growth and internationalisation. 
Severstal‘s strategy developed in a particular context. Ownership structure and 
entrepreneurial legacy have traditionally had a very significant impact on the 
company‘s decision-making process. The post-privatisation Russia exhibited a 
highly volatile political and economic environment in the 1990s; an economic 
boom in the 2000s and sharp economic contraction on the wake of the 2008 
global crisis provided a distinct and challenging external context.     
Practical purpose 
This research has a very practical purpose – to explore how strategy process at 
the corporate level is organized now and how it evolved historically under the 
influence of the company‘s context. As an end result, the research intends to 
offer practical suggestions on how strategy-making can be organized in the 
future. These suggestions will draw from the conceptual insights provided by 
academic literature on the subject and recognise the constraining (and 
enabling) impact of the particularities of specific company context identified over 
the empirical study.  
As Severstal developed itself from a single-plant ―provincial‖ manufacturer of an 
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―old-fashioned‖ commodity product into a multi-business group with an 
international portfolio, the company faced a growing number of unresolved 
dilemmas related to its strategy development. The role and composition of the 
corporate centre evolved with the company as its asset portfolio changed - first 
with diversification from steel-making into unrelated businesses, then rapid 
growth, spin-off of unrelated businesses and formal consolidation back into a 
steel and mining company with increasingly internationalised assets. The roles 
of the corporate centre were changing from financial management and 
controlling to managing business turnaround to a more integrated strategic 
management of an enlarged holding. As management principles and asset 
composition changed over time, the company faced periods of uncertainty and 
confusion about the content of strategy (―what is after all our strategy?‖), optimal 
degree of centralisation of strategy process and ―division of labour‖ between the 
corporate centre and business units in strategy development. This study will 
attempt to address some of these concerns.  
Academic relevance 
From an academic perspective, the problem of ―strategy confusion‖ is of course 
not unique to this company or this context; indeed, the issues of ―search for 
focus‖ after a period of rapid development are typical for entrepreneurial 
companies (Mintzberg & Waters, 1982), while the questions of corporate centre 
role and relevance have been high on corporate agenda since 1970s (Ward et 
al, 2005). However, we can draw few practical conclusions on the organisation 
of strategy process in the distinct context described above. Despite a 
remarkable half-a-century development of the modern study of strategy, the 
field still presents a rather ―eclectic‖ view of its subject with a wide array of 
approaches, theories and even differing scientific vocabularies (Mintzberg at al., 
1998). There are clear strengths of this pluralism in terms of the freedom of 
scientific endeavour unconstrained by sacred truths, but complexity of the field 
(Hutzschenreuter & Kleindienst) and lack of universally recognized normative 
concepts (Mintzberg et al, 1998) present an admirable challenge for practice-
conscious managers. This is becoming increasingly apparent since applied 
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interest in strategy-making has been growing in the last decade as manifested 
by the widespread use of popular strategy methods and growing demand for 
strategy-related jobs (Wittington & Cailluet, 2008).  
Nevertheless, strategy research did elaborate a comprehensive set of powerful 
and insightful theories of strategy process and content and distinct research 
methodologies (De Witt & Meyer, 2004). These may be particularly relevant for 
the companies from emerging markets which have a much shorter history of 
operating in market economy and hence much shorter ―institutional memory‖ 
about the techniques and methods of strategy development (Wright et al, 2005). 
This study intends to contribute to identification of optimal role and responsibility 
of the corporate centre for Severstal in the new, post-crisis environment. The 
particular question in focus of this research - the effectiveness and level of 
involvement of corporate centres managing diversified corporations – was 
widely addressed in both academic and business writing in the West (Ward et 
al, 2005). The view of a corporate centre as a diversifier of risks and ―portfolio 
manager‖ was increasingly criticized in the 1980s and 1990s (De Witt & Meyer, 
2004) since financial markets were presumed to be more efficient in doing this 
work. Alternative views of value-creating corporate centre were offered in the 
1980s and 90s and reflected in academic models of ―activist‖ corporate centre 
which adds value by managing group-wide competences and strategic 
initiatives (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Ward et al, 2005). Moreover, even the 
role of portfolio manager may still be important for the emerging markets, where 
financial markets are less developed and property rights are not well-
guaranteed (Wright et al, 2005), calling for diversification of personal wealth 
through acquisitions of companies rather than shares and use of corporate 
centres as control vehicles to provide additional oversight over managers. 
Based on the previous literature findings, evolution of the role of corporate 
centre may be connected to the impact of its distinct and volatile external 
environment (Rajagopalan et al, 1993; Grant, 2003), while strategy process in 
general is deeply embedded on the organisational context particularities, such 
as concentrated ownership and entrepreneurial management (Mintzberg an 
Waters, 1982). In this sense, the research will aim to bridge the ―relevance gap‖ 
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between theory and practice (Tranfield & Starkey, 1998) by looking at how the 
patterns identified by academics in Western business practices and in (mostly) 
public companies would work in the brave new world of the privatized ex-Soviet 
industrial giant, and what impact its internal and internal context might have on 
the corporate centre shape and role in the strategy process. 
Public/political relevance 
The author also hopes that this paper will contribute to better understanding of 
the emerging Russian business by providing insights into its most intimate 
process – strategy-making. The way businesses are run in Russia remains 
uncharted waters, little explored in Western business literature, both popular 
and academic. For example, only two papers, both very recent (Carr, 2007 and 
Gurkov, 2009) addressed strategy-making in the Russian context. The picture 
that exists in mass media is all too often constrained by embedded myths and 
over-simplistic interpretations, thus limiting the world‘s understanding of the 
country and damaging the strategic dialogue between Russian and international 
business communities. Hopefully, this study and its future extensions will 
contribute to overcoming this unfortunate knowledge gap. In particular, the 
above discussion of the issue of corporate centre relevance has found an 
interesting new perspective in Russia. Much popular attention has focused on 
issues of the purposes of owners-managers of large corporations (―oligarchs‖). 
The debate centred around whether their focus remains mostly on maximisation 
of short-term financial cash flows or on the long-term development with 
maximisation of the assets‘ long-term value. The events in the wake of the 2008 
economic crisis further sparked this debate when the government decided to 
use public funds to provide financial relief to some of the major Russian 
corporations. This paper will add to our knowledge of the question by going 
inside a major company run by a majority shareholder whose interests are 
represented by the corporate centre. Therefore, one of the exploratory 
questions in the empirical project will be the nature of corporate centre 
involvement: does it act as a passive and detached ―shareholder‖ interested in 
maximisation of short-term financial return only, or as a proactive and involved 
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leader, determined to position the company for a long-term future?  
THE RESEARCH STRUCTURE AND EVOLUTION OF 
RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This section presents the evolution of research focus as the study progressed 
through the literature review and empirical investigation. The abovementioned 
practical issues and author‘s professional and personal interest in the roles of 
the corporate centre in strategy process underpinned the initial focus.  The 
choice of questions was further shaped by the iterative processes of scoping 
study, literature review and empirical investigations. The Cranfield DBA 
programme is structured around three projects (see Table 1). The study started 
with a scoping study followed by a comprehensive literature review (Project I), 
which helped to identify the gap in the literature, determine relevant 
methodology and formulate research questions to the empirical investigation. 
The empirical part consisted of two separate projects which were conducted in 
one organisation but addressed two different aspects of strategy process. 
Project II addressed the comprehensive questions of strategy process nature, 
participants, roles of the corporate, time perspective (evolution of corporate 
roles and process characteristics) and the role of the external environment, in 
line with the traditional methodology of the configurational approach to strategy 
process research (Mintzberg et al, 1998). The results of Project II highlighted 
the importance of CEO leadership and personal traits as crucial determinants of 
the strategy process. Therefore, the impact of a CEO‘s leadership on the key 
elements of Severstal‘s approach to strategy process – ―leader-focused 
decentralisation‖ – became the principal focus of Project III. The investigation of 
leadership traits allowed the author to formulate the comprehensive description 
of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖, including its process, context and 
leadership characteristics. The purpose of the linking document was to provide 
an overview of the research structure and evolution, to summarise discussion of 
the outcomes of the three projects, relate them to academic literature, discuss 
main contributions of the study and outline potential areas for future research.    
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Table 1. Overview of projects, research questions and key outcomes 
Project/Approximate 
Period of Enquiry 
Questions to the Project Key Project Outcomes Implications for Further Study 
Preliminary Scoping 
Study 
May 2006-July 2007 
How can the DBA research problem be broadly positioned 
within the framework of existing academic literature on 
strategy? 
Strategy literature was reviewed 
and three key dimensions of 
strategy were identified – strategy 
process, content and context.  
Strategy process was identified as 
the key research area. Time 
perspective of strategy and the role 
of the corporate centre were 
identified as supplementary 
research areas.  
Key literature perspectives on the 
research problem were reviewed 
and potential contribution to 
knowledge was established. 
Research areas for the literature 
review were formulated. 
DBA Project I 
(Literature Review) 
March 2007-July 2009 
(incl. a “crisis” gap 
year) 
The basic research question: 
How does the academic literature describe the  role of a 
corporate centre in the strategy making process in a multi-
business firm? 
Additional questions to provide further focus to the 
research: 
-  What are the key perspectives on the nature of the strategy 
making process and its evolution over time?  
-  What does the literature tell us about the impact of 
national context on strategy making processes?  In particular, 
is there published research on the strategy process in a 
Russian context? 
- What methodologies are employed for studying strategy 
process? 
 
After a systematic review of the 
existing literature, a literature gap 
was identified. Key literature 
concepts informing the empirical 
study design and methodology 
were highlighted. 
Review of strategy process research 
helped to identify the most relevant 
methodology and formulate the 
empirical research questions.  
  
  
 
Questions to the Empirical Project I 
were formulated. 
Empirical research methodology 
and scope were identified.  
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DBA Project II 
(Empirical Project I) 
September 2009-July 
2010 
The basic research question:  
How did the role of corporate centre in the strategy making 
process evolve in Severstal over the ten year period since its 
emergence as a multi-business corporation and until the 
aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2008?    
Supplementary research questions on the basis of strategy 
process concepts from the literature review:  
-  What was the degree of centralisation of the strategy 
process, and to what extent was the corporate centre 
involved in shaping business strategies of business units? In 
particular, was the corporate centre role built primarily 
around: 1) setting and controlling financial performance 
targets only 2) setting corporate objectives while leaving 
business-level strategy to business units and 3) centralising 
strategy in the centre and closely managing the strategy 
process? 
- Can the strategy process in Severstal be described as 
primarily formal and deliberate vs. emerging and iterative?  
- Who are the key participants on the corporate and business 
unit level, what are the organisational structures around 
strategy development (departments, working groups, 
committees) and their place in general organisational 
structure?  
- Context impact: Can we identify what was the influence of 
the external environment of Russia on  strategy process?  
- Can we untangle the impact of the CEO (majority 
shareholder) on strategy process?  
Severstal approach to strategy 
process is thoroughly described. Its 
evolution is tracked over the study 
period and related to the changes 
in the company’s external and 
internal context.  
Key “process” characteristics of 
Severstal’s “leader-focused 
decentralisation” approach to 
strategy making are defined.  
Results of Project II have 
demonstrated that the key 
elements of strategy-focused 
decentralisation are closely related 
to the leadership role and personal 
traits of company CEO and majority 
shareholder, as well as a number of 
gray zones and apparent paradoxes. 
The role and impact of the CEO’s 
personal traits were placed in the 
centre of the empirical investigation 
in Project III. 
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DBA Project III 
(Empirical Project II) 
August 2010-
November 2010 
The questions to the Empirical Project II were formulated to 
explore in more detail the impact of CEO personal traits on 
the key charachteristics of “leader-focused decentralisation”: 
-  Leadership role in encouraging initiative and aligning 
interests.  
-  Impact of personal traits of the leader on the emergence of 
the “pilot” management model and its role in strategy 
process. 
-  Strengths and weaknesses of “leader-focused 
decentralisation” as they are perceived by the process 
participants.  
In addition, Empirical Project II was supposed to serve as a 
second iteration of Project I in order to support the validity of 
its key conclusions, given the different composition of 
interviewees. 
Conclusions of Project II regarding 
the characteristics of “leader-
focused decentralisation” were 
further explored and elaborated 
with a different cohort of 
respondents.  
Areas of major impact of CEO 
leadership and personal traits were 
identified. Perceived strengths, 
weaknesses and risks were 
identified and discussed.  
Comprehensive definition of 
Severstal’s “leader-focused 
decentralisation”, including 
process, context and leadership 
characteristics, was developed.   
Leader-focused decentralisation 
was comprehensively described. 
Enabling and constraining 
characteristics of the leader’s 
personal traits are suggested and 
discussed. 
Linking Document 
November 2010-
January 2010 
How do the empirical projects’ results relate to the findings 
of the literature review?  
How do the results of Empirical Project II (importance of 
leadership and personal traits in shaping the strategy 
process) relate to the key  leadership literature? 
Results of the three research 
projects were brought together and 
summarised. The results were 
related to the relevant findings 
from literature review and to the 
leadership literature.  Contributions 
and potential limitations of the 
study were discussed and analysed. 
Areas for further research were 
suggested. 
Suggestions for further research are 
offered.  
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OVERVIEW OF THE LITERATURE 
The first step in the literature analysis involved the ―scoping study‖ which 
positioned the DBA research problem within the frameworks of existing 
academic literature about strategy. The key research areas for the literature 
review (strategy process, role of corporate centre and time perspective of 
strategy) were identified. Chapter 2 presents and discusses the literature review 
methodology, conduct and findings. Figure 1 presents the key areas explored in 
literature review (nature of the strategy process; impact of internal and external 
context; methodology of strategy process research; time perspective of strategy 
process; and the corporate centre role in strategy process in multi-business 
groups). 
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Figure 1. Illustrative summary of key literature topics covered in the Literature Review  
11 
Because strategy process research is still in its early stages, the literature 
review assumed a dialectical perspective in order to capture a variety of views 
which include ―white‖ and ―gray‖ areas (Wittington and Cailluet, 2008), and an 
―eclectic‖ view of the subject and low acceptance of universal normative 
concepts (Mintzberg at al, 1998). The thesis highlights different and directly 
opposing strategy process phenomena views and contrasts them. Where 
relevant, the author identified and discussed a synthesising perspective.  
The review identified two potential areas of contribution with existing knowledge 
gaps: 1) the corporate centre role in strategy process and 2) distinctiveness of 
strategy process in the emerging market context. On the role of the corporate 
centre, the literature review identified two major theoretical approaches and two 
theoretical models (by Goold and Campbell, 1987,1993 a,b, and Ward et al, 
2005). Nevertheless, the existing models are rather conceptual and prescriptive 
in nature with relatively little supporting empirical evidence. The embeddedness 
of the strategy process in the inner and outer context (Pettigrew, 1992), 
recognized by the models‘ authors, calls for the development of a richer 
empirical material to understand how corporate centres are engaged in strategy 
process in a different context, rather than in an ideal form. Many essential 
variables, such as organisational structures and work routines supporting 
strategy process in multi-business groups were not yet subject of any research. 
A variety of contexts such as a non-Western context, companies with 
concentrated ownership and evolving companies in different historical periods 
remain unexplored and many authors call for more studies about their impact on 
strategy process and its evolution (e.g. Paroutis & Pettigrew, 2007; Regner, 
2003; Wittington & Cailluet, 2008). In addition, it is important to note that the 
lack of studies in the emerging market context is a characteristic of strategy 
process research as such, not only of its more narrow area of strategy process 
in multi-business groups. Hence, the literature review identified potential 
contribution to the debate in the form of an empirical investigation on the 
historical development of the corporate centre‘s role in a particular context of a 
rapidly transforming company with concentrated ownership operating in an 
emerging-market (Russian) context. This will contribute to our understanding of 
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what are the actual vs. prescribed roles for the corporate centre and business 
units in strategy process, and hopefully, will move the debate further towards 
the conceptualisation of the corporate centre‘s role in different company 
contexts. Finally, the literature review helped to identify the research 
methodology which would be most relevant to the tasks and research 
questions.  
The author conducted most of the literature work as part of a systematic 
literature review in DBA Project I, which Chapter 2 describes. However, the 
author also added new pieces of literature through the empirical projects as 
research findings inspired new endeavours in the emerging themes. As a result 
of the empirical investigation (Project II), the author identified an entirely new 
major area of research (leadership) as crucial in answering the research 
question. Project III was then devoted to the empirical investigation of this new 
theme. Introduction of leadership as an important new domain prompted the 
addition of a short review of leadership literature to the linking document. This 
iterative process of going back and forth from literature to data has helped to 
improve the research quality and build a better way to link the research findings 
to the existing knowledge base (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002).  
EMPIRICAL RESEARCH METHODOLOGY, PHILOSOPHY AND 
DESIGN 
The research employed an explorative, qualitative longitudinal case study 
methodology. The choice of the research methodology was determined by the 
nature of the business problem, identified knowledge gap and the previous 
literature on strategy process research. The nature of the identified ―relevance 
gap‖, lack of universally recognised normative concepts and empirical data to 
inform the research called for an explorative, inductive research strategy 
(Saunders et al, 2007). The author adopted the longitudinal, historical 
perspective to reflect the dynamic nature of strategy (Porter, 1991) and the 
importance of the temporal aspect of strategy-making as a dynamic social 
process (Pettigrew, 1992), particularly relevant in the fast-changing context of 
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Russia in the early 2000s. Pettigrew (1992) suggest in-depth longitudinal multi-
case studies for such types of research contexts and purposes. This 
methodology is particularly well-fit to explore new phenomena with a potential to 
make a contribution to theory (De Witt and Meyer, 2004). Other methodologies 
for strategy-process research, including cross-sectional studies relating strategy 
context, process and outcomes (e.g. Rajapopalan et al., 1993) or process-
focused ―single-level‖ case studies concerning the impact of ―concrete‖ 
decisions/actions (Chakravarthy and White, 2002) do not fit the need for an 
open-minded enquiry into a complex and multi-level phenomenon (Tsoukas and 
Khudsen, 2010). According to Tsoukas and Khudsen (2010), a ―stationary‖ view 
of social systems, which has traditionally been prevalent in strategy-content and 
industry-level strategy studies, cannot meet the demand of the process-focused 
enquiries since the very ontology of process-oriented scholars is ―open-world‖, 
dynamic and change-conscious. Therefore, strategy process research should 
adopt a more dynamic, historical and holistic methodology (Pettigrew, 1992; 
Porter, 1991). This holistic approach demands that we consider multiple factors, 
including the external strategy context (evolution of competitive environment), 
organisational context (organisational structures, influence of participants in 
strategy process) and, of course, strategy content. This determines the choice 
of an explorative, in-depth, longitudinal case study as a methodology of choice 
for this research.  
The author preferred the single case study to a multi-case study method to 
secure the necessary ―depth‖ of enquiry, address practical problems and take 
full advantage of unique ―access‖ to the intimate and untransparent world of 
strategy-making in major Russian corporations.  Because of the explorative 
nature of the research, the author used an inductive approach, without any 
preconceived theory to test, prove or reject (Saunders et al, 2007). However, 
the research is also not entirely ―open-ended‖ (Glaser, 1992). Rich literature on 
strategy process and theoretical models of corporate centre allowed the author 
to define the research framework and formulate specific questions to capture 
the diverse characteristics of the strategy process. The inductive nature of the 
research called for an iterative research flow, i.e. going from literature to 
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empirical research and then back to literature between different projects 
(Strauss and Corbin, 1998). Therefore, elements of empirical exploration and 
pattern matching (theory testing) were combined in the research, particularly at 
the linking document stage.  
The study employed multiple methods, as advocated by many authors for in-
depth case studies (Yin, 2009). The main source of empirical data about 
strategy process, leadership and internal organisational dynamics came from 
the in-depth interviews with strategy process participants. Indeed, scholars 
consider interviews as the primary source of rich, contextually embedded data 
for qualitative research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967), as well as a preferred tool 
when discussing complex, ambivalent and sensitive issues (Easterby-Smith et 
al, 2002). The interviews were semi-structured around the key research 
questions. Semi-structured interviews facilitated effective comparison of 
interviews results and consistency in data gathering. At the same time, the 
interview structure was sufficiently dynamic and adaptable. The author 
encouraged participants to suggest additional themes and expand on any topic 
that they considered important. As a result, the author subsequently added 
popular emerging themes and illustrations to the interview questionnaire 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2002). 
The case study also employed written materials (internal memos, strategy 
presentations, annual reports and, where relevant, external publications) as its 
instruments, particularly to investigate past periods. This supporting data helped 
to provide a comprehensive picture of organisational structure, strategy content 
and external environment (including both national economic and institutional 
environment and global industrial environment for the steel and mining 
industry). The employment of documentary and statistical data and in-depth 
interviews with process participants as the key instruments follows the example 
of other in-depth case studies (for example, Mintzberg and Waters, 1982).   
The main purpose was not only to capture the specifics of strategy process, but 
also relate them to particularities of distinctive internal and external contexts. 
Therefore, the study aspired to explore the underlying patterns, ―mechanisms‖ 
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that cause the events in the social world (Collier, 1994). At the same time, the 
study recognised limitations related to the subjective, contextually embedded 
nature of peoples‘ perception of the social world (Dobson, 2002).  Therefore, 
the study assumed the ―critical realism‖ epistemological position - although our 
knowledge of the reality is subject to social conditioning and we have to 
consider the social context very carefully, through systematic scientific enquiry a 
researcher should identify the underlying mechanisms and patterns that define 
social activities (Bhaskar, 1989). Researchers should study and interpret the 
underlying assumption of critical realism that social reality is dynamic and 
changing with a temporal perspective in mind (Saunders et al, 2007). This is 
consistent with the employed longitudinal approach.  
Figure 2 presents a schematic overview of research design and key outcomes 
by projects. 
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Figure  2. A brief overview of research design 
 
Research scope summary:   
Company scope: Severstal and a related ―Severstal Group‖, a multi-business 
group, initially diversified from a single post-privatisation steel-making plant into 
a number of both related and unrelated business. It later transformed into an 
international metals and mining company more clearly separated from unrelated 
businesses belonging to a majority owner, but with a distinct division into 
geography and product-based business units. 
Strategy scope:  Formation of corporate strategy of a parent company and role 
and involvement of a corporate centre in the formation of business strategies of 
business units. 
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Time span: From the first acquisitions and formation of a ―multi-business‖ group 
in 2001-2002, through IPO and formalisation of a metals and mining company in 
2006, to the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis.  
KEY FINDINGS 
Key findings of the empirical projects are summarized in tables 2-4:
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Table 2. Summary of conclusions of Empirical Project I, including breakdown by stages 
Topic 
(Thematic Category) 
Conclusions informing the research questions 
Strategy-making 
team 
Stage I.  
- Entrepreneurial "partnership" – five top managers and partners making all important decisions  
o Taking care of all assets, regardless of the industry 
o Three out of five partners perform roles of corporate managers and business unit leaders at the same time 
o Significant input, but not overall a decisive role of “Deputy CEO for Strategy”, ad-hoc and unstructured decision-
making 
o Very small strategy staff at the corporate level, playing a minor support role 
- Main shareholder ultimately making all final decisions  
o However, genuine or at least formal consensus was sought  and, in fact, required to make a final decision 
- "Overstretch" and “loss of drive” by the small top management team as company became bigger and made the old team 
unable to cope with management challenges 
Stage II.  
- Dissipation of “partnership”, introduction of “professional” managers. Decision-making is led by the main shareholder. 
o Management board consisting of approximately 10 members involved in decision-making at the corporate level 
o Separation of decision making structure, including decision making teams.  Emergence of de-facto 2 corporate 
centres: the one caring about metals and mining  – Severstal proper,  and “non-core” - other businesses, with 
some people working in two corporate centres simultaneously 
Strategy-making teams at business units: 
- Decision making has always concentrated in a very small circle of top managers 
o Including BU CEO, Director for Strategy (where existed), CFO, and some other key officers (such as Sales Director 
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and Technical Director in one case) 
o In Cherepovetz, overseas steel subsidiaries and in automotive business, in Stage I strategy process was led by a 
corresponding “partner” 
o Included a minority shareholder in one subsidiary  
Strategic decision-
making process 
(nature of) 
- Ad-hoc, opportunistic approach to strategic decisions, especially in Stage I 
o Concerning, first of all, M&A decisions at both Stage I and II 
o CAPEX decisions – ad hoc case-by-case resource allocation process in Stage I, more structured process of strategic 
discussions with BUs in Stage 2.   
o For non-core assets, very opportunistic approach to acquisition with minimum formal analysis and very rapid 
decision-making 
- Unstructured, informal strategic decision making process at Stage I: 
o However, one BU officer commented that Cherepovetz BU has always had a rather well-structured and formalised 
strategy (business plan) review process  
- More formal, relatively more structured process of “strategy/strategic business plan review” with business units in Stage II 
- Absence of formal or informal shared vision and well-defined corporate strategic objectives for the company until after 
the 2008 financial crisis 
- Expansion and diversification driven by: 
o Perceived management capabilities (turnaround of troubled assets), especially characteristic for Stage II  
o Pressure from “cheap money” and desire to grow at Stage II  
- Long time horizon, long-term orientation (10 years in investment planning and 5 years in M&A analysis); varying (2-5 
years) expected payback period 
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Role of corporate 
centre 
Stage I  
- All important decisions were made by the “partnership” – de-facto “5-people-strong” corporate centre 
o Very small corporate support team 
o Beyond the top circle, very little/no corporate influence, no “corporate machine”, established  strategy-related 
routines or traditions  
- High role of CEO, his involvement, personal traits and leadership is repeatedly emphasised as the ultimate factor behind 
strategic decision making  
o Search for consensus among the decision making team by CEO as a prerequisite to decision making  
- Very high discretion and role of business units in creating own development plans and strategic alternatives 
o  Main shareholder involved in review/approval process only 
o No ex-ante financial or strategic goals set by the corporate centre 
o Very informal review/approval process  
- At the same time, typically the shareholder went into great details in his discussions with business units (concerning not 
only strategic, but also, and first of all, operational performance). The involvement was particularly intensive at the 
“turnaround” stage at Cherepovetz and with other Russian assets. 
Transition to Stage II  
- Formal separation of corporate management for “core” – Severstal proper - and “non-core” assets (all others)  
- Push for a more decisive role of  a  corporate centre; resistance of business units to centralisation 
- Corporate standards as means of ensuring best practice dissemination and conformity 
o Corporate University was seen as a means to ensure common standards, but their adaptation was, at best, very 
slow 
o Role of Strategic Business Plan (including corporate-produced market assumptions) as a unification mechanism, at 
least from the reporting standard point of view  
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o At the same time, Strategic Business Plan was perceived by business units as a “non-binding” financial planning 
instrument, not a genuine “strategy” document.  
Stage II: Core assets  
- More involvement of the corporate centre from early 2006 
o Still, the key role played by the main shareholder 
o Also certain formal and informal role for COO and some other corporate top managers 
o Formal and well-established review/approval process 
o Unsatisfied demand for across-business-units coordination from BUs themselves 
- Corporate involvement, although perceived as “stronger” in Stage II, still did not imply setting any concrete targets and 
coming up with significant top-down initiatives. The overall process was now more structured and formalised, but still 
remained very much bottom-up, business unit-oriented.  
 
- Overseas assets: 
o High self-sufficiency of overseas subsidiaries in the initial stages 
o More intervention from the corporate centre in operational management over time   
o Less motivation and leadership in business units as the authority of the corporate centre increased 
o However, comment from an overseas BU top manager: “We had regular discussions, a few times a year, with the CEO 
and some people from the centre… The Severstal CEO approved nearly all initiatives … he asked for the opinion of the 
CEO of Severstal International and other top people and then approved the suggested plan.”  
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Stage II: Non-core assets 
- Very different degree of the main shareholder’s involvement, depending on the level of his interest, business size and level 
of ambition (i.e. is it a “$1 billion potential value” business or not?) 
o Level of involvement also dependent on the perceived level of expertise of corporate team members – e.g. a 
former banker was particularly interested in reshaping the strategy of the bank and worked with it, etc.  
Transition to Stage III (?) 
- More involvement from the corporate centre as the global crisis struck in late 2008: 
o Financial goals set  
o Strategic KPIs introduced in 2008/09 
o Corporate portfolio planning/strategy introduced 
o However, comment from one BU officer: “ These are tactical, not strategic changes, no big increase in the CC role.” 
Role of external 
environment 
- Typically, the “Russian” external environment was not considered an important factor in shaping strategic decisions 
o Some influence on intention to invest abroad 
o High volatility did not hinder long-term focus of planning 
- Highly favourable external industrial and financial environment (i.e. high profits from steel and mining, cheap credit at the 
financial markets), pressure to “find deals for cash” was seen as a cause for opportunistic, intuitive M&A decisions abroad 
conducted without detailed analysis and stress-testing as every steel-related investment seemed to be creating value  
- Certain (rather limited) government influence on strategic decisions in Russia, in the form of non-binding “suggestions” or 
as a “background” thought about company priorities 
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Table 3. Overall periodisation of strategy process development and the corporate centre role from the Empirical Project I (as inferred from the 
periods reflected for every major thematic construct) 
Periods in company 
development, 2000-2009 
Summary of strategy process attributes and corporate centre role(s)   
Transition to Stage I: 
Diversification  [2000-
2002] 
 
- Initially, all acquisitions, including diversification-related, were made on the balance of Cherepovetz steel plant – 
Cherepovetz and its top team were the “corporate centre” for all the assets  
- In 2002, Severstal-Group was formally established as a “corporate centre” and the top team of 5 partners transferred 
from Cherepovetz to the new company  
- Severstal Group remained very compact and lean 
Stage I – Partnership 
[2002-mid-2006] 
 
- All strategic decisions are made by the five “partners” with the main shareholder making the final decision 
- Very entrepreneurial, ad-hoc and quick decision-making 
- Development initiatives coming mostly bottom-up from business units in their respective fields (their industry, their 
region…); corporate centre focused mostly on external growth opportunities, especially on steel acquisitions abroad 
and broad diversification in Russia 
- Corporate centre only involved in review and approval of business units’ plans  
o CEO going into deep details during the review; Deputy Director General for Strategy and First Deputy Director 
are mentioned as those also involved in strategic discussions  
o Combination of corporate roles and roles as heads of business units for the members of “partnership”  
- Relatively unstructured and ad-hoc process of strategic discussions with business units (exception: Cherepovetz); 
operational and strategic discussions become clearly separated only by the end of the period 
Transition to Stage II: 
Professionalisation [mid 
2006-mid 2006] 
 
The previous management system started being perceived as ineffective because of two basic reasons: 
- Failure to succeed in the merger bid for a major European company, Arcelor demonstrated weakness of loose, 
unstructured, entrepreneurially-managed company 
o No consolidated financials 
o No common plans or visible strategy 
o Non-integrated assets 
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- Failure of the “partnership” system to work effectively with a much bigger and more complex company 
o Too big for five people to comprehend all details and make all strategic decisions 
o Impossible to cope with management of business units and corporate responsibilities at the same time (for 
the three of five partners) 
o Desire of former partners to change their position/status (“loss of drive” about their former role)  
To respond to these challenges, over the latter part of 2006-early 2007 main shareholder has completely reorganised 
management system and made the company public through an IPO in November 2006 
Stage II: Corporation 
[late 2006-late 
2008/2009] 
- CEO still playing ultimate role in strategic decision-making 
o Professional “salaried” managers – members of the formal Management Board - came up as a certain 
“substitution” for the former partnership system. However, it was perceived that they only played an advisory 
role, and CEO made all decisions by himself 
- Decision-making process remains rather ad-hoc and opportunistic for M&A deals, but becomes somewhat more 
formalised for CAPEX (internal growth) decisions 
- Perceived higher “intervention” from the corporate centre, but strategy process is still very much bottom-up  
o Still no financial or strategic goals set from the centre  
o CEO is about the only “constant” participant in the strategy review process; little apparent role of other 
senior corporate managers (unlike from some of the partners in Stage I) 
o However, strategic business plan now functions throughout all business units and the review process 
becomes relatively more formal and structured 
Crisis-driven transition 
to Stage III – 
Centralisation (?) [late 
2008-2009] 
- Concrete financial goals and strategic KPIs set 
- Corporate portfolio planning/strategy introduced 
- More perceived involvement of corporate centre (though not universally recognised) 
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Table 4. Summary of conclusions of Empirical Project II 
Topic 
(Thematic Category) 
Conclusions informing the research questions 
Part I. Setting the scene: Elaborating upon the conclusions of Project I, further exploring the characteristics of “leader-focused decentralisation” 
Strategy process centralisation 
- Roles of corporate centre 
and business units  
 
 
Strategy process is relatively centralised and level of centralisation has increased recently. Very high role of 
business units in generation of strategic ideas and options, development of regional/business strategies: 
- The system has become more centralised over the last 2-3 years  
- Despite growing centralisation, business units actively participate in generation of strategic options and ideas  
- Bottom-up initiatives form the backbone of company’s strategic development 
- Business units self-sufficiency is higher for organic growth decisions, whilst the corporate centre plays a higher 
role in M&A  
- Role of corporate financial 
and strategic objectives 
Financial objectives are now clearly defined and provided from the corporate centre. Elements of strategic 
objectives are defined through corporate vision and investment allocation priorities (mining vs. steel, regional 
allocation of emerging markets vs. developed, etc)  
Both financial and strategic objectives were introduced over the last 2-3 years, but did not exist before: 
- No financial or strategic targets, opportunistic and unsystematic approach to strategy in the earlier period of 
corporate development 
- Movement towards a more structured approach over the last 2-3 years. Specific financial targets are clearly 
defined. There is a universal recognition that corporate strategic priorities now exist and this has made the 
company stronger.  
- There is a certain disagreement on whether financial and strategic objectives are provided top-down or bottom 
up. Most of the respondents think this is mostly top down, but business units are also involved in the process. 
 
26 
Responsibility for decision-
making and the role of CEO 
and top team 
Final strategic decisions are made by CEO. Direct communication between CEO and business units, 
unsystematic/modest involvement of corporate centre officers: 
- CEO is the main driver and key decision maker in the strategy process.  
- The strategy process itself is a reflection of CEO's personal attitude and approach to decision making. It 
evolves in line with the CEO's “personality”.  
- The role of top team in the corporate centre is either unclear or seen as secondary/advisory compared to 
the decisive role of the CEO 
- Level of corporate team involvement depends on business unit: in Russian Steel, there is little involvement 
of the corporate centre apart from CEO.  
Part II. A more detailed look at the role of CEO leadership and personal traits in shaping strategy process 
Characteristics of strategic 
discussions with CEO 
CEO plays a leading, crucial role at the strategic interactions: interviewees emphasise that he is leading the 
meetings, asks the majority of questions and has a "controlling stake" in decisions.  
The style of the meetings and strategic discussions reflects the CEO's personal preferences, such as close personal 
attention to details: strategic discussions are usually relatively well-structured (although there is a division on that 
point), but they are universally considered as very long and focused on details. 
Significant issues are associated with the style of meeting and CEO’s personal involvement: 
- Excessive focus on details may mean inefficient time allocation, as a factor constraining efficiency of 
decision-making  
- CEO's frequent overload may create serious issues and reflect on the quality of decisions 
- Very high role of the CEO means that it becomes an issue for the whole corporation if (when) he becomes 
overloaded  
- The specifics of the CEO’s approach to discussions may be challenging/ demotivating for managers from 
overseas, for example in the US and Italy, but are better perceived by Russian managers 
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Encouraging initiative and 
aligning interests within the 
top team 
 
Initiative from below is encouraged. However, to be successful, initiatives should correspond to the CEO's vision 
and priorities.  
- All interviewees emphasise that initiative is very much encouraged and welcomed  
- Discussions are conducted in an open and comfortable manner; everyone can express her opinion; CEO is 
interested in hearing diverse arguments 
- However, to go through an initiative should correspond to the CEO's general, high-level vision on current 
priorities  
- Presenters of initiatives may not always show a balanced picture and may "push" for pet projects too 
aggressively  
 
The CEO aims to achieve consensus and alignment in the team, promotes open discussion and allows people to 
express their opinion. He is keen to explain his own reasoning behind strategic decisions.  
- CEO's inclination to seek consensus and buy-in from all the team members is seen as a personal trait of the 
CEO (he even gets "surprised" when somebody is not "in line" with the prevailing view)  
- CEO doesn’t like disagreement within the team and aims to get to apparent consensus, even if this 
consensus is not quite real  
- To push for consensus, the CEO carefully explains his own reasoning behind a decision and that brings 
people on his side 
The CEO’s push for apparent alignment may present a problem since many observers have noted that top managers 
may be reluctant to raise an issue that contradicts the CEO's strong view at the moment. Interestingly, the CEO's 
interest in consensus seems to be focused on the very top team and does not extend to the middle management, 
which is seen as an issue. 
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“Pilot” strategic  management 
model in action - attention to 
details and high granularity of 
discussions 
The CEO is normally very focused on details in strategic discussions. This is a reflection of his “personality” - deep 
personal curiosity. It also serves as an instrument to keep the management team alert and focused on details in the 
presentation of strategic options:  
- Generally, the CEO/shareholder is inclined to look at details, although it depends on whether he is 
personally interested in a topic.  
- High level of detail is the reflection of the CEO’s personal interest and curiosity, but it is also a vehicle to 
teach management that it is important to track the details. One interviewee suggested such focus on details 
may also reflect lack of trust between the CEO and management team: he tries to establish tighter control 
by keeping an option to question any figure or detail at any moment.  
- High personal involvement of CEO is part of the model of small and lean corporate centre with minimum 
internal bureaucracy and direct communication between business units and the decision-maker. There is a 
bigger potential role for corporate centre in this area – corporate officers with business units could prepare 
the discussions with CEO in advance which should that less time should be devoted to details at CEO's 
personal meetings with business units.   
 
Practically, too much focus on small details also has some clearly negative implications: 
- There is a suboptimal allocation of managerial time - strategically important issues may not receive 
adequate attention   
- Sometimes too much time devoted to detailed research means that a strategic opportunity may be lost to 
competitors  
- Management team may become demotivated by the requirement to present too detailed a business case 
when it is not relevant due to high uncertainty and a long planning horizon   
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Part III. Participants’ perception of strengths and weaknesses of the “leader-focused decentralisation” strategy process 
Strength-Weakness I. Adaptive 
and agile decision-making 
system with strong business 
units/weak corporate centre 
and overreliance on CEO  
Strengths:  
Direct communication with CEO and majority shareholder, high role of business units create an adaptive and agile 
decision making system. This is an important strength for a diverse and growing corporation.  
- High role of "close-to earth" business units, direct communication with CEO create adaptive, non-
bureaucratic and agile decision making system. On balance, this is good for a diverse and growing company 
like Severstal since too centralised decision making would be too slow and costly 
- Direct access to the owner of the business can solve issues of any level of complexity; there is a comfortable 
consistency of dealing with the same person  
 
Weaknesses: 
Overreliance on CEO and weak corporate centre create significant issues for decision making:  
- Direct connection and overreliance on CEO decisions becomes an issue when he is overloaded 
- Business units’ strategies remain disjoint and unconnected to each other 
- Expertise of the corporate centre is underutilised since decisions are discussed directly between the CEO 
and business units; unclear authority of corporate centre. There is a need for a stronger corporate expertise 
in addition to the CEO's personal involvement   
- Mental constraints of the CEO and top team (implied supremacy of steel assets) may reduce efficiency of 
decision making 
Many interviewees highlight weaknesses of the system, but for the majority agility and adaptiveness more than 
make up for possible weaknesses. 
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Strength-weakness II. Raising 
sensitive issues: constructive 
atmosphere for strategic 
discussions, but reluctance to 
question the prevailing CEO’s 
opinion  
Possibility to raise sensitive issues and engage in an open dialogue with the CEO proved to be a very controversial 
issue.  
On the one hand, there is an open and constructive atmosphere; expressing views and suggesting initiatives is 
encouraged. Some respondents maintained that raising any issue is possible:  
- There is a universal recognition that the CEO encourages initiatives and an open atmosphere; ensures that 
there is a possibility to raise different views and express opinions  
- Some interviewees state directly that raising sensitive issues is easy and there is a straightforward, open 
atmosphere  
Besides, there is strong focus on the CEO on building alignment and shared understanding of decisions within the 
top team.  
The CEO has a strong authority and top team members may be reluctant to contradict CEO/shareholder and 
highlight risks/issues associated with his decision. Difficulty of raising sensitive questions and focus on one man's 
opinion is a significant problem and historically has led to suboptimal decisions and value-destruction:  
- Since the CEO has a high authority, team members may be concerned about appearing in contradiction 
with CEO's view  
- Team members may not be fully prepared to discuss difficult topics because they feel pressure from (and 
on) overstretched and exhausted CEO which makes fully open discussion more difficult  
- There is an insufficient level of trust between the top team and CEO  
- There is a lack of initiative from the top team members since they prefer waiting for the CEO's opinion 
before expressing their views. Interestingly, the same interviewee may speak about an open and trustful 
atmosphere, and at the same time,complain that the top team is complacent; their main idea is to "keep 
the CEO happy". Therefore, there is not enough challenge and scrutiny of strategic decisions. Interestingly, 
according to this view, middle managers do raise difficult issues and are better prepared to discuss them.   
Possibility to raise sensitive issues with the CEO proved to be a very controversial issue. There was an almost 50:50 
distribution of opinions.    
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Strength-Weakness III. 
Excessive focus on details. 
The CEO's focus on details is a reflection of his “personality”. An excessive focus on details distracts CEO's and 
executives' attention from more important issues, makes meetings too long and tiresome, demotivates personnel 
and makes the overall system less efficient. Focus on detail also indicates a lack of trust and insufficient level of 
delegation. 
There were some comments that attention to details is a positive moment for the business, but the majority of 
comments maintained that excessive attention to details is a weakness. On the other hand, this is just a natural 
extension of the CEO’s “personality” and hence should be tolerated.   
Weakness I  High pressure on the CEO from his roles as executive, wealth manager and participant in political affairs. This puts 
high pressure on the CEO personally and on his team. This overload has a negative impact on the quality of 
decisions.  
Weakness II  Decision-making is concentrated at the top; there is little communication with and involvement of middle 
management. Top team and CEO are rather closed; there is a need for more communication with the rest of the 
company. 
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Characteristics of “leader-focused decentralisation” in Severstal: 
Summarising conclusions from the Empirical Projects  
―Leader-focused decentralisation‖ is a particular approach to strategy making in 
a multi-business group which combines decentralised, bottom-up, business 
units-led generation of strategic proposals and initiatives and a crucial role of 
the ―final‖ decision-maker, the company leader and a small circle around him. 
The leader is personally involved in both strategic and operational details, 
controls the strategic agenda, makes all final strategic decisions and remains 
closely engaged in a direct, detailed dialogue with business units.  
In its ―pure‖ form, which we can track through the early 2000s-2006, we can 
describe leader-focused decentralisation by the following key characteristics: 
- A highly decentralised and flexible strategy process, ad-hoc approach to 
strategic initiatives. Absence or vague formulation of explicit corporate 
financial/strategic goals ensures a very high discretion of business units, 
securing a high level of initiative and unconstrained creativity. Creativity of 
business units is unconstrained by ―strategy as liability‖, i.e. by any financial 
or strategic frameworks or requirements.  
- Control over the ―final stage‖ of decision-making in the hands of a highly 
authoritative CEO/company leader and a small circle of top managers.  
- Small and lean corporate centre, minimum corporate rules or bureaucracy, 
very few/no ―intermediate steps‖ or barriers between business units and the 
―final‖ decision-maker.  
- ―Pilot‖ management model - deep personal involvement of CEO, granular 
attention to details in the strategic discussions with business units. Attention 
to details is a crucially important instrument enabling the CEO to control the 
content and quality of decisions in the absence of a strong corporate 
bureaucracy.  Control is facilitated by in-depth personal involvement in 
operational and strategic details during the review process. This approach is 
a unique capability since such practice is very difficult to imitate by 
competitors because of very tough requirements of time and emotional 
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resources from the CEO/shareholder and his small top team, given the size 
and complexity of businesses under management.  
- Personal attention of CEO/company leader to create a favourable climate for 
bottom-up initiatives, promoting constructive and open environment for 
strategic discussions and ideas-sharing. Emphasis on building top team 
alignment and buy-in despite the high role of the leader ultimately making all 
final decisions. 
This particular type of a corporate centre was developing in the distinct context. 
We can characterise the external environment in Russia at the time as highly 
volatile and uncertain, but also presenting unique business development and 
growth opportunities. The second part of 2000s brought a more stable country 
context, increasing importance of financial markets and transparency and an 
unprecedented economic boom in the steel and mining industry which was 
followed by an abrupt and severe crash in the wake of the 2008 financial crisis.     
Crisis of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ and partnership system occurred by 
2005-2006 as a result of personality issues in the top team, increased company 
size and complexity and a new demand for transparency after a failed merger 
with Arcelor and a rising role of capital markets in Russian business in general. 
In the wake of the leadership crisis, Severstal started moving towards higher 
centralisation and ―professionalisation‖ of the management system. However, 
the system retained its defining features and associated strengths and 
weaknesses. 
Tighter centralized control, including introduction of financial targets for 
business units and formulation of corporate strategy (for the first time in the 
company‘s history) occurred after the 2008 financial crisis. One can interpret the 
introduction of financial targeting and emphasis on corporate strategic priorities 
as an attempt to focus business units‘ attention on efficiency improvement and 
disciplining ant-crisis measures. The strategy process itself became somewhat 
more structured and systematic.  
34 
However, the pre-eminent role of the leader as the ―final‖ decision-maker was 
preserved. Business units still have a very high discretion and senior 
management (?) very much encouraged a bottom-up initiative which they 
viewed as the main driver and the key source of strategic ideas, although the 
corporate centre started playing a more important role in the development of 
external (inorganic) growth options.   
The evolved system retains the key perceived strengths of agility, flexibility and 
direct access to the final decision-maker. However, it also has serious 
perceived weaknesses and constraints which include the overreliance on the 
energy and involvement of one single person, suboptimal allocation of 
managerial resources, disjointed business strategies and lack of unity and 
inefficiencies related to occasional overstretch and loss of focus by the 
company leader.   
The ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ approach to strategy making was in line 
with the leader‘s personal style and preferences. Such fundamental attributes of 
the system as high personal involvement of the leader, focus on details and 
push for team alignment are universally interpreted by interviewees as the 
CEO‘s personal traits.  
DISCUSSION OF KEY FINDINGS AND RELATION TO 
LITERATURE 
The findings are related to two streams of literature: first, to the strategy process 
literature covered in the literature review and second, to the leadership 
literature.   
Relating the research findings to strategy process concepts from 
the literature review 
The Nature of Strategy Process 
One can clearly position the nature of the strategy process which is emerging 
from the empirical investigation within the dominant strategy process 
frameworks. Its characteristics indicate emergent, ad-hoc and opportunistic 
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decision making with a remarkable flexibility and adaptability to the external 
environment, much in line with the ―emergent strategy‖ school of strategy 
process research (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Quinn, 1978). For most of the 
company‘s history the CEO and top team purposefully avoided explicit 
formulation of strategy in order to preserve strategic flexibility and bottom-up 
initiative. Hence, the Severstal case provides some evidence in support of the 
somewhat provocative notion of ―strategy as liability‖.   
At the same time, the study also lends support to the very recent synthesising 
argument which claims that in real life, organisations combine elements of both 
―emergent strategy‖ and ―strategic planning‖ approaches to strategy process 
(Wittington & Cailluet, 2008). For example, Severstal introduced a formal 
process of ―strategic business planning‖ in 2004 in the overall context of 
opportunistic strategic decision making. The purpose of this ―business planning‖ 
exercise was to provide a ―financial picture‖,  a forecast of key financial and 
operating indicators, which served as background information about the 
company‘s organic development projects. The company viewed the ―strategic 
business plan‖  as a background, not as a precise ―plan‖ (strategic initiatives are 
firmly approved for in the next year budget only). It served as a supporting 
instrument for daily, emergent strategic decisions.  
In addition, the study found that an opportunistic and emergent approach to 
strategy did not equate to short-term orientation: on the contrary, the investment 
horizon in the company remained rather long (5-10 years), even in the volatile 
and uncertain environment of the early 2000s. Even after the unprecedented 
economic contraction of 2008,  the investment horizon still comprised three to 
five years. Therefore, management may think long-term without necessarily 
having a well-defined long-term strategy per se, as proponents of the traditional 
―strategic planning‖ school (e.g. Andrews, 1971) would insist. The ―long-term 
focus without a long-term strategy‖ is one of the most interesting features of 
strategy process in the explored context. 
We can also highlight a conceptual fit of the strategy process in Severstal and 
Burgelman and Bower‘s ―iterative resource allocation‖ models of strategy 
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process. The biggest similarity is the bottom-up nature of strategic initiatives. In  
the Severstal case, most of the strategic initiatives appear on the business unit 
level and get accepted (or rejected) by the small corporate centre team. The 
particularity is that Severstal does not formally define the ―strategic context‖, or 
prevailing strategy concepts that they use to filter the projects, rather the leader 
determines them in an emergent way and in line with his current, loosely 
defined vision. Also, organisational context in the form of a small, lean and 
flexible, but very powerful corporate centre with a top team, combining both 
business unit and corporate roles, provides a distinct ―structural context‖.  We 
can vew the shifts in the company decision making system in 2006 and 2009 as 
shifts in the ―structural context‖ which altered the top management approaches 
to decision making and interpretation of the world and signaled change in the 
nature of expected strategic initiatives. We can view the ―leader-focused 
decentralisation‖ in the Severstal case as an empirical illustration of the 
Burgelman-Bower model if we substitute ―middle management‖ for ―business 
units‖ and ―mediating structures and strategic context‖ for ―CEO‘s (and top 
team) vision, leadership and strategic intuition‖. It is important to note that the 
particularity of the Severstal system is such that the limitation of 
―structural/strategic‖ context are purposefully brought to a minimum, i.e. the 
corporate centre was trying to impose as little formal constraints on creativity as 
possible (―our strategy is to create more EBITDA‖), whilst the decision making, 
particularly in early stages, was very direct, expedient and unbureaucratic.   
In line with the recent wave in strategy process studies (Hutzschenreute and 
Kleindienst, 2006), the enquiry into the Severstal strategy process 
demonstrated the importance of the ―human‖ factor, a high role of 
characteristics, personality and priorities of the process participants. At the 
same time, the involvement into strategy making in Severstal remained ―elitist‖. 
Only the top team members participate in strategy formulation, both at the 
corporate and business unit level. This brings us back to a more traditional view 
of strategy as a grand ―design‖ of the close circle of top team members, 
although, of course, the system is very different from the 1960s-style strategy 
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making by CEO, since the team plays an essential role despite the CEO‘s 
ultimate leadership.  
Entrepreneurial strategy 
Unsurprisingly, the Severstal‘s ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ bears many 
similarities with the characteristics of ―entrepreneurial‖ strategy process, i.e. 
strategy process found in companies with a strong entrepreneurial owner-leader 
at the helm. Like in typical entrepreneurial companies, the strategy making is 
built around the role and personal traits of a company owner-manager.  
Similarities include the fact that an entrepreneur acts as a decisive strategist, 
fully involved in the details of his business (Mintzberg, 1978), able to make 
quick decisions when needed, with close attention to the opportunities 
presented by the external environment (Stevenson and Gumpert, 1985), dislike 
of formal plans and leaning towards informal, non-binding vision (Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1982). At the same time, there is a crucial difference between the 
traditional view of entrepreneurial strategy and the characteristics of ―leader-
focused decentralisation‖. Principally, a traditional view of entrepreneurship 
connects it with a dominant personality (Miller, 1983), an owner-manager 
making bold decisions all by himself, led by a strong vision and conviction even 
in the most uncertain conditions (Busenitz and Barney, 1997). Although the role 
of the leader in Severstal‘s system is very high, the system is built around 
bottom-up initiatives. The leader does not impose a dominant vision and does 
not show ―a one true way forward‖. Instead, he is encouraging his team to offer 
diverse options and then makes his choice among them, in line with own 
instincts.  The ―vision‖ part is more concerned with motivating and aligning the 
team, rather than with showing a precise way forward to the admiring followers. 
The difference may be partly related to the fact that a traditional entrepreneurial 
strategy making researched in the Western context (like a classical work by 
Mintzberg and Waters, 1982) assumes a relatively small and, therefore, 
relatively simple business that one‘s mind can comprehend and drive. 
Severstal‘s business group included multi-billion dollar businesses ranging from 
coal mining to steel production to car making to tourism, spanning, in different 
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periods and many countries. The complexity of the business lines was arguably 
too high for one entrepreneur, however bold and devoted, to have a strong 
―vision‖ for every business. Even in the case of a much smaller and 
homogeneous business which Mintzberg and Waters (1982) explore, as the 
company grew to a turnover of hundreds of millions of dollars, strategy making 
became somewhat more decentralised and analytical. In Severstal‘s case, the 
leader still controls decision making and company operations, by going deep 
into details, but he does not impose a vision, or ―strategy‖, on the team.   
Time Embeddedness 
Many influential strategy scholars (e.g. Pettigrew, 1992; Porter, 1991) 
emphasise the importance of temporal dimension in the study of a dynamic 
strategy process.  The study has taken a longitudinal perspective and explored 
the evolution in the strategy process characteristics. This evolution was then, in 
line with the methodological demand of the configurational school of strategy 
process research (Mintzberg et al, 1998), related to the changes in the external 
and internal environment.  Overall, the study identified two distinct ―stages‖, or 
―configurations‖, the first lasting between 2002-06 and the second in 2006-
08/09, up until the global economic crisis. In addition, the study earmarked three 
―transition stages‖. Arguably, we can best describe the transition between 
stages in terms of ―quantum‖, or relatively quick and decisive change, in line 
with the view of organisational change advocated by the ―configuration school‖ 
scholars (e.g. Miller and Friesen, 1982; Mintzberg, 1989). In line with the 
suggestions of the configurational school, the study related changing 
characteristics of strategy process to changes of strategy content, external 
context and internal events, including interpersonal dynamics. For example, the 
development of ―Partnership‖ configuration of strategy process (Stage I, 2002-
2006) was driven by change in strategy content – rapid build up of a diversified 
business portfolio from the traditional base of a ―one plant‖ manufacturer, 
creation of a formal ―corporate centre‖. Virtual collapse of ―Partnership‖ strategy 
process configuration could be related to two sets of factors. Externally, the 
growing importance of financial markets in funding company‘s growth, 
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manifested by the failure to secure the game-changing merger with Arcelor, has 
stipulated the need to separate core and non-core assets, increase the level of 
transparency and internal coherence of steel-related businesses. This implied 
increasing the role of a corporate centre, introduction of common procedures, 
including IFRS financial reporting, and more attention to cross-business units‘ 
synergies. Internally, the growing size and complexity of the business 
overwhelmed the former ―partners‖. In addition, they became much more 
interested in pursuing their personal agendas and, managing their own 
business units which, for one of them, translated into managing his own 
business after a management buy-out.   
After the collapse of the ―Partnership‖, the ―Corporation‖ stage began, with more 
―professional‖ management and clearer internal structures. However, even in 
the ―Corporation‖ stage, decision making remained overall ad-hoc and 
opportunistic, led by business units. No corporate strategy or guiding limitations 
emerged, although the strategy making process was becoming somewhat more 
formal and structured. The next big shift might have started in late 2008, driven 
by the unprecedented external shock of the 2008 financial crisis which followed 
ten years of almost uninterrupted growth in the national economy and the global 
steel market. The ―wider‖ corporate centre arguably became much more 
powerful, and for the first time in company history, senior management 
implemented concrete top-down financial targets to the business units. Severtal 
introduced a corporate strategy in the form of formal targets and resource 
allocation priorities. It remains to be seen how the system would settle beyond 
the immediate reaction evidenced in 2008 and 2009, and whether the new 
steady state would mean more or less centralised strategy making.      
Interestingly, the study respondents normally describe the company leader as 
the initiator and driver of strategic changes. In essence, the main explanation 
for strategic changes in the company was ―because it makes the 
CEO/shareholder more comfortable, it allows him to have more control, to 
communicate better with his team, etc‖.  The company attributed the strategic 
changes, although they might have been driven by changes in the external 
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environment, to the personal influence of the CEO. This result is similar to the 
findings of Mintzberg‘s empirical study of strategic change (Mintzberg, 1978) 
which concluded that leadership acts as a mediating factor between external 
environment pressures and internal bureaucratic resistance to change. In 
Severstal‘s case, the role of CEO as the majority shareholder and ultimate 
decision-maker naturally puts him in a position of the main driver of strategic 
change.  
External Context 
External environment plays a major role in shaping the nature and outcome of 
strategy process (Rajagopalan et al, 1993). Moreover, effective leadership of 
strategy process is also highly contextually embedded (Chakravarthy and 
White, 2002). The literature review identified a number of external 
environmental characteristics which have a major impact on strategy process. 
These include particularities of a company‘s industry (life cycle and industry 
dynamics), general market environment (―volatile vs. stable‖ and ―hostile vs. 
conductive‖) and national/regional context which may include variables ranging 
from ―national traditions‖ and culture to institutional, political and economic 
environment.  Wright et al (2005) postulate that when studying strategies in 
emerging economies, one must consider institutional factors and environmental 
impact on strategic choices of managers.  
The literature review identified very few specific studies which addressed the 
particularities of strategy process in emerging markets, and particularly in the 
Russian context. Carr et al (2007) and Kets de Vries et al (2004) found that 
Russian companies have a very short-term orientation in their strategy making 
process. According to Carr et al‘s (2007) comparative study, Russian 
companies employ relatively little formal analysis and use very simple, short-
term tactics. In a more elaborated recent study, Gurkov (2009) confirmed short-
term orientation and highlighted a very dynamic, ad-hoc and opportunistic 
nature of decision making in Russian companies. 
41 
The enquiry into Severstal‘s strategy process confirmed most of the earlier 
conclusions about the nature of strategy making in Russia, with some notable 
exceptions. In line with the previous studies,  one can characterise strategy 
making in Severstal as iterative and opportunistic. There is a general dislike of 
formal plans and formal analysis. Interestingly, according to Gurkov (2009), in 
Russian companies the presence of a dominant shareholder would further 
decrease probability of adoption of a formal strategic plan. This finding is in line 
with the findings of general literature on strategy in entrepreneurial companies 
with strong leaders who prefer to remain flexible and attune to environment.   
The study also highlighted the importance of a highly favourable industrial 
environment, particularly in 2004-2008. According to many participants, a very 
conductive environment created an impression of low investment risks and 
further stimulated opportunistic decision making not backed by formal analysis 
and risk calculation. This is in line with Gurkov (2009) who notes that a low 
degree of competitive pressure decreases chances for adoption of a formal 
strategic plan by Russian companies.    
Findings of this study, however, contradict another observation by Carr et al and 
Gurkov – that Russian companies tend to focus only on the short-term and don‘t 
plan far into the future. This study finds that the strategic horizon has always 
been very long – traditionally ten years for organic growth and five years for the 
analysis of M&A targets. This is strongly confirmed throughout the interviews 
and across all business units involved.  At the same time, long-term strategy (in 
the form of a ―plan‖) did not exist and decision making remained relatively ad-
hoc. This phenomenon of ―long-term focus without a long-term strategy‖ 
deserves special attention. Most probably, the ad hoc decision making process 
was a response to a volatile environment and corresponding demand for 
strategic flexibility, as suggested by Uhlenbruck et al (2003). A long-term 
strategy would inevitably inhibit ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ since the latter 
requires absence of pre-determined strategic frameworks imposed from the 
corporate level. We might explain the existing long-term orientation by the 
capital-intensive nature of the steel and mining industry (as emphasised in a 
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number of interviews) and, arguably, idiosyncrasies of the main shareholder‘s 
―involved‖ leadership style, his deep interest in the long-term success of the 
business. Importantly, the study participants did not view Severstal‘s long-term 
orientation as ―typical‖ for the management of other big companies in Russia.    
One of the integrative conclusions of this study is that the Severstal‘s ―leader-
focused decentralisation‖ configuration of strategy process might be interpreted 
as a good match to peculiar economic and institutional conditions in Russia in 
the first decade of 21st century. Decentralized and flexible decision-making 
addressed the need to grow business quickly in the environment of high risks, 
but also ample economic opportunities. Demand for higher flexibility and 
decentralisation was highlighted in the previous studies of strategy process in 
volatile environments (Grant, 2003). Rapidly growing Russian economy and 
global steel industry, availability of cheap credit at the international markets 
created a pressure to ―find deals for cash‖. The informal and agile decision-
making, unconstrained by formal ―strategy‖ or strategic ―objectives‖, allowed to 
capture emerging opportunities and address numerous risks in the environment 
of weak institutions and underdeveloped judicial and legal systems (Kets de 
Vries et al, 2004; Pappe and Galukhina, 2009).  Severstal‘s strategy reflected 
the abundance of opportunities and need for flexibility. The period between 
2000 and 2006 was an era of opportunistic and aggressive growth strategy, a 
very rapid growth in the size and profitability of the organisation, numerous 
acquisitions and, to a lesser extent, disposals of a variety of both related and 
unrelated businesses.   
Lack of human resources and little pressure for financial and strategic 
transparency in early 2000s meant that formal structures and rules were in 
small demand. Severstal could better utilise precious human resources in 
business development, rather than in staffing corporate bureaucracy, whilst the 
financial markets and stakeholders, including the government, did not apply  
corresponding pressure on transparency and more formal processes (Pappe 
and Galukhina, 2009).  
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It is remarkable how Severstal‘s management system reacted to the 
unprecedented pressures of the 2008 financial crisis. In the environment of 
sharply intensified competitive pressure, the company was quick to introduce 
formal financial and strategic objectives, corporate portfolio planning and overall 
higher centralisation.  Need for financial and strategic discipline in the sharply 
deteriorated economic environment fostered higher centralisation, further 
demonstrating the system‘s flexibility (see illustration of the historical change 
drivers and outcomes in Figure 3).   
Figure  3. Temporal development of Severstal’s strategy process: Context-embedded 
drivers of changes and observed changes 
 
Relating the research findings to the leadership literature 
Brief overview of key leadership concepts  
Given the ultimate role of leadership in shaping Severstal‘s strategy process, as 
identified in the empirical part, this section will offer a brief discussion of 
leadership literature and attempt to relate the empirical findings with the 
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literature takeaways. The literature highlights the importance of top team 
characteristics and CEO leadership traits in a number of context-focused 
enquiries into the determinants of the strategy process (Bantel & Wiersema, 
1992; Papadaikis & Barwise, 2002). Based on an earlier study, Mintzberg 
(1978) argued that the role of leadership in strategy process is to overcome 
bureaucratic resistance to change and ensure a successful adaptation to 
environmental change. Hart and Quinn (1993) argue that, despite much 
progress in the academic study of leadership, there is no universal normative 
consensus regarding the attributes of effective leadership. This partly results 
from the evolution of the view on what are the tasks of organisation itself, the 
paradoxical and often contradicting demands from modern leadership 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt 1988), as well as the embeddedness of 
organisational strategy content and process and, therefore, ―effective‖ strategic 
leadership in a particular context (Chakravarthy and White, 2002).  
Leadership types and roles 
According to a review of leadership literature in Kakabadse and Kakabadse 
(2007), one way to classify approaches to leadership is through the lenses of 
―transformational‖ vs. ―transactional‖ leadership. Transformational leadership 
refers to a visionary, powerful, extraordinary personality that makes an 
extraordinary impact on the surrounding world, ―transforming‖ it by leading the 
followers to a different (better or worse, but still different) future. According to 
Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007), these leaders create the vision of the 
desired future and then invest heavily their effort, time and emotions into 
sharing this vision and aligning their troops behind it. Ever since ancient times 
thousands of years ago, philosophers and historians, from Confucius to 
Socrates and Plato, have widely discussed the phenomenon of break-through, 
visionary leadership. The main purpose of the ―early‖ transformational 
leadership literature was to capture and describe the inherent attributes of 
leadership, which would eventually allow identification of future leaders and 
train them in leadership qualities to a desired level. In modern times, 
psychologists and social anthropologists, rather than philosophers and 
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management scholars, at some point, assumed the work of analysing 
leadership traits.  
One of the key questions in the field of transformational leadership concerns the 
issues of the origin of leaders‘ attributes. Are people ―born to lead‖ or can we 
purposefully train and develop leadership traits (the ―do-it-yourself philosophy‖)? 
The search for unique characteristics of ―born to be great‖ leader occupies an 
important place in the psychology and leadership literature. The central object in 
these investigations, as well as in this study, is personality, which we can define 
as ―distinctive, fundamental characteristics of an individual‖ (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2007). The term ―trait‖, which the study often uses, refers to a ―fixed 
or reasonably constant element of personal character that remains reasonably 
constant across different contexts‖. Freud was a pioneer in the attempt to track 
the origins of certain personality traits, which he attributed to the early childhood 
experiences, in particular to the relationships with the child‘s caretakers. Later 
followers developed and refined Freud‘s ideas. For example, Lowen (1975) 
linked such leadership traits as the ability to make changes, lead people, exhibit 
personal charm and even good intuition to the experiences of early childhood.  
In this light, it is interesting to recall  Kets de Vries et al‘s (2004) conclusions 
that many of the leading Russian entrepreneurs had a powerful, dedicated and 
deeply caring mother in their childhood. Interestingly, according to Time 
magazine, Bill Gates also had a socially accomplished and confident mother 
who had a profound impact on his personality (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2007). Other important traits of ―natural‖ leaders include charisma (Kets de 
Vries, 1989), which is in particular need in times of crisis or radical change, and 
narcissism, which can take both constructive and destructive forms (Freud, 
1974; Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007).    
The importance of context and leadership adaptation 
Industrialisation and creation of modern forms of organisations, such as 
factories and conveyor belts, and growing complexity in value chains in the late 
19th and early 20th centuries has marked the emergence of modern, structured 
work organisations. According to Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007), leadership 
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in modern organisations, in contrast to the more traditional, individualistic type 
of leadership, is heavily influenced by the surrounding context which includes 
the drivers of competition, characteristics of the workforce (―followship‖). 
Leadership becomes contextually embedded. What was effective leadership in 
one organisation with particular circumstances becomes ineffective in another. 
Leadership effort can also only be effective if it considers the needs and 
requirements of the followship, the subordinated, teams, members of the 
organisation and also other stakeholders who may have an impact on the 
outcome of leadership efforts.  
Moreover, in a complex context, a successful manager should be able to master 
multiple and often contrarian demands and hence play multiple ―roles‖ in the 
complex organisational setting (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981). Ability to play 
multiple roles implies a high level of behavioural complexity such as the ―ability 
to play out a wide range of roles in the interpersonal and organisational arena‖ 
(Laljani, 2007). Integrating the organisational life-cycle analysis and leadership 
roles, Miller (1989) offers a life cycle model of strategic leadership behaviours. 
This model describes the dominant leadership roles (―styles‖) at different stages 
of organisational maturity, from entrepreneurial ―prophet‖ to a ―barbarian‖ leader 
of growth to a ―bureaucrat‖ who imposes tight checks and controls in a well-
established organisation. This emphasises not only contextual, but also 
temporal embeddedness of leadership traits. In this light, it is interesting to 
analyse how the characteristics of leader-focused decentralisation, as inferred 
from the empirical projects, relate to these attributes of strong leadership.  
The emergence of modern forms of organisational life has also brought into light 
the new, perhaps slightly less glamorous but indispensable side of leadership – 
the daily, ―functional‖, or ―transactional‖ leadership. The term ―transactional 
leadership‖ was coined by J.M. Burns (1978), who emphasised that in a modern 
organisation the leaders need to perform a great deal of ―operational‖, ―routine‖ 
and day-to-day tasks, such as leading the meetings, reviewing budgets and 
results, prioritising workload, coordinating and apprising other people‘s work. To 
ensure overall success, leaders must ensure that the organisation runs its 
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course and employees are aligned and effective in their performance. Thus, 
leadership has important work to do even in the absence of major challenges 
and transformational shifts and turnarounds.     
Henry Fayol (1916) was among the first authors to conceptualise the roles of 
enterprise leaders in modern organisations. He delineated activity types that  
organisations perform and highlighted the tasks of the leaders, such as making 
forecasts and planning production, coordinating across units, and controlling 
and improving the performance.  An organisation must divide all work into a 
distinct process and should elaborate on meticulously described procedures in 
order to align different parts of the industrial and commercial processes. In this 
world, the task of the leader is to develop a plan, articulate clear goals, translate 
them ―down‖ to the workers and maintain a clearly structured ―command and 
control‖ system to manage the implementation process.  These views were 
conceptually influenced by Weber‘s works (Weber, 1988) on the virtues of 
professional and orderly management in a well-organised bureaucracy.  Later 
works have recognised a somewhat more fine-tuned concept of leadership 
work. Mary Follet (1924) highlighted the need for ―contingency-based‖ 
leadership which included the requirement to follow the need of the more 
knowledgeable and competent team members in specific situations. Barnard 
(1938) was among the first to recognise the importance of interpersonal 
dynamics at the workplace and the need to pay attention to communication, 
psychological needs and motivation drivers of the workers.  
It is easy to spot philosophical similarities with the ―strategic planning‖ school of 
strategy process with its emphasis on the precision forecasting, inflexible goal-
setting, task allocation and performance control. Just like strategic planning in 
the 1970s, businesses (?) challenged the ―structured‖ approach to 
organisational leadership in a major way by the accelerating pace of 
competition, with the proliferation of information technologies and the demolition 
of traditional pyramidal, hierarchical organisational structures. The new 
organisations had to become more agile and responsive, their top management 
had to move closer to customers and operations, whilst companies trimmed and 
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downsized middle management (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007).  
Proliferation of information technology also meant that many members of 
organisations gain access to information, limiting leaders‘ exclusivity of 
information ownership (Korac-Boisvert and Kouzmin, 1994). In addition, 
organisational boundaries have become increasingly blurred because of the 
prolific nature of information flows and greater empowerment of people at lower 
levels of the organisation.  Things such as restructuring, empowerment, 
outsourcing, internationalisation and introduction of matrix organisational 
structures, foster fragmentation and conflicting agendas (Boettinger, 1989).  
The tasks of organisational leaders became much more complex and less 
structured, as presented in studies like Mintberg‘s (1973), who found that 
managers faced various and often conflicting tasks and adopted varying types 
of behaviours in response to demands of these tasks. To succeed, managers 
need to develop and apply multiple skills and approaches and learn to manage 
inevitable paradoxes, such as the fundamental paradox of ―freedom‖ 
(decentralisation) and ―integration‖ (Lawrence and Lorsch (1986), Laljani, 2007). 
One of the negative consequences of dealing with multiple paradoxes is that 
managers and leaders also become increasingly pressurised and overstretched 
by the complexity and conflicting agendas. Kakabadse and Kakabadse (2007) 
refer to the results of the Cranfield surveys which demonstrated that leaders 
typically need to devote up to 80% of their time to transactional activities, such 
as reviewing financial and operational data, holding meetings, and providing 
feedback. The key task for them is to combine this ―power of details‖ with a 
transformational outlook and ability to maintain organisational focus of their 
vision and ―big picture‖ strategic agenda.  
As far as transformational leadership is concerned, arguably the most important 
task of a leader is her ability to create a powerful and convincing vision for the 
future and align a team behind this vision (Bennis, 1993). However, empirical 
research (Korac-Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 1998; Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2007) has demonstrated that cohesion and sharing of one image of 
the future can be difficult to achieve. Cranfield international surveys of private 
and public sector top teams demonstrated that 20 to 48% of top team members 
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admit that there are ―fundamentally differing views concerning the direction of 
organisation‖ in the top teams. Of those, Swedish and Japanese boards 
demonstrated the lowest, whilst countries as diverse as France, Ireland, Hong 
Kong and Spain show the highest levels of internal dissent. The negativities of 
not having a shared vision include, among other things (from Kakabadse et al, 
1998): 
- Organisational chaos (divergent directions from different managers, lack 
of unifying theme in organisational discourse, unfocused and sporadic 
nature of organisational efforts) 
- Short-term orientation in the absence of shared long-term goals 
- Paradoxical empowerment, when middle management becomes 
confused and/or cynical because of the contradicting messages from 
above and finally adopts its own agenda 
- In-fighting, destructive internal conflict which absorbs positive energy and 
may lead to the departure of key team members and team‘s self-
destruction 
Generating a shared vision is very important for the success of the top team 
and the whole organisation. However, it is often very difficult to arrive at this 
shared vision, and building up organisational alignment behind this vision 
remains the foremost task of the senior leadership. Exhibiting conviction, 
involving the whole of the top team, nurturing an open and constructive 
feedback environment (in the form of constructive opinion sharing and building 
trusting and open relationships) and learning to engage in a constructive 
dialogue to share and align behind the vision are among the prerequisites for 
generating a shared vision. At the same time, as discussed above, ―vision‖, like 
overall modern leadership, should be dynamic and adaptable. Bourgeois and 
Eisenhardt (1988) emphasise the importance of flexibility and empowerment to 
achieve organisational success, particularly in a ―high velocity‖ environment.  
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Other requirements of great leadership include (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2007): 
- The strength to surface sentiments (i.e. to reveal and openly discuss 
even deeply held divergences on values, goals and philosophies in an 
open and honest way). One of the best ways to surface hidden agendas 
and grievances is a mutual feedback system. 
- Ability and ―wisdom‖ to cut through the management paradoxes, such as 
the ―paradox of strategy‖. The paradox of strategy refers to the apparent 
contradiction between the demand for command and control vs. 
decentralised and empowered management. 
- Corporate leadership must work simultaneously to extract ―vertical 
synergies‖ by achieving efficiencies and cutting costs through top-down 
coordination and promote ―horizontal synergies‖ to ensure information 
sharing and mutual support on the issues of quality, responsiveness to 
customers‘ needs and market flexibility. In modern organisations, leaders 
need to achieve both, which further complicates their leadership 
workload. 
- Flair to engage through dialogue, which refers to the ability to configure a 
high-quality, open debate about important issues without forcing the 
team members out of their ―comfort zones‖. Interestingly, empirical 
studies demonstrate that, depending on a region, from one third to 80% 
of top executives report that there are important but sensitive issues 
which the top level does not discuss (Korac-Kakabadse and Korac-
Kakabadse, 1997). Effective leadership depends on the quality of a 
dialogue and readiness to discuss all matters of real importance for a 
company, however sensitive they are to particular people. One also may 
improve the quality of a dialogue by involving a wider circle of managers, 
those who could play a vital role in the decision implementation. If a 
certain layer of management feels isolated from the strategy making 
process, they may feel alienated and hence unwilling to contribute to the 
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better design and implementation of the strategic decisions made by the 
―top gang‖.   
- Ability to communicate effectively by providing a direction (vision); 
showing example of ―best practice‖ leadership and behaviour, engaging 
people in the discussion and promoting cabinet responsibility and sense 
of ownership for the decisions taken by the group  
- Displaying passion for success, including showing a sincere enthusiasm 
for the case a leader stands for and paying attention to details, including 
operational details which are important to the team members and 
subordinates    
An interesting study by Kets de Vries et al. (2004) highlighted the specifics of 
leadership in the Russian context. According to Kets de Vries et al. (2004), the 
Russian organisational environment is very dynamic with employees constantly 
engaged in coping with crises. This environment is particularly fertile for the 
emergence of a charismatic leader - a strong leader, capable of showing the 
way out of difficult situations. This desire to see a strong, ―messiah-type‖ leader 
is also deeply embedded in national history. As a result of specific Russian 
character power and control in any Russian organisation naturally comes from 
the top (Gurkov and Kuzminov, 1995). Together with inherited centralism, 
strong bureaucratic and hierarchical organisational structure unsurprisingly lead 
to unequal distribution of power in institutions and organisations (Hofstede, 
1984).  
Another historical heritage is the ―democratic centralism‖ approach to decision-
making in Russian organisations (Kets de Vries et al., 2004). The term 
―democratic centralism‖ was one of the central elements to the Communist 
Party‘s official decision making system, but in fact, had its roots in the pre-20th 
century traditional village communal democracy. Under democratic centralism, 
all party members were supposed to participate in the discussion of issues and 
policies and all members cast a vote for leadership. After the leader was put in 
place, however, very little opposition to his idea was permitted (Lawrence and 
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Viachoutsicos, 1990). This approach to decision making linked democracy and 
centralism in dynamic tension, although, naturally, was routinely abused by 
authoritarian rules and rarely worked in an intended way (Kets de Vries et al., 
2004). 
Shared leadership  
An interesting perspective of leadership going beyond the traditional top-down, 
single-leader-oriented approach emerged in late 1990s. The concept of ―shared 
leadership‖ was simultaneously and independently introduced by a number of 
scholars (Pearce and Conger, 2003). The ―shared leadership‖ concept defined 
leadership as an ―activity that can be shared, or distributed between the 
members of a group or organisation‖ (Pearce and Conger, 2003).  According to 
this view, members of the team can exhibit ―situational‖ or temporal leadership 
depending on circumstances and requirements of the moment, and then can 
change their roles again as context changes. According to Fletcher and Kaufer 
(2003), the interest in shared leadership and team contribution stems from the 
emergence of more flexible, interdependent, task-oriented and cross-functional 
forms of organisational life (e.g. cross-functional teams), with less focus on 
―heroic‖ figures of strong leaders. Such modern phenomena as a formal division 
of leadership roles (emergence of co-CEOs) and a more direct involvement of 
company‘s top management into operations, as well as smaller and leaner 
organisational structures, have also sparked a more practical interest in the 
topic. The concept of empowerment and its virtues also played a role in 
theoretical underpinnings of ―shared leadership‖ (Conger and Kanungo, 1988). 
In the 1990s, the term ―shared leadership‖ was formally coined and conceptual 
models of shared leadership were elaborated (Pearce and Sims, 2000). The 
concept of shared leadership was then further addressed in empirical studies in 
varying contexts. Interestingly, some of the empirical studies suggested that 
shared leadership may be more effective in terms of its practical outcomes 
compared to the traditional top-down approach (e.g. Pearce and Sims, 2002).  
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Locke (2003) highlights the limits of ―shared leadership‖ in the top teams, 
emphasising the necessity for a company leader to maintain certain leadership 
tasks and attributes and impracticality of ―totally‖ shared company leadership in 
the for-profit context. As a certain response to the claim of shared leadership 
effectiveness, Locke (2003) shows how teams can be more effective when lead 
and tightly managed by strong, confident and fully empowered leaders. In such 
environments, the CEO may still use his power to assign goals and delegate full 
responsibility for concrete tasks or projects to skilled and trusted subordinates 
(Locke, 2000).  
The role of personal relationships in the top team: implications for leader-
focused decentralisation 
The issue which clearly emerges from the empirical part of study is the 
important role played by people – the personal traits and leadership style of the 
CEO/majority owner, and the personal traits of his surrounding executives. The 
issues of personal cohesion and ―chemistry‖ stand out from the empirical 
material in a bold way. Leadership and governance literature (Burton, 2000) has 
acknowledged the importance of the quality of interpersonal relationships for the 
effectiveness of top team functioning.  For example, the quality of personal 
relationships between the company‘s most senior figures – Chairman of the 
Board and CEO - was determined as a very important factor of the Board 
effectiveness and organisational performance (Kakabadse et al, 2005). Forbes 
and Milliken (1999) have stipulated that personal affinity among the group 
members improves the intra-group unity and leads to higher levels of work 
satisfaction. These questions are also touched upon in strategy process 
studies. Indeed, many strategy processes and even strategy content papers 
have addressed the questions of the impact of top team characteristics and 
relationships on the strategy process and outcomes. As an example, lack of top 
team engagement and sense of ―ownership‖ may be one of the key reasons for 
the failure to create effective strategies (Bowman and Kakabadse, 1997). 
Kakabadse et al (2010) further define the notion of ―quality of relationships‖ 
through the dual lenses of compatible sense-making capabilities, or analytical 
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interpretive capacity, and mutual emotional attachment, or philos.  Sense-
making compatibility (―collective mind‖ for ―collective action‖) emerges as a 
result of a process of collective data collection, interpretation and subsequent 
action (learning) where group members pay careful attention to the each other‘s 
views in order to maintain and improve the quality of relationships in the group 
(Daft and Weick, 1984). Shared cognitive patterns that emerge as a result of 
this collective work create emotional comfort and facilitate consensus-building 
(Weick and Roberts, 1993). These patterns will affect the amount of attention 
and priority managers would give to different projects, facilitating 
communication in the environment of conflicting and incomplete information 
(Daft and Weick, 1984). In order to achieve shared understanding and capability 
for collective decision making, members of the group must pay attention to the 
ex-post critical reflection of one‘s own knowledge structures and mental maps 
and engage in a continuous dialogue to develop shared meanings and 
perspectives (Kakabadse et al, 2005). Therefore, the process of building a 
shared interpretation of the world, or shared sense-making capabilities (Weick, 
1995), remains dynamic and sensitive to the decision context since it is 
reproduced and enhanced on an ongoing basis within the decision making 
group (Kakabadse et al, 2010).   
We can find the origin of the conceptual thinking about philos, like for so many 
other leadership-related concepts, in the ancient world philosophy. Philos, a 
term first coined by Aristotle, refers to a friendship which involves not only 
emotional closeness and affinity, but also a mutual trust and periodic self-
disclosure (Kakabadse et al, 2010). Mutual affinity and trust are greatly 
facilitated if relatively frequent encounters take place and if the participants of 
those encounters have similar perspectives of the world (Haines and Bedard, 
2001). Overall, we are more likely to develop good mutual emotions if people 
are put in a position where it pays, i.e. when they have to spend considerable 
time together. A high level of mutual trust and personal familiarity also facilitates 
information exchange and therefore enhances the intellectual capital and 
learning capability of an organisation (Mooradian et al, 2006). In contrast, lack 
of mutual empathy and trust inhibits the achievement of shared meaning, which 
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may lead to delays in problems  in recognition and damage performance 
(Westfal and Bender, 2005).  Kakabadse et al (2010) conclude that both philos 
and analytical compatibility are important to achieve good working relationship 
in the context of CEO and Board Chairman relationships. If one element is 
lacking, relationships remain workable, although it takes more efforts from both 
sides to keep them this way. If, however, both elements are missing at the 
same time, collapse of the relationship becomes only a matter of time.   
… 
To summarise the above leadership literature review, clarity of goals, mastery of 
context, quality of strategic dialogue and good cooperation across the 
organisation are the ―best practices‖ of the more traditional brand of 
transactional leadership. Modern developments have added to this list the 
importance of attention to people‘s needs, strong team identity and emotional 
motivation, as well necessity to combine both transactional and transformational 
elements of leadership as de-layering and improved access to information 
made traditional command-and-control systems less relevant (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2007).  Achieving a shared vision, involving the team, creating a 
constructive climate for discussion, nurturing the relationships and building 
internal alignment are all essential parts of effective leadership, be it 
transactional or transformational. Maintaining strong relationships in the top 
team is an extremely important ingredient for team cohesion and ―workability‖. 
Leaders may build good relationships and interpersonal ―chemistry‖ either 
through shared cognitive and analytical frameworks (―analytical capability‖), or 
through emotional philos.  In any case, strong relationships and trust require 
significant investments of emotions and time for leaders to establish and 
maintain over time.  Successful leadership is also heavily embedded in the 
organisational context, including the organisation‘s maturity and position in a life 
cycle.  
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Linking the research findings to leadership literature concepts: 
Discussion and implications 
Research outcomes offer interesting material for the discussion of intersections 
of leadership and strategy process domains. The ―leader-focused 
decentralisation‖ configuration of strategy process is heavily dependent on a 
particular type of leadership to work on a sustainable basis. Approval of all 
important decisions by one person, ―pilot‖ management models, close personal 
involvement and attention to details, reliance on bottom-up initiatives, 
unstructured and opportunistic decision making all highlight an unusually high 
role of personal relationships and ―chemistry‖ between decision makers. 
Moreover, the study participants often expressed their view that Severstal‘s 
strategy-making system itself was developed on the basis of the particular 
personal traits of the leader, which means that leadership was shaping the 
strategy process, not simply facilitating it.  In this light, it would be interesting to 
analyse how Severstal‘s ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ responds to the 
demands of modern leadership as per the literature review above. 
In line with the demands to modern leadership (Quinn and Rohrbaugh, 1981), 
Severstal‘s system implies multiple and often conflicting roles of the 
CEO/leader. The ―system leader‖ needs to balance both transactional and 
transformational elements of leadership, including attention to details, 
operational management, organisation of strategic discussions and major 
organisational transformations. The ability to combine the ―power of details‖ 
(―pilot‖ management model) with a transformational outlook and ability to 
maintain a ―big picture‖ strategic agenda is an essential characteristic of 
leadership in ―leader-focused decentralisation‖. A down-to-earth, details-
conscious approach of top management is also in line with the most recent 
demand for de-layering, simplification and direct involvement of top 
management in modern organisations (Boettinger, 1989). On the other hand, 
this also assumes an inherent risk: the required leadership qualities may 
become overstretched as the organisation grows in its scope and complexity.   
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Study participants viewed the leader as the main driving force behind strategic 
change. This is in line the more traditional ―heroic‖ view of leadership 
(Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007).  At the same time, as the study has 
demonstrated, we may also interpret strategic changes as a response to 
contextual pressures and personal issues within the top team. Hence, we can 
view the role of leadership as a mediator between changing context and 
intraorganisational inertia, as an effective force that can send the right signal 
and overcome possible internal inertia (Mintzberg, 1978).  
 
One of the key tasks of effective leadership is to find a way to manage the 
inherent paradoxes of modern management (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 
2007). We can interpret ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ as one of the possible 
mechanisms to manage the paradoxes through involved and committed 
leadership. It allows preservation of the demand for control (leader‘s control on 
decision and involvement), creativity (decentralisation of initiatives generation) 
and flexibility (opportunistic and agile decision-making). The high involvement of 
the CEO creates an effect of substitution of bureaucracy for personal 
involvement. It reflects the philosophy of a small and lean corporate centre with 
direct and agile communication with business units. Flexibility and 
empowerment are particularly important in the volatile, uncertain environment 
(Bourgeois and Eisenhardt, 1988), particularly relevant to Severstal‘s context.  
Interestingly, the involved, personalised, ―hand management‖ approach is also 
one of the distinct features of Russian managerial and political tradition (Kets de 
Vries et al, 2004).   
 
The leader also serves as an inspiring example to his team (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2007). For example, one interpretation of CEO‘s attention to details 
is that it serves as an ―educational‖ tool. It shows the top management how 
deeply they should be familiar with details in their areas of responsibility.    
Leader-focused decentralisation also involves some elements of shared 
leadership: there is an involvement of team members and an extensive 
consultation process, with much emphasis put in internal alignment. 
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Empowerment is well-manifested in the exceptionally high role and initiative of 
business units in the strategy process. This was also particularly evident in the 
―partnership‖ stage of system development in the relationship between the 
corporate top team members. As one them  commented,  ―all of the decisions 
were sort of distributed between five of us, so any five of us could take a 
decision, okay, which was then 100% recognised and approved by the five 
others, even though the person did not tell others‖. This leadership style could 
not be more different from the typified image of a ―heroic CEO‖, decisively 
driving the team into the world of his bold and well-articulated vision. On the 
contrary, the system is based on a bottom-up initiative and top team 
engagement, although middle management remains unengaged. At the same 
time, the leader tightly controls the decision making process through meticulous 
attention to details and control of the final stage decision making. This can be 
an example of a ―constructive‖ shared leadership which steers participation and 
still meets the demand for control (Locke, 2003).  
One of the areas where ―leader focused decentralisation‖ may be weak is 
strategic visioning. Generating a shared vision and building up organisational 
alignment behind this vision is critically important and remains the foremost task 
of the senior leadership (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007). However, the 
―leader focused decentralisation‖ emphasised creativity and flexibility and does 
not presume, at least in its classical form, a precise ―vision‖ (CEO‘s phrase ―our 
strategy is to create more EBITDA‖ is a good illustration of the vagueness of the 
formulated priorities). This became a serious organisational problem when 
entering into a conflict with an organisational context and internal demand, and 
also became one of the management issues which inspired this research. 
Clarity of vision and ―sense of belonging‖ to something great and united is also 
one of the fundamental success factors for the ―creative‖ configuration which is 
so close to Severstal‘s world.  In a similar vein, demand for leadership role in 
ensuring coordination may not be fully met due to lack of top-down integration 
and cross-business unit coordination in the flexible, ad-hoc structure. Arguably, 
inability to formulate a shared, coherent strategic agenda for the whole 
company contributed to the breakaway of ―pure form‖ leader-focused 
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decentralisation in 2006. At the same time, should the organisation set a task of 
creating a shared vision, this exercise would not be too difficult given the 
generally open and constructive atmosphere and willingness of the leader to 
engage in dialogue (Korac-Kakabadse and Korac-Kakabadse, 1997).  
Interestingly, the ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ is conceptually very close to 
an ideal type of ―democratic centralism‖ as per Kets de Vries et al. (2004). In 
both cases, lower levels (subordinates/subjects/party members/business units) 
are free to discuss and offer suggestions to the leadership, and the leader is 
supposed to respect, if not accept these views.  However, once the leader has 
made up his mind, the discussion stops and he or she implements the decision 
without a moment of hesitation. More generally, ―leader-focused centralisation‖ 
fits well to the Russian cultural tradition of searching for a strong and respected 
leader (Gurkov and Kuzminov, 1995).     
Finally, leadership effort can also only be effective if it takes into consideration 
the needs and requirements of the ―followship‖: the subordinated, teams, 
members of organisation (Barnard, 1938), as well as other stakeholders who 
may have an impact on the outcome of leadership efforts (Kakabadse and 
Kakabadse, 2007). Emotional motivation and involvement are critical for 
success in the modern context (Burton, 2000).  
Most of the time in Severstal system‘s ―steady state‖, management (?) 
maintains relationships at a strong level. Indeed, in a system so focused on 
personal involvement and so indifferent to formal rules, nurturing and 
developing interpersonal relationships becomes a major factor for success. For 
example, the company stipulated the crisis of ―entrepreneurial partnership‖, 
among other things, by personality issues and divergence of personal agendas 
of the top team members. The system, where the top team combined the roles 
of corporate executives and hands-on business unit managers in the ever-
growing, complex corporation, led to overstretch, loss of drive and dilution of 
attention among the top team members. By late 2006, the ―partnership‖ fell 
apart, and the system was overhauled, becoming more professional and 
structured.  According to feedback from some participants, the risk of poor 
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decision quality becomes particularly acute if there is an insufficient level of trust 
between the CEO and the top team. The fact that personalities, not formalities 
are driving the business, makes developing interpersonal relationships one of 
the key functions of leadership in the ―leader-focused decentralisation‖. 
According to the research findings, the company leader/CEO goes at length to 
maintain emotional comfort in the team. He creates an open and constructive 
atmosphere for strategic discussions, makes sure that individuals express 
diverse opinions. He also takes time to explain his decisions and aims to 
achieve alignment and buy-in, at times ―pushing‖ for consensus. At the same 
time, the very structure of the system may inhibit these values. The CEO‘s 
authority and position, when combined with push for consensus, creates a 
challenge with raising sensitive issues or highlighting risks.  
To summarise, many of the characteristics of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ 
are in line with the modern demands for leadership: close involvement, mastery 
of details, direct communication and attention to peoples‘ needs. It is well-fit to 
address the seemingly conflicting demands for flexibility and control, team 
empowerment and strong central leadership. Somewhat paradoxically, it is not 
strong in providing clear goals and coordinating across an organisation. Overall, 
the effectiveness of the system is heavily ―personality-dependant‖; the quality of 
relationships in the top team plays a crucial role. The leader ensures that the 
relationships in the team are strong by investing this time and effort into creating 
a constructive and open atmosphere for discussion. We can view this 
dependence on ―personalities, not formalities‖, and particularly the involvement 
and leadership competences of the leader, as both a strength and a limitation of 
the system.  
Severstal’s “leader-focused decentralisation” as a distinct approach 
to strategy process in a multi-business firm 
To summarise the above discussion, Severstal‘s strategy process and overall 
―configuration‖ of strategy content, process and structure was heavily influenced 
by the company‘s external context (national institutional and economic 
environment, moment in the industry life cycle) and internal idiosyncrasies (role 
61 
of leadership, influence of personal traits and relationships in the top team). The 
distinctive role of corporate centre cannot be easily related to the existing 
concepts and models of the corporate centre role in multi-business groups. The 
observed reality defies the traditional views of corporate centre as either  the 
―detached financial controller‖ (Henderson, 1979; Hedley, 1977) or ―active 
mover and shaper of company-wide competences‖ (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; 
Raynor and Bower, 2001).  On the one hand, business units have an extremely 
high degree of self-sufficiency. For most of the observed period, corporate 
centre does not even set specific financial, let along strategic, goals to the 
business units. Rather, financial performance targets appear as a result of 
iterative and, to a great extent, ad-hoc mutual process. The same applies to 
strategic priorities or, indeed, the very notion of ―corporate strategy‖:  no 
intended, ex-ante strategy is declared to (impose upon) business units. Rather, 
investment allocation takes place on a relatively unstructured, opportunistic 
basis. New ideas and creativity are welcome regardless of how they relate to 
the current strategy or asset configuration (e.g. the decision of a steel company 
to invest over $1 bln into a gold business, which accidentally proved extremely 
successful thanks to, among other things, as unprecedented rise on gold 
prices).  
Of course, the mechanisms for control and corporate involvement are also very 
much present in the system. The Severstal corporate centre, and its leader, 
remains extremely involved and active. However, the control mechanisms 
remain somewhat different from the traditional corporate approaches. First, 
particularly in Stage I, company leadership controls the quality of decisions, and 
the quality of business unit management, through close personal engagement 
with details of both strategic and operational activities (―pilot‖ management 
model). Any investment proposal has a reasonable chance of leadership 
scrutinising the deepest level of details, ensuring that management remains 
very alert and attentive to the quality of proposals that they bring to the chief. 
This is facilitated by the fact that the members of the corporate top team often 
combined (in Stage I) their duties as corporate officers and heads of business 
units. Hence, they were able to devote themselves to deep understanding of 
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their respective businesses. Given the high level of trust in the corporate top 
team, for a time this mutual support and ―substitutability‖ allowed the leadership 
to keep tight control over the diverse and rapidly growing businesses. Personal 
traits of the company leader, who was very much keen to go into details, have 
also facilitated this approach.  
Besides, the fact that strategy was never explicitly formulated to the business 
units did not mean that it didn‘t exist in the minds of the top team. We have 
some evidence that even in earlier stages, elements of vision, general as they 
are, did exist and were shared by the top team (i.e. quoted corporate objectives 
―to become a company with 50 to 100 million tonnes of steel production‖, ―to 
become an international steel producer‖).  
The general expectation of delivering ―growth‖ was well-understood within the 
company, but at the same time business units‘ creativity was not constrained by 
any specific limits of a financial or strategic nature. On the contrary, the 
company actively nurtured creativity and motivation through the carefully 
maintained open and conductive atmosphere for strategic discussions. The 
leader took deliberate efforts to explain the reasons behind his decisions. 
Essentially, we can view this discussion atmosphere as an important element of 
overall strategy process configuration, since it works as an element of both 
motivation (encouraged initiative) and involvement and coordination (staying 
attuned to the leader‘s vision and expectations). The same applies to the 
leader‘s ongoing efforts to maintain trust and emotional comfort within the team, 
which we may view as a crucial element of this one-person-focused decision-
making structure. The higher the level of trust, the less scrutiny one requires for 
strategic decisions, which means that a leader can make strategic decisions 
quickly and efficiently even in complex and uncertain situations. Finally, the fact 
that all decisions of significance require CEO/corporate leader approval means 
that the system also includes a very direct control mechanism.   
The system has preserved its key properties even as it evolved under the 
external and internal pressures. For example, in Stage II (―Corporation‖), the 
role of corporate ―bureaucracy‖ has increased and the strategy process became 
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more formal compared to the ―Partnership‖. Indeed, the structure of the 
company, most of the corporate leadership team and many of the corporate 
procedures have changed. However, despite these seemingly major shifts, such 
crucial elements as powerful and strategically self-sufficient business units, 
deep personal engagement of the leader with details and leader‘s control over 
the final approvals have not changed materially.  Interestingly, Ocasio and 
Joseph (2008) found in their enquiry into the evolution of strategy process in 
General Electric that the company preserved core elements of strategy making, 
such as structured approach, dominant corporate control, simultaneous 
involvement of staff planners and line managers throughout its history. These 
key, underlying mechanisms remained in place despite apparently tectonic 
changes in the corporate strategy process, including the famous abandonment 
of ―strategic planning‖ by Jack Welch. Interestingly, changes in the format were 
to a great extent driven by different priorities of company leadership, but the 
company preserved the core traits of the system. It remains to be seen whether 
the seemingly revolutionary changes in Severstal‘s strategy process in 2008-09 
(introduction of explicit financial targets, explicit formulation of corporate 
strategic priorities) were part of a major shift to a more centraliszed ―strategic 
control‖ system, or merely a tactical reaction to the acute pressures of a global 
financial crisis.     
In summary, the “leader-focused decentralisation” in its pure form 
implies: 
1) Overall a very important role of corporate centre; high level of involvement 
and time commitment of corporate officers, first of all the corporate leader; 
crucial role of leader‘s personal traits and drive in shaping strategy process and 
initiating strategic changes  
2) High level of business units‘ initiative and self-sufficiency in creating strategic 
options and alternatives 
3) Presence of both direct and indirect mechanisms of corporate control. 
Indirect mechanisms include efforts to maintain a conductive atmosphere for 
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bottom-up initiatives. Creativity and initiative are facilitated by intentional 
avoidance of ―creativity inhibitors‖ in the form of concrete financial and strategic 
targets, at least in the absence of sharp external pressures. Elements of direct 
control through leader‘s personal control of final strategic decisions and deep 
engagement with details in strategic options review.  
The models of a corporate centre role usually define it through the level of 
involvement (financial targeting only; setting strategic priorities and frameworks; 
building an integrated strategy process and heavily participating in a business 
units‘ strategy-making) and means of control (target setting; identifying and 
developing group-wide competences). The ―leader-focused decentralisation‖, 
which combines elements of strong decentralisation with an explicit direct and 
indirect control, can not easily fit into the existing models. As far as Goold and 
Campbell‘s (1987, 1993 a,b) model is concerned, ―leader-focused 
decentralisation‖ combines elements of ―strategic control‖ and ―strategic 
planning‖ ―styles‖. On the one hand, like in ―strategic control‖, the corporate 
centre delegates considerable flexibility to the business units, but participates in 
review and approval of strategic business plans and corrects them as 
necessary. However, the Severstal model does not imply tight control over 
financial targets; rather, the focus is on long-term success rather than on short-
term financial results. However, Severstal‘s case could not be any further from 
another key property of a ―strategic planning‖ style  – close interference and 
high centralisation of the strategic planning process.  Severstal‘s system does 
not exhibit any traits of ―financial control‖ style since the corporate centre is 
involved in strategy, but does not impose financial targets. In summary, we 
cannot fully classify Severstal‘s ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ according to 
any of Goold and Campbell‘s ―strategic management styles‖, suggesting that 
one might extend their taxonomy to take account of a wider variety of 
organisational contexts and resulting strategic management styles.  
The corporate configurations model by Ward et al (2005) may present a 
potentially more promising framework for the analysis of ―leader-focused 
decentralisation‖. Ward et al offer generic corporate strategies for multi-
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business groups that are based on the nature of the value-adding role of a 
corporate centre. Although this model is primarily preoccupied with the content 
of activities performed by the corporate centre and type of resources it 
leverages, its configurations specify the style of a corporate centre‘s 
involvement and some other process attributes.  
The ―control‖ configuration implies indirect corporate centre involvement, mostly 
by financial target-setting through a formal and well-defined planning and 
reporting cycle. Clearly, in Severstal‘s case the involvement of a corporate 
centre is much deeper, although financial targets are absent, and process is not 
as structured and well-defined, although it gradually evolves in this direction, 
especially after 2006.  
―Scope‖ and ―scale‖ configurations describe the cases of the corporate centre‘s 
direct involvement with business units‘ strategies. In ―scale‖ configuration, a 
corporate centre provides shared services or leverages resources across 
business units to reduce costs. Clearly, cross-business units synergies 
management is not a focus of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖. Corporate 
bureaucracy is relatively small and weak, it does not possess strong centralised 
mechanisms for cross-company interference which would be required in this 
case. Corporate ―push‖ in strategic areas is purposefully avoided. The corporate 
centre certainly produces some shared services important in the emerging 
market context such as GR and access to financial markets, but these play a 
rather auxiliary role. ―Scale‖ configuration, which implies a corporate role in 
transferring  best practices and competences across the group, is less 
straightforward. One of the strongest motives for rapid expansion in the early 
2000s was the intention to leverage the ―turnaround capability‖ of troubled 
assets developed in the Cherepovetz steel mill and Severstal automotive plants. 
However, this line did not find much empirical support in the research. There 
was little mentioning of the relevance of competences/best practice transfer as 
an important structural corporate role. On the contrary, there were strong 
indications of business units‘ resistance to ―standards‖ imposed form the 
corporate level. Business units also did not mention best practice transfer as 
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their important contribution to the corporate strategy process. Rather, the units 
view the importance of corporate leadership as providing a vision, encouraging 
dialogue and allocating scarce resources.  
This brings the discussion to the last configuration, ―creative‖. In this 
configuration, the corporate centre influences business units‘ strategy indirectly, 
through cross-company communication and alignment around a strong vision 
and corporate values. It provides a sense of unified direction and determines 
general corporate priorities, leaving determination of business strategies to 
business units. Ward et al (2005) note that the strategy process may, in fact, 
vary in this configuration depending on context. Company-wide planning can be 
more or less rigorous, or the focus may be on short- or long-term results. 
However, the main instrument for control is not well-specified procedures and 
financial targeting (which might still exists, but ―provision of meaning‖, a unifying 
vision and values which the corporate leader transmits by and through 
company-wide programme initiatives. Communication is intense and informal,  
and the corporate centre is heavily involved in shaping business units‘ 
strategies, but the company executes this involvement through indirect 
influence rather than through a precise prescription.  
―Leader-focused decentralisation‖ in its core would arguably be a good example 
of this configuration. Indeed, many of the key elements coincide. It combines a 
high level of the business units‘ self-sufficiency with a strong, if indirect, 
involvement of the corporate centre. The crucial role of the company leader is 
manifested through setting the vision, providing ―shared meaning‖, setting the 
context for strategic discussion (―growth paradigm‖) and facilitating business 
units‘ creativity and engagement. Moreover, the leader is the initiator and main 
driver of strategic change (corporate-wide programmes), such as the ―tectonic 
shifts‖ of 2006 and 2008/09. This is encouraging, given that Ward et al consider 
the ―creative‖ configuration as the only one that is capable of delivering 
sustainable value over a long period. Of course, it is difficult to argue that 
Severstal‘s ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ is a perfect example of an ideal 
―creative‖ configuration, devoid of its weaknesses. At different stages, the study 
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participants all quoted lack of precise enough vision (―what is after all our 
strategy‖?), excessive attention to details, lack of financial and strategic 
discipline, overreliance on one person and excessive concentration of decision 
making authority as the system‘s weaknesses. It is unclear to what extent the 
―pilot‖ management style is an essential part of the system which keeps it both 
disciplined and agile, or merely a historically developed idiosyncrasy stemming 
from the personal traits of the CEO/owner.  
Finally, Ward et al (2005) and Goold and Campbell (1987) argue that 
companies may evolve from one configuration to another, depending on the 
nature of businesses in their portfolio and the characteristics of the external 
environment. Ward et al (2005) add that this transition often takes place over 
the company‘s life cycle. The task of the company leaders is to recognise the 
need for such a transition and prepare a company and its corporate centre for 
evolution. However, such transition usually meets strong resistance from within 
due to organisational inertia (Senge, 1990) or ―bureaucratic momentum‖ 
(Mintzberg, 1978). The task of the leader in such cases is either to change the 
composition of the business portfolio (to make the current configuration work) or 
change the executive top team (to change configuration) (Ward et al, 2005). In 
confirmation of this observation, the major transition of 2006 was accompanied 
by a major reshuffle of the top team composition and management structure.  
“Leader-focused decentralisation”: Integrating the roles of context and 
leadership   
Factors enabling the leader-focused decentralisation in its “classic form” 
in 2000-2006: 
- Economic and institutional environment: need for growth; conductive 
environment rewarding rapid expansion; little external pressure for 
transparency and formal rules  
- Leadership characteristics: a deeply involved, interested and energetic 
CEO/majority owner, naturally keen to focus on details and drive 
business decisions, but also prepared to listen to suggestions from below 
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and delegate responsibilities to the business-unit level. Leadership ability 
to build strong and trusting personal relationships is highly important for 
maintaining bottom-up initiatives in the absence of formal rules and 
precise, articulated strategy. Continuing focus on creating a constructive 
and open atmosphere for strategic discussions and energetic promotion 
of team alignment are critical for this people-focused decision making 
system.  
AREAS OF CONTRIBUTION  
Contribution to Practice 
The key empirical contribution of the research is identification and description of 
―leader-focused decentralisation‖. The study has demonstrated that such a 
particular approach to strategy making may exist, that is a very small, lean, 
agile and low cost corporate centre, which makes final decisions, but 
encourages bottom-up initiatives, entrusts business units options-generation 
and does not limit its creativity by formal rules and ―strategy‖.  The system 
presumes deep involvement of corporate leaders in the business, including 
close attention to both strategic and operational details.  
Strengths of such an approach include flexibility, quick decisions, adaptability to 
changes in the environment, and quick reaction to emerging opportunities.  A 
small, low-cost corporate centre requires few human resources since the 
―bureaucratic apparatus‖ is virtually absent.  
Weaknesses of this model include heavy dependence on personal qualities and 
a very high level of engagement and time commitment of top team members. 
Effective functioning also depends on trust and smooth interpersonal 
relationships at the top team. Decision making is opportunistic and does not 
assume existence of a well-defined long-term strategy. The model is not well 
adapted to extract synergies between business units.  The institutional 
environment must allow for the existence of such a ―loose‖ corporate model 
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(limited public demand for strategy communication, consolidated vision, internal 
controls, etc).  
Therefore, the model may not fit to particular environments including 1) a well-
developed institutional environment with high importance to access to financial 
markets which demand transparency, well-articulated business plans and 
strategy and 2) established, mature industries in their consolidation phase 
where synergies extraction between business units is important (De Witt and 
Mayer, 2005). 
The model is arguably best fit for 1) a rapidly changing, volatile environment 
which requires flexibility and quick decision-making; 2)  a high growth-high 
uncertainty environment (much better fit to capture ―high growth‖ investment 
opportunities rather than to secure cost reduction and efficiency improvement); 
and 3) an environment with difficult access to human capital and lower 
importance of access to global financial markets, particularly equity markets. 
From a practical perspective, such a model may present an interest to the 
indigenous, entrepreneurial business groups seeking rapid expansion in the 
environment of ―frontier‖ emerging markets, i.e. new markets in a high-growth 
stage with underdeveloped institutions, limited competition and lack of high-
quality human capital. The model may respond well to the demand for strategic 
flexibility, highly valuable in such environments (Uhlenbruck et al, 2003).  
Alternatively, elements of such a model may arguably fit to highly uncertain 
environments, for example, early-stage technology markets with low entry 
barriers.  
Regarding the practical relevance inside the company, the research has helped 
to highlight strengths and, more importantly, limitations of the existing decision 
making system. The mechanisms which have worked well in the past were 
contextually embedded, and hence their efficiency and effectiveness might 
change with evolution of context. The author discussed the weaknesses and 
limitations with the interested parties inside the company, including the leader. 
Interestingly, the leader fully recognised and supported the conclusions on 
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weaknesses. The participants also aired and discussed structural measures to 
address weaknesses and risks and planned concrete actions for the mid-term 
future.   
Such an analytical description of the last decade in company‘s development 
could be helpful as a tool for constructive reflection for veteran members of the 
executive team. Making sense of experiences and reflecting on past actions 
and outcomes facilitates sense-making of the future data flow and future 
choices (Strabuck and Milliken, 1988). Collective reflection of the past helps to 
―merge individual terms of references‖ and move to a shared understanding of 
the world (Kakabadse et al, 2010), i.e. it may facilitate development of mutual 
cohesion and positive ―chemistry‖ in the team. According to the feedback from 
some of the new members of Severstal top team, understanding the origins of 
the current decision making system also served them as a valuable insight into 
the ―collective mindset‖ of the organisation and its leaders.    
Contribution to Public/Political Domain 
Possible contribution to the public and political discussion comes from the 
uniqueness of the study‘s intimate look at the world of strategy in a major 
Russian corporation. The study finds little support to the popular public picture 
of an ―oligarch‖ owner busy with skimming quick profits from privatised natural 
resource companies.  The study highlights a long-term orientation of strategic 
thinking, assessment of acquisition targets and strategic plans stretched for five 
to ten years and remains long-term even in the darkest days of the 2008 
financial crisis.  Given that the company builds its strategy process around the 
preferences and leadership traits of the CEO, one may conclude that this long-
term approach also reflects a long-term personal orientation of the CEO. 
Furthermore, the corporate centre, as well as its leader, does not act as a 
passive ―shareholder-style‖ body who is interested in profit skimming and short-
term value extraction. Instead, the corporate centre is fully involved with its 
businesses as a committed strategic owner. Moreover, the CEO/leader presides 
over a system which to a certain extent substitutes corporate bureaucracy for 
his personal control and involvement. Hence the CEO remains extremely 
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committed, as manifested by his relentless focus on details (to a point when 
team members consider such a focus on details and time spent at meeting 
excessive). This type of commitment presumes massive investments of time 
and energy, to a level when the whole system is perceived to be at risk because 
of its overreliance on one person and his continuing involved participation. The 
research thus lends support to a more positive image of an ―oligarch‖ as a 
proactive and involved leader, determined to move the company ahead. His 
active role in strong leadership preserves strategic flexibility in critical points, 
such as the 2008 financial crisis. This strategic flexibility is highly valuable in 
light of the volatile external environment.  The risks and weaknesses of the 
system are related more to overreliance on the owner‘s continuing involvement 
rather than to his short-term committment and lack of constructive engagement 
with the interests of the enterprise.   
Another socially important conclusion concerns the role of the government in 
shaping Severstal‘s strategic decisions. Again, contrary to popular beliefs about 
the high interference with major corporations, findings suggest that the 
government role was relatively limited. Interviewees recalled only one case 
when the government ―suggested‖ to undertake certain acquisition (which it 
later executed). However, interviewees mentioned that government policies 
were a ―background thought‖ in executives‘ minds when thinking about 
company strategic priorities.  
Contribution to Empirical Knowledge and Theory 
The study adds to the existing body of knowledge by looking at the corporate 
centre‘s role in strategy process in the previously unexplored contexts: 1)the  
non-western context of a major Russian enterprise developing in the volatile 
and uncertain period of economic growth and eventual crisis between 2000 and 
2008 and 2) a distinct context of a privatised company with a dominant 
shareholder-manager, developing in conditions of high uncertainty. A rare case 
of an in-depth empirical investigation in such a context demonstrated that, 
thanks to a high personal role and involvement of a company leader, it is 
possible to combine a strong and involved corporate centre with a high level of 
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self-sufficiency and initiative of business units. An in-depth enquiry allowed the 
author to develop a concept of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ as an 
empirically-derived theoretical step towards a dialectical synthesis of ―activist‖ 
vs. ―detached‖ views of the corporate centre‘s roles in relation to the strategy 
process in multi-business firms. 
Contribution to the Theory of the Corporate Centre’s Role in the 
Strategy Process in a Multi-business Firm 
The phenomenon of leader-focused decentralisation lies somewhat outside the 
existing frameworks of the corporate centre‘s role in strategy process (e.g. 
Henderson, 1979; Prahalad and Hamel, 1990; Goold and Campbell, 1987, 1993 
a; Ward et al, 2005). Most of the previous literature emphasised the dilemma of 
―activist‖ vs. ―detached‖ corporate centre as a principal approach in the 
construction of conceptual models and typologies. The study began from this 
starting point and employed basic premises of such typologies as research 
questions to the empirical investigation. Although highly useful as a first-step 
conceptual distinction aiming to rationalise and comprehend complex 
organisational phenomena, such clear-cut division was irrelevant to the 
company practice given its external and internal contexts. In its comprehensive 
shape, we can view leader-focused decentralisation as a synthesizing 
mechanism for solving the theoretically introduced dilemma of ―activist‖ vs. 
―detached‖ corporate centre. This synthesis was made possible by introducing a 
multi-disciplinary approach to the problem and including the leadership and 
context elements into the discussion of strategy process and the corporate 
centre role. Strong leadership involvement and distinct ―pilot‖ management style 
acted as a substitution for formal corporate procedures and control mechanism 
in the overall environment of generating decentralised initiatives and highly self-
sufficient business units. These leadership characteristics of leader-focused 
decentralisation were made possible because they corresponded to personal 
traits and the leadership style of the company‘s CEO and majority owner. The 
leader-focused decentralisation was developed in a particular emerging market 
context which exhibited a high level of volatility and risks, an underdeveloped 
market and public institutions, but also presented lucrative and diverse 
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opportunities for business expansion. Demand for strategic flexibility, highly 
important in the emerging-market context (Uhlenbruck et al, 2003), needs to 
develop more emergent and iterative approaches (Carr, 2007). There is also a 
need to decentralise decision making in the face of volatility (Grant, 2003), 
combined with a need to maintain effective control in the face of 
underdeveloped financial markets and public institutions (Pappe and Galukhina, 
2009). This facilitated the creation of a leader-focused decentralisation in its 
classical form from 2000-2006.  
The synthesizing nature of leader-focused decentralisation challenges certain 
elements of the existing conceptual models of the corporate centre role. 
Severstal‘s strategy process cannot be adequately described by any of Goold 
and Campbell‘s (1987, 1993 a) ―strategic management styles‖ which they base 
on the corporate centre‘s involvement dichotomy. This conclusion opens a way 
to a discussion about both practical and theoretical relevance of ―either/or‖ 
models in varying contexts and suggests that we must extend Goold and 
Campbell‘s taxonomy to incorporate wider attributes, including the leadership 
component that can cut across the formal ―process-based‖ procedures and 
control mechanism.  
Leader-focused decentralisation can arguably be interpreted as one of a variety 
of possible mechanisms for implementation of ―creative‖ configuration (Ward et 
al 2005), with one important distinction. Many of the key elements coincide: a 
high level of the business units‘ self-sufficiency,  and the crucial role of company 
leadership in company-wide strategic change. However, Ward et al‘s ―creative‖ 
configuration assumes that the corporate centre employs mostly ―indirect‖ 
control mechanisms whilst in leader-focused decentralisation, leadership‘s role 
in the strategy process assumes high importance of both direct and indirect 
means of involvement. The direct influence focuses on a formal control over the 
―final stage‖ decision making. There is also close personal involvement with 
granular details in strategic discussions. The corporate centre plays an indirect 
role  through the encouragement of a bottom-up initiative, avoidance of top-
down constraints and ongoing efforts to maintain an open and constructive 
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atmosphere for strategic discussions. Therefore, Ward et al‘s model should 
extend to incorporate the possibility of both direct and indirect means of control 
in the context of strong leadership and external demand for strategic flexibility.  
Contribution to the Discussion of Conflicting Demands to Modern 
Leadership 
Concerning a wider perspective of leadership role in strategy processes, the 
research may also provide empirical evidence to academic discussion about the 
need to secure team engagement and empowerment (Conger and Kanungo, 
1988; Bowman and Kakabadse, 1997) and leadership control (Locke, 2003). 
Severstal‘s ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ allows the leader to secure 
flexibility, self-sufficiency and bottom-up initiative and tight control of the 
decision-making. Hence, the Severstal case may provide an empirical 
illustration of how a major corporation responds to the apparently conflicting 
demands for empowerment and control. At the same time, such response is 
heavily dependent on a particular type of leadership to work on a sustainable 
basis. In line with the demands of contemporary leadership (Quinn and 
Rohrbaugh, 1981), Severstal‘s system implies multiple and often conflicting 
roles of the CEO/leader. It emphasises a high personal role of the leader in 
securing a highly flexible yet controllable strategy process in the conditions of 
high uncertainty and external volatility. The ability to combine the ―power of 
details‖ (―pilot‖ management model) and close personal involvement with 
transformational outlook and ability to maintain a constructive and involved 
strategic dialogue with the top team despite the dominant authority of the leader 
is an essential characteristic of leadership in ―leader-focused decentralisation‖. 
In the context of academic debate on the corporate centre‘s role, we can 
interpret leadership traits which facilitate ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ as an 
enabling feature that allows us to solve the theoretical paradox of ―flexibility vs. 
control‖.  
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Contribution to the Empirical Knowledge about Strategy Process 
Particularities in Russia. Suggestions for Methodology of Strategy 
Process Research in the Russian/Emerging Markets Context 
The study also adds to our limited knowledge of strategy process specifics in 
emerging markets, particularly in Russia. Contrary to the previous cross-
sectional and quantitative studies of strategy process in the Russian context, 
this enquiry offers a more comprehensive view, including simultaneous 
consideration of strategy process, organisational structure, external 
environment and historical legacy, as suggested by strategy process research 
methodology (Pettigrew, 1992). The enquiry into Severstal‘s strategy process 
provides evidence in support of the earlier conclusions of Carr (2007) and 
Gurkov (2009) about opportunistic strategic decision making and general dislike 
of formal plans and analysis in Russian companies. However, the study findings 
contradict  Carr (2007), Gurkov (2009) and Kets de Vries et al‘s (2004) 
prevailing conclusion that Russian companies tend to focus only on the short-
term and don‘t plan far into the future. This study finds that the ―strategic 
horizon‖ has always been very long – ten years for the analysis of organic 
growth and five years for the evaluation of M&A targets. At the same time, 
explicitly defined and articulated long-term strategies did not exist and decision 
making remained relatively ad-hoc. The phenomenon of ―long-term focus 
without a long-term strategy‖ implies that the company owners/managers may 
have a long-term orientation in their strategic thinking and long personal 
business horizon and at the same time pursue highly opportunistic and 
emergent strategies, quickly shifting their focus across varying industries and 
geographies without a well-defined and communicated ―vision‖, let alone a 
―plan‖. We may interpret the emergent and ad hoc nature of the strategy 
process and purposeful avoidance of explicit strategy formulation as a reaction 
to the volatile and uncertain environment of the early 2000s which rewarded 
Russia with ―strategic flexibility‖ (Uhlenbruck et al, 2003). This is in contrast to 
the findings of Carr (2007) and Gurkov‘s (2009) studies revealing that Russian 
companies have a short-term orientation in their strategic decisions and 
―therefore‖ are reluctant to adopt formal ―business plans‖ (Gurkov even found 
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that companies with higher ownership concentration have a lower probability of 
adoption of a long-term business plan). Ontologically, this kind of approach 
stays within a base picture of strategy as purposeful activity in which a company 
sets its goals, uses strategic management tools, achieves results, and the 
―business plan‖ is the main reflection of strategic activity and the main product 
of the strategy process. The in-depth nature of this study allowed the author to 
differentiate between ―time orientation‖ as a mental pattern, a way of thinking of 
the top team and ―presence of a formal business plan/strategy‖ as an 
instrument of strategising, which may or may not be practical in the face of 
external environment challenges. One should also differentiate between short-
term orientation as a fundamental attitude of decision making and a short-term 
planning horizon as a ―forced‖ response to a volatile environment demanding 
strategic flexibility. Even genuinely long-term-oriented top teams may exhibit 
opportunistic behaviour and avoid explicit formulation of plans and strategies as 
they see strategy as unnecessary and burdensome ―liability‖ in a particular 
institutional and socio-economic context. The conclusion of the study is that we 
should not automatically assume, at least in the emerging market context, that 
an opportunistic and ad-hoc approach to strategic decisions and ―absence of 
formal business plans‖ somehow automatically imply ―short-term orientation‖ of 
business owners and managers. From a methodology point of view, 
differentiation between ―time orientation‖ as an instrument of strategising and as 
a mental framework may be a useful step in the context of similar studies. It 
allows us to make a gnosiological shift from the discussion of formal strategic 
instruments as key elements of strategy process exploration methodology to the 
identification of underlying mental frameworks of the decision makers driving 
the process. Introduction of the language of leadership, personal traits and 
management style helped the author take a further step in this direction. 
To summarise, the conclusions of the study about the existence of a ―long-term 
focus without a long-term strategy‖ call for a more nuanced attention to 
methodology of strategy process research in the emerging market context. 
Companies may not necessarily uphold the frequently implied ―automatic‖ 
opposition of such widely used process characteristics as ―short-term 
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orientation‖ and ―adoption of formal [long-term] planning‖ in particular contexts. 
We may require a more in-depth enquiry or incorporation of a different set of 
questions in cross-sectional studies to capture the particularities of these 
strategy process characteristics. While time orientation (short- vs. long-term) is 
a more fundamental, philosophical category essentially related to the views and 
attitudes of business owners (and/or top managers), a formal business plan is 
just one of the possible instruments facilitating strategy process. The content of 
this instrument (a binding ―plan‖ or an indicative ―forecast‖) may differ 
depending on the impact of context.  
Contribution to the Discussion of “Entrepreneurial” Strategy Making 
in Varying Contexts  
We may also interpret ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ as one of the possible 
responses of the entrepreneurial decision making system to the double 
challenge of growing complexity and size of the business and volatile, yet 
opportunity-rich environment.  The study identified a number of striking 
similarities of Severstal‘s strategy process with characteristics of 
―entrepreneurial‖ strategies identified in earlier studies, such as the ultimate role 
of the leader and reluctance to adopt formal plans (e.g. Miller, 1983; Mintzberg 
& Waters, 1982). The key difference was, however, in the ―decentralisation‖ 
component. Normally, in entrepreneurial, single-leader (or ―family‖) companies 
the decision making is firmly concentrated on top, and the company leader has 
a very strong and well-articulated vision for the whole company.  In Severstal‘s 
world, the decision making system is built around bottom-up initiatives which 
are unconstrained by a dominant vision or even a formal ―strategy‖. The role of 
the leader is to incentivise and energise his team to offer diverse options by 
facilitating a constructive and motivating strategic dialogue and aligning the 
team behind accepted decisions.  
The difference may be partly related to the fact that traditionally entrepreneurial 
strategy-making was researched in the Western context where it normally 
concerned relatively small businesses and start-ups that can (and, perhaps, 
should) be analytically comprehended and driven by one leader or a small team 
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around him. The Severstal‘s business group was not only quite large (multi-
billion-dollar), but also a highly diverse and rapidly growing business at the time 
of the study. In addition, it operated in a highly volatile environment which tends 
to reward more decentralised decision making processes (Grant, 2003). 
Leader-focused decentralisation combined decentralisation of strategic 
initiatives with the ultimate role of a strong leader who controls decision making 
and goes deep into details of strategic projects. This combination allowed 
Severstal to maintain the ―entrepreneurial‖ qualities of the organisation and 
satisfy the leader‘s agenda for involvement and control, whilst also keeping the 
diverse system flexible and open to new ideas despite its size and complexity. 
Therefore, we can interpret the ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ as an 
approach to strategy process in a multi-business group as a response of an 
entrepreneurial decision making system to the challenge of growing complexity 
and size of the business. Thus, we may use the results of the study, when 
combined with a more generalised cross-sectional type of research, to extend 
Mintzberg et al‘s (1998) conclusions that entrepreneurship and strong personal 
leadership may have a particularly important and constructive role in three 
stages of the organisation: 1) the startup phase 2) the turnaround and 3) the 
small organisation in need for ―perpetual leadership‖. When combined with a 
properly managed decentralisation of strategic initiative, we can apply strong, 
entrepreneurial leadership even in large and diverse companies in the 
environment that facilitates opportunistic, non-bureaucratic approaches and 
rewards strategic flexibility.  
… 
Overall, the study concludes that Severstal‘s strategy process and overall 
―configuration‖ of strategy content, process and structure were heavily 
influenced by the company‘s external context and leadership style and personal 
traits of its CEO/main shareholder. Severstal‘s ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ 
configuration of strategy was a good match to the volatile and risky economic 
and institutional conditions in Russia and exhibited some distinctive features 
which the company never described in other contexts (co-existence of strong 
79 
leadership and organisational decentralisation). This conclusion supports 
methodological Wright et al‘s (2005) organisational claim about the potential of 
studies in an emerging market context to enrich our knowledge by offering 
completely new concepts and models based on a different institutional, cultural 
and historical background.     
LIMITATIONS AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER RESEARCH 
Limitations of the Research 
The key limitations of the research are related to its methodology as an 
explorative, single case study. The advantage of such studies is their breadth 
and coverage of a varied context (Pettigrew, 1992), but they have limited 
conclusive power and their findings, although idiosyncratically applicable, we 
cannot normally generalizes them to a wide population (Easterby-Smith et al, 
2002). Essentially, the main task of the research was to identify areas with a 
potential to create a conceptually new perspective through further research and 
thus contribute to theory development. We can achieve this through a discovery 
of a previously undescribed phenomena (e.g. ―leader-focused decentralisation‖) 
which would lie outside of prevailing theoretical frameworks and thus would 
allow us to modify and extend existing theories. Similarly,  we may bring about 
potential contribution to empirical knowledge by highlighting points of 
divergence with previous literature (e.g. the short-term approach to strategy 
process in Russia). Such findings may serve as starting points for deeper, 
cross-sectional/quantitative investigations. The explorative study may, however 
formulate a working hypothesis for such studies on the basis of its own findings.  
Other limitations of the study concern the status of the researcher as an active 
employee involved in the strategy-making (as head of the corporate strategy 
department). This raises obvious implications for the research reliability. The 
researcher‘s position in the corporate centre may have an obvious and clear 
impact on interviewees‘ sincerity, particularly for those at an equal or lower 
position in the organisational hierarchy. As company employees, interviewees 
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may not be fully open about their thinking on the company business processes 
and the role of the CEO because of concerns about their careers.  
On the other hand, these biases are a flipside of the study‘s great advantage – 
full access to the key decision makers, independent of their position within 
organisation. Given the Russian business climate, prevailing culture of secrecy, 
intimate nature of strategy process and low proliferation of management 
research into the world of Russian business, we can consider this access a 
unique advantage which would not be easy to replicate in any foreseeable 
future, well worth the abovementioned limitations.  Taping, transcription (where 
permitted) and subsequent systematic analysis of interviews also helped to 
mitigate the potential personal bias problem.  One of the ways to increase 
internal validity even within the single case study framework was to separate 
the enquiry into two empirical projects, each with a different cohort of 
participants. The author used the second empirical project as a tool to verify the 
validity of Project I‘s conclusions with a different set of participants. The 
inclusion of a wide variety of viewpoints (Easterby-Smith et al, 1998) supports 
the external validity of the research from a relativist position.  The inclusion of 
interviews from employees from different organisational levels (from CEO to line 
strategy managers) and different regions (Russia, US, Italy), as well as former 
employees and employees from companies other than Severstal, but still 
controlled by the same shareholder, supported and helped validate this 
research.  
Opportunities for Further Research 
The phenomenon of a ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ approach to strategy 
process deserves deeper empirical and theoretical exploration. It would be 
interesting to conduct similar studies with other major business groups in 
Russia and in other emerging markets with a similar context, and track their 
strategy making system over the same period of time. One of the interesting 
questions is: to what extent was the development of this particular system 
caused by the pressures and opportunities from the external environment vs. 
personal idiosyncrasies of company leader(s)? In other worlds, was it mostly 
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Russia or mostly CEO Mordashov who shaped the particularities of the system? 
Based on the case study materials, this paper argues that the system was 
developing in response to contextual demands, but also in line with the 
particular leadership capabilities and personal traits of the company leader. It 
would be interesting to find out more about this issue on the basis of richer 
empirical data. As discussed above, researchers should expand existing 
theoretical concepts and typologies of the corporate centre‘s role (Goold and 
Campbell, 1987, 1993 a; Ward et al, 2005) to accommodate the cases of the 
overall decentralised strategy process tightly controlled through personal 
involvement of a limited number of top leader(s) in the absence of both financial 
and strategic goals (Goold and Campbell, 1987, 1993 a), and possibility for 
combination of both direct and indirect means of involvement and control in 
certain ―configurations‖ of the corporate centre‘s role (Ward et al, 2005).   
The controversial question of ―short-term‖ orientation of Russian strategy 
making also deserves further attention since the results of this research 
contradict previous studies (Carr, 2007; Gurkov, 2009).  
Another potentially promising area for research is to examine the extent of 
Russian leadership practice that is embedded in the national cultural 
background. For example, to what extent do the traditions of ―searching for a 
strong leader‖ or ―democratic centralism‖ shape strategy process and decision 
making in modern Russian corporations and can they create any cultural 
barriers to a more distributed leadership?  
The importance of leadership-related aspects to Severstal‘s ―leader-focused 
decentralisation‖ suggests a potentially promising area of academic enquiry, 
related to the intersections of leadership and strategy process/corporate centre 
role research. This calls for deeper conceptual and empirical investigation of the 
characteristics of leadership that facilitate certain configurations of the corporate 
centre role in multi-business groups.   
The study also highlights the role of personalities and importance of team 
cohesion and constructive engagement for the functioning of Severstal‘s 
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strategy process. According to the research findings, the issues of top team 
involvement and the quality of strategic dialogue both receive considerable 
attention from leadership and present many reasons for concerns by the team 
members, all at the same time. Although the notion of importance of 
interpersonal relationships for the process effectiveness is not unique (e.g. 
Burton, 2000; Kakabadse et al, 2005), this study places the ―micro‖ issue of 
―relationship building‖ and ―team engagement‖ in the centre of a ―macro‖ topic of 
corporate strategy process and configuration sustainability, offering a new, 
potentially highly interesting avenue for a more detailed exploration. The depth 
of the enquiry and its initial focus on organisational-level issues did not allow the 
study to grant the topic of personal relationships and ―chemistry‖ all the 
attention it deserves. Many interesting questions remain unresolved. In 
particular, one of the interesting questions is: what strategies do leaders use for 
engagement and alignment?  To what extent is the system built for the 
convenience of the CEO (as some interviews have suggested), and how does it 
incorporate the needs of other participants? 
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―When a subject becomes totally obsolete, we make it a required course‖  
Peter Drucker 
 
Chapter 2 
2. Project I: Systematic Literature Review 
 
INTRODUCTION 
Research Problem 
This study intends to assist Severstal in the optimisation of its strategy 
development process and help in building internal alignment on the role of a 
corporate centre. Through this literature review, the study will capture key 
academic perspectives on the strategy development process, the corporate 
centre role in strategy development and how these may relate to the company 
context. The empirical part of the research will look at how the roles of the 
corporate centre and business units in strategy development evolved with the 
company and its context. This will help Severstal to address its present issues 
since strategy process and structure are embedded in the past (Pettigrew, 
1992) and one may only apply normative solutions if there is a clear 
understanding of the organisation‘s position in its lifecycle, considering the 
current state of its structures, processes and external context.  
Positioning the research  
To inform the research question, this paper will address three literature themes: 
strategy process, the corporate centre role in strategy making in multi-business 
groups and time perspective of strategy, with additional consideration of the 
emerging market (Russian) context impact on the strategy making process. 
Strategy process is the main focus of the study. The review will aim to untangle 
key perspectives on the nature of strategy making in the private sector and its 
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connection to internal and external organisational contexts. The corporate 
centre role in strategy making in multi-business groups is of interest because it 
addresses the specific question of the optimal role for a corporate centre in 
strategy development. Finally, time perspective of strategy is important because 
of the fast pace of organisational growth and the dynamic external context of 
modern corporations. ―Optimal‖ strategy process is not cast in stone - structure 
and strategy jointly evolve over time as companies are engaged in a perpetual 
quest for a ―fit‖ with the changing context (Mintzberg et al, 1998). The paper 
aims to explore the logic and driving forces of the strategy process development 
over time in order to provide conceptual insights and practical 
recommendations.  The empirical exploration of how the corporate centre‘s role 
in the strategy process develops over time in a particular context of an 
emerging market multi-business group is a key contribution of the research.  
Literature Mapping 
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Literature Perspectives on the Topic and Potential Contribution to 
Knowledge  
The previous research stage (scoping study) was devoted to comprehensive 
research of the ―overall‖ strategy literature. The research identified three main 
dimensions of strategy – strategy content, strategy process and strategy 
context (De Witt & Meyer, 2004). The focus of this literature review is strategy 
process as ―the process by which strategies come about‖. However, as many 
strategy researchers have emphasised, both content, process and context 
actively interact and influence each other. For example, Mintzberg et al (1998) 
argues that in-depth longitudinal studies of strategy process should embrace 
internal and external contexts and strategy content characteristics. These 
―configurations‖ of strategy and contexts should be the main object of enquiry. 
Therefore, the review will also address the questions of strategy context and 
content when they come across the process stage.  
Strategy-making Process 
Literature on strategy process is vast and diverse. It has developed a distinct 
methodology and elaborated a set of theories and concepts encompassing all 
aspects of the process, from cognitive and behavioural determinants of strategic 
thinking to political and organisational constraints of strategy formulation and 
implementation.  
Methodology. Literature on strategy process has elaborated its own 
methodology (Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992) and assumptions, as well as a 
number of opposite perspectives that will be discussed below. However, 
Fredrickson (1983) contests that research progress in this field remains rather 
normative or conceptual and suffers from a lack of empirical resting. An 
illuminating article by Pettigrew (1992) summarised key ―guiding assumptions‖ 
or methodologies for strategy process research, including its embeddedness in 
the inner (organisational structure, politics and culture) and outer (industrial, 
economic, political environment) context of the organisation.  Pettigrew (1992) 
suggests the longitudinal comparative case study method of strategy process 
research because it allows for a holistic approach, careful examination of 
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concrete contexts and deep comparative analysis of cases rather than simple 
and abstract cross-sectional analysis of isolated variables.  
Theoretical perspectives. From the historical perspective, strategy process 
attracted relatively little attention in the strategy literature of the 1950s and 60s. 
Instead, such influential authors as Andrews (1971) and Chandler (1962) 
focused on the content and context, in particular on analytical techniques for 
analysis of the internal and external environment. Scholars said little about the 
process itself. Essentially, they considered the process relatively simple.  
This relatively straightforward view of strategy process was challenged by the 
rise of ―strategic planning‖ in the 1970s. Igor Ansoff (1965), in his famous 
book on corporate strategy, outlined the basic premises of strategic planning, 
such as its deliberateness, logic and all-encompassing nature.  
Strategic planning fell out of fashion in the 1980s. Critiques named difficulty of 
forecasting, over-formalisation, limited creative power and ignoring of 
organisational culture and context as its key deficiencies (Mintzberg, 1994a). 
Perhaps the most famous critique of strategic planning concerned the implied 
notion that strategy process should be a formal, logical and deliberate exercise. 
In reality, scholars argued that, ―making strategies involves sense-making, 
reflecting, learning, envisioning, experimenting and changing the organisation, 
which cannot be neatly organised and programmed‖ (De Witt & Meyer, 2004). 
Mintzberg and Waters (1985) conceptualised the distinction between 
―deliberate strategies‖ (strategies that were first created and then actually 
implemented) and ―emergent strategies‖ (―patterns of consistencies realised 
despite, or in absence of, intentions‖). The learning perspective of strategy 
explicitly related strategic management to a (collective) learning process (Hamel 
& Prahald, 1990). The view of strategy making as a political process refers to 
the fact that as a social activity, strategy making is contextually embedded in 
organisations and hence intra-organisational dynamics exert a considerable 
influence over strategy (Mintzberg et al, 1998).  
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The study of strategy process in entrepreneurial firms (or under 
entrepreneurial leadership) has its roots in the traditional economic view of 
firms as economic agents embodied by individual decision makers. Empirical 
findings (Mintzberg, 1978) revealed the picture of entrepreneur as a decisive 
strategist, fully enmeshed into details of his business (no separation between 
―formulation‖ and ―implementation‖ whatsoever), motivated by growth, yet 
caring about sustainability of his enterprise.  
Time Perspective of Strategy Process  
Literature on the time perspective of strategy is primarily focused on the 
descriptions of strategic change processes and evolution of organisational 
characteristics related to the strategic change. Empirical enquiries into the 
strategies‘ development over time (Chandler, 1962; Pettigrew, 1999) provided a 
solid methodological foundation and formulated the necessary vocabulary, but 
were more focused on strategy content rather than process. The ―configuration‖ 
view of strategy process sought to provide an integrative perspective of strategy 
process development over time in particular organisational and environmental 
contexts (Mintzberg et al, 1998). These studies are highly relevant to the topic 
of this research. They inform us about the key forces shaping the strategy 
process and provide some informative examples of modes of strategy process 
in particular contexts. The study of strategy in an entrepreneurial firm 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1984) may be particularly relevant to the Severstal case 
because of the entrepreneurial nature of Severstal‘s management. However, it 
is easy to notice that scholars conducted nearly all the configurational case 
studies in the Canadian context – hence, adding the Russian experience would 
provide a considerable contribution to our knowledge. Also, founding fathers of 
the configurational theory recognise the limitations of their research (particularly 
the difficulty to encompass all complexities of strategy process and its interplay 
with context) and call for deeper empirical enquiry into the details of strategy 
making (Mintzberg et al, 1998). This research aims to conduct such an 
empirical enquiry with an in-depth focus on strategy process change in a 
particular internal and external context. From the research standpoint, Severstal 
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provides an interesting opportunity to study a company that went through a 
series of rapid (and rather bold) changes, making its way from a loss-making 
privatised asset operating in a highly uncertain environment to a major 
international company in a highly profitable industry. Since this transformation 
occurred in a relatively short period of time, key actors in and around the 
organisation are relatively easily accessible.  
The Corporate Centre Role in Strategy Making in Multi-Business 
Firms 
Corporate strategy in multi-business firms deals with two fundamental 
questions: 1) In what businesses should the corporation be active?‖ and 2) 
―How should this group of businesses be managed?‖ (De Witt & Meyer, 2004). 
Most of the studies on multi-business firms‘ strategy focused on the content of 
strategy, particularly portfolio management (BCG Growth/Share Matrix) and 
product management techniques (Ansoff‘s Product Development Matrix – 
Ansoff, 1965). Resource-based theories highlighted the importance of the 
corporate centre‘s role in identification and development of corporate-wide 
competences and capabilities (Hamel & Prahald, 1990). A great deal of studies 
concerned the impact of diversification moves on performance, with resulting 
consensus that unrelated diversification is generally adverse to financial results 
(Porter, 1987). As far as strategy process rather than content is concerned, a 
distinct model of the corporate centre‘s ―strategic management styles‖ by Goold 
& Campbell (1987) explicitly defines the corporate centre‘s role models and 
discusses their process attributes in terms of the depth and purposes of the 
corporate centre‘s involvement in shaping business strategies.  
Studies on the role of the corporate centre in strategy making are rather limited 
and lack empirical depth beyond the narrow limits of cross-sectional enquiries 
on the impact of certain corporate strategies on performance. This study will 
aim to contribute to knowledge through empirical exploration of the actual role a 
corporate centre plays in shaping company strategy. It will add to our 
understanding through a comprehensive longitudinal case study methodology 
capturing the complexity of the phenomenon. Moreover, it will contribute to the 
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wider strategy process theme by addressing the little-explored question of 
strategy making in a non-western context. This contribution builds on the 
convergence of the fields of strategy process, the corporate centre role and 
temporal development of corporate configurations.  
Review Objectives 
The focus of this research is the evolving role of the corporate centre in strategy 
process as a company developed over time in a particular context of post-
privatisation, emerging market economy. The research question and intended 
research methodology were mostly informed by the strategy process literature, 
particularly studies on the temporal development of strategy process as part of 
corporate configurations and perspectives on the role of the corporate centre in 
strategy process of multi-business groups.  
The aim of this review is to identify and analyse in the existing literature relevant 
theories, perspectives, empirical findings, authors and research methodologies 
that can inform the overarching research question: 
―What is the role of a corporate centre in the strategy making process in a multi-
business firm‖? 
Additional specific questions could provide further focus to the research: 
 What are the key perspectives on the nature of the strategy making 
process and its evolution over time?  
 What does the literature tell us about the impact of national context on 
the strategy making process; in particular, is there published research on 
the strategy process in a Russian context? 
 What methodologies are employed for studying strategy process? 
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REVIEW METHODOLOGY 
Overview 
This section presents the methodology adopted in the systematic literature 
review. The process illustrated in the figure below was designed to ensure that 
the review was performed in a comprehensive and systematic way, starting 
from the design of search strategy, paper selection, assessment and 
categorisation, leading to systematisation of identified knowledge and 
refinement of the research question. The search and selection process 
comprised two parts. In the first part, the focus was on the general strategy 
process literature and methodology of strategy process research, whilst in the 
final stage, following discussions with the Panel, the focus was further narrowed 
to the role of a corporate centre in strategy process in multi-business groups.   
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Figure  5. Systematic Review Process Model 
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Review Panel 
The review Panel included the Supervisory Panel members, an academic 
expert on the subject and specialists in literature search and systematic review 
methodology. Members of the supervisory Panel, Dr Kakabadse and Dr 
Jenkins, advised on the structure and initial approaches to the systematic 
review, as well the initial set of key authors and theoretical approaches in the 
field.   
Table 5. Review Panel 
Person Title Organisation Involvement 
Andrew 
Kakabadse 
Professor of 
International 
Management 
Development 
Cranfield 
University 
Lead Superviser. Reviewed 
structuring, references on 
strategy and leadership, 
strategy and organisational 
structure, role of the corporate 
centre in multi-business groups 
Mark Jenkins Professor of 
Business Strategy 
Cranfield 
University 
Reviewed structuring, theme 
definition and refinement, 
references on business strategy 
theory 
Kim James Professor of 
Executive Learning 
Cranfield 
University 
Theme definition, management 
research methodology 
Emma Parry Research Fellow Cranfield 
University 
Systematic review methodology 
Heather 
Woodfield 
Social Sciences 
Information Specialist 
Cranfield 
University 
Literature search strategy & 
search engines  
Ed Barrows DBA student Cranfield 
University 
Systematic review structuring 
and pitfalls  
Cliff Bowman Professor of Strategic 
Management 
Cranfield 
University 
References on business 
strategy theory, literature search 
David Danyer Senior Lecturer Cranfield 
University 
Systematic review process 
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Heather Woodfield advised on the search strategy and search engines whilst 
David Denyer and Ed Barrows advised on the review structure and 
methodology. At the start of the process, Prof Cliff Bowman offered deeper 
insights into the theoretical background of strategy process and provided a 
number of useful references in the strategy field. At the final stage of the review, 
Dr Emma Parry was consulted on the robustness of the review methodology 
and results and Dr Bowman on the comprehensiveness of the literature 
selection.  
Search Strategy 
Information Sources 
The primary sources of information were electronic databases, references from 
the Panel members and cross-referencing from the key papers and key authors 
in the field. Other sources of information included discussions with fellow DBA 
candidates with adjacent topics and relevant internet-based academic sites, 
most notably the strategy-as-practice.org.  Heather Woodfield‘s personal search 
experience and helpful advice led to the identification of ABI Proquest, EBSCO 
Business Source Premier and Science Direct as the most efficient electronic 
databases. Although the keyword search through the databases proved to be a 
useful first step, the author sourced approximately half of the articles from the 
references in books and textbooks, bibliographies of the key authors in the field 
(Mintzberg, Miller, Wittington, Pettigrew) and recommendations from the Panel 
members.  
The principal sources of information included:     
Databases.  Keyword search was based on three databases: ABI Proquest, 
EBSCO Business Source Premier and Science Direct.  
References from books and other articles.  Some books were sourced through 
electronic databases, but most of them came from recommendations of Panel 
members and cross-referencing. Strategy process-related textbooks (De Witt 
and Meyer, 2004 and Johnson et al, 2008) proved to be the most valuable 
reference sources. The ―literature review‖ articles (such as Mintzberg and 
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Lampel, 1999 and Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst, 2006) were very useful as 
reference sources as they were presented in a structured way around key 
theoretical concepts.      
Key authors’ bibliography.  As noted above, once the author identified the most 
widely referenced (and referred to) authors in the preliminary stages of the 
research, the author carefully checked their bibliographies and identified a 
significant number of relevant books and articles.  
Academic Websites.  The strategy-as-practice academic community website 
was a valuable source of information on this emerging perspective; e-mail-
based conversations with the members of the community helped in identifying  
a number of conceptual papers.  
Key Words 
From the scoping study and initial review of the vocabulary used by seminal 
papers and key authors, the author identified a number of keywords for each 
literature domain:  
Table 6. Keywords 
Literature Domain Keywords 
Strategy Process Strategy process and its parts/synonyms: strategic planning, 
strategy formulation, strategy formation, strategy making 
Key strategy process attributes: deliberate, emergent 
Time perspective of 
strategy  
Temporal, pattern, development  
(other potential search strings included ―time‖ and ―dynamics‖, but 
these proved to be too commonly used in varying contexts, so their 
inclusion produced an excessive number of irrelevant hits) 
National (Russian) context 
of strategy process 
Emerging markets, national context, Russia/Russian 
Corporate Centre role in 
strategy making multi-
business groups 
Strategy process (and synonyms) and: 
Corporate centre, business units, diversified, multi-business 
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Search Strings and Results 
The author developed the keywords identified above in combinations that 
constituted search strings for the electronic database review. These 
combinations of words are the final product of a number of trials and errors 
which initially produced too many hits (numbering in thousands of returned 
results) or failed to provide sufficient relevance to the focus of the research.   
 
The first string aimed to identify literature perspectives on strategy process and 
its key attributes, whilst the second one addressed the papers on strategy 
process evolution over time since per Mintzberg et al (1998), one can effectively 
research strategy process only from a temporal perspective.  In summary, the 
first two strings aimed to identify key perspectives in the field before turning to 
the narrower context focus of the research.   
The third and fourth strings were looking at the papers that associated strategy 
process with a national context. Emerging market and Russian contexts were of 
particular interest because of the intended empirical platform for this study. 
Finally, the last string was directed at the search for papers which examined the 
strategy process in multi-business/diversified firms and roles of corporate 
centres and business units in strategy making.  
 
Table 7. Search Results 
Search Strings ProQuest 
(Scholarly 
Journals 
only) 
EBSCO Science Direct 
(Business, 
management and 
accounting 
journals only) 
strateg* process AND (strategic planning OR 
strategic management OR strategy formulation 
OR strategy formation OR strategy making OR 
emergent OR deliberate) 
124 103 140 
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(strateg* process OR strategy formulation OR 
strategy making)  AND (temporal OR pattern OR 
development) AND NOT (marketing OR 
government OR forecasting OR scenario 
planning) 
299 231 75 
(strateg* process OR strategic planning OR 
strategy formulation OR strategy formation OR 
strategy making) AND (emerging markets OR 
national context OR international strategy OR 
multinational) 
96 53 11 
(strateg* process OR strategic planning OR 
strategy formulation OR strategy formation OR 
strategy making) AND (Russia OR Russian) 
11 13 6 
(strateg* process OR strategy formulation OR 
strategy formation OR strategy making) AND 
(corporate center OR corporate centre OR 
business units OR diversified OR multi-business) 
48 12 10 
Total Papers found through the search strings: 578 412 242 
Note: The author reviewed only abstracts in the cases of Proquest and EBSCO because for the 
purposes of this study, abstract only searches proved to be more robust compared to titles and 
abstracts. Inclusion of titles resulted in an excessive number of irrelevant hits with a word 
“strategy” or “strategic” in the headings. At the same time, virtually all relevant articles employed 
strategy process-related terms in their abstracts.    
 
Selection Criteria 
The relatively large number of ―hits‖ resulted from the use of far-reaching 
keywords and multiple overlapping areas of interest. To manage the workload, 
the author developed the inclusion and exclusion criteria based on the 
prioritisation of the papers directly addressing the focus of the study.  
Criteria for Paper Title and Abstracts Review 
The author used the following criteria in the reviews of titles and abstracts: 
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Table 8. Selection Criteria 
Inclusion Criteria Rationale 
Papers explicitly focused on the 
nature, key attributes and 
research methodology of 
strategy process  
The purpose of the study is to develop our knowledge of 
strategy process, hence it was imperative to get a full 
understanding of the theories and concepts behind strategy 
process and methodology for strategy process research.  
Papers that discuss the time 
perspective of strategy process 
From the early scanning of literature, it became apparent 
that the prevailing research methodology advised 
longitudinal, time-sensitive research of strategy process. The 
paper intends to take a historical perspective and analyse 
strategy process as it developed over time. Hence the 
longitudinal, time perspective of strategy process was added 
to the inclusion criteria (as opposed to cross-sectional 
studies, focused mostly on context variables and impact on 
performance). 
Papers on the impact of 
emerging market/Russian 
context on strategy process 
were included  
The study will be conducted in the context of a Russia-based 
enterprise, hence special interest to the Russian and, more 
generally, emerging market context. 
Papers that discuss the role of  
corporate centre and business 
units in strategy process in 
multi-business firms  
The study will focus on the role of a corporate centre in 
strategy process. 
Only the key, representative 
papers on the relationships of 
general internal and external 
strategy context on strategy 
process (derived from cross-
referencing) were included 
To provide an overview of the key perspectives on the 
impact of strategy context (in line with ―configurational‖ 
methodology) without going into excessive detail since 
strategy context, per se, is not the prime focus of the study. 
  
Exclusion Criteria Rationale 
Papers focused on the areas 
outside of strategy and strategic 
management in business 
context were not included 
Not relevant to the study topic. 
Papers focused on strategy 
content rather than context 
Not relevant since the study is focused on the process side 
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Papers focused on the 
relationships between strategy 
process and general strategy 
context  
Less relevant to the study focus (with the exception of 
national context). 
Papers on the impact of strategy 
process on firm performance 
Less relevant to the study.  
Papers in languages other than 
English and Russian 
In the case an important non-English (Russian) paper 
emerges from cross-referencing, it will be translated into 
English. 
 
The criteria helped to reduce the number of articles under review by 
approximately 85%. Of those, about 65 percentage points related to the topic 
outside of the strategy domain, and the remaining 20 percentage points 
included articles on strategy content and less relevant attributes of strategy 
process. Most of the excluded strategy-related articles were looking at the 
strategy content, correlations of strategy and performance and the detailed 
analysis of particular contexts of strategy, such as industry, firm size or process 
participants.    
Criteria for Full Text Papers  
The author adopted the following approach from Dr. David Denyer‘s lecture and 
slides and modified it based on a review of samples of doctoral students‘ 
research protocols: 
1. Well Defined Theory:  The clarity of theory definition and its relation 
to other theories and concepts; sufficient explanation of the literature 
informing the study  
2. Appropriate Methodology: Good explanation to the choice of the 
adopted methodology, including the selection of unit of analysis and 
data collection  
3. Data Analysis and Interpretation:  Analysis of the data is clearly 
explained and contributes to the theme of the paper; robust data 
interpretation  
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4. Contribution to Knowledge:  Originality of the article as compared 
to other research 
5. Conclusion in Alignment: Conclusions are aligned with the theme of 
the paper 
The author appraised the papers on a 3 point scale, where 1 is a poor valuation 
on a dimension, 2 is moderate quality and 3 is the high quality. If a paper does 
not include a relevant dimension, it is rated non applicable.  
Table 9. Assessment Criteria 
Criteria 1 = Low or 
absent 
2 = Medium 3= High Not applicable 
Well defined 
theory 
Not enough 
information to 
assess or not 
well defined 
Theory is fairly 
well defined 
Theory is very 
well defined 
Element not 
applicable to the 
paper 
Appropriate 
methodology  
Not enough 
information to 
assess or 
methodology is 
inappropriate 
Methodology is 
fairly 
appropriate 
Methodology is 
very appropriate 
Element not 
applicable to the 
paper 
Data analysis 
and 
interpretation 
Not enough 
information to 
assess; data 
analysis is not 
robust or does 
not contribute to 
understanding 
the aim of the 
paper; 
patchy/unrelated 
interpretation 
Data analysis is 
reasonably 
robust and 
contributes to 
understanding 
the aim of the 
paper; 
interpretation is 
reasonable 
Data analysis 
contributes 
significantly to 
understanding 
the aim of the 
paper; clear and 
logical 
interpretation 
Element not 
applicable to the 
paper 
Contribution to 
knowledge 
Not enough 
information to 
assess or no 
significant 
contribution to 
knowledge 
Contribution to 
knowledge is 
limited in 
importance or 
significance 
Contribution to 
knowledge is 
significant 
Element not 
applicable to the 
paper 
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Conclusion in 
alignment 
Not enough 
information to 
assess or 
conclusions are 
not aligned 
The conclusions 
are fairly aligned 
with the theme 
of the paper 
The conclusions 
are very aligned 
with the theme 
of the paper 
Element not 
applicable to the 
paper 
The author adopted papers with scores 2 or higher on at least three of the five 
criteria for further analysis. The author assessed the paper quality based on his 
limited experience in the academic field and analysed sample paper tests 
performed in class with the help of David Denyer. The author based most of the 
exclusions on the low scoring on theory definition (incomprehensive coverage of 
preceding literature) and contribution to knowledge (novelty and originality of a 
paper). The author excluded a significant number of relevant papers, 
sometimes by the same author, that addressed very similar topics and drew 
similar conclusions.Only one, the most robust, was left as a representative for 
this line of thought.   
Cross-Referencing 
The scoping study and initial discussions with the Panel members produced a 
limited number of key authors who made the most important contributions to the 
field in question. These included Henry Mintzber, Danny Miller, Andrew 
Pettigrew and Richard Wittington. The author analysed their works in detail and 
identified the more relevant papers. The review articles on strategy process, 
such as Droge, Miller and Toulouse (1988), Hutzschenreuter and Kleindienst‘s, 
(2006) and Mintzberg and Lampel (1999) and textbooks, such as De Witt and 
Meyer (2004) and Johnson et al (2008) were a valuable source of additional 
references and key perspectives on the topics of interest. Panel members also 
recommended a number of important references. The author analysed papers 
drawn from cross-referencing in the same way as those retrieved from 
databases.  
Data Extraction 
The author imported selected papers into Procite, analysed them and collected 
the following information: 
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1. Citation information: author, title, journal, data of publication, volume, 
pages; 
2. Descriptive information: focus and purpose of the study, units of analysis, 
location, industry; 
3. Methodological information: type of a study - theoretical, empirical 
(qualitative/quantitative) or methodological, data structure and sample size, 
data collection and analysis; 
4. Thematic information: key conclusions and contributions to knowledge, 
identified limitations, suggestions for development and further research  
5. Theoretical information: key research areas/perspectives where the study 
comes from and contributes to.  
Data Synthesis 
At the first stage, the author attributed selected papers to literature themes and 
analysed them from the perspective of their input into the key 
areas/perspectives identified in the study. The author identified contribution of 
each paper and contrasted opposing perspectives emerging from the analysis. 
This helped to answer the review questions and identify knowledge structure at 
the strategy process domain. The second stage focused on further refinement 
and justification for the focus of the study. On the basis of thematic structuring, 
the author identified the knowledge gap and further developed the study 
questions. Finally, the author developed the scope and methodology of Project 
II on the basis of refined research questions and relevant takeaways from 
methodology papers.       
 
DESCRIPTIVE ANALYSIS 
Overview 
The following section describes and systematises the results of the literature 
search. The search results and selection steps are presented first, followed by 
the descriptive literature statistics including literature themes, timing of studies, 
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type of studies, data structure, regional and industry breakdown for the 
empirical papers, journal and author frequency.        
Search Results 
The initial search results based on the identified search strings produced 1232 
items across three databases. However, this included a very significant number 
of duplications, so the total number of articles collected for the review was 
reduced to 783, less than two thirds of the initial. Review of titles and abstracts 
removed 469 non-strategy-related items. Most of the remaining 227 papers 
focused on strategy content and strategy process (particularly strategic 
planning) relationship with performance. Full paper review rejected further 45 
papers which did not address relevant topics or were of marginal value to the 
field as the study narrowed its focus following the Panel‘s advice. Following the 
quality appraisal, 38 papers were included into the study. The author 
provisionally added a paper by Gurkin (2009) since it was published in a journal 
not referenced by Cranfield and scored low on theoretical background.  
However, it was the only identified paper that directly addressed the issue of 
particularities of strategy process in Russia, so the author decided to include it 
in the list as the only source of the insight into the problem. Note that the author 
added a significant number of articles through cross-referencing (mostly from 
books and key authors), bringing total number of referenced articles to 68. 
Finally, the author included17 books in the review, 5 of them recommended by 
the Panel and the rest identified through cross-referencing. This brings the total 
number of references to 85.   
 
Table 10. Search Results 
Search Iterations Number of 
items 
Initial database search results (Proquest – 578; EBSCO - 412, Science 
Direct -  242) 
1232 
    Duplications  (438) 
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    Eliminations (no author, non-English language, book reviews) (11) 
Subtotal 783 
    Non-strategy-related articles (469) 
    Strategy-related but not meeting other inclusion/exclusion criteria (227) 
Subtotal for full paper review 87 
   Articles excluded during the full paper review (14) 
   Articles removed in later analysis as repetitive/adding marginal value (31) 
Articles selected for quality appraisal  42 
  Articles removed during the quality appraisal (4) 
Articles included in the study from database search 38 
  Articles added by the Advisory Panel 3 
  Articles included from the scoping study and cross-referencing 27 
Final count of articles  68 
  Books added by the Advisory Panel  5 
  Books added through cross-referencing  12 
Final count of books 17 
Final number of references included in the review  85 
Literature Characteristics 
Literature Themes 
Prime attention of the review focused on untangling key perspectives of strategy 
process, research methodology and specifics of strategy process in multi-
business firms and in the emerging market, particularly the Russian context. To 
provide comprehensive coverage of strategy process-related concepts, and in 
line with recommendations of the configurational school of strategy process 
research, the study also aimed to cover, at a relatively high level, key 
perspectives on organisational and external context of strategy-making. 
Composition of papers picked to represent these perspectives roughly reflects 
104 
relative attention given to these topics: more papers on organisational structure 
and strategy process participants (especially the role of top teams and 
entrepreneurial strategy), and relatively fewer studies on the impact of the 
external environment.   
Thematic review of journal papers 
Table 11. Distribution of Journal Papers by Literature Theme 
Literature themes Number of articles 
Strategy Process: definition, research methodology and key attributes 28 
Temporal development of strategy process  - theoretical concepts and 
empirical studies 
4 
National (of those Russian) context of strategy making 5(2) 
Strategy process specifics in multi-business and multinational 
corporations 
8 
Organisational context of strategy process: role of organisational 
structure and strategy participants  
11 
External environment and strategy process 4 
Other (auxiliary) topics required to illustrate key perspectives, including:  8 
   Organisational change  3 
   Entrepreneurial behaviour  3 
   Corporate governance 1 
   Organisations in emerging economies 1 
 
Most of the identified papers focused on strategy process definition and 
methodology.  National (especially Russian/emerging market) context received 
very little direct coverage.  Strategy process in multi-business firms inspired a 
number of relatively comprehensive and well-grounded papers and books, but 
they were mostly theoretical or prescriptive with very few field studies. On the 
context side, the author gave significant attention to the interplay of 
organisational structure and strategy process, as well as composition of 
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strategy teams and the impact of strategy participants on the process. The 
author devoted relatively little attention to the external context, apart from the 
impact of turbulent/hostile environments on strategy process characteristics. 
Thematic review of books 
The author devoted most of the books included in the review to 
conceptualisation of strategy process and included them in cases when an 
adequate and comprehensive article describing a certain perspective was not 
available. Textbooks and the review book by Mintzberg et al (1998) were the 
most useful as sources of further references.  The books also presented the 
seminal concepts on the roles of the corporate centre in multi-business groups.  
Table 12. Distribution of Books by Literature Theme 
Literature themes  Number of books 
Strategy process definition and key attributes (including one review of 
existing perspectives)  
8 
Textbooks on strategy process  2 
Corporate centre‘s role in strategic management in multi-business 
corporations  
3 
Longitudinal case studies with focus on strategy and structure 
relationship 
2 
Organisational theory  1 
Practitioner paper on designing optimal strategies  1 
Total 17 
Timing of Studies 
The following graph presents the frequency distribution of the reviews articles. 
The author did not limit or restrict using older resources. The earliest journal 
paper dates to 1971 (the earliest quoted book was published in 1965). Interest 
in the modern study of business strategy took off in the late 1950s – early 1960s 
(Mintzberg et al, 1998), but initially it focused more on the content rather than 
the process. In addition, the most influential ideas at the time came from books 
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rather than from journals. Besides, restrictions on timing of articles stored in 
databases might have influenced the distribution. The articles exhibit a relatively 
even distribution, with spikes in the mid-1980s and early 1990s which witnessed 
a renewed interest in strategy process following popular and academic 
disappointment with ―strategic planning‖. Interest in strategy process research 
continues, with the latest reviewed article published in 2009. In recent papers, 
scholars directed more attention to the new contexts of strategy, particularly the 
emerging markets, which are rapidly gaining their weight in the global economy, 
and also multi-business groups.        
Figure  6. Timing of Studies 
 
Key authors 
Unsurprisingly, the key authors of the ―configurational‖ school - Henry Mintzberg 
and Danny Miller – hit the top of the authors‘ popularity league. Also well-
represented are Fredrickson and Pettigrew, the leading methodology authors. 
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Table 13. Key Authors 
Author Name 
Number of 
(co)authored 
articles  % of Total 
Mintzberg, H. 8 7% 
Miller D. 6 5% 
Fredrickson, J. W. 4 3% 
Bower, J. L. 3 3% 
Pettigrew, A. M. 3 3% 
Friesen, P. H. 3 3% 
Waters, J. A. 2 2% 
Porter, M. E. 2 2% 
Iaquinto, A. L. 2 2% 
Goold, M. 2 2% 
Doz, I.  2 2% 
Campbell, A.  2 2% 
Total 118 100% 
 
Type of Studies 
Distribution by study type is presented below. Since this review focused on 
untangling key perspectives of strategy process and research methodology, the 
review included a significant number of conceptual/theoretical papers. Papers at 
the narrow focus of the study – corporate centre and emerging market context – 
were mostly empirical. The author based a significant number of organisational 
context studies and all of those linking strategy and performance on the 
analysis of evidence from the field. The research area also benefitted from a 
few excellent literature reviews and methodology papers.  
Table 14. Study Type 
Study Type Amount 
Empirical 40 
Theoretical/Conceptual 18 
Methodological 4 
Literature Review 6 
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Industry Types 
Empirical papers discussed a wide number of industries, without any clear 
favourite. Most of the cross-sectional studies focused on companies from a 
number of different industries. The studies on the corporate centre role pay 
significant attention to diversified groups spanning multiple industries.   
Table 15. Industry Type 
Industry Type Amount 
Diversified/Multiple 29 
Manufacturing 3 
Services 2 
Auto 1 
Chemical 1 
Entertainment 1 
Oil 1 
Semi-Conductor 1 
Utility 1 
Location of Studies 
Location of most of the studies was in North America, which we can partly 
explain by the predominance of a Canadian-based configurational school of 
strategy process research and overall leadership of US academics in strategy 
research.  Although strategy process in Russia and within the more generally 
emerging markets context was the focus of the search process, the author 
identified relatively few papers based in these locations.  
 
Table 16. Study Location 
Study Location Amount 
North America 30 
Europe 9 
Japan 3 
Russia 4 
Other Emerging markets 4 
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Publications of Studies 
Unsurprisingly, most of studies came from the flagship Strategic Management 
Journal. More practitioner-focused Long Range Planning featured a significant 
number of empirical papers attempting to connect theory with performance and 
draw practical recommendations.  
Table 17. Study Publication Distribution 
  Study Publication Amount 
Strategic Management Journal 13 
Long Range Planning 10 
Academy of Management Journal 8 
Harvard Business Review 4 
Journal of Management 4 
Journal of Management Studies 4 
Management Science 3 
Sloan Management Review 3 
The Academy of Management Review 3 
Academy of Management 2 
California Management Review 2 
International Studies of Management & Organisation 2 
Journal of Business Venturing 2 
European Management Journal 1 
Strategic Management 1 
Administrative Science Quarterly 1 
British Journal of Management 1 
Human Resources 1 
Journal for East European Management Studies 1 
Journal of Financial Economics 1 
Public Relations Quarterly 1 
 
Data Structure 
The key methodology for strategy process research has traditionally been 
longitudinal case study, with the growing fashion for multiple simultaneous case 
studies. This is clearly reflected in the table below. However, the absolute 
number of such studies remains rather limited.  Cross-sectional studies mostly 
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addressed the organisational and environmental context and strategy-
performance themes. 
Table 18. Study Data Structure 
Data Structure Amount 
Cross Sectional 20 
Longitudinal case study 6 
Multiple case study 14 
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FINDINGS FROM THE LITERATURE 
Concepts of strategy process  
Two recent papers have neatly summarised theoretical perspectives on the 
nature of strategy process. The variety of possible interpretations of strategy-
making  was the subject of a seminal paper by Mintzberg & Lampel (1999) who 
argued that we can view strategy as a ―plan‖ (strategic planning school), a 
―position‖ (in the industrial environment), a ―design‖ (product of conception), a 
―ploy‖ (political activity around strategy making), a ―vision‖ (by an entrepreneur), 
or a learning exercise (product of an ongoing learning). Some of these 
dimensions have clear process characteristics (―ploy‖, or ―learning exercise‖), 
some are more concerned with content rather than with how the process is 
actually conducted (―position‖). Authors offer an integrating framework of 
―strategy as configuration‖ which this paper discusses below. 
 
In their recent review of strategy process literature, Hutzschenreute & 
Kleindienst (2006) identified six main perspectives of strategy process: 1) a 
rational-mechanistic perspective (―classical‖ rational analytical models, similar to 
Mintzberg‘s and Lampel‘s ―design‖ and ―strategic planning‖ schools), 2) a 
cognitive perspective (focus on the bounded rationality of strategists as 
individuals – similar to ―cognitions‖), 3) a related upper-echelon perspective 
(focus on the impact of attributes of top executives on strategy, corresponding 
to some elements of a ―ploy‖ and ―entrepreneurial‖ school), 4) a middle-
management perspective (highlighting important, if more often indirect, role of 
middle management in shaping strategy process), 5) an organic perspective 
(strategy making as a ―dialectic process involving rationalisation and structuring 
through upper-echelon and strategic initiatives of lower levels within the 
organisation‖, with importance of path dependence), and 6) a micro perspective 
(―strategy-as-practice‖, focus on strategy as a social, everyday activity). 
 
These two reviews offer a good framework for the study of the existing 
literature, although they may be based on a slightly different categorisation 
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criteria: Mintzberg and Lampel have a somewhat broader focus and highlight 
both content and process characteristics, whilst Hutzschenreute & Kleindienst 
remain focused on the process side. The key conclusion we can draw is that 
this ―eclectic‖ view of strategy reflects the fact that the field is in relatively early 
stages of development and still has to elaborate a more universal vocabulary 
and commonly accepted conceptual framework.  
 
We can summarise a few defining features of strategy process research from 
these categorisations: 
- Contrast between a more traditional view of strategy as a deliberate, 
analytical and formal process (Ansoff, 1991) and the ―incremental‖ 
perspective that emphasises the role of organisational learning, adaptation 
and rationalisation (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985; Farjoin, 2002).     
- Recognition of the ―human‖ side of strategy process analysis which gains 
increasing attention from the scholars (Hutzschenreute & Kleindienst, 2006):  
 Considerable attention was focused on the cognitive aspects of 
strategic thinking; the field has evolved from ―rational-mechanistic‖ 
assumptions to recognition of the complex nature of human thinking 
and the role of biases, mental maps and so on (Gioia & Chittipeddi, 
1991). Interestingly, the same ―behavioural‖ trend was developing in 
economics and finance research in 1990s and 2000s driven by 
illuminating works on behavioural biases by Kahneman and Tversky 
(1992). 
 An in-depth study of the role top management teams (TMT) play in 
strategy process and the impact of TMT demographics on the 
process and outcomes (e.g. Laquinti and Frederickson, 1997; 
Bowman and Kakabadse,1997). Another interpretation of strategic 
activity has taught us about the less direct but crucial role middle 
management can play in strategy process through its influence on 
strategic initiatives and legitimisation of performed action (Floyd & 
Wooldridge, 1997).  
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 Role of political activity (Pettigrew, 1978) and particularities of 
entrepreneurial strategy making (Mintzberg & Waters, 1982).  
 Finally, a micro perspective of strategy-as-practice seeks to enrich 
the strategy debate by looking at strategy as an everyday, social 
activity of strategy practitioners (Jarzabkowsky, 2005). 
- Complex nature of strategy and its connection to the external and internal 
context of organisation. Hutzschenreute and Kleindienst (2006) attest that 
contradicting conclusions of many cross-sectional empirical studies 
attempting to link organisational context to strategy process and 
performance reaffirm the view that modern organisations are too complex to 
explain their performance by a few specific variables. Instead, as per Miller 
(1987),we should use a comprehensive configurational framework 
incorporating organisational, strategic and environment characteristics. A 
―configuration‖ perspective that links strategy process to the broader theme 
of the dynamic interplay of strategy, structure and context provides a distinct 
and highly promising methodological framework to explain organisational 
reality (Miller, 1987).  
 
The rather broad definition of strategy process as ―the process by which 
strategies come about‖, provided by De Witt & Meyer (2004) is useful because it 
leaves enough flexibility to include differing points of view on the nature of 
strategy process. For example, according to Chakravarthy & Doz (1992), 
strategy process deals with ―how effective strategies are shaped within a firm 
and then validated and implemented efficiently‖. This definition emphasises the 
deliberateness of strategy process and distinction between formation and 
implementation. However, as Frederickson (1983) points out, a wide array of 
studies emphasise the emergent and incremental nature of strategy process 
without a clear distinction of formation and implementation stages. This 
dichotomy is most vivid in the contradiction in the view of strategy process by 
the “strategic planning” and “emergent strategy” perspectives discussed below.  
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Strategic Planning  
Strategy process attracted modest attention in strategy literature of the 1950s 
and 60s. Instead, such influential pioneers of modern strategy as Andrews 
(1971) and Chandler (1962) focused on the content and context, in particular on 
analytical techniques for analysis of the internal and external environment. They 
said little about the process itself. Essentially, they considered the process 
relatively simple. For example, Andrews argued for the following process 
premises of strategy process (by Mintzberg et al, 1998): 
o Strategy is a deliberate and analytical process. 
o The CEO is the chief architect and, in fact, the only ―owner‖ of 
strategy (the Board is also involved, but only in strategy review).  
o The model of strategy process is kept simple and informal.  
o Strategy formulation is detached from implementation.  
This relatively straightforward view of strategy process was challenged by the 
rise of the ―strategic planning‖ perspective that was at the height of its glory in 
the 1970s. Igor Ansoff (1965), in his famous book on corporate strategy, 
outlined basic premises of the strategic planning approach. According to Ansoff, 
strategy process is not only a deliberate and conscious process, it is also a 
process that can and should meticulously analyse, deconstruct, plan and control 
nearly every significant step of an organisation. A strategy (or, indeed, ―plan‖) of 
an organisation should be comprehensive and internally consistent, it should 
leave very little chance for improvisation over the course of implementation. 
Basic assumption is that strategy equals intention – if a company doesn‘t follow 
a deliberate plan it ―muddles through‖ (Ansoff, 1991).  
The strategic planning approach presumed a higher degree of complexity, 
formalisation and professionalisation of strategy process compared to the 
relatively straightforward view that Andrews advocated. For example, Steiner 
(1969) delineates eight major ―steps‖ of the strategic planning process, from 
formulation of organisational purpose and values of top managers to review and 
evaluation of implemented strategies. Formulated strategies should be further 
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broken into substrategies, substrategies into short-range planning, short-range 
planning into tactical plans, and tactical plans into budgeting – all in a nice and 
neat order, each stage following the other.  
Strategy Emergence and Learning  
Perhaps the most famous critique of strategic planning concerned is its implied 
notion that strategy process should be a formal, logical and deliberate exercise. 
Not quite so. The surrounding environment is too complex, fast changing and 
full of ―wicked‖ problems to be captured by formal analysis (Mintzberg, 1994a). 
―Making strategies involves sense-making, reflecting, learning, envisioning, 
experimenting and changing the organisation, which cannot be neatly organised 
and programmed‖ (De Witt & Meyer, 2004). Mintzberg and Waters (1985) 
conceptualised the distinction between ―deliberate‖ and ―emergent‖ strategies. 
Deliberate strategies are the intended strategies that one, in fact, implements 
and then realises. Emergent strategies are the ―patterns of consistencies 
realised despite, or in absence of, intentions‖. Deliberate strategies presume 
control over implementation. Emergent strategies emphasise learning whilst 
acting and gradual convergence of different processes into a distinct pattern 
(realised strategy). Emergent strategies resulting from an informal process of 
discussion, learning, experimentation, accumulation experience and trial-and-
error are much better equipped to deal with uncertain and dynamic 
environments of the real world. We should base formal plans and analytical 
calculations on the preconceived strategies rather than precede them 
(Mintzberg, 1994b). 
To deal with the surrounding complexities companies need to employ a careful 
step-by-step approach, gradually adapting the organisation and its constituents 
to the new situation. Logical (or “strategic”) incrementalism becomes the 
key word for strategy process description (Quinn, 1978). Logical incrementalism 
doesn‘t equate to ―muddling through‖. Strategists do shape the state of affairs 
by directing the emergent strategies, but they do not ―impose‖ some 
preconceived deliberated strategies on the organisation. The strategies 
employed at one moment evolve in conjunction with changes in the external 
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and internal context of the organisation. Formal planning techniques can not 
capture innovations and ―wicked‖ problems. Real strategic changes require 
complex work on breaking cultural and behaviour barriers, overcoming political 
pressures and general organisational rigidity (De Witt and Meyer, 2004). 
Therefore, ―incremental shaping‖ is the most suitable mechanism for moving 
organisations forward.  
Ralph Stacey provides a related perspective of strategy as ―order emerging 
from chaos‖. Stacey (1993) argued that chaos theories of physics may well 
inform us about the nature of activities in complex organisations. Constant 
disturbances influencing an organisation create perpetual instability and 
dynamics. Self-organisation is capable of detecting and leveraging emergent 
opportunities arising from this dynamism. Hence the role of a leader is to 
encourage this self-organisation, provide challenge to realise existing potential 
and flexibility to make use of emergent opportunities.    
A related learning perspective of strategy explicitly relates strategic 
management to a (collective) learning process (Hamel & Prahald, 1990). 
Mintzberg et al (1998) stipulated that learning would involve both formulation 
and implementation (trial, strategic experimentation) developing together. The 
role of a leader is to facilitate the learning process, not to limit it by 
preconceived deliberate strategies (Senge, 1990).   
Wittington & Cailluet (2008) argue that the critique of formal strategic 
planning has ―overreached‖ in its zeal to criticize professional structures and 
formal approaches. Its unintended consequence was a sharp loss of interest 
from academics in the field whilst in the real world professional strategising was 
well alive and expanding, particularly in the public sector. Most recent empirical 
studies (Grant, 2003; Ocasio & Joseph, 2008) have challenged the ―caricature‖ 
view of strategy as either fully intended and rational, or a purely emergent, non-
structured process (Wittington & Cailluet, 2008). They demonstrated that 
despite academic criticism, formal strategic planning is still widely present in 
organisations, although its focus might have changed from formal forecasting, 
analysis and ―precisions planning‖ to general coordination, alignment and 
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performance control. At the same time, real strategy making process is taking 
place in great part outside of the formal planning cycle, thus confirming the view 
of strategy as an emergent, incremental process (Mintzberg & Waters, 1985; 
Quinn, 1978), built on the basis of bottom-up initiatives as per resource 
allocation process models (Burgelman 1983).  
Whilst we should recognise that strategy is by all means not limited to the 
deliberate strategic planning process, it still plays an important role. This role, 
however, has changed since the 1970s. The emergence of information 
technologies, proliferation of managers with management qualifications and 
rising complexity of organisational structures transformed the role of strategic 
planning. It became much less prescriptive and more facilitatory. Its focus is 
increasingly placed on the spread of knowledge and organisational alignment. 
Hence, we have seen a renewed interest in formal strategy processes in recent 
literature, including the emergence of a promising practice perspective.     
Burgelman (1983) presented a model of strategy process that looked at 
strategy as a multilayered process with a big role of middle management. He 
identified a distinction between induced strategic behaviour (resulting from 
current strategy concepts) and autonomous strategic behaviour (corporate 
ventures resulting from the likes of private initiative and experimentation that are 
not related to current strategy concept). He then presented a model that shows 
how autonomous strategic behaviour can influence strategy concept by 
―legitimising‖ itself through the corporate ―strategic context‖. Top managers use 
organisational context (―structural context‖ by Burgelman) to put a generation of 
strategic proposals in line with the strategy concept, whilst ‖strategic context‖ 
represents alternative strategic visions and political activities to promote them. 
Therefore, the drivers of change are ―autonomous‖, entrepreneurial strategic 
actions by middle management that can over time change the prevailing 
thinking and ultimately the concept of strategy. In this view, structure works as a 
mediator, a calibrating mechanism that limits deviations from current strategy 
concepts, but can be overcome by powerful strategic initiatives – hence, 
structure both follows strategy and is, in turn, ―created‖ by strategy. Similarly, 
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Noda & Bower (1996) suggest that the best way to describe the strategy making 
process in large, complex organisations is to look at it as at the iterated 
process of resource allocation by top management to the business 
unit/middle management level. 
 
Interestingly, in these perspectives the main source of new endeavors is middle 
management, whilst top management plays a crucial role in 
acceptance/rejection of these initiatives. Farjoun (2002) presented a concept 
that is similar in spirit. Organic perspective sees strategy making as a 
―dialectic process involving rationalisation and structuring through upper-
echelon and strategic initiatives of lower levels within the organisation‖, with 
importance of history and path dependence. 
Methodology of Strategy Process Research 
Growing interest in strategy process since the 1970s allowed for the 
development of conceptual and methodological frameworks for its research. 
Literature on strategy process has started to elaborate its own methodology 
(Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992) and guiding assumptions. However, the relative 
youthfulness of the subject and significant divergence in understanding the 
nature of strategy process so far have not allowed for the emergence of 
comprehensive and universally recognised methodology. For example, 
Fredrickson (1983) contests that research progress in this field remains rather 
normative or descriptive and suffers from lack of empirical resting.  
An illuminating article by Pettigrew (1992) seeks to summarise the key ―guiding 
assumptions‖ or methodologies for strategy process research: 
 Embeddedness of strategy process in the inner (organisational structure, 
politics and culture) and outer (industrial, economic, political 
environment) context of the organisation  
 Embeddedness of strategy process in the past 
 Strategy process is constrained by external environment, but it also 
shapes the environment because of the role of human action  
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 Holistic approach - need for a comprehensive analysis involving many 
levels of contexts through the investigation of recurring patterns in 
strategy process  
Pettigrew suggests longitudinal comparative case studies as the key method of 
strategy process research because it allows for a holistic approach, careful 
examination of concrete contexts and deep comparative analysis of cases 
rather than simple and abstract cross-sectional analysis of isolated variables.      
This view is echoed in the works of arguably the most well-known and 
articulated school of thought in strategy process research – the ―configurational‖ 
school that originates from the works of the faculty of McGill university in 
Canada, most notably Dennis Miller and Henry Mintzberg. We can summarise 
the key premises of the configurational school approach to strategy process 
research as simultaneous attention to strategy process, content and internal 
and external context, strong emphasis on the time perspective of strategy 
(―configurations‖ reflect the state of an organisation in a particular stage) and 
focus on the transitions from one stage to another (Mintzberg et al, 1998). The 
key research method advocated by this view are in-depth, detailed longitudinal 
case studies. The strategy process per se is not, therefore, the only or even the 
most important focus of attention; rather, it is one of the fundamental elements 
of the configuration.  
Fredrickson (1983) offers some practical recommendations for the empirical 
research of strategy process. He contrasts two of the key theoretical 
perspectives emerging in the field. A ―rational-comprehensive‖, or ―synoptic‖ 
perspective sees strategy process as purposeful, rational, goal-oriented and 
integrative (Ansoff, 1965). A contrarian perspective of ―incremental‖ process 
emphasises the complexity of the decision-making process that is focused on 
the sequential approach to problem-solving in the fast-changing context of 
behavioural, political and organisational dynamics (Mintzberg, 1973). 
Fredrickson (1983) formulates six key criteria for evaluation of strategy process 
and identification of its synoptic or incremental nature: 
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o What initiates the process 
o The role played by the goals 
o The relationship between means and ends 
o The concept of choice 
o Analytic comprehensiveness of decision making 
o Integrative comprehensiveness of decisions 
Fredrickson advocates adaptation of decision making (rather than a  ―rational 
planning‖) perspective because it allows to capture a wider spectrum of 
organisational activities and avoid unnecessary limitations of a rationalistic, 
planning perspective. He also speaks for the need to vary qualitative and 
quantitative methodologies according to the research questions. 
Dess & Lyon & Lumpkin (2000) offer their methodology for operationalisation of 
entrepreneurial orientation in organisations, particularly relevant for the 
research of strategy making process in the entrepreneurial context. 
As far as multi-business groups are concerned, Paroutis & Pettigrew (2007) 
have recently presented an elaborated approach to the issues of sample 
selection, conducting interviews and data interpretation in a well-illustrated case 
study of strategy teams‘ interaction in a multi-business firm.  
Strategy Process and Organisational Context 
Strategy and Structure 
The strategy process literature widely recognizes the importance of 
organisational structure (or ―organisational design‖). The design, in turn, is 
shaped by a number of external and internal factors, most importantly 
organisational size, geographical spread, corporate history (legacy), technology, 
intensity of competition, management information systems and even habits of 
organisational decision-makers (Kakabadse et al, 2004). According to Johnson 
et al (2008), the classical types of organisational structures include functional 
structure, multidivisional structure (most relevant to the concept of a ―multi-
business firm‖ where each division is responsible for managing a distinct 
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―business‖, or product/market), matrix structure, transnational structure (similar 
to matrix but addressing internationalisation of company markets and the need 
for cross-national alignment) and project-based structure. Kakabadse et al 
(2004) add a basic product structure to the list. Each of the structural types has 
its strengths and weaknesses as they respond to the key challenges for modern 
organisations: 1) need for control 2) speed of change and levels of uncertainty 
3) importance of knowledge creation and knowledge sharing and 4) 
internationalisation of modern business (Johnson et al, 2008). Similar to 
strategy process research, over time the enquiry into organisational structures 
has changed its focus from the search of an ―optimal structure for all 
organisations and times‖ to a more contingency-rooted approach of ―structure 
supports strategy‖ (Chandler, 1962). From the 1970s, a growing market volatility 
and increasing pressure on performance gave a boost to the ―extra-
organisational‖ developments of structures, including outsourcing of corporate 
functions or parts of value-chain, spin-offs, alliances, networks and virtual 
organisations (Kakabadse et al, 2004).    
The relationship between organisational structure and strategy were the subject 
of many enquiries, starting from the famous Chandler‘s ―Strategy and 
Structure‖. Chandler (1962) observed strategies and structures developed by 
the four leading American corporations and concluded that ―structure follows 
strategy‖, i.e. organisations purposefully deploy structures with optimal fit to the 
strategies chosen by company management. In turn, these strategies emerge 
as a response to the threats and opportunities arising from changes in the 
external environment.  
Yet strategy and structure appear to have a more complicated and dialectical 
relationship than this view suggests. Scholars widely acknowledged that 
organisational context (primarily structure, processes, politics and 
organisational culture) may influence and, to a certain extent, determine 
company strategy (De Witt & Meyer, 2004). ―Incrementalist‖ theories of strategy 
process emphasise the complex and dialectical nature of strategy making and 
the role of human cognition and multilayer relationships (Quinn, 1980). 
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Essentially, they contest that strategy is ―embedded‖ in the organisational 
context, be it personal characteristics of management teams, nature of 
competitive pressures in the industry or organisational processes and even 
culture (Hutzschenreute and Kleindienst, 2006). 
Hall & Saias (1980) argue that structure has a profound influence on strategy 
content. For example, diversified multi-business corporations may find it easy to 
adjust their portfolio through mergers and acquisitions, but would struggle to 
uncover opportunities for innovation and knowledge sharing between 
businesses.  
Miller (1987) argued that organisational structure has a significant and direct 
impact on strategy process characteristics. According to his empirical findings, 
formal integration between organisational units is positively associated with 
decision rationality and degree of interaction between strategy-makers during 
the process. Miller found decentralisation to be positively associated with the 
level of interaction and assertiveness.    
However, in a later and related study, Miller, Droge & Touluse (1988) argued 
that strategy process may serve as a mediator between context and structure. 
In particular, a CEO‘s need for achievement (context attribute) may lead to a 
higher degree of rationality in the strategy making process which in turn leads to 
higher formalisation and integration. Although the correlation suggested by 
Miller (1987) remains, its direction changes to the opposite. Key insight to the 
―strategy and structure‖ debate comes from the fact that organisational 
attributes may influence structure using strategy process as a mediator, an 
instrument to deliver the desired structural attributes.   
Past strategies may become a source of organisational inertia and momentum 
(Miller & Friesen, 1980), thus limiting the strategic agenda and restricting 
strategy process. Stacey (1993) emphasised the dynamic and complex nature 
of organisations (he compared internal environment to ―chaos‖) that make 
deliberate stewardship complicated, if not impossible. Instead, he called for 
unleashing and fostering the creative power of the organisation (―strategy as 
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order emerging from chaos‖). The view that an organisation should produce 
strategies through self-organisation and learning is perhaps the strongest 
manifestation of strategy‘s embeddedness in the organisational context.  
Bower‘s (1970) study examined the process of strategic investment project 
initiation and approval in a major diversified firm. He found that strategic 
initiatives are born mostly ―at the bottom‖ – the level of plants and divisions, but 
corporate top management uses a ―structural context‖ to define the type of 
proposal that they will initiate and they will receive impetus from the divisions. 
Later, Bower and Doz (1979) conceptualised these findings stating that the 
―new process school of research‖ sees the role of ―top management‖ as 
―managing strategy process‖, rather than ―performing strategy process‖ through 
direct formulation and objectives-setting. In other words, top management 
determines strategy by providing a structural framework that gives rise to one 
type of project and rejects other.    
The built-in contradiction of such an approach is evident and recognised by 
Bower and Doz. If structure purposefully shapes strategy, then what determines 
this initial ―purpose‖, or ―vision‖? Following Bower‘s findings, Burgelman (1983) 
tried to respond to this question with his model of strategy process where 
structure works as a calibrating mechanism that limits deviations from current 
strategy concepts, but can be overcome by powerful strategic initiatives that, in 
turn, impact the concept of strategy and trigger changes in the structural 
context. Hence, structure influences strategy, but it is also ―created‖ by strategy 
as a mechanism for preserving strategy continuity.   
Perhaps the best conclusion we can make is that strategy process/content and 
organisational structure mutually evolve in a reciprocal manner. Strategies do 
determine organisational structure and are, in turn, embedded in the particular 
organisational contexts. To succeed in the challenging environment, formal 
structures and processes in an organisation must align with informal processes 
and relationships. Formal structural design (formal roles, responsibilities and 
lines of reporting), company processes (including strategy process) and 
relationships of people within and outside an organisation comprise a distinct 
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and, hopefully, coherent configuration (Johnson et al, 2008). Section on time 
perspective of strategy discusses the nature and shape of the ongoing 
relationship between strategy and structure in different phases of corporate 
development.       
The Human Side of Strategy - The Role of Participants in Strategy 
Process 
To most of the early writers on strategy (i.e. Ansoff, 1965; Andrews, 1971), it 
went without saying that  a CEO creates strategy, or at most, a close circle at 
the top (Mintzberg et al, 1998) does. However, scholars argued that although 
some activities would be in the exclusive domain of the top management, others 
will be assigned to lower-level managers and even professionals. For example, 
assessment of internal and external environment and other analytical activities 
are usually performed by people at the lower levels of hierarchy, whilst top 
management is involved in selecting strategic options (De Witt & Meyer, 2004). 
According to the more recent studies, middle managers and managers in 
business units play an important role as sources of new ideas and strategies 
(Burgelman, 1983). Companies may also choose to ―outsource‖ strategic 
activities to outsiders (Robinson, 1982). Strategy consultants and, most 
recently, investment banks, act as outside stakeholders of strategy. However, 
their contribution is usually confined to analysis, or at most, option generation. 
Actual strategic choice and implementation most often land on the shoulders of 
internal decision-makers.   
A significant number of empirical studies sought to find a link between personal 
traits of top managers and strategies exhibited by their companies. For 
example, various demographic attributes of top management teams were 
shown to have a significant impact on strategic change process (Bantel & 
Wiersema, 1992) and firm‘s performance (Hamel & Prahald, 1990).   
Papadaikis & Barwise (2002) studied the effect of top management teams 
(TMT) and CEO characteristics on the process of strategic decision-making. 
They found that TMT had a significant impact on the process, whilst the CEO‘s 
influence was much weaker. The CEO and TMT also had differing impact on 
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different characteristics of the process. The CEO personality was a strong 
determinant of hierarchical decentralisation, whilst TMT influence was most 
significant in determining process rationality and lateral communications. Of the 
CEO characteristics, tenure was the most influential, whilst risk attitude does 
not prove to be significant. The level of competitive aggressiveness of TMT is 
the most influential factor of strategy process, with significant influence on 
rationality, lateral communications and decentralisation. The study also 
positively associated TMT educational level with rationality.   
Entrepreneurial Strategy 
 We can find a very distinctive way of strategy formation that deserves a 
separate account in entrepreneurial organisations. Mintzberg (1978) identifies 
an entrepreneur through the leadership, control and behavioural lenses: ―a 
bold decision-maker, with tight control, who walks confidently into an uncertain 
future‖. According to Miller (1983), a traditional view of entrepreneurship 
connects it with a dominant personality, most often an owner-manager who 
makes independent decisions. Empirical findings (Mintzberg, 1978) revealed 
the picture of entrepreneur as a decisive strategist, fully enmeshed into the 
details of his business (no separation between ―formulation‖ and 
―implementation‖ whatsoever), motivated by growth, yet caring about 
sustainability of his business. Nevertheless, despite all the decisiveness, at 
more mature stages of company development, the entrepreneur in case 
preferred ―foot-in-the-water‖ strategies and tried to test the environment 
whenever possible before making a bold move.     
Other key attributes of entrepreneurs that the literature describes include: 
 Pragmatism, independent thinking and focus. Entrepreneurs are usually 
more prepared to take risks or live in a situation of higher uncertainty. 
They also require a higher degree of centralisation and feel the need to 
accumulate decision-making authority in their own hands.  
 Focus on quantitative growth and even ―empire-building‖ (Mintzberg et al, 
1998). 
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 Ability to make quick decisions when required. Entrepreneurs stay 
―constantly attuned to the changes in environment‖ in search for a 
sudden chance. Their decisions and strategies tend to be ―revolutionary‖ 
and bold (Stevenson and Gumpert, 1985).   
 ―Overconfidence‖ and the ability to make decisions based of incomplete 
and controversial information. These attributes are particularly valuable 
in highly uncertain environments (Busenitz and Barney, 1997).  
 Positive thinking and optimism (―seeing more of strengths and 
opportunities than threats and weaknesses‖) ( Palich and Bagby, 1995).  
 Dislike of formal plans and leaning towards informal, non-binding 
agreements and visions (Mintzberg and Waters, 1982). We may explain 
this interesting observation by entrepreneurs‘ emphasis on the search for 
opportunities and quick reaction to changes in environment. Presumably, 
desire for strategic flexibility is not compatible with planning because 
planning means commitment to a particular course of action. Moreover, 
we could view planning as a limitation of the power of a leader because 
accepted plans taken out of one‘s hands immediate authority to shape 
the course of action.    
Mintzberg et al (1998) conclude by observation that entrepreneurship and 
strong personal leadership may have a particularly important and constructive 
role in three types of organisation: 1) startup phase, when organisations are in 
need for a strong vision and articulated strategy, 2) turnaround – an 
organisation in trouble needs dramatic and forceful change and 3) a small 
organisation in need for ―perpetual leadership‖.   
Strategy Process as a Political Phenomenon 
Strategy process is contextually embedded in organisations and hence intra-
organisational dynamics do exert a considerable influence on strategy. Political 
activity within organisations refers to a dynamic system of interpersonal 
bargaining and compromise in the conditions of uncertainty, competing goals, 
differing perspectives and limited resources (Mintzberg et al, 1998). Here the 
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emphasis is very much on the political and social factors of strategy making, 
emphasising its soft, humanitarian nature.     
Graham Allison (1971) draws attention to the importance of political dynamics 
by introducing three models of decision making in large, complex organisations 
using the example of the Cuban missile crisis. He demonstrated that we may 
determine strategies not only by ―rational‖ choices made by value-maximising 
agents, but also by bureaucratic and political organisational dynamics. 
Pettigrew (1977) notes that within an organisation,  both individuals and 
subgroups can exhibit political behaviour.  
Mintzberg et al (1998) argue that strategies resulting from a political process 
tend to be emergent rather than deliberate because the political process is 
essentially a continuing search for a compromise. Arrival to strategy thus 
becomes incremental and piecemeal. Bargaining is involved on the way and 
changes occur as a result of the compromise.  
Strategy-As-Practice Perspective 
The emerging area of strategy as practice has further developed the question of 
strategy process participants and their roles and actions. The practice approach 
to strategy is focused on the details of strategising activities and addresses 
managerial agency, situated action and strategy stability types of issues, whilst 
‖traditional‖ process studies are more focused on ―change events from a firm 
level of analysis‖ (Jarzabkowsky, 2005). A number of strategy-as-practice 
studies focused on the micro-side of strategy making in multi-business firms 
which this paper discusses below.   
Strategy Process and External Context 
External environmental factors play a significant role in determining the nature 
and outcome of strategy process (Rajagopalan et al, 1993). As an example, 
Fredrickson and Mitchell (1984) found negative relationship between process 
comprehensiveness and organisational performance in an unstable 
environment. Slevin and Covin (1997) demonstrated that a deliberate, ―planned‖ 
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manner of strategy making is positively associated with performance in the 
context of ―mechanistic‖ organisational structures operating in hostile 
environments. These scholars positively associated ―emergent‖ strategies with 
results among firms with organic structures operating in benign environments.  
The literature most often refers to such environmental premises as degrees of 
environment uncertainty, hostility and stability. Most of the studies in this area 
look at the relationships between strategy (decision) process, environmental 
characteristics and performance outcomes.   
National Context 
National context is of particular interest for this study because it will look at 
strategy process development in a distinct context of an emerging market 
country. The literature search identified a limited number of studies addressing 
national context influence, with many of them focusing on the differences 
between Japanese and Western strategy practices in the 1970s-80s, the period 
of common interest in Japanese management style. As an example, an 
empirical investigation by Hayachi (1978) looked at how corporate planning 
practices in large Japanese corporations performed relative to a set of standard 
―corporate planning premises‖, mostly associated with the ―strategic planning‖ 
view of strategy process, including the deliberateness and rationality of decision 
making, clear statements of objectives and means and clear distinction between 
―formulation‖ and ―implementation‖. The findings of his empirical study 
demonstrated that in the Japanese context, there was a clear reluctance to 
―programme‖ in detail the way to stated objectives.  The study treated objectives 
as loose policy guidelines or desired state of affairs rather than feasible and 
achievable goals. The very nature of planning and programming that existed 
was very much ―bottom-up‖. Overall, the strategy making process was very 
different from the then-dominant western ―strategic planning‖ initiative. 
However, Kono (1984) found in his comparative study of the UK and Japanese 
firms that the Japanese strategy process was more centralised, whilst 
companies in both countries employed a combination of analytical and informal 
approaches.     
129 
Later, a relatively large body of strategy research focused on the emerging 
markets context. However, according to Wright et al (2005), researchers 
devoted a considerable amount of research to the investigation and analysis of 
the content of strategies in the emerging economies. These studies mostly 
employed resource-based, agency cost, institutional and transaction-cost 
economic theories. One of the prevailing features of external context for the 
firms operating in emerging economies that Wright et al (2005) identify is the 
―high velocity‖ environment of rapid political, economic and institutional changes 
that are accompanied by relatively underdeveloped factor and product markets‖. 
This is in line with other studies that singled out the high level of turbulence and 
underdeveloped legal and institutional framework as the most significant 
characteristics of emerging economies (La Porta et al, 2000).  Uhlenbruck et al 
(2003) suggest that one of the responses to such an environment may be the 
development of ―strategic flexibility‖ of a firm – the ability of managers to 
reconfigure, redeploy and rethink corporate resources and capabilities in light of 
rapid change. This demands more emergent and iterative approaches, with less 
regard to formal planning or sharing of responsibility for strategy making, as 
evidenced in an empirical study by Carr (2007). A considerable number of 
studies was devoted to the issues of corporate governance and managerial 
(including owners-managers with control over an enterprise) opportunism in the 
context of weak corporate governance-enforcing laws and institutions (La Porta 
et al, 2000). Wright et al (2005) conclude that when studying strategies in 
emerging economies it is necessary to consider 1) institutional factors and how 
environment dynamics impact on strategic choices of managers, 2) the different 
effect these factors may have for different organisational forms (small 
businesses, business groups, state-owned companies), and 3) the need for an 
integrated perspective combining a numerous theories to explain what is 
happening in a high-velocity environment.  
 
Very few studies attempted to address the specifics of strategy process in the 
Russian context. Carr (2007) investigated the influence of a national context in 
his research on the strategic investment decision drivers in US, UK, German, 
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Japanese and Russian companies. His focus was mostly on the ―behaviour‖, or 
―cultural‖ variables‘ which impact on the choice of time orientation of strategic 
decisions (short vs. long-term) and on the level of sophistication in financial and 
strategic analysis. Carr concludes that the US firms were the most focused on 
short-term achievements, but used more elaborate financial and strategic 
analyses techniques. Germany, and particularly Japan, had longer-term goals 
and simpler, less formal financial evaluation techniques. The UK was not much 
different from the US. Of particular interest for this study, the Russian approach 
to strategic decisions featured the most pronounced short-termism and the 
simplest, tactical decision making drivers, with very little formal analysis. 
Interestingly, this represented a complete reversal from the state-led long-term 
planning practices registered by a similar study ten years before (in late 1988, 
during Soviet Union times). The short-term orientation was caused above all by 
an extremely volatile and hostile external environment and resulting focus on 
the immediate survival. Note, however that the author interviewed Russian 
companies in 1998, the year of the sharpest economic crisis since the collapse 
of Soviet Union and arguably the most challenging period in the modern 
economic history of the country.   
Gurkov‘s (2009) most recent article represents the first attempt to untangle the 
specifics of strategy making process in Russian corporations. Gurkov suggests 
examining the issue of strategy process through the lenses of ―strategic goals‖ 
pursued by ―strategy stakeholders‖. Strategic goals are the goals pursued by a 
corporation which may vary according to the desires and relative influence of 
strategy stakeholders. Strategy stakeholders, in Gurkov‘s view, are those who 
contribute resources to a company: shareholders themselves, employees, 
customers and a government (which contributes ―administrative resources‖). 
Gurkov assesses that corporate goals are set as a dynamic compromise, in 
most cases between the dominant financial stakeholders and company top 
management responsible for strategy formulation. Since this process is not 
constrained by an established system of historical traditions and court rulings, 
the process of this ―fight for power‖ remains dynamic and neither side is capable 
of securing a long-standing victory – that is why Russian companies exhibit very 
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little desire for formal and long-term plans and prefer opportunistic, project-
driven approaches to strategy making.  
We can summarise the specifics of the strategy process in Russian 
corporations as follows:  
1) Russian companies dislike the use of formal, detailed strategic plans, 
although with growth in size they tend to accept more planning; failure to 
plan for the long-term 
2) Strong positive correlation between the degree of competitive pressure and 
probability of adoption of a detailed strategic plan  
3) Strong negative correlation between the presence of a dominant decision-
maker (CEO or a dominant shareholder) and probability of adoption of a 
formal planning process       
In his view of the key strategy process drivers, Gurkov implicitly refers to the 
view of strategy process as a political activity, a shifting compromise between 
the interest groups in their struggle for power and resources. Although such 
perspective may offer valuable insights, it lends only a partial explanation for the 
nature of strategy making. Organisations should consider other important 
variables like the role of organisational structure, external environment and 
historical legacy. The author recognizes these limitations and calls for more 
qualitative studies on strategy process in a different context.  
 
Time Perspective of Strategy Process 
Many influential writers on strategy recognise its dynamic nature and 
emphasise the importance of research on the time perspective of strategy. 
Porter (1991) calls for research on dynamic aspects of strategy to capture the 
evolving phenomenon of competitive tensions.  Pettigrew (1992) argues that 
strategy research should adopt more of the methodology of historians. 
Mintzberg et al (1998) argue that adopting a time perspective would allow to 
reconcile seemingly contradicting views on many aspects of strategy process. 
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Different views of strategy process such as entrepreneurial creativity, formal 
planning, and emergent learning would more or less accurately explain what is 
going on in organisations, but only for particular periods of time and, in 
particular, external and internal contexts. Research of the time dimension of 
strategy process should aim to explain why strategy making changes over time 
and what is the underlying logic of this change.  
Strategic Change 
Strategic change is arguably one of the most important concepts in the time 
perspective of strategy. If strategies are dynamic and changing, this dynamic 
should manifest in major shifts in organisations‘ courses of action, structures, 
processes and contexts. Organisations need strategic change to create a new 
―fit‖ – a new alignment between organisational characteristics and 
environmental pressures. Strategic change embraces changes in both business 
systems (―configuration of resources, value-adding activities and 
product/service offerings directed at creating value for customers‖) and 
organisational systems (―how individuals populating a firm have been 
configured, and relate to each other, with the intention of facilitating the 
business system‖) of an organisation (De Witt & Meyer, 2004).  
Key properties of strategic change concern its time span and intensity level: 
change could be disruptive (abrupt shifts of a large magnitude in a relatively 
short period of time) or gradual (the slow and incremental pace of small 
changes over extended period of time). The organisational and strategic 
literature (Tushman & O‘Reilly, 1986) widely recognises this distinction and 
arising theoretical and empirical controversies. For example, scholars strongly 
associate the notion of gradual (evolutionary) change with the ―strategic 
incrementalism‖ view of strategy process advocated by Quinn (1978). Literature 
on visionary leaders and turnaround situations provides numerous examples of 
radical, revolutionary changes that occur in a relatively short period of time. 
Radical changes are indispensable in the organisational context when there is a 
need to overcome structural barriers to changes. These include psychological 
resistance of organisational members and political resistance to change 
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(Pettigrew, 1977), cultural inertia (Senge, 1990) and numerous implications of 
previous commitments such as sunk costs and investments in existing 
processes (Porter, 1991).    
Configurations 
In the words of Mintzberg et al (1998), the study of time perspective of 
organisational and strategy transformation should aim to unveil particular 
―states‖ (―models‖, ―ideal types‖) ―where different dimensions of an organisation 
cluster together under particular conditions‖. Configuration of these ―states‖ over 
time produces ―stages‖, ―periods‖ and ―organisational life cycles‖. This 
―configuration‖ view of organisational and strategy dynamics is arguably the 
most systematic approach to the research of the time perspective of strategy. It 
originated with a the team of researchers at McGill University in the 1970s and 
featured Henry Mintzberg and Danny Miller among its chief contributors. The 
configuration school asks the following key questions: ―What is the pattern of 
organisational transformation and how do the processes of change and 
continuity relate to each other? How do organisations come about change and 
how do they manage to maintain status quo? How do organisations develop 
contexts and strategies jointly over time?‖ Key premises of the configuration 
school include (from Mintzberg et al, 1998): 
 Most of the time organisations exhibit a relatively stable configuration of 
characteristics  
 These periods of stability are occasionally interrupted by shorter periods 
of transformation (―quantum change‖ view of organisational 
transformation – Miller & Friesen, 1982) 
 Configurations of changing states over time may produce a certain 
pattern that could be summarised in a certain way, for example as a ―life 
cycle‖ of an organisation 
Through empirical research, Mintzberg (1989) identified seven highly generic 
types of organisational configuration. He associated these types with particular 
patterns of change (for example, a highly elaborated, process-focused ―machine 
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organisation‖ can sustain only a revolutionary type of change followed by long 
periods of a steady state). On a similar line, Miller and Friesen (1982) described 
change as ―quantum‖ transition from one particular archetype of an organisation 
to another.  On the strategy process side, Mintzberg (1978) argues that we can 
view the strategy process as an interplay between bureaucratic momentum and 
a dynamic environment with leadership mediating between them. The role of 
leadership then is to ensure a successful adaptation to environmental change 
within the constraints imposed by organisational and business systems. 
Numerous case studies explore this topic from an empirical perspective.  
Strategy Process Case Studies 
Mintzberg attributes to leadership the pivotal role in strategy making due to its 
capacity to overcome organisational inertia. Using the examples of 
Volkswagen‘s business strategy from the 1950s to 1970s and US military and 
political strategy in Vietnam in the 1960s and 1970s, Mintzberg demonstrates 
that in the absence of push from the leadership, bureaucratic rigidity will 
preserve continuity even in the face of a rapidly changing environment. 
Mintzberg offers evidence of ―self-reinforcing‖ strategies. Once accepted, the 
strategy of military pressure on North Vietnam led to ever-escalating military 
offensives. The leadership of President Johnson was not strong enough to 
overcome bureaucratic momentum and environmental pressures. It took a 
radical shift in environment and political leadership to change the course of 
action. The new president, Richard Nixon, faced military stalemate and made a 
political decision to change the strategy to ―vietnamisation‖ of the conflict.  
Another Mintzberg and Waters (1982) study aimed to identify patterns of 
strategy process change in the context of a growing entrepreneurial firm in the 
retail industry. Mintzberg and Waters (1982) describe evolution of strategy 
process as it developed in conjunction with changing scope and structure. In its 
first stages, strategy making was entrepreneur-centred, informal and 
discretional, grounded in the very deep knowledge by the entrepreneur of 
slightest details of his business and his industry. As business grew larger and 
more sophisticated, the strategy process became more decentralised and 
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ultimately involved many more owners. Pressure from emerging financial 
stakeholders contributed to the development of a formal ―planning‖ strategy 
mode. To a certain extent, the strategy process had to follow structure and 
submit to the demands of the environment.    
Similar studies by Mintzberg and his co-authors included investigations of a 
Canadian film-making board, a textile giant, a university and an airline. The 
conceptualization of strategy process is performed in the study of ideal ―modes‖ 
of strategy-making (Mintzberg, 1973): entrepreneurial, adaptive and planning 
modes.  
Configuration approach was criticized on a number of issues. Summarizing 
multifaceted, complex compositions of organisational structure, strategy and 
context into simple generic models of configuration means making rather crude 
generalisations of the real world situations (Donaldson, 1996). Moreover, as 
Donaldson (1996) observed in his criticism, the notion of ―quantum‖ change is 
also misleading. Most organisations change incrementally through a series of 
smaller steps over long periods of time.  
Mintzberg et al (1998) readily admitted that configurations do not fully capture 
complexities of the real world. However, the configuration approach creates the 
necessary vocabulary and methodological apparatus to look at the temporal 
development of organisations and their strategies. The configuration school has 
only started to take off. What follows may come up with more complex and 
enduring classifications. In any event, simplification is necessary for 
understanding and conceptualising the reality. The real issue is to limit distortion 
as much as possible without going too deeply into unnecessary details. 
Mintzberg et al (1998) conclude with the call for more nuanced enquiries into 
the corporate configurations.  
The main conclusion of the configuration school as far as the strategy process 
is concerned is that strategy processes may vary according to particularities of 
a particular ―stage‖ of organisational development. In each stage an 
organisation would work out an optimal strategy process that fits its outer and 
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inner context. This combination may survive for some time, but dynamics in the 
inner and outer environment will sooner or later call for a major revamp. After a 
period of change, things settle down again to a new kind of steady state. 
Therefore, studies of strategy process are best equipped when they take a 
temporal perspective and compare the strategy process in different points in 
time and in different contexts. This also corresponds to the call for strategy 
process research to be mindful of the surrounding organisational context 
advocated by the key methodology writers in the field. This research intends to 
take exactly this approach.  
Models of Strategy Process 
This section discusses empirically derived models of strategy process. It skips 
numerous normative models, most of them in the strategic planning domain, as 
less relevant and failing to encompass recent evolution in our thinking on the 
complexity of strategy making. Instead, the focus is on the empirically derived 
models as those can lend themselves to testing during the project.    
The literature review has so far identified five such distinct models: 
1. Hart (1992) offered an integrative framework aimed at capturing the 
phenomenon in all its diversity. The framework is based on the ―varying 
roles strategy makers and other organisational members play in the 
strategy making process‖. However, this typology focuses on the strategy 
making participants and doesn‘t directly encompass context 
characteristics in their full variety (although organisational attributes such 
as entrepreneurial style of bureaucratic processes do play a part in the 
model).   
2. Shrivasta and Grant (1985) use a field study on the process of decision-
making on a major IT investment to come up with a ―grounded‖ model of 
strategy process. Attributes of different modes include nature of process, 
process participants and their role, implicit aims of the process, roles of 
learning systems,  and the influence of environment. Authors admit that 
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this model may serve as a ―first step‖ in the development of a truly 
comprehensive process model. 
3. Miller and Friesen (1978) offer a typology based on the configuration 
approach that encompasses such attributes as the type of external 
environment (moderate or hostile), organisational structure (for example, 
―entrepreneurial conglomerate‖), size and past records (for example, 
formerly successful big bureaucratic organisations coming under 
competitive attack by more agile newcomers), top team characteristics 
(―team spirit‖) and decision process attributes (such as the amount of 
formal analysis or responsiveness of decisions to the external 
environment). Overall, the model tracks 31 variables. Despite the 
model‘s comprehensiveness, a very divergent and complex nature of its 
process characteristics makes testing it a difficult task. 
4. Mintzberg (1973) offers a shorter and somewhat more explicit model of 
―strategy making modes‖, of which he identifies three ―pure‖ cases: 
adaptive, planning and entrepreneurial, as well as a number of cross-
breeds. He offers 15 characteristics of the process, including 
environment conditions, decisions makers, type of options evaluation, 
and dominant organisational goals. The strengths of the model are in its 
relative simplicity, focus on the process, but consideration of context 
characteristics and general applicability in the context of current 
research.  
5. The already discussed model by Burgelman (1983) that examined the 
strategy process in a large diversified firm. Autonomous strategic 
behaviour induced by entrepreneurial activity of business units over time 
can challenge status quo and redefine corporate strategy. Top managers 
use the organisational context as a calibrating mechanism that limits 
deviations from current strategy concepts but which they can overcome 
by powerful strategic initiatives.  
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The Role of the Corporate Centre in Strategy Process in a Multi-
business Corporation 
Corporate Centre Role: Empirical Studies and Concepts 
 This paper will focus on the role of the corporate centre in strategy process in a 
multi-business group. Therefore, it will look at the strategy process that first of 
all focuses on the corporate level strategies and on the business-level 
strategies to the extent that the corporate centre is involved in their formulation. 
While business strategy deals with the company‘s position in a distinct business 
area (product/regional market), corporate strategy is concerned with how to 
manage a multi-business entity by deciding 1) ―in what businesses the 
corporation should be active‖ and 2) ―how should this group of businesses be 
managed‖ (De Witt & Meyer, 2004). There are different views on the role a 
corporate centre could play in strategy process. Earlier works on corporate-level 
strategy viewed a corporate centre as a relatively detached ―shareholder-style‖ 
body, demanding financial results and caring about diversification of corporate 
risks through asset portfolio adjustments (Henderson, 1979; Hedley, 1977; 
―controls configuration with indirect involvement‖ in Ward et al (2005), for 
example the WPP Group in the 1980s). Organisations strongly emphasise 
business responsiveness over seeking synergies (De Witt & Meyer, 2004), to 
preserve the autonomy of the business units. In this world, the corporate centre 
has a small role to play in determining business strategies. They are left to 
business units who nevertheless must meet stringent financial performance 
measures and adhere to the company-wide principles of financial management 
and investments approval. In a similar fashion, but with a different background 
philosophy, the role of a corporate centre may be limited to provision of a strong 
unifying vision, sense of purpose and stretching financial and strategic targets, 
whilst business units have a wide discretion in how to achieve the stipulated 
targets (Collins (2001) ‗hedgehog concept‖, ―creative configuration with indirect 
involvement‖ in Ward et al (2005), for example the model of GE designed by 
Jack Welch in the 1980s). This approach does not mean that the corporate 
centre is not active or not demanding. On the contrary, it is very demanding and 
has little tolerance for not meeting its targets or, even worse, not adhering to 
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corporate values and standards. However, its involvement in the strategy 
process is normally limited to verification of the strategies‘ adherence to 
corporate principles and making sure that their results are satisfactory from the 
corporate standpoint.   
The contrasting theoretical view stipulates that the corporate centre should 
assume an active, value-creating role of a hands-on mover and shaper of 
company strategy, fully involved in the organisation of the business, supplying 
strategic initiatives, staying in constant strategic dialogue with business units 
and focusing on the development of ―company-wide competences‖ as the key 
outcome of its activity (Prahalad and Hamel, 1990). Here, of course, the 
corporate centre is actively involved in business strategy and the borders 
between corporate and business strategy become increasingly blurred. 
Corporate and business strategists develop a common competitive strategy, 
with the leadership of the corporate centre (CORRECT?) (Raynor and Bower, 
2001). The corporate centre is more directly and intimately involved in current 
business processes. It is an undisputable leader in adapting the company to the 
future challenges by creating a company-wide strategic architecture that 
facilitates the development of critical competences for the future success 
(Prahalad and Hamel, 1990).     
Ocasio and Joseph (2008) contributed to the discussion by challenging 
conventional wisdoms with their account of the evolution of formal strategic 
planning processes in the ―classical case‖ of a diversified firm - General Electric. 
Contrary to popular perceptions, they found that formal strategy making 
mechanisms (―strategic planning‖) under the control of a corporate centre have 
been present throughout the company‘s history, albeit under different labels. 
Their study found the important role played by the ―governance channels‖ which 
facilitate communication and information flow, and simultaneously involve both 
―professional planners‖ and line staff in the strategy process. The corporate 
centre leads major company-wide initiatives which is important in the strategy 
process. The role of a corporate centre evolved from emphasis on detailed 
centralised planning to performance targeting and control through company-
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wide initiatives, but always remained very important. Corporate centre 
involvement may have evolved from direct to indirect, but all the time remained 
structured and exerted dominant influence. Interestingly, the study also 
highlighted the importance of the CEO‘s agenda and priorities for strategy 
process design.  
An interesting empirical investigation by Andersen (2004) demonstrated that a 
combination of decentralised decision making authority and formal strategic 
planning process allows for better performance outcomes in turbulent 
environments, presumably because the strategic planning process serves to 
coordinate and effectively combine strategies and projects elaborated in 
creativity-friendly, decentralised decision making structures. Although Andersen 
doesn‘t explicitly discuss the problem in terms of corporate centre business 
units dynamics, his conclusions may clearly suggest that strategic planning as a 
coordinated activity performed by a corporate centre may be very effective even 
when business units have a high degree of discretion in their own strategy 
making. An excellent study by Grant (2003) reached similar conclusions by 
looking at the strategic planning in oil majors in the context of turbulent 
environment. His study found that the role of a corporate centre was built 
around performance control and formulation of strategic priorities, while 
business-level strategy was left at business units‘ discretion. At the business 
unit level, organisations formulated strategies in an emerging and informal way. 
Corporate centres played an important role in coordination and alignment of 
strategies. Grant concluded that this process of ―coordinated emergence‖ was 
effective in securing adaptation and responsiveness necessary in the turbulent 
environment, but failed to provide comprehensiveness and analytical rigor. He 
also highlighted that the ―division of responsibilities‖ is based on the pertinent 
knowledge (business strategy in the business units, corporate strategy in the 
centre). His findings are in line with another conceptual model proposed by 
Burgelman (1983) who argued that strategies emerge in a bottom-up way, as 
accumulation of ―strategic projects‖ (initiatives by lower-level organisational 
units) making their way through ―structural context‖ constructed by top 
management (the corporate centre). They also resemble Goold and Campbell‘s 
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(1987) ―financial control‖ configuration, although the corporate centre here is 
more involved in strategy by shaping the overall corporate priorities.  
Regner (2003) focused on the micro-level of strategy activities in multinational 
firms from the strategy-as-practice perspective. He studied the distinctions in 
the type of strategy activities in the centre and periphery and concluded that 
they were fundamentally different. Strategy making in the corporate centre was 
deductive in nature and focused on analytical understanding of industrial and 
environment issues. The process itself was well-structured and included formal 
analysis, planning and use of ―formal routines‖. On the contrary, in the business 
units, strategy making was more inductive, informal and emergent in nature, 
with extensive use of experimentation. However, Regner did not discuss the 
issue of the relationships between the corporate centre and business units‘ 
strategy teams and corporate centre‘s involvement in strategy process in 
business units. Paroutis & Pettigrew (2007) addressed this gap by investigating 
the activities and relationships between strategy making teams in the corporate 
centre and business units in the context of multi-business firms. Their study 
identified types of activities performed by strategy teams such as ―initiating‖, 
―executing‖, ―coordinating‖  and the importance of interaction between these 
teams, as well as important changes in dominant activities of strategy teams 
over time. Paroutis & Pettigrew (2007) highlight the distinctiveness of strategy 
process research in multi-business groups because of the dynamics of 
interrelations between central and peripheral teams, i.e. corporate centre and 
business units‘ strategy teams.  
Corporate Centre Role: Theoretical Models 
Theoretical models on the role of the corporate centre in strategy making 
attempted to address the dilemma of ―activist‖ vs. ―detached‖ corporate centre. 
They postulated, very much in line with Mintzberg‘s configurational approach, 
that more than one type of value-creating role is possible for the corporate 
centre depending on the nature of the business model, industry specifics, types 
of synergies, and corporate life cycle. Porter (1987) elaborated a model for the 
interaction of corporate centre and business units that embraces both a 
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―detached‖ strategy (―Portfolio management‖) and one assuming deeper 
involvement of a corporate centre (―restructuring‖ – the most interventionist 
approach; ―skills transfer‖ and ―activities sharing‖ target intra-firm cooperation). 
However, these models (like all works by Porter) are much more preoccupied 
with the content of strategy, rather than with its process, and therefore can only 
inform us on a more general level.  For example, it is unclear whether ―skill 
transfer‖ or ―activity sharing‖ would necessarily involve a corporate centre‘s 
involvement in strategy process determination, or if it will limit itself to the 
ancillary role of resource provider, leaving strategy making to business units.   
Goold and Campbell (1987, 1993 a,b) and Goold et al (1995) provide distinct 
typologies of the corporate centre‘s management styles and value-creation 
types, including the degree of a corporate centre‘s involvement in strategy 
development in business units. They argue that each style has strengths and 
weaknesses and may be value-creating, but for this, a style must fit the 
conditions facing the business. In their earlier model, Goold and Campbell 
(1987) classify eight strategic management styles based on 1) the influence of 
the centre in the planning process and 2) the type of centre‘s reaction to actual 
performance – tight financial control, tight strategic control and flexible strategic 
control. Three of those eight strategic management styles are relevant for multi-
business groups (De Witt & Meyer, 2004) and employ distinct characteristics of 
the strategy process: 
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Strategic Management Styles Model (Goold and Campbell, 1987): 
Table 19. The Model by Goold and Campbell 
Strategic management 
styles: 
Characteristics of strategy process: 
Financial control Key model attributes: Low interference in planning process, tight 
financial control, focus on short-term performance   
Business units are highly autonomous, the corporate centre does 
not coordinate activities across BUs 
Control is based on financial objectives 
Strategic decisions are almost entirely left to business units, very 
little/no corporate centre involvement in formulating business 
strategies. The centre‘s role is to agree and monitor demanding 
financial targets for businesses.   
Strategic control Key model attributes: High level of interference in planning 
process, tight financial control 
Overall emphasis is on decentralisation and delegation of 
responsibility to business units and control against demanding 
financial targets. However, the corporate centre participates in 
business strategies review through a formal planning process and 
tries to coordinate activities between BUs boundaries  
Control is based on  financial objectives, but the centre is also 
trying to review and assess strategic performance 
Heavy involvement of the corporate centre in the extensive 
strategic planning process; the role of the centre is to add value 
by reviewing, challenging and – when necessary - adjusting 
business strategies 
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Strategic Planning Key model attributes: High level of interference in planning 
process; flexible strategic control, i.e. focus on long-term not 
short-term results 
Many activities are centralised; corporate centre is heavily 
involved in cross-business coordination  
Control is exercised through direct supervision 
The centre actively participates in formulating business strategies 
and often initiates ―strategic thrusts‖ among interrelated 
businesses  
 
In their later works, Goold and Campbell (1993 a,b) verified relevance of their 
strategic management styles by looking at the performance of companies 
adhering to each style. This confirmed their earlier stipulation that to succeed, a 
style should fit the composition of a business portfolio (diversity and relatedness 
of businesses) and nature of competition in the industry (high/low competition 
intensity, volatility, scale of investment projects, short vs. long-term orientation). 
In particular, diversification into more than two core business areas or into 
unrelated businesses proved to be extremely challenging for the strategic 
planning style which requires good understanding of businesses by the 
corporate centre. Similarly, work in cyclical or technology-dependant industries 
creates additional obstacles for the financial control style.  The strategic control 
style proved to be most challenging in terms of performance. To succeed it 
requires a good understanding of the businesses by the controlling centre which 
is difficult in cases of diverse portfolios with differing strategic characteristics. 
Where businesses were too diversified, or distant from the centre, strategic 
control style did not perform well. However, the authors restate their believe that 
the strategic control style is still a viable option for a portfolio of businesses with 
related characteristics and when a corporate centre has a good feel of the 
businesses in the group.  
Ward et al (2005) provide an interesting conceptual model of the corporate 
centre‘s role in multi-business groups that stipulates the types of activities that 
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the corporate centre performs for business units and the types of corporate 
centre‘s involvement with business units. They identified four generic 
configurations: control, scale, scope and creative. Essentially, Ward et al offer 
generic corporate strategies for multi-business groups that are based on the 
nature of the value-adding role of a corporate centre. Ward et al (2005) agree 
that the configurational approach to the study of strategy remains the most 
promising. They argue that one should study strategy, structure and context 
together and that corporate configurations can evolve over time. Hence, the 
configuration that they identify assumes a combination of ―fit together‖ corporate 
strategies, structures and processes. As far as strategy process is concerned, 
their configurations specify the style of the corporate centre‘s involvement and 
some other process attributes, but they are primarily preoccupied with the 
content of activities performed by the corporate centre and type of resources it 
leverages rather than by the process itself. However, they do provide a 
description of a ―planning and control process‖ which incorporates the strategy 
process.  
We can identify the following strategy process-related attributes identified per 
the corporate configurations model by Ward et al (2005): 
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Table 20. The Model by Ward et al 
Corporate 
configurations: 
Characteristics of strategy process: 
Control Indirect involvement – Strategy of business units is not directly affected by the corporate centre 
Core centre activity: Targets setting and control   
The planning process is formal and well-defined; focus is mostly on short-term financial targets; relationships between centre 
and BUs are centred around a formal planning and reporting cycle 
Process focus is on targets setting and monitoring; formulation of business strategies is left entirely to BUs, subject to 
fulfillment of a small number of strict and well-defined financial caveats (such as central approval of large capex (?) 
programmes).  
Corporate strategy is in the exclusive domain of the corporate centre; the only coordinated activity is financial targets setting; 
strictly defined rules on the way BUs can produce their business plans and financial reports to avoid ―game playing‖; 
planning process can be very different for different parts of the group to reflect their diversity and competitive strategies 
Scale Direct involvement – Strategy of business units is directly affected by the corporate centre 
Core centre activity: Cost reduction by centralisation 
Planning and control process generally assumes higher level of coordination and centralisation of specific activities 
The control process focuses on the usage of centralised resources and relative cost performance 
The planning process is driven by the centre but assumes shared responsibilities and high level of coordination and 
resource planning; relatively intensive interaction between BUs and the corporate centre  
Essentially, it means (although the authors do not say it explicitly) that business units are invited to participate in corporate 
strategy formulation because without their participation it is impossible to agree to the appropriate level of the corporate 
centre‘s involvement.  
However, depending on the nature and importance of centralised activities, business units may have a high or lower level of 
autonomy in their business strategy formation. For example, business units may ―outsource‖ to the corporate centre non-
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core activities and focus on the development of the ―core‖ of their corporate strategy without much intervention from the 
centre. On the other hand, if the centre starts performing ―core‖ activities, business units may feel that they lose control over 
their own strategy and performance and become demotivated. 
Therefore, the role of the corporate centre in formulation of business strategies may vary from effective ―ownership‖ of a 
major part of strategy (execution of ―core activity‖) to the focus on low-cost supply of periphery services and almost full 
delegation of strategy formulation to business units. However, one may argue that the position of a corporate centre that 
only centralises ―non-core‖ activities is not sustainable in the long-run. Hence, the model will either transform itself or move 
to centralisation of more of the core activities. That will assume the higher role of the corporate centre in determining 
essential parts (but not all) of business units‘ strategies.    
Scope Direct involvement – Strategy of business units is directly affected by the corporate centre 
Core centre activity: Exploiting existing core competences 
The planning process is focused on identification of group-wide competitive advantages. The centre then develops plans on 
how business units will use these advantages.  
The involvement of the corporate centre is therefore more intensive. There is considerable debate and interaction between 
the centre and the business units.  
Critical elements of the business unit‘s business strategies (core value-adding competences) are affected by a centre by 
knowledge and best practices transfer through group-wide functions and processes. In turn (although  the authors do not say 
it explicitly), business units also affect corporate strategy by contributing their knowledge to the corporate pool.  
The planning process is more strategic and forward-looking, whilst the control system is inevitably looser and focuses on 
both business units‘ long-term performance and contribution to the group.  
Creative Indirect involvement – Strategy of business units is not directly affected by the corporate centre 
Core centre activity: Provide strong unifying vision and values, identify new group competences, promote sense of 
unity within the corporation  
Corporate centre influences business units‘ strategy through its strong vision and values setting. It provides a sense of 
unified direction and determines general corporate priorities.  
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The planning process is tailored to the concrete vision/values; it may be more or less formal with the focus on both long-term 
and short-term results. The organisation achieves financial focus through employment of tailored performance measures 
and development of results-conscious corporate culture.  
The interactions between centre and business units are intensive and often informal;  they achieve coherence through joint 
projects, information exchange and informal contacts, but they can supplement these with more formal events, training 
programmes  and regular review processes. The corporate centre explicitly encourages intensive communication, cross-
divisional initiatives and competence-sharing between Bus.  
Corporate strategy is determined solely by the corporate centre. The corporate centre actively influences BUs business 
strategy, but this influence is indirect. It is translated through very demanding strategic goals, standards and initiatives. From 
the process perspective, BUs have a great discretion in the development of their business strategy. However, creative 
configuration assumes (although the authors do not state it explicitly) a higher involvement of the corporate centre in the 
business units‘ strategy process through the alignment of their strategies with corporate strategic priorities and its value 
system. This assumes a more in-depth strategic dialogue than in the control system where the centre usually only seeks 
achievement of pure financial goals. 
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Ward et al argue that there needs to be a complete agreement in the company 
on the configuration that exists and the configuration that is appropriate for the 
corporation. Also, as with Goold and Campbell‘s (1987) model, successful 
configurations depend on the external environment and types of businesses 
involved. Ward et al make a further step and conclude that, like with all 
configurations (Mintzberg et al, 1998), they may actually evolve with a company 
over its lifecycle. The challenge for the executives then is to recognise the need 
for such change and prepare a company and its corporate centre for evolution. 
However, due to the issues of organisational inertia and entrenched practices, 
such moves require either significant changes in the composition of the 
business portfolio (to make the current configuration work) or change in the 
executive top team (to change configuration). Interestingly, Goold and Campbell 
(1987) also emphasise difficulty of transition from one strategic management 
style to another and argue that it requires either abrupt changes in the external 
environment or change in the top management team. Ward et al also note the 
importance of leadership in a configuration and necessity to align corporate 
management leadership style with the requirements of a particular 
configuration.  
A related line of strategy-structure literature sheds further light on the work of 
big divisionalised corporations. Earlier works by Bower (1970), Bower and Doz 
(1979) and Burgelman (1983) stipulated that corporate top management shapes 
strategy by manipulating a ―structural context‖ that determines which types of 
strategic projects get to ―go ahead‖. The underlying purpose is to fit these 
projects into a prevailing ―strategic concept‖, i.e. company strategy. However, 
large diversified firms feature a fair amount of ―entrepreneurial‖ activity at the 
lower level which from time to time makes it through ―structural context‖ walls 
and leads to implementation of new strategies. Over time, this accumulated 
―strategic renewal material‖ starts influencing the prevailing concept of strategy 
and ultimately leads to changes in strategy. Here the corporate centre does 
influence the strategies of business units, but this influence comes from a rather 
loosely defined ―structural context‖ of organisation, rather than from direct 
intervention and supervisions. Conceptual insight into the mechanism of a 
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corporate centre‘s influence on strategy, provided by Bower, Burgelman and 
others, is consistent with both models discussed above, but the models provide 
a more rigorous and well-defined framework for the assessment of the 
corporate centre‘s role.   
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DISCUSSION OF FINDINGS  
This study started from an interest in how companies can organise the strategy 
process effectively in the context of a multidivisional industrial group based in 
the emerging market country. The prime interest was in the role that a corporate 
centre could play. The preceding literature review aimed to identify key 
academic perspectives on strategy process and literature recommendations on 
methodologies for strategy process research. After establishing the key 
perspectives, the review focused on the theoretical and empirical background 
on corporate centre‘s role in strategy making and on the impact of the emerging 
market context on strategy process. This chapter presents the key papers, 
frameworks and concepts influencing the research agenda, design and 
methodology. It identified knowledge gaps and synthesized the research 
subject to arrive at the formulation of the final research questions and 
methodology informing the empirical enquiry in Project II.        
Identifying the Knowledge Gap in the Literature 
The study identified two potential contribution areas with persisting 
knowledge gaps: 1) the corporate centre’s role in strategy process and 2_ 
the distinctiveness of strategy process in the emerging market context. 
The literature review identified two major theoretical approaches to the 
corporate centre‘s role: 1) a ―shareholder-style‖ corporate centre with mostly 
indirect involvement in the strategy process in business units, focused on 
performance control and portfolio management and 2) an ―activist‖ corporate 
centre, fully involved in strategy process and developing group-wide strategies 
and competences. The most important concepts informing this enquiry were the 
models offered by Goold and Campbell (1987) and Ward et al (2005) to present 
a more comprehensive framework describing different roles for a corporate 
centre. Goold and Campbell (1987) provide distinct typologies of the corporate 
centre‘s management styles and value-creation types, including the degree of 
the corporate centre‘s involvement in strategy development in business units. 
Ward et al (2005) offer a prescriptive model of the corporate centre‘s role in 
multi-business groups that stipulates strategic activities performed by the 
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corporate centre and types of corporate centre involvement with business units. 
The model by Ward et al was illustrated by a number of practitioner-oriented 
short business cases, whilst Goold and Campbell (1994 a,b) investigated the 
performance outcomes of different styles of corporate centre involvement with 
cases that showed the importance of ―fitting‖ (?) between a style and context 
characteristics, as such, and the degree of relatedness of business units‘ 
markets and complexity of their industries.  
Nevertheless, the aforementioned models remained rather conceptual and 
prescriptive with relatively little empirical evidence to support and develop their 
conclusions. Goold and Campbell recognise embeddedness of the strategy 
process in the inner and outer context (Pettigrew, 1992). Ward et al particularly 
find that strategy content, organisational structure and process are ―inextricably 
linked‖ to form distinct configurations. This recognition calls for the development 
of a richer empirical material to understand how corporate centres engage in 
strategy process in a different context, rather than in an ideal form. The review 
identified very few of such empirical studies. In their longitudinal case study of 
General Electric, Ocasio and Joseph (2008) found that the involvement of both 
business units and corporate centres in strategy process was secured through 
the development of an effective information exchange and communication 
system, participation of both ―professional‖ strategists and line staff and 
connection of strategy with other critical corporate initiatives. They also 
highlighted the crucial importance of the attitude and strategic agenda of the 
CEO for organisation of the process. Grant (2003) examined the strategic 
planning in major oil companies (?) in the context of the turbulent environment 
and found that in these conditions the role of a corporate centre was confined to 
performance control, formulation of overarching strategic priorities and 
coordination and alignment, whilst business units developed practical strategies 
in an emerging and iterative process. He also concluded that the ―divisions of 
labour‖ between a centre and the periphery was explained by differences in 
strategy making competences. Grant‘s findings were confirmed by another 
study by Andersen (2004) which demonstrated positive performance outcomes 
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combining decentralised decision making authority and the formal strategic 
planning process led from the centre in the context of a turbulent environment.   
The strategy-as-practice approach to strategy research also enriched the field 
with some recent enquiries. Regner (2003), in his micro-level study found that at 
the corporate centre, the strategy process was more formal and structured, 
whilst in business units it was more inductive, informal and emergent. Paroutis 
and Pettigrew (2007) addressed in-depth the activities and relationships 
between the corporate centre and business units‘ strategy-making teams. They 
defined the term ―strategy teams‖ and its relevance as the unit of analysis and 
highlighted the importance of interactions between the teams at different levels. 
They also found that these interactions evolved over time depending on the 
changing requirements of the adopted strategy process. Crucially for practice, 
Paroutis and Pettigrew (2007) suggest that we can attribute success and failure 
of strategy process to the state of interactions between the corporate centre and 
business units‘ teams, not only to the quality or efficiency of actual strategy 
work within these teams. They highlight the importance of the local context for 
shaping these relationships and call for more research on the impact of the 
context on strategy process and its outcomes.   
The literature review demonstrated that despite some progress in high-level 
conceptualisation (Goold and Campbell, 1987; Ward et al, 2005 and 
Burgelman, 1983), we still have limited empirical knowledge on the actual role 
of the corporate centre in strategy process. Among the few empirical 
investigations, a study by Grant looked at the specific context of the turbulent 
environment and Ocasio and Joseph (2008) addressed the importance of 
organisational governance channels and CEO personality in a distinct context of 
a major Western diversified group. However, many essential variables, such as 
organisational structures and work routines supporting strategy process in multi-
business groups were not yet subject of any research. Also, a variety of 
contexts such as the non-Western context, companies with concentrated 
ownership and evolving companies in different historical periods remain 
unexplored and many authors call for more studies into their impact on strategy 
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process and its evolution (e.g. Paroutis and Pettigrew, 2007; Regner, 2003; 
Wittington and Cailluet, 2008).  
Remarkably, it is important to note that lack of studies in the emerging market 
context is a characteristic of strategy process research as such, not only of its 
more narrow area of strategy process in multi-business groups. For example, 
only two papers, both very recent, addressed strategy making in the Russian 
context. The comparative study by Carr (2007) looked at the drivers of strategic 
decision making and attempted to connect ―cultural traits‖ and attributes of the 
environment to the choice of a time orientation and level of sophistication in 
strategic and financial analysis. Another study by Gurkov (2009) examined the 
strategy process from a ―political‖ perspective, as a dynamic interplay of 
competing motives of strategy stakeholders, primarily top managers and 
owners. Although this study offered some interesting insights into the impact of 
the national environment (extreme volatility, underdeveloped institutions) on the 
process characteristics, it was based on a cross-sectional analysis of a limited 
number of specific variables and lacked richness and rigour offered by in-depth 
case studies recommended as the most adequate methodology for the 
explorative strategy process studies (Chakravarthy & Doz, 1992; Pettigrew, 
1992). Hutzschenreute and Kleindienst (2006) claim that contradicting 
conclusions of many cross-sectional empirical studies attempting to link 
organisational context to strategy process and performance reaffirm the view 
that modern organisations are too complex to explain their performance by a 
few specific variables. Instead, we need to employ methods like longitudinal 
case studies, action research, and ethnographic modeling.. To summarise, it 
one could argue that the Russian context for strategy remains underexplored, in 
contrast to the much better researched Western context. The growing role of 
emerging markets in the global economy and rising cross-border trade and 
investment makes understanding strategy making in the emerging markets an 
increasingly important and practical task. Besides, research in the emerging 
market context can enrich and expand an academic field by offering different 
cultural and institutional perspectives and challenging established consensus 
(Wright et al, 2005). 
155 
This study will contribute to the debate by adding an empirical 
investigation on the historical development of the corporate centre’s role 
in a particular context of a rapidly transforming company with 
concentrated ownership operating in the volatile emerging-market 
context. This study will be descriptive in nature and will aim to identify 
key attributes of strategy process, including its emergent vs. deliberate 
nature, composition of participants and distinction of roles between the 
corporate centre and business units. The study will connect strategy 
process to internal (concentrated ownership) and external (Russian) 
context and historical development of the company. This will contribute to 
our understanding of what are the actual vs. prescribed roles for the 
corporate centre and business units in strategy process, and hopefully, 
will move the debate further towards the conceptualisation of the 
corporate centre’s role in different company contexts. The study will also 
add to the existing body of knowledge by looking at strategy process in 
the non-western context of a post-privatisation Russian enterprise 
developing in a highly volatile environment.  
The Choice of the Study Design and Methodology 
This section presents the key papers and concepts informing the choice of the 
study design and methodology. The choice of the research methodology is 
determined by the nature of the identified knowledge gap and analysis of the 
previous literature on the strategy process methodology research. The 
company-specific nature of the business question which motivated this research 
calls for an initial focus on the company and its strategy process as the study‘s 
―unit of analysis‖ (Yin, 2009). The study will aim to explore the development of 
the corporate centre role in strategy process in a particular context of an 
emerging-market company with concentrated ownership. Therefore, the main 
subject of the study will be the strategy process as the process by which 
strategies come about (De Witt & Mayer, 2004).  
A chosen methodology should fit this ―process-related‖ nature of the research. 
The process focus of the enquiry implies that attention should be given not 
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simply to the way the decisions are made, but rather to the ―patterns‖ of 
decisions and actions which over time combine to form an intended (or realised) 
strategy (Tsoukas and Khudsen, 2010). The very definition of ―process‖ as a 
―sequence of events that describe how things change over time‖ (Van de Ven, 
1992) implies its embeddedness in time and necessity to give attention to 
dynamics. Therefore, a methodology of choice should encompass the temporal 
dimension to reflect the dynamic nature of strategy-making.   
The literature review demonstrated that there is relatively little systematic 
empirical knowledge about the actual (vs. prescribed) role of the corporate 
centre in strategy process.  Although we are armed with conceptual insights into 
the nature of strategy process and the corporate centre‘s role, scarcity of 
empirical data justifies an open-minded, explorative approach (Yin, 2009). In 
addition, the literature review demonstrated that, despite some progress in 
normative and theoretical research, there is little empirical knowledge about the 
particularities of strategy-making in Russia. Since the impact of context is  
potentially a highly important consideration for this particular research, the 
research methodology should help to capture the rich contextual phenomena 
and their impact on process (Chakravarthy and White, 2002).  Therefore, the 
study methodology should be based on an inductive, explorative research 
strategy and should facilitate capturing the dynamic nature of strategy process 
and the impact of the rich and peculiar strategy context.  
Longitudinal comparative case studies are recommended as the key method of 
strategy process research because they allow for a holistic approach, careful 
examination of concrete contexts and deep comparative analysis of cases 
rather than simple and abstract cross-sectional analysis of isolated variables 
(Pettigrew, 1992).  Other empirical methodologies employed in strategy-process 
research include cross-sectional studies relating varying characteristics of 
strategy context, process and outcomes (e.g. Hall & Saias, 1980; Rajapopalan 
et al., 1993). For example, a significant number of quantitative empirical studies 
sought to find a link between demographics of top management team, strategy 
process, context and outcomes (e.g. Papadaikis & Barwise, 2002; Bantel & 
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Wiersema, 1992). Focus on strategy as a state, rather than on its dynamics and 
evolution, is an important limitation of such cross-sectional, single-level 
methodologies. Such approaches cannot meet the modern demand for 
dynamic, comprehensive and context-conscious holistic enquiries 
(Chakravarthy and White, 2002). From a broader philosophical perspective, we 
can view such a holistic approach as a response to the most recent challenge to 
strategic management research to employ the research methodologies that 
combine elements of both strategic choice (as a rational and purposeful 
exercise underpinned by the role of a human actor) and strategic change, as 
more of an environmentally-determined, exogenous actor (Tsoukas and 
Khudsen, 2010).  
As discussed in the literature review, the ―configurational‖ school of strategy 
process research emphasises the importance of simultaneous attention to 
strategy process, content and context and identification of distinct 
―configurations‖ of strategy content, process and structure, as well as the 
importance of transitions from one configuration to another (Mintzberg et al, 
1998). This research employs this methodology since it meets the demand for a 
temporal focus, breadth and comprehensiveness of the enquiry and attention to 
the rich surrounding context.   
To summarise, we can define the study‘s methodology as a qualitative, 
explorative case study, initially on the basis of one company (we can extend it 
to other companies at the subsequent stages). The author preferred the 
explorative, single case study to a comparative multi-case study method 
recommended by Pettigrew (1992) to secure the necessary ―depth‖ of enquiry, 
address practical problems and take full advantage of his unique ―access‖ to the 
intimate world of strategy-making in a major Russian corporation. The 
explorative nature of the study as one of the pioneering enquiries into strategy 
making in Russian corporations means that the breadth of enquiry will be 
important. At the same time, because of the DBA programme structure, the 
study will be based upon two distinct empirical projects. The second empirical 
project may address the call for ―comparativism‖ by providing evidence from a 
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different setting or sample within the same organisation, thus helping to improve 
the study‘s internal validity.  
Because of its explorative nature, the study will be based on a more inductive 
research strategy, without any preconceived theory to test, prove or reject. 
There are no any ex-ante assumptions about the outcomes of data analysis. 
However, rich literature on strategy process does allow us to formulate specific 
questions that will define and characterise strategy process under investigation. 
Theoretical models of corporate centre involvement by Goold and Campbell 
(1987) and Ward et al (2005) can help to formulate the ex-ante questions which 
will help to determine the role of the corporate centre (see the conceptual 
framework at Figure 7). Therefore, the adopted approach is not completely free 
from the influence of previous research, as suggested by some radical 
grounded theory proponents (Glaser, 1992). Rather, the study design, 
methodology and questions are informed by previous research, but the novelty 
of the context justifies the explorative approach without any pre-formulated 
hypotheses to test.  
The study will explore the past and present of strategy process and will seek to 
identify the impact of particular contexts on the process. In other words, the 
study will aim to explore the underlying patterns, ―mechanisms‖ that cause the 
events in the social world (Collier, 1994). Changes in the level of volatility in the 
―emerging market‖ context of a transitioning Russian economy and highly 
concentrated ownership structure arguably represent the most distinctive 
external environment variables to explore in terms of their influence on the 
strategy process. At the same time, as Dobson (2002) observed, it is difficult to 
learn the objective underlying mechanisms directly, since people as social 
actors are inherently prone to subjective perceptions and judgements and 
influenced by personal history, social position, beliefs, preconceptions and 
mental maps. Therefore, one should recognise the need to consider this 
subjective, contextually embedded nature of peoples‘ perception of social 
reality. In particular, people may place different meanings to the concepts 
fundamental to this research, such as ―strategy‖ or ―external environment‖, 
159 
which may not reflect exactly the underlying social reality. Whilst recognising 
these limitations, the research will attempt through the systematic enquiry to 
contribute to moving towards understanding of underlying, ―objective‖ social 
mechanisms and forces. Therefore, the study will assume the “critical 
realism” epistemological position - although our knowledge of the reality is 
subject to social conditioning and we have to consider the social context very 
carefully. Through systematic scientific enquiry a researcher can and should 
identify the underlying mechanisms and patterns that define social activities 
(Bhaskar, 1989). The underlying assumption of critical realism is that social 
reality is dynamic and changing and should be studied and interpreted with 
temporal perspectives in mind (Saunders et al, 2007). This is consistent with the 
main premises of strategy process research methodology as advocated by 
Pettigrew and Mintzberg.     
Empirical Research Design  
The explorative, inductive nature of study calls for qualitative research methods 
that can effectively describe complex phenomena and rich contexts (Strauss 
and Corbin, 1998). Therefore, this study will aim to explore the role of the 
corporate centre in the strategy process whilst considering (obviously, at 
a lower level of detail) the external environment, organisational structure 
and content of strategies and their respective influence on the corporate 
strategy process. The study will adopt a historical perspective that 
recognises the dynamic nature of strategy and the importance of temporal 
development (Pettigrew, 1992).  
This methodology is manifested by the ―configurational‖ approach to strategy 
process research that examines the evolution of a complex ―configuration‖ of an 
organisation‘s strategy process, content, organisational structure and context 
(Mintzberg et al, 1998). Since the basic premise of the ―configurational‖ 
approach corresponds to the methodological choice of this study, they can be 
employed to inform the study design and methodology.  In-depth personal 
interviews are the main instrument in such enquiries (e.g. Miller, 1983; 
Mintzberg and McHughes, 1985; Grant, 2003). Interviews allow us to explore 
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complex issues and are appropriate when one needs to 1) understand the 
reasoning behind an interviewee‘s opinion, 2) find ways and means to influence 
the situation, and 3) discuss politically and commercially sensitive situations 
(Easterby-Smith et al, 2002).  The enquiry will be primarily based on in-depth 
interviews with the participants of strategy process. Analysis of previous 
studies helped to define key areas for investigation and formulate detailed 
research questions. Therefore, the interviews will be semi-structured, i.e. the 
interviewer will ask the same questions to all participants to allow for 
comparison of interview results and consistency in data gathering. At the same 
time, participants will be free to express their views on the relevance of certain 
questions and suggest additional themes which they consider important. The 
author will adopt these themes for further interviews and will include them in the 
question list, so that the interview structure will be sufficiently dynamic as 
advised by Easterby-Smith et al (2002). 
Given the inductive, explorative nature of the study, the choice of the interviews 
sample can be based on non-probability-related sampling techniques, with 
sample size and selection mostly based on the nature of questions and chosen 
epistemological position (Saunders at al., 2007). The sample scope should be 
sufficient to ensure that there is a broad representation of views, as required by 
―critical realist‖ epistemology (Easterby-Smith et al., 2002). Overall, the 
selection of interviewees will be based on the demand for relevance (ability of 
an interviewee to contribute to the discussion of the research questions), 
external validity (representation of a wide variety of views, as demanded by the 
adopted epistemological position) and ethical and access-related 
considerations. The sample size will be based on the ―saturation criterion‖, i.e. 
the interviews will be added until it is clear that inclusion of additional interviews 
doesn‘t add incremental ideas and concepts about the topic in question.  .    
 
The case study will also employ written materials (internal memos, strategy 
presentations, annual reports and, where relevant, external publications) 
as its instruments, particularly to investigate past periods (following the example 
of other similar studies in configurational tradition, e.g. Mintzberg and Waters, 
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1982). The research will base the identification of the external environment 
impact on strategy process upon key economic and industrial statistics of the 
Russian economy and Russian/global steel industry. 
 
Research scope:  A longitudinal case study of strategy making in a multi-
business industrial company:  
 
- Company scope: Severstal and a related ―Severstal Group‖, a multi-
business group, initially diversified from a single post-privatisation steel-
making plant into a number of both related and unrelated business; it later 
transformed into an international metals and mining company more clearly 
separated from unrelated businesses belonging to a majority owner, but with 
a distinct division into geography- and product-based business units. 
 
- Strategy scope:  Formation of corporate strategy of a parent company and 
role and involvement of the corporate centre in the formation of business 
strategies of business units. 
 
- Time span: From the first acquisitions and formation of a ―multi-business‖ 
group in 2001-2002, through IPO and formalisation of a metals and mining 
company to creation of a formal divisional structure in 2008 to the aftermath 
of the 2008 global economic crisis.  
Findings from the Literature Informing the Research Structure and 
Questions 
A number of previous studies helped to formulate research questions to 
structure the empirical enquiry. Wittington and Callouet (2008) call for ―going 
inside the black box‖ of strategy making and pay attention not only to 
performance outcomes and contextual variables, but to the process itself: how it 
is organised, and who are the process participants. In this case, the study will 
identify the participants in strategy making both in the corporate centre and 
business units and organisational structures of strategy such as departments, 
working groups and committees. Another fundamental characteristic of strategy 
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making refers to it as a deliberate, formal and structured vs. emerging, iterative 
and unstructured process (Mintzberg and Waters, 1985). It is arguably the most 
important variable in strategy process research, including the studies of multi-
business groups (Grant, 2003; Regner, 2003).  
The specific questions related to multi-business groups describe different 
roles for a corporate centre:  
 Establishing and controlling financial performance only, as 
opposed to setting corporate strategic priorities or, at the extreme, 
full involvement through centralised or centrally managed strategy 
creation (Goold and Campbell, 1987; Ward et al, 2005). 
 According to the more recent enquiries, the  role of the corporate 
centre can focus on the coordination of strategies and building 
alignment among business units (Grant, 2003), including through 
the informal mechanisms of unified corporate culture and values 
(Ward et al, 2005).  
 The importance of strategic agenda and purposes of the CEO 
(Ocasio and Joseph, 2008).      
Another focus area in the research agenda will be the impact of the internal and 
external context and the content of strategies on the strategy process and the 
corporate centre‘s role. Ocasio and Joseph (2008) showed how the role of the 
centre in GE changed from a more direct (centralised planning process) to a 
more indirect (financial performance targeting, strategic corporate initiatives on 
market share, quality, inter-divisional collaboration) because of a combination of 
a personal drive by the CEO and changing portfolio of businesses. Grant 
(2003), in his study of oil majors demonstrated that as the environment became 
more turbulent, the role of a corporate centre shifted from close management to 
formulation of strategic priorities, performance control and internal alignment-
building, whilst business-level strategy was left at the business units‘ discretion. 
Recognizing that the role of a corporate centre will change in response to 
external economic pressures, the study will demonstrate how changes in 
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the Russian business environment may have impacted the nature of a 
corporate centre’s strategy making. The environment evolved from the 
extreme volatility and uncertainty to a more constructive and stable environment 
in the second part of President Putin‘s term, 2004-08, as demonstrated by key 
macro indicators, but remained challenging in terms of key market institutions, 
inducing short-termism and facilitating entrepreneurial, intuitive behaviour.  
An important practical question emerging from both the academic literature and 
business press concerns the effectiveness and optimal level of involvement of 
corporate centres managing diversified corporations. In the particularities of the 
Russian business environment, much popular and political attention was given 
to the issues of the purposes of owners-managers of large corporations 
(―oligarchs‖). The debate centred around whether their focus was mostly on 
maximisation of short-term financial cash flows or on the long-term development 
with maximisation of the assets‘ long-term value. In academic literature, the call 
for a proactive role of a corporate centre is perhaps best manifested by the 
debate between the proponents of a more classical ―shareholder-style‖ 
corporate centre and the one which is deeply involved in managing the 
corporation and its ―company-wide‖ competences (Prahalad & Hamel, 1990). 
This debate is reflected in the section on the empirical studies and concepts of 
the corporate centre‘s role. Scholars increasingly criticised the view of a 
corporate centre as a diversifier of risks and portfolio manager increasingly in 
the 1980s and 1990s (De Witt & Meyer, 2004) since financial markets can do 
this work better. However, this role may still be important for the emerging 
markets, where financial markets are less developed and property rights are not 
as well-guaranteed (Wright et al, 2005), calling for diversification through 
acquisitions of companies rather than shares and the use of a corporate centre 
as a control vehicle over a business units‘ managers. At the same time, it is 
important to note that ―proactivity‖ of a corporate centre does not necessarily 
imply close management and formalised processes and roles. A corporate 
centre may add value through indirect involvement, for example by providing a 
unifying mission and vision and challenging strategic targets, by creating a 
sense of belonging among the top managers. This kind of corporate centre 
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makes up the most sustainable ―creative configuration‖, which is the most 
difficult to imitate (Ward et al, 2005). Of course, this centre is also a true leader, 
moving the company ahead rather than passively observing and shifting the 
portfolio of assets. In light of these academic, political and business 
considerations, one of the questions to test in the empirical project will be 
the nature of the corporate centre’s involvement. Does it act as a passive 
and detached “shareholder” or proactive and involved leader, which is 
determined to pull the company ahead?  This will be particularly interesting 
in light of the political debate in Russia about the role of ―oligarchs‖. Are they 
just beneficiaries who milk the assets obtained during the privatisation 
(―shareholder-style‖), or active managers determined to develop their 
companies for the long-term (―proactive‖ style).  
Figure 7 summarises the conceptual framework informing the enquiry, including 
the specific questions for investigation.  
Figure 7. Focus of the enquiry - Strategy Process in an emergent market multi-business 
firm with concentrated ownership structure 
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To summarise, the literature review provided additional focus to the original 
research question on the basis of the literature gap analysis and the 
methodology.  
For the empirical enquiry, the basic research question… 
How did the role of the corporate centre in the strategy making process evolve 
in Severstal over the ten year period since its emergence as a multi-business 
corporation and until the aftermath of the 2008 global economic crisis?   
…was further developed by a number of supplementary research 
questions emerging on the basis of literature review. These questions 
helped to locate the findings in the context of strategy process concepts. They 
form the foundation of semi-structured interviews in the empirical stage of which 
the following questions emerged:  
1. What is the degree of centralisation of strategy process and to what 
extent was the corporate centre involved in shaping business 
strategies of business units? In particular, was the corporate centre 
role built primarily around: 1) setting and controlling financial 
performance targets only, 2) setting corporate objectives whilst 
leaving business-level strategy to business units and 3) centralising 
strategy in the centre and closely managing the strategy process? 
2. Can we describe the strategy process in Severstal as primarily 
structured and deliberate vs. emerging and ad-hoc?  
3. Who are the participants on the corporate and business unit level and 
what are the organisational structures involved in strategy 
development?  
4. Context impact: Can we identify the influence of the external 
environment of Russia on the strategy process, considering 
underdeveloped market institutions throughout the study period, the 
challenging macroeconomic environment in the first half of the 2000s 
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and the economic boom in the second part of President Putin‘s term 
in 2004-08?  
5. Can we untangle the impact of the highly concentrated ownership 
structure and heavy involvement of the CEO (majority shareholder) in 
business management? Was his leadership proactive or reactive, i.e. 
was the prime purpose to control the assets as a passive shareholder 
interested in short-term financial returns, or as an active owner-
manager focused on the long-term standing of the company? 
6. How does the observed involvement of the corporate centre in 
strategy process relate to the models of the corporate centre role by 
Goold and Campbell (1987, 1993 a,b) and Ward et al (2005)?  
Reliability and Validity 
The key limitation concerns the status of the researcher as an active employee 
involved in the strategy making as head of the corporate strategy department. 
This raises obvious implications for the research reliability. The researcher‘s 
position in the corporate centre may have an obvious and clear impact on 
interviewees‘ sincerity, particularly for those on an equal or lower position in the 
organisational hierarchy. As company employees, interviewees may not be fully 
open about their thinking on the company business processes and the CEO‘s 
role because of concerns about their careers.  
Unfortunately, some of these biases would be very difficult to mitigate. On the 
other hand, they are a flipside of the study‘s great advantage – full access to the 
key decision-makers, independent of their position within the organisation. 
Given the Russian business climate, prevailing culture of secrecy, intimate 
nature of strategy process and low proliferation of management research into 
the world of Russian business, we can consider this access a unique advantage 
which would not be easy to replicate in any foreseeable future, well worth the 
abovementioned limitations.  To include former employees wherever possible 
was instrumental in mitigating any biases since they have less 
attachment/dependency on the company and interviewer.  Taping, transcription 
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and subsequent systematic coding of interviews helped to mitigate the potential 
personal bias problem.    
Validity of the research undertaken from a relativist position is supported by 
inclusion of a wide variety of viewpoints (Easterby-Smith et al, 1998). This 
research validity will be supported by the inclusion in the interview sample of 
employees from different organisational levels (from CEO to line strategy 
managers) and different regions (Russia, US, Italy), inclusion of former 
employees and, potentially, an extension of the study to other organisations.  
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IMPLICATIONS FOR PROJECT 2 (EMPIRICAL PROJECT I) 
Methodology: Explorative qualitative longitudinal case study 
Methodology is informed by the ―configurational‖ approach to strategy process 
research: looking at evolution over time at the organisation‘s strategy process, 
content, organisational structure and context (Mintzberg et al, 1998). The author 
will base the methodology of the longitudinal case study approach on 
Pettigrew‘s (1992) methodological framework with additions from Chakravarthy 
& Doz (1992) and Wittington and Callouet (2008). A case study by Grant (2003) 
provides useful examples of methodology on data collection, interview 
structuring and formulation of relevant questions to capture strategy formulation 
phenomenon. The author developed the preliminary framework for the interview 
questionnaires from the previous literature.  
 
Scope:  A longitudinal case study of strategy making in a multi-business 
industrial company:  
 
- Company scope: Severstal and a related ―Severstal Group‖, a multi-
business group, initially diversified from a single post-privatisation steel-
making plant into a number of both related and unrelated business; it later 
transformed into an international metals and mining company more clearly 
separated from unrelated businesses belonging to a majority owner, but with 
a distinct division into geography- and product-based business units. 
 
- Strategy scope:  Formation of corporate strategy of a parent company and 
role and involvement of a corporate centre in the formation of business 
strategies of business units. 
 
- Time span: From the first acquisitions and formation of multi-business 
structures in 1999-2000 through IPO and formalisation of a metals and 
mining company to creation of a formal divisional structure in 2008. 
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―Our strategy is to create more EBITDA‖ 
Severstal CEO, December 2006 
 
Chapter 3 
3. Project II. Role of the Corporate Centre in Strategy 
Process: An Empirical Investigation 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Interview analysis 
This section introduces the empirical part of the research and describes the 
process of data collection and analysis. Figure 8 outlines the process that the 
author adopted in the empirical part of the research.  
Figure 8. Outline of Empirical Research Procedure 
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The adopted methodology of an explorative longitudinal case study is 
underpinned by the importance of context (emerging markets, concentrated 
ownership), lack of empirical studies and articulated hypotheses concerning the 
particularities of corporate centre role in such context and necessity to employ 
dynamic, complex and multi-layered longitudinal methodology to explore 
process-based phenomena (Tsoukas and Khudsen, 2010). Explorative nature 
of the study also corresponds to the call for a more ―open world‖, inclusive 
methodology that should be adopted in process studies as opposed to the 
cross-sectional, ―closed-world‖, quantitative methodology mostly focused on 
linking static process and context characteristics to outcomes.  
Interviews are considered to be the primary source of rich, contextually 
embedded data for the research (Glaser and Strauss, 1967). The interviews will 
be semi-structured around the key research questions identified in the literature 
review as the useful instruments to describe the basic properties of existing 
strategy-making process and describe the role of corporate centre in a 
systematic way. The interviewer will ask the same broad set of questions and 
topics to all participants to allow for comparison of interview results and 
consistency in data gathering. At the same time, participants will be free to 
express their views on the relevance of certain questions and suggest additional 
themes that they consider important. These themes will be adopted for further 
interviews and included in the question list, so that the interview structure is 
sufficiently dynamic as advised by Easterby-Smith et al (2002). Where relevant 
in the interview flow, respondents were encouraged to reflect on their 
experiences in a free, narrative form, not just answering questions, but telling 
stories, giving real-life examples and critically reflecting upon the organisational 
reality. Such a narrative approach provides rich sources of first-hand data in the 
social frameworks pertinent to the real people experiences (Baumeister and 
Newman, 1994). Narrative conversations include information about personal 
interpretations and meanings, essential for contextually-conscious, in-depth 
interpretative research (Pettigrew, 1992).    
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The author used documentary data and external environment data as a 
background and supporting information in order to 1) secure a well-informed 
interviewee as a knowledgeable partner in the interviews and 2) facilitate data 
analysis and interpretation.      
Once the author had recorded and transcribed the interviews, systematic data 
structuring and analysis followed. As a first step, each interview was analyzed 
separately and key concepts (themes and interpretation) were captured and 
systematized (see Appendices 4 and 5 for detailed takeaways). As a second 
step, the author synthesized the conclusions from every interview to arrive at 
overarching case conclusions. The author paid careful attention to capturing 
differences in interpretation and contrarian perspectives where they were 
present. After the data synthesis and interpretation, the author related the final 
conclusions back to the research themes emerging from the literature. The 
author highlighted areas of consensus and divergence with previous findings 
and identified potential contributions to knowledge. The author further 
investigated the most interesting and promising conclusions (from a contribution 
standpoint) in greater detail in the follow-up stage.  
Interview Sample Selection, Recording and Conduct  
For the purposes of Empirical Project I, the author contacted fourteen potential 
interviewees. Of those, twelve responded positively, but one interview did not 
materialise due to logistical and time constraints of the prospective interviewee. 
The author conducted all interviews in the period from January to April 2010. 
For Empirical Project II, the author contacted and interviewed eight people in 
the period from August to October 2010.  
The author determined the approach to ―group sample‖ selection by 
considerations of relevance to the issue at hand, methodological soundness 
(representing a diversity of views) and subjective estimation of the probability of 
quality access. Therefore, the overall approach was non-probability, purposive 
sampling, with the main aim to enable the author to answer the research 
questions (Saunders at al, 2007).  
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The first iteration of sampling regarded a potential interviewee‘s capacity to 
discuss the research problem. To qualify as an informed participant, he or she 
should have been involved in the strategy-related activity. A preliminary 
assumption, conformed by the pilot interview, was that in Severstal‘s reality, 
only the members of the top corporate team and first-tier members of the 
business units teams were involved in strategy-related discussions and 
activities. Therefore, a potential pool of interviewees was limited to the top team 
members in the corporate centre and business units. In addition, a lower-level 
―strategy professionals‖ (i.e. mid-level staff members working in ―strategy-
related‖ Strategy and M&A departments) were added to the list, in order to 
secure a broader representation of views not limited to the top team, as 
discussed in the methodology section. 
To gain a better insight into the topic, the author included all corporate and 
business units‘ directors for strategy on the interview short list. All of them 
agreed to participate. For ethical and bias-related purposes, all current or 
former direct reports of the author were excluded from the pool of potential 
interviewees.            
The ―critical realist‖ epistemological position employed by the author also 
influenced the approach to the interviewee sample selection. This approach 
calls to include a sufficient number of different perspectives into the sample to 
secure external validity. To comply, the author ensured that there was an 
appropriate balance of corporate centre and business units‘ employees, as well 
as a broad representation of geographies, in terms of both location and areas of 
responsibility. In addition, the author endured that the sample included former 
employees (to mitigate a ―participant bias‖), as well as the employees from 
outside of Severstal proper (i.e. the representatives of companies from the 
―Severstal Group‖ business group which belonged to the same majority 
shareholder and shared their management company with Severstal prior to 
official separation of ―core‖ and ―non-core‖ businesses in 2006).  
The longitudinal nature of the study also meant that length of stay in the 
company was an important selection criterion. Ideally, an interview should have 
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covered the whole period of interest, from early 2000s untill 2009. Therefore, 
the author preferred to interview those employees who started their career in 
senior or strategy-related positions earlier, although in reality there were very 
few such people. In addition, the author ensured that there was a balance 
between coverage of earlier and later periods. Involvement of former employees 
also greatly facilitated a proper coverage of earlier stages.     
Finally, once these considerations were used to limit the potential choice, the 
author used a subjective judgement to evaluate ease of access and opportunity 
for a high-quality, open and detailed dialogue.  
In order to facilitate potential demographic analysis and cross-interview 
comparison of diverse perspectives, the author referenced each interview by a 
number of characteristics, including interview date, duration, interviewee‘s 
position in the company (the last occupied in the case of former employees), 
interviewee‘s position in the corporate centre or business unit, interviewee‘s 
primary location and region of responsibility (where relevant, in case the 
responsibility is company-wide, it is considered to be ―global‖). The author 
assigned each interview a unique reference number reflecting the interviewee‘s 
position in either the corporate centre or business unit and his or her region(s) 
of primary responsibility.     
Table 21. Characteristics of Interviews 
Interview 
Reference 
Number 
Interview 
Date 
Interview 
Duration 
Interviewee 
Title 
Corporate 
Centre/ 
Business 
Unit 
Prime 
Location 
Region(s) of 
Responsibility 
CGUE1 26.01.2010 1 h 05 
min 
Deputy CEO 
for Strategy 
and Business 
Development 
C Russia Global, USA, 
Europe 
 
Prior to the meeting, each interviewee received a written request, outlining the 
purpose of the research project, results achieved to date, interview structure, 
key questions and confidentiality terms. To ensure internal validity, the author 
conducted all interviews using the same tools and sets of questions, although 
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the author asked interviewees to feel free to expand on any topic they find 
relevant or skip those where they don‘t feel to be competent enough (see 
question list and interview debrief in the Appendix). The author requested each 
interviewee to allocate at least one hour for a meeting, but did not place 
restrictions on the interview duration. Interview length will depend entirely on 
interviewees‘ time limitations and the speed and relevance of discussion.   
Interviewees received guarantees of confidentiality and were assured that the 
author would only reveal their responses to the relevant members of Cranfield 
University faculty and external examiners, who in turn are limited by 
confidentiality restrictions. Even then, interviewees‘ names would not be 
revealed.    
To address the internal confidentiality implications and facilitate cooperation, the 
author suggested substituting in the transcribed tapes all real company names 
with symbols, only outlining their industry and relative size (particularly when 
M&A deals are mentioned). Similarly, the author substituted people‘s names for 
ethical purposes in the places describing instances such asconflict, mistakes, 
and controversial relationships. Whenever possible, the author conducted the 
interviews in English.  
The author asked interviewees if they would consent to taping and further 
transcribing the interviews. Of the eleven cases, eight agreed to recorded 
interviews. The author captured responses of the other three through field notes 
during and immediately after an interview.  
Pilot Interview 
Apart from the trial of the author‘s basic interviewing skills and approach, the 
author conducted the pilot interview to test the thematic structure identified in 
the literature review. The author modified (augmented) the structure if additional 
significant topics were to emerge from the pilot interview. The author selected a 
well-informed former employee for the pilot interview to minimise the bias 
related to the author‘s current employment status with the company.  
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 Since the interviewee was a particularly well-informed and long-serving 
member of the top management team in the company of interest, the author 
also discussed with him the selection of other interviewees to address to the 
research objectives and methodology.     
Author’s Position at the Interview 
Prior to a pilot interview and three initial interviews, the author asked 
interviewees to disregard, to the extent possible, the author‘s position and 
experience within the company, and attempt to answer the questions as if they 
were asked by a stranger. However, this approach did not seem to work well in 
the pilot interview, as well as in many other cases. Interviewees referred to 
some common experiences, assumed the author‘s familiarity with the 
company‘s assets, strategic challenges, and sometimes explicitly referred to the 
author as part of the analysed structure (―participants in the strategy making 
process – CEO, heads of divisions, your department, CFO, Deputy CEO for 
strategy‖ – CG3 interview). Therefore, the author adopted a more natural 
approach and neither pretended to be a complete stranger to a company, nor 
attempted to bring into discussion his experience or point of view. The author 
took particular care on the latter point.He did not bring into discussion anything 
coming from his own work experience. Instead, the author adopted the position 
of a ―well-informed outsider‖ who has completed significant research about the 
company from open sources and approached an interview with a good 
understanding of company asset structure, history and management – as much 
as one could derive from the open sources. The purpose of this examination 
was to prepare for the interview and subsequent analysis in order to have a 
productive discussion with interviewees and better understand any implicit 
references to the past and present corporate circumstances.  
Documentary Evidence 
In order to preserve objectivity, the author looked upon himself as an outsider 
rather than as a company employee having privileged access to internal 
materials. Therefore, he limited the documentary search to public documents 
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only. This started with an investigation of available online sources on the 
company website. As a next step, the author contacted the company PR 
department and requested, and where available, received older documents 
(dating from approximately 1999 to 2006) that were no longer available at the 
current version of the website.  
The author used the following sources of data about the company before the 
interviews began: 
- Current company website – press releases, ―company history‖ and 
―company structure and assets‖ sections  
- An old version of the company website (as of 30.12.2006) – ―company 
history‖ and ―structure‖ sections 
- Selected external presentations: Severstal Eurobond offering March-April 
2004, Severstal-Arcelor Investor Day Presentation 22.06.2006, IPO Analyst 
Presentation 25.09.2006, Severstal Corporate Presentation, February 2007.  
- Annual reports 2005-07 (2008 report was not published) 
The identified characteristics included (where possible, for the period 2000-
2009): 
- Assets composition (key business units, geographies and products) 
- Key historical corporate events (acquisitions, disposals, changes in 
management structure or shareholders composition) 
- Communicated strategy content, including strengths and weaknesses 
assessment and reasoning behind major strategic steps  
- Key financial and operational performance indicators  
External Environment Data 
In addition, the author collected key quantitative data about the external 
environment, both national (Russia) and industrial (steel, iron ore and coking 
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coal industries) in order to facilitate better understanding of the company‘s 
external circumstances (2000-2009 and earlier periods for reference):   
- Annual GDP growth, dollar-nominated GDP per head and annual inflation in 
Russia 
- Global prices and production volumes for steel, iron ore and coking coal 
industries 
- Consolidated profits of the global steel industry   
During the interview, the author only brought into discussion those points which 
he could learn from these open sources (e.g. ―What about this or that business 
unit‖? ―Why did you decide to acquire abroad in 2004‖?) In line with the adaptive 
nature of an in-depth semi-structured interview method, the author also asked 
interviewees‘ opinions about the most important concepts/propositions derived 
from the previous interviews, in case an interviewee did not address them on 
his own initiative. At the same time, the author ensured that he broadly asked 
the same set of questions at each interview to ensure compatibility and 
structuring of the data set.  
Data Analysis  
Interview Analysis 
As a first step, the author translated all recorded interviews that he conducted in 
Russian into English. He then carefully reviewed every interview and noted all 
references to the topic of research interest in the text at the end of a 
corresponding sentence. He could then make a brief comment on the topic and 
glean a potential ―takeaway‖ from this quote which he then inserted in the note 
on the document‘s margins. The author identified all themes/ideas relevant to 
the research regardless of whether they were important. The author duly noted 
and captured every piece of text in the transcribed interviews and interview 
notes in the analysis stage to ensure accurate reflection of participants‘ views 
exactly as they expressed them in the interviews.  
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Once the author carefully read the interview and identified relevant references, 
the author captured, described and organised them around key themes in a 
spreadsheet. An Excel document was created with a separate sheet devoted to 
each interview (abbreviated after an interviewee‘s codename). First, a quote 
was inserted. Then, ―comments and analysis‖ was added to each quote – 
comments made on the document‘s margin concerning potential relevance and 
underlying meaning of the expressed idea. Once a quote was identified and 
analyzed in this way, it became clear which idea, or ―concept‖ could be inferred 
from it – essentially, a ―concept‖ was a brief conclusion, essence of an idea 
expressed in the interview. The author later used ―concepts‖ as a prime unit of 
analysis at the synthesis stage. These were instrumental in arriving at overall 
conclusions from the interviews (see illustrative interview analysis in Appendix 
3).  
All concepts were grouped into major ―topics‖ - the high-level thematic blocks 
defining the nature of strategy process and corporate centre involvement. 
These topics emerged from the literature review and were used to construct 
interview questions and ensure comprehensive coverage of all major elements 
identified as important in the earlier academic studies (see ―interview questions‖ 
in the Appendix). Using the ―literature topics‖ as a unit of consolidation was 
useful since it allowed to structure the data analysis around key literature 
―themes‖ and therefore facilitated identification of potential new perspectives 
adding to the previous research. The allocation of interviewees‘ views and 
positions within a particular thematic structure allowed to make sense and 
effectively interpret the participants‘ stories (Czarniawska and Gagliardi, 2003).   
Synthesis of Conclusions 
Once all interviews were analyzed, and data from each interview were duly 
systematised in the spreadsheet, the synthesis stage began. The purpose of 
this stage was to combine the individual interview insights into comprehensive 
conclusions for the case as a whole. As part of the synthesis process, the 
author identified areas of consensus and divergence which can arguably serve 
as a guide to the relative strength and validity of the case conclusions.  
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The author synthesised the material on the principle of bringing together 
contrasting and comparing ―concepts‖ that addressed the same narrow 
question. The author created a ―summary‖ sheet to reflect the overall 
conclusions and demonstrate which interviews mentioned and supported or 
rejected these conclusions. The author structured the concepts around the 
same topics as in the interview analysis. One of the purposes of constructing 
this database, and carefully describing each step in the analysis and synthesis 
stage was to ensure a high level of reliability of the study as one can easily 
replicate the same process in a different setting. Clearly explaining the step-by-
step analysis to support the conclusions is also important for the study validity 
(Yin, 1994).  
 The process started with the first interview (the pilot CGUE1 was selected as a 
starting point due to its comprehensiveness), a certain concept was selected 
and then every one of the remaining interviews‘ analysis was searched for a 
similar concept addressing similar research question. Once all interviews were 
looked through, a prevailing thought/conclusion was becoming apparent . The 
author then formulated and placed this in the ―conclusions‖ column. This 
approach is in line with the categorisation algorithm suggested by Spiggle 
(1994). In case an interview supported the ―overall‖ conclusion, the author 
assigned it a ―+‖ sign. If an interviewee expressed a contrarian view, the author 
assigned it a ―-‖. In case there was no mentioning of a particular concept, the 
author left it blank. This data organisation technique is similar to the ―charting‖ 
approach that Ritchie and Spencer (2002) describe. It allows the researcher to 
capture conflicting perspectives expressed about the themes in question and, 
therefore, helps to capture the complexity of a theme and organisational 
environment. This richness is important to the validity from the ―critical realist‖ 
standpoint which asks the researcher to ensure that he adequately reflects all 
views and perspectives in the analysis.    
This simple approach allowed the author to highlight and, to a certain extent, 
assess quantitatively two important considerations about the internal validity of 
a certain concept:  
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1) Is the concept universally recognised (observed) within the company? The 
higher the number of interviews that mentioned it, the stronger the concept‘s 
recognition, and, arguably, the more accurately it reflects organisational 
phenomenon.  
2) The degree of consensus about a particular concept within the company. 
The higher the level of coherence between different interviews, i.e. the 
smaller the percentage of contrarian perspectives, the more accurately this 
concept reflects the organisational phenomenon in question. 
 
Naturally, we should treat this ―quantitative‖ assessment with a high degree of 
caution. The number of interviews is too small to make any meaningful 
quantitative conclusions, whilst objectivity of respondents‘ judgements can be 
influenced by personal and social constraints, so that the same phenomenon 
can be interpreted differently by people with different backgrounds, experiences 
or places in organisational structure and hierarchy. Nevertheless, one can 
interpret the strong ―showing‖ of a particular concept in many interviews as a 
certain guide to a relative ―strength‖ of this concept.         
The author selected a number of the most characteristic and well-articulated 
quotes to illustrate the conclusions. He also added comments and analysis 
informing the concepts to illustrate the thinking process behind the final 
conclusions.  
In cases when the author identified and substantiated clearly expressed 
contrarian perspectives, he mentioned them in the conclusions as 
exceptions/outliers, informing the discussion and highlighting underlying 
complexity.  
The systematisation process required a ―creative leap‖ as the author identified 
similar concepts from different interviews and ―merged‖ them together to form 
an overarching conclusion. It was important to grasp commonalities among 
concepts, but also not to miss important particularities and details, combine 
analysis and conclusions from every interview to arrive at an overall conclusion. 
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This process was not particularly difficult given the deep familiarity with the texts 
and fresh recollections about the interviews.     
 Once the author identified and described the overarching conclusions, they 
were further grouped into more general themes (topics), similarly to the 
groupings he made when analysing the individual interviews.  
Capturing Temporal Dimensions 
We can broadly structure further analysis of available conclusions around two 
dimensions. The first is the ―content‖ dimension which asks questions such as 
how has the company organised the strategy process, who participated in it,  
and what was the role of corporate centre. A careful look at the conclusions 
highlights the importance of another critical dimension – temporal development, 
i.e. change in content characteristics over time. This distinction is absolutely 
necessary to capture the complexity of the strategy process phenomena in line 
with the demand for time-embeddedness analysis and longitudinal nature of 
strategy process research (Pettigrew, 1992). The configurational approach to 
strategy process research (from Mintzberg et al, 1998) calls for identification of 
specific periods and capturing configurations of process characteristics for 
every period. Luckily, the richness of data and attention to the temporal aspects 
at the interview stage facilitated delineation of periods for every major thematic 
category (―topic‖). Careful investigation of conclusions made within every topic 
allowed the author to 1) identify differences between observed phenomena in 
different periods, 2) where possible, identify bifurcation points separating these 
periods and 3) suggest underlying reasons behind this observed evolution. 
Table 2 summarises the ―content‖ conclusions and initial periodisation per topic. 
Once  the author identified periods within the major topic, the next and final 
synthesis stage included application of these periods to the company strategy 
process as a whole (Table 3).  Figure 9 summarises the overall data analysis 
and synthesis process.  
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Figure  9. Data analysis and synthesis process 
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Interview Analysis: Summary of Conclusions  
During the first stage of the research (January-April 2010), 11 in-depth 
interviews were conducted, in line with the original interview plan. This volume 
of interviews is considered to be sufficient since it 1) helped to achieve a rather 
broad representation of different functions and regions – to be discussed in the 
section on reliability and 2) brought the author to the point when the 
interviewees, however different their background was, started to repeat 
themselves – virtually no new concepts were appearing in the new interviews in 
addition to what was already brought in by the previous ones. This state has 
highlighted the possibility of reaching a sufficient ―saturation point‖ in the 
interview-based research which demonstrates that the author had covered a 
sufficient number of perspectives. This is in line with the demand of the critical 
realist‗s epistemological position  that  there is a sufficiently broad 
representation of viewpoints (Easterby-Smith et al, 2002), but the addition of 
data does not seem to allow us to enrich our conclusions in any major way.  
Another demand of critical realism is that our knowledge of the reality is subject 
to social conditioning and we have to consider the social context very carefully 
(Bhaskar, 1989) – will be addressed in the discussion stage.  
Elaborated conclusions from the data analysis are summarized in Tables 22 
and 23.   
  
184 
Table 22. Summary of conclusions, including breakdown by stages  
Topic 
(Thematic Category) 
Conclusions Informing the Research Questions 
Strategy Making Team Stage I.  
- Entrepreneurial "partnership" – five top managers and 
partners making all important decisions among 
themselves 
o Taking care of all assets, regardless of the 
industry 
o Three out of five partners perform roles of 
corporate managers and business unit leaders 
at the same time 
o Significant input, but not overall a decisive role 
of ―Deputy CEO for Strategy‖, ad-hoc and 
unstructured decision making 
o Very small strategy staff at the corporate 
centre, playing a minor support role 
- Main shareholder ultimately making all final decisions  
o However, genuine or at least formal 
consensus was sought and, in fact, required to 
make a final decision 
- "Overstretch" and ―loss of drive‖ by the small top 
management team as the company became bigger 
and made the old team unable to cope with 
management challenges 
Stage II.  
- Decision making is led by the main shareholder 
o Management board consisting of 
approximately 10 members involved in 
decision making at the corporate level 
o Separation of decision making structure, 
including decision making teams, for the 
‖core‖ – Severstal proper -  and other 
businesses: emergence of de-facto two 
corporate centres, with some people working 
in two simultaneously 
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Strategy-making teams at business units: 
- Decision making was concentrated among a very 
small circle of top managers 
o Including BU CEO, Director for Strategy 
(where it existed), CFO, and some other key 
officers (such as Sales Director and Technical 
Director in one case) 
o In Cherepovetz, overseas steel subsidiaries 
and in automotive business, in Stage I 
strategy process was led by a corresponding 
―partner‖ 
o Included a minority shareholder in one 
subsidiary  
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Strategic Decision Making 
Process (Nature of) 
- Ad-hoc, opportunistic approach to strategic decisions, 
especially in Stage I. 
o Concerning, first of all, M&A decisions at both 
Stage I and II 
o CAPEX decisions - case-by-case resource 
allocation process in Stage I; more structured 
process of strategic discussions with BUs in 
Stage 2.   
o For non-core assets, very opportunistic 
approach to acquisition with minimum formal 
analysis and very rapid decision making 
 
- Unstructured, informal strategic decision making 
process at Stage I: 
o However, one BU officer commented that 
Cherepovetz BU has always had a rather well-
structured and formalised strategy (business 
plan) review process  
- More formal, relatively more structured process of 
―strategy/strategic business plan review‖ with 
business units in Stage II 
 
- Absence of formal or informal shared vision and well-
defined corporate strategic objectives for the 
company 
 
- Expansion and diversification driven by: 
o Perceived management capabilities 
(turnaround of troubled assets), especially 
characteristic for Stage II  
o Pressure from ―cheap money‖ and desire to 
grow at Stage II  
 
- Long time horizon, long-term orientation (10 years in 
investment planning and 5 years in M&A analysis); 
varying (2-5 years) expected payback period 
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Role of the Corporate 
Centre 
Stage I.  
 
- All important decisions were made by the 
―partnership‖ – de-facto ―5-people-strong‖ corporate 
centre 
o Very small corporate support team 
o Beyond the top circle, very little/no corporate 
influence, no ―corporate machine‖; established 
strategy-related routines or traditions  
 
- High role of CEO, his involvement, personal traits and 
leadership is repeatedly emphasised as the ultimate 
factor behind strategic decision making  
o Search for consensus among the decision 
making team by CEO as a prerequisite to 
decision making  
 
- Very high discretion and role of Business Units in 
creating own development plans and strategic 
alternatives 
o  Main shareholder involved in review/approval 
process only 
o No ex-ante financial or strategic goals set by 
the corporate centre 
o Very informal review/approval process  
 
- At the same time, typically the shareholder went into 
great details in his discussions with business units 
(concerning not only strategic, but also, and first of all, 
operational performance). The involvement was 
particularly intensive at the ―turnaround‖ stage at 
Cherepovetz and other Russian assets. 
 
Transition to Stage II:  
 
- Formal separation of corporate management for 
―core‖ – Severstal proper - and ―non-core‖ assets (all 
others)  
 
- Push for a more decisive role of the corporate centre; 
resistance of business units to centralisation 
 
- Corporate standards as a means of ensuring best 
practice dissemination and conformity 
o Corporate University was seen as a means to 
ensure common standards, but their 
adaptation was, at best, very slow 
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Role of the External 
Environment 
- Typically ―Russian‖ external environment was not 
considered an important factor in shaping strategic 
decisions 
o Some influence on intention to invest abroad 
o High volatility did not hinder long-term focus of 
planning 
 
- Highly favourable external industrial and financial 
environment (i.e. high profits from steel and mining, 
cheap credit at the financial markets), pressure to 
―find deals for cash‖ was seen as a cause for 
opportunistic, intuitive M&A decisions abroad 
conducted without detailed analysis and stress-testing 
as every steel-related investment seemed to be 
creating value  
 
- Certain (rather limited) government influence on 
strategic decisions in Russia, in the form of non-
binding ―suggestions‖ or as a ―background‖ thought 
about company priorities. 
 
Table 23. Overall periodisation of strategy process development and corporate centre role  
(Inferred from the periods reflected for every major thematic construct).  
Periods in Company 
Development  
2000-2009 
Summary of Strategy Process Attributes  
and Corporate Centre Role(s) 
Transition to  
Stage I: 
Diversification  [2000-
2002] 
 
- Initially, all acquisitions, including diversification-related, 
were made on the balance of the Cherepovetz steel plant – 
Cherepovetz and its top team were the ―corporate centre‖ 
for all the assets  
 
- In 2002, Severstal-Group was formally established as a 
―corporate centre‖ and the top team of five partners 
transferred from Cherepovetz to the new company  
Severstal Group remained very compact and lean 
Stage I – Partnership  
[2002-mid-2006] 
 
- All strategic decisions are made by the five ―partners‖ with 
the main shareholder making the final decision 
 
- Very entrepreneurial, ad-hoc and quick decision-making 
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- Development initiatives coming mostly bottom-up from 
business units in their respective fields (their industry, their 
region…), corporate centre focused mostly on external 
growth opportunities, especially on steel acquisitions 
abroad and broad diversification in Russia 
- Corporate centre only involved in review and approval of 
business units‘ plans  
o CEO going into deep details during the review; 
Deputy Director General for Strategy and First 
Deputy Director are mentioned as those also 
involved in strategic discussions  
o Combination of corporate roles and roles as heads 
of business units for the members of ―partnership‖  
 
- Relatively unstructured and ad-hoc process of strategic 
discussions with business units (exception: Cherepovetz), 
operational and strategic discussions become clearly 
separated only by the end of the period 
Transition to  
Stage II: 
Professionalisation 
[Mid 2006-mid 2006] 
 
Previous management system started being perceived as 
ineffective because of two basic reasons: 
 
- Failure to succeed in the merger bid for a European major 
company, Arcelor, demonstrated weakness of loose, 
unstructured, entrepreneurially-managed company 
o No consolidated financials 
o No common plans or visible strategy 
o No integrated assets 
 
- Failure of the ―partnership‖ system to work effectively with 
a much bigger and more complex company 
o Too big for five people to comprehend all details 
and make all strategic decisions 
o Impossible to cope with management of business 
units and corporate responsibilities at the same 
time (for the three of five partners) 
o Desire of former partners to change their 
position/status (―loss of drive‖ about their former 
role)  
 
To respond to these challenges, over the latter part of 2006-
early 2007,  the main shareholder has completely reorganised 
the management system and made the company public 
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through an IPO in November 2006.  
 
 
 
Stage II: Corporation 
[late 2006-late 
2008/2009] 
- CEO still playing ultimate role in strategic decision making 
o Professional ―salaried‖ managers – members of the 
formal Management Board - came up as a certain 
―substitution‖ for the former partnership system. 
However, it was perceived that they only played an 
advisory role, and the CEO made all decisions by 
himself. 
 
- Decision making process remains rather ad-hoc and 
opportunistic for M&A deals, but becomes somewhat more 
formalised for CAPEX (internal growth) decisions. 
 
- Perceived higher ―intervention‖ from the corporate centre, 
but strategy process is still very much bottom-up  
o Still no financial or strategic goals set from the 
centre 
o CEO is about the only ―constant‖ participant in the 
strategy review process; little apparent role of other 
senior corporate managers (unlike from some of 
the partners in Stage I) 
o However, strategic business plan now functions 
throughout all business units and review process 
becomes relatively more formal and structured. 
Crisis-driven 
Transition to  
Stage III – 
Centralisation (?) 
[late 2008-2009] 
 
- Concrete financial goals and strategic KPIs set 
 
- Corporate portfolio planning/strategy introduced 
 
- More perceived involvement of corporate centre (though 
not universally recognised) 
 
 
DISCUSSION  
The first part of the empirical investigation identified the key characteristics of 
strategy process and explored the evolving role of the corporate centre in the 
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context of a big Russian diversified corporation. The author conducted 
structured and iterative analysis of the interviews and synthesised the 
exploration of the individual interviews to overall conclusions along four crucial 
dimensions determined at the literature review stage: 
- Strategy making team  
- Nature of strategy making process 
- Centralisation and role of the corporate centre in strategy making  
- Role of external environment in shaping the strategy process 
The research also highlighted distinct periods in the evolution of strategy 
process characteristics and through further synthesis identified three distinct 
periods and three transition stages in the evolution of strategy process and the 
corporate centre‘s role.   
This section will discuss the conclusions of interview analysis and attempt to 
summarise them into distinct concepts relating to the previous literature findings 
and characterise the distinctiveness of strategy process and the corporate 
centre role in the particular context (see Appendix 4 for a detailed description of 
key takeaways).  
One of the most defining characteristics of strategy process, clearly reflected 
and emphasised in all interviews was the crucial importance of the main 
shareholder/CEO leadership and personal traits in strategy process: 
- He is the one who finally makes all strategic decisions and has a critical 
personal influence on strategy process:  
BUE1: “CEO personally was the key driver and an absolute decision-maker in strategy 
process”. CG3: “CEO was constantly involved in decision-making and was the final 
decision-maker is all things, went into much details. Right now we have very similar 
system, as in early 2000's”.  BUG1: "I think in our organisation our CEO personality has very 
significant influence on process... on setting-up priorities for organisation… where we 
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should develop geographically, etc, that pretty much depends on the position of our leader 
and CEO."  
- Personal involvement in all significant strategic decisions should be 
evaluated in the context of:  1) Large-scale ($10-20 bln. in revenue, 
depending on a year) ―core‖ business; 2) Multiple BUs across three macro 
regions (Russia/CIS, Europe, USA), complex value chain - from coal mines 
to end-product for individual customers - and relatively complex technology; 
3) Stakes (mostly majority) in 30+ ―non-core‖ companies, ranging from 
companies with over $1 bln. in revenues to small venture firms and from 
biotechnology industry to tourism, all demanding shareholder‘s personal 
attention: 
 CG1: “The level of CEO’s participation in decision-making was still different in other cases 
and dependent on the level of ambition (for example, a popular benchmark was whether a 
business can achieve $1 bln. value creation)… As far as the key steel and mining business 
was concerned, the CEO’s involvement was usually deeper and focused on details”. 
- In the ―Partnership‖ stage, decisions were apparently made by the small 
team of five partners, but still with the clear leadership of the CEO/main 
shareholder (see Appendix 4):  
CG1: “Before 2006, the 5 people were making all the important decisions - Mordashov, 
Shvetzov, Makhov, Noskov and Kruchinin, with the leadership of the key shareholder. 
However, the shareholder’s leadership is emphasized also here, as well as his inclination to 
seek for demonstrated “consensus” in the team, essentially achieving the team’s formal 
alignment behind his visions”. CG6: “...he *CEO+ always worked until they had a unite with 
his opinion. He was not at ease with taking even a majority decision and especially 
minority decisions were always on him.  So he would always argue as long as there would 
be a bridge to the other side’s opinion. And the others would sooner or later give up".                                                                                                     
- CEO leadership in strategic changes (e.g. radical overwhelming the 
management team and management structure in 2006, seen as his personal 
initiative):  
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CGUE1: “*In 2006+ Severstal  became public company, one of the reasons is because CEO 
was looking for the way to replace the former partnership team…System changed 
drastically, because the CEO decided to change balance introducing a lot of functional 
people. It was his idea somehow that, expressed by himself, that we no longer need 
entrepreneurs or leaders, we now do need managers, because we don’t need so much of 
initiative, we must squeeze costs. .. I believe that the cause of it was that the CEO made a 
very serious attempt to change the balance of power, to change the sort of power of five 
of us and introduce the power of fifteen to twenty people in the company”.  
Particularities of CEO leadership: 
- Very broad focus and very broad personal involvement – multitude of 
businesses requiring his personal involvement  
- Goes deep into details – very deep at times  
CG1: “As far as the key steel and mining business was concerned, the CEO’s involvement 
was usually deeper and focused on details”. BUR2: “Full day a lot of people were present, a 
lot of issues discussed: varying issues, very strategic, very big by nature and very small 
ones. Why we should buy his type of equipment that could cost $1 mln, for example, in 
2014 rather or 2015 and that kind of question could be discussed for two hours or 
something like that… on the back of a $1 bln discussion about *total+ investments”. CG6: 
“The task was to make money but actually a lot of the decisions of what to do, especially 
investment actually were made by Aleksey, [for] every major investment. He got very deep 
into the manifold of everyday management”.  
An interesting metaphor described the CEO as a ―pilot‖ (hands-on manager, 
involved in current, situation-specific, short-term decisions), rather than an 
―astronaut‖ (strategist/vision provider with a long-term horizon). This attitude 
also caused contradictions with the ―partnership‖:  
CG2: “Shareholder and “triumvirate”… And sometimes to me it looks like, if you ask 
somebody: who are you – pilot or astronaut? It’s a different role in the strategic process… 
The pilot should rule airplane, he doesn’t have any horizon, huge horizon and he can see 
just the stuff under his plane, like trees, you know? And shareholder, from my point of 
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view, should be like astronaut, looking at big events and big picture. And sometimes I 
notices that “triumvirate” would like to be astronaut and shareholder decides to be pilot”. 
- Seeks consensus among the top team in strategic decision-making, insists 
on ―buy-in‖ and apparent consensus even if people are unconvinced:  
CG5: “The key shareholder made all final decisions, but he was looking for a common 
consensus, essentially, no decision was made if there was no real, or apparent consensus”. 
CG6: “Well, actually I don’t remember any case in the early time when Aleksey would have 
exquisitely gone against the opinion of the group. It was never occurred, so if you said this, 
this, this, actually he always worked until they had a unite with his opinion... he always 
worked until they had a unite with his opinion. He was not at ease with taking even a 
majority decision and especially minority decisions were always on him.  So he would 
always argue as long as there would be a bridge to the other side’s opinion. And the others 
would sooner or later give up".                                                                                                     
- Decision to acquire and depth of involvement is highly dependent on 
personal interest in a particular business/industry, as well as on (loosely 
defined) opportunity to create ―huge‖ value:  
CG1: “As far as the management of the acquired assets was concerned, that was very 
different. In some cases the key shareholder did not spend any time at all (in case the 
investment was too small and not interesting to him). Then the CFO and Deputy CEO for 
Legal looked after the financial and legal sides of the businesses, made corresponding 
decisions, including investment approval. The level of CEO’s participation in decision-
making was still different in other cases and dependent on the level of ambition (for 
example, a popular benchmark was whether a business can achieve $1 bln. value creation) 
and personal interest/perceived level of expertise of the “investment committee” 
members”.      
Corporate Centre Involvement, Function and the Level of 
Centralisation 
An analysis of the top management team at the centre demonstrated the 
importance of personal traits and leadership of the CEO/shareholder and, at the 
same time, a high role of a very small, but powerful corporate centre team:  
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BUE1. “The top management of the Group of companies (without much differentiation 
between steel&mining and other businesses at the initial stages) was represented by the 
Management Board of 5 people”.  
It is particularly remarkable that the corporate centre as such in the first period 
until 2006 remained extremely small: essentially, the five top managers, 
including the CEO, making all decisions and a small support staff playing a 
minor role, as represented in the example of strategy and M&A function:    
CG1: I quit to the group and then I created a team for mergers and acquisitions and a small 
team for strategy … mainly playing a small role, frankly speaking, mainly playing a role in 
evaluating the M&As.” CG3: “We, *M&A+ project managers, have limited capability to 
influence those decisions. The M&A committee is headed by the CEO. So you have to persuade 
him to make any decision.”  
Note that this group made all strategic decisions, with the ultimate decisions 
made, as we have discussed, by the main shareholder.  Despite that this small 
centre was ultimately involved in making final decisions, a more careful look at 
the process reveals that it remained very non-intrusive from the business units‘ 
perspective, particularly in Stage I. Essentially, for this period we can observe a 
rather consistent picture of decentralised organisation with much discretion of 
the business units‘ leaders in initiating strategic decisions like CAPEX, 
investments and external development (see Appendix 4). A lean corporate 
centre was involved in reviewing and occasionally challenging the business 
plans. Review of business plans was the main management instrument as far 
as the current assets were concerned:  
 
BUE1: "In terms of the corporate centre influence, it was always very small. The main activity 
was around the review of business plans by the CEO.  The participation of corporate centre in 
strategy process was very limited, not even financial targeting. Only in one case over the 2006-
2010 we were asked to increase the EBITDA plan slightly, in other cases we were taking our 
internally calculated figures to the discussion and received approval."  CG6: “My feeling is that 
it was more initiatives and thinking coming from below and the corporate centre decided 
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whether it had sense or not”.CG3: "I think that no one saw the need for a big corporate 
strategic machine”.  
Note that managers of key business units were also the members of the 
corporate top team: Anatoly Kruchinin, CEO of the flagship ―cash cow‖ 
Cherepovetz steel mill was one of the five partners. Vadim Shvetzov was 
―responsible‖ for the then-second largest business, Severstal Auto, and the 
Chief Strategist, Vadim Makhov, had responsibility for overseas steel assets 
once they were acquired. As discussed earlier, in reality, the level of the 
corporate centre‘s involvement was different depending, among other things, on 
the size of the business and the CEO‘s personal interests:  
 
CG5: “The real situation varied – for example, Severstal-Trans was very self-sufficient and 
standalone, making tactical decisions on its own and disregarding any kind of strategy. 
Severstal-Auto, run by Shvetzov, also was very self-sufficient. There were also other businesses 
where the corporate centre, or, I better say, Mr Mordashov’s involvement was much deeper – 
for example, CherMK, but CherMK was a very closed, inward-looking, “Soviet” enterprise 
which was dealing very little with other members of the corporate team”.  
The Case for Decentralisation  
In summary, in the first half of the 2000s, the ―partnership‖ period, we observe a 
very bottom-up strategy process. Strategic initiative is fully in the hands of BU 
management. The centre is involved in plans and performance review only, with 
very few strategic initiatives coming from the it. This is in line with Grant‘s 
(2005) study of strategy process of major oil companies‘  decentralised strategy 
process which gave much more discretion to business units as their external 
environment became more volatile in the 1990s. The early 2000s was still a 
time of high uncertainty in Russia and the growth of the steel industry had only 
started gaining its pace (see section on external environment in Appendix 7).   
On the surface, that would make a classic example of a ―hands-off‖, returns-
focused corporate centre as in the ―Financial Control‖ configuration by Goold 
and Campbell (1987) or a ―Control‖ configuration by Ward et al (2005). The 
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crucial difference, however, is that in the Severstal case the centre is not setting 
any financial goals or return requirements. The centre discusses these issues 
with BUs on an ad-hoc basis and bases them on discussions of the BU‘s plans, 
not externally-imposed benchmarks.   
BUR1: “After the crisis started we received a task - Russian steel release $ 500 mln from a 
cashflow…. This was the first time, never took place before 2009”. CG6: “Strategy formulation, 
strategy development was a very informal process… Nor even formalize how much money 
which part would return etc., but do we think that it was the kind business we could create 
value or not. I think that was the main kind of thinking”. CG2: “There was frankly speaking – no 
corporate level…. Other people from divisions had their ideas, tried to implement their 
initiatives… Yes, and the key principle was to contact with business unit level and suggest 
them. No budget, no planning. Just visit them and see – ok, they are working great”.  
Apparently, we are observing the case of a rather ―radical‖ decentralisation. 
The Case for the Importance of Central Leadership   
Of course, the reality was much more complex since all decisions must finally 
receive approval by a small circle of top managers and ultimately the main 
shareholder. Perhaps even more importantly, freedom in ideas generation 
comes along with a highest level of granular scrutiny of these ideas and 
business plans by the CEO personally.  The nature and style of shareholder‘s 
involvement clearly differentiates this approach from the abovementioned 
―financial control‖-type configurations. A very high level of the CEO‘s personal 
involvement in details, including not only strategic, but also operational and 
tactical questions, defines the nature of decision-making and approval process:  
BUR1: “Well, you know he *CEO+ is a kind of a person that can talk both about very in depth 
issues and very vogue ones during the same presentation. And therefore … the *presenting+ 
director could easily bring some specialists responsible for the calculations because he never 
knew whether question will be asked or not...  because of this we had a very good advantage 
because … he could find out maybe some small opportunities. But at the same time the 
negative to that was that it was very unregulated”. BUR2: “A.A.Mordashov went into much 
details during each meeting I participated, Russian Steel directors also discuss those details. 
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Managers from corporate centre also participate in those meetings from time to time, and ask 
some questions. It gives me impression, that they role is surveillance". CGUE1: “*In 
Cherepovetz] we had meetings once a month on] implementation of monthly budget, top 
program, budgeting program, introduction of purchasing initiatives, sales, blah-blah-blah. So 
all time was filled in with new initiatives projects. ... we asked CEO, functional director, deputy 
director, chief of department, deputy chief of department, head of bureau, foremen… so, it’s a 
lot of levels. Now, we spoke directly to the foremen level. Drilling down.” 
Synthesis 
To summarise, the role of the corporate centre in its relationships with business 
units was almost dialectical. On the one hand, we observe a very decentralised 
strategy process with strategic initiatives coming bottom-up in a rather 
unstructured, ad-hoc manner. The corporate centre is not setting any ex-ante 
goals, targets or strategic priorities (that is, no ―corporate strategy‖), but rather 
relies on the business units‘ management for ideas and strategic projects 
generation. On the other hand, the centre and its leader control the decision 
making by approving all major strategic decisions. Moreover, evidence suggests 
that in strategic discussions, the CEO/main shareholder may go very deep into 
operational details demonstrating very fine granularity of the strategic 
discussion.      
We can describe the resulting picture as ―leader-focused decentralisation‖.By 
decentralisation we mean primarily decentralisation of ideas generation and the 
unconstrained nature of the business units‘ strategic thinking, not limited by any 
financial or strategic frameworks. Essentially, we are talking about the absence 
of a unifying ―strategy‖ coming from the corporate centre. However, the crucial 
role of a leader is maintained in this strategy process configuration since he 
(and to an extent his ―partners‖, who combined the roles on corporate leaders 
and business unit managers) were personally involved in the review and 
approval process for all major decisions and was able and willing to maintain 
strategic dialogue at a very fine level of granularity. Strategy was almost 
―substituted‖ by a person, by the strong personal involvement of the 
CEO/shareholder and his deep and all-encompassing engagement with his 
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business unit management teams in discussing details of their plans and 
operations. The ―corporate centre‖ existing in this configuration is very powerful, 
but also extremely small, lean and non-intrusive. The centre expects and 
encourages ―local‖ initiative.  
This is a phenomenon which arguably lies somewhat outside of the existing 
frameworks of the corporate centre‘s role in strategy process (Goold and 
Campbell, 1987; Ward et al, 2005) and therefore deserves a more careful 
exploration.   
One possible rationalisation for this phenomenon might be that this kind of 
approach allowed the main shareholder 1) to maintain tight control over what‘s 
going on in the company through personal involvement and the ability to ask 
questions even about the slightest details whilst 2) keeping the corporate centre 
as small and low-cost as possible and maintaining strategic flexibility through 
self-confident business units unconstrained by corporate bureaucracy (even in 
its lightest from of ―target-setting‖ financial control). Business units thus have 
high discretion in how to deal with their internal and external development 
plans. This implies a basic choice of not having a corporate strategy or 
constraining frameworks, effectively absence of ―corporate strategy‖:  
CG5: “I approached the main shareholder with a question – how can we position this group to 
the market, how can we explain the strategy behind it? But there was never an answer to it, in 
fact, he was not interested in explaining the strategic logic. “We live in a very fast-changing 
world, so why do we need a strategy if the market is changing so quickly?””.   
This hypothesis would be in line with the premise of other studies in the 
emerging market context which highlighted the importance of strategic flexibility 
in the fast changing world awash with unexpected risks and opportunities 
(Uhlenbruck et al, 2003). Existing theoretical frameworks were based on 
Western business practices and external context, thus may not have captured 
the ―emerging-markets‖ phenomenon fully.  
Of course, the ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ also requires an extremely high 
level of time and effort commitment on behalf of the CEO/main shareholder and 
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other members of the small corporate team. Borrowing the metaphor from one 
of the interviews, he was acting in a very time-consuming role of a “pilot” who 
had to steer the wheel every second of the flight. Alternative to this is arguably a 
more natural (for a business owner) role of an “astronaut” who has a very wide 
horizon, but doesn‘t have to be involved in ―operational details‖ once dispatched 
for the long journey from the Earth to its orbit.  
Another important part of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ is a very lean and 
non-intrusive ―corporate centre‖ with corporate bureaucracy minimised to the 
lowest possible level. Effectively, we are talking about a ―blurred‖ distinction 
between corporate and business strategies since both the CEO and most of the 
other de facto top team members combined business unit management with 
their corporate roles. Here, of course, lie the seeds of the system‘s eventual 
destruction.  As the company rapidly grew in size and complexity, team 
members became naturally overstretched: 
CGUE1: "Because the meetings with Moscow headquarters were such that I could fly to  US 
only for three days than I must return back than I must fly to Italy, fly to Cherepovets, do 
something for Corporate University, meet with banks for M&A meeting… so  I was a listener 
and not the active leader, not the champion in this case. And it seems this is what happened 
with many of us. So I think that was the problem of the size and the problem of the 
management model..." 
Also, such a decentralized system could not respond to the increasing demand 
for transparency and openness to the outside world (see the section on the 
developments external environment), which became particularly evident after 
the Arcelor case: 
CG5: “The reason for this change *management system and top team overhaul] – the Arcelor 
story, which demonstrated the deficiencies of the former system: The steel and mining 
businesses were not consolidated, not an integrated company from management standpoint, 
no unifying strategy, formal plans, etc”.  CG1: “The transfer from “partnership” to the wider 
decision-making team was driven by 1) loss of “drive” by many members of the partnership, 
divergence of interests between them and the key shareholder 2) necessity to consolidate 
steel and mining business and separate it from management point of view after the Arcelor 
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case and IPO - it was not possible to manage all [i.e. both steel-related and other] assets from 
one centre any more”. 
The CEO became less satisfied with the old, ad-hoc and decentralised 
management system and its transformation began:   
CG5: "After Arcelor the management structure was completely overturned – the partnership 
of commonly-minded people was fully dissolved, and the new team of “salaried” managers has 
taken over."  CGUE1: “To make it more clear, before January 2006 any decision of the group 
was …by one of five of us. Now, system changed drastically, because the CEO decided to 
change balance introducing a lot of functional people. It was his idea somehow that, expressed 
by himself, that we no longer need entrepreneurs or leaders, we now do need managers, 
because we don’t need so much of initiative, we must squeeze costs. .. I believe that the cause 
of it was that the CEO made a very serious attempt to change the balance of power, to change 
the sort of power of five of us and introduce the power of fifteen to twenty people in the 
company”.                        
However, the system appears to be very effective in securing profitable and 
rapid growth, as demonstrated by the corporate history in 2000-2006. Given the 
size and diversity of the holding, the implied level of commitment required 
nontrivial efforts on behalf of the whole top team and CEO in particular. This 
lends support to an argument that the owners of privatised companies are 
committed to long-term growth and development rather than to short-term profit 
skimming and quick financial rewards.   
Nature of the Strategy Making Process 
An observed ad-hoc, quick and opportunistic decision-making process, as 
was particularly clear in Stage I, and very wide business interests (from steel to 
tourism) also lend support to the ―strategic flexibility‖ argument: unconstrained 
and agile decision making puts rapid response before thorough analysis and 
allows to catch opportunities very quickly (see Appendix 4). One of the 
interviewees said it directly:  
CG6: “It was very much ad hoc process receiving opportunity and basically making decisions 
and whether to go for it or not… In the end it was very much like emergent markets,  that you 
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rather take or don’t take opportunities which you come across rather than your structure 
formalized process…  Not even formalize how much money which part would return, etc.” 
There were however indications that the centre formulated some priorities, at 
least as far external expansion was concerned. However, the centre formulated 
these priorities in fairly general terms and they changed quickly, so the overall 
framework did not constrain opportunities:   
CG4: “We had a clear understanding of why we want to be in North America, we were 
considering coming into China, but after time we finally decided to proceed with US. At the 
same time, our participation in some projects, it just was sometimes spontaneously, for 
example, projects with Evraz, projects in Ukraine, Turkey, and the one's related to Lucchini, 
Ascometal ... all our activities, were somehow vaguely spelled out, but still all were oriented to 
create a company that, firstly, will be a leader, stable and sustainable”.  
An ad-hoc, opportunistic approach to strategic decisions also served as a 
barrier for explicit strategy formulation (since strategy is, after all, a commitment 
– Mintzberg and Waters, 1985):  
CG5: "The approach was very entrepreneurial and opportunistic; there was no clear strategy. 
From communication standpoint, there was no clear, coherent, assured strategy." CG1: “There 
was also relatively little analysis in the acquisition stage, little “deep research” into the 
businesses. Decisions were made on an intuitive, opportunistic basis. About thirty investments 
were made out of hundreds they looked through – and all that over a very limited period of 
time and with the force of three senior and a small number of more junior members of a 
committee. There was very little “physical” ability to comprehend such a number of diverse 
projects, let along the new technologies which were the basis of many projects”.   
 This approach was reflected also in a relatively unstructured approach to 
strategic decision-making. However, the unstructured nature of process is not a 
universal phenomenon: there is evidence that, at least for a number of divisions, 
the strategy review process remained rather well-structured and had its 
established annual routines:  
CG1: “The discussions of investment proposals and business plans were relatively ad-hoc and 
unstructured, for the non-core businesses they took place about once in a month. However, 
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the major Power machines (energy equipment manufacturer) company has a well-structured 
and approved set of business planning and strategy discussions with the key shareholder set in 
advance for the whole year – although, of course, there was significantly less time spent on 
this business compared to the steel and mining”. BUR1: “There is a number of days, especially  
in the first half of the year (March, and June) when we [Cherepovetz steel mill, later Russian 
Steel executive team] had to approve our strategic plan and strategic investment program. In 
June, we had to approve it at the highest level with a parent company. Then there was a kind 
of pause, and closer to the November-December, this process has been renewed for next year. 
At all meetings, one way or another, (with A. Mordashov once a month at least)  we raised the 
question about the strategy. Formally,  the first half of the year - 3-4 meeting, when we 
showed the presentation”.  
One of possible explanations for such differences is the legacy of old, Soviet-
style industrial bureaucracy in ―old‖ enterprizes like Cherepovetz Steel Mill or 
Power Machines. Since the company was so large and nontransparent, cultural 
and working routines inherited form the Soviet period remained intact for a long 
time.     
Previous studies of conglomerates in emerging markets recognised their 
inclination for unconstrained, opportunistic expansion in many businesses and 
explained it by the intention to apply their unique capabilities (access to finance, 
human capital, technologies) to as wide a market as possible (Khanna & 
Palepu, 2000). Our findings are in line with the previous data from the Russian 
context: according to the studies by Carr (2007) and Gurkov (2009), dislike of 
formal plans and analysis and quick decision making were the dominant 
characteristics of strategy process in observed Russian companies. 
Interestingly, Gurkov (2009) also concludes that firms with the presence of a 
dominant decision maker (powerful CEO or dominant shareholder) tend to have 
less formalised processes. 
In addition, a highly favourable industrial environment with ever-growing steel 
prices in 2004-H12008, combined with benign financial conditions (see 
Appendices 6 and 7 for the discussion of economic environment and steel 
industry context) created an impression of low investment risks and further 
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stimulated opportunistic decision making not backed by formal analysis and risk 
calculation: 
CG6: “Money was so cheep that actually you needed to create opportunities for the cash 
rather then the cash for the opportunities there were different proposals etc. and there was a 
norm again, that’s meant a good business, but, for example, there was quite opportunistic and 
then came the analyses: yes or no, they said yes. First there was the idea and then the strategy 
was created for the idea”.  
This is in line with Gurkov (2009) who notes that a low degree of competitive 
pressure decreases chances for adoption of a formal strategic plan by Russian 
companies.    
Findings of this study, however, sharply contradict another observation by Carr 
and Gurkov – that Russian companies tend to focus only on the short-term and 
don‘t plan far into the future. This study finds that the planning horizon has 
always been very long-term – traditionally ten years for organic growth and five 
years for the analysis of M&A targets. This is strongly confirmed throughout the 
interviews and across all business units involved:  
CGUE1: "First of all time horizon for myself was about 50 years plus in terms of taking 
decisions or whenever expected short term gains we expected long-term value creation. 
Saying 50 years meaning could be 20-30-10 whatever… he return in investment between 2000 
and 2004-5 was 4 years, so if it was more than 4 years paper we did not invest, between 2000 
and 2006 the return in investment gradually moved to 6-7 years”. 
Even in the most difficult and uncertain situation of late 2008 the planning 
horizon, although cut by half, still remained long-term: 
CG3: "The strategic business plan, pre 2008 - it covered 10 years, post 2008 - 5 years, because 
[in times of financial crisis] why do we need a 10-year plan if we don’t know if we will survive?”  
In fact, the long-term orientation is strongly defended by interviewees as the 
only viable approach for the industry: 
BUR1: “Classically business plan has always been for a period of 10 years, since Makhov 
became responsible, because classical theory suggests that the normal investment projects in 
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the metallurgical industry have payback period of 5-7 years. When we talk that in the steel 
industry a project will be recouped over a couple of years, we just lie to ourselves. In order to 
feel the effects of a new investment activities, the payback period of which is 5-7 years, we 
should plan for 10 years, because for 5 years, we will see only a negative NPV”. 
We can attribute the long-term planning to the capital-intensive nature of the 
steel and mining industry with relatively long payback periods. It also lends 
support to the hypothesis about long-term orientation of the main shareholder – 
otherwise there would simply be no need for such long-term planning and for 
projects requiring a payback period from 4 to 6-7 years. Notice that the 
existence of the long-term planning horizon does not contradict ad-hoc decision 
making. Management may not have any pre-established financial and industrial 
goals or product-market strategies and may stay attuned to any opportunity, but 
once such an opportunity arrives (be it an M&A deal brought in by an 
investment bank or a CAPEX project suggested by a business unit), 
management will make sure that its financial calculations and analysis are 
performed on a 5- or 10-year basis. Therefore, management may think long-
term without necessarily having a well-defined long-term strategy per se, as 
proponents of traditional ―strategic planning‖ school (e.g. Andrews, 1971) would 
insist. We may describe such an approach to strategic decision making  as a 
“long-term focus without a long-term strategy”.  This is also one of the most 
interesting features of strategy process in the explored context.  
Evolution of Strategy Process and Corporate Centre Role Over Time 
Limitations of the ―Stage I‖ management model became evident in a few years, 
as the unstructured and disjoined business units failed to form a credible 
platform for a merger with Arcelor. This coincided with a breeding crisis in the 
―partnership‖ model. The company faced a double crisis of demotivated and 
exhausted top team and an inefficient organisational structure of a loose 
―confederation‖ of assets united by little more than common ownership. 
Severstal could partly explain the failure to secure the merger with Arcelor 
because of the low level of company transparency to the global market 
(Bouquet and Ousey, 2008). At the time, Severstal did not have an international 
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listing and consolidated reporting in line with international accounting standards. 
Moreover, it did not technically consolidate some of its steel businesses  into a 
single entity at all. Lucchini Group, the European outlet, belonged directly to the 
company CEO/majority shareholder and was consolidated back to Severstal 
just before the London Stock Exchange IPO, in September 2006. Also, the 
management of all assets where the CEO/majority shareholder had a stake, 
was going through the privately held ‗management company‘ Severstal Group. 
Severstal Group was supposed to act as a corporate centre for all businesses, 
from steel to automotive to plywood, each with different shareholding structures. 
This peculiar structure did not help to improve Severstal‘s steel and mining 
business transparency and attractiveness from the financial markets‘ point of 
view. The ―price of transparency‖ was becoming too high, particularly in light of 
the fact that external financing (either debt or equity) was becoming an 
increasingly popular business instrument for the Russian corporates (Pappe 
and Galukhina, 2009; see also Appendix 7 for details on the growth of bank 
financing and the Russian stock market). Overseas companies, encouraged by 
rampant economic growth and apparent improvement in institutional 
characteristics, were coming into Russia via building greenfields and, 
increasingly, by acquiring local companies for handsome premiums (see 
Appendix 7). Russia, now part of the BRIC, was becoming a fashionable 
destination for investments, although players also recognised the risks. Now, 
unlike in the early 2000s, it paid to be transparent and open to investors.       
What followed the Arcelor deal was the formal dissipation of partnership, the 
IPO of harshly consolidated steel and mining assets and attempt to establish 
more formal rules, in line with expectations of the market and listing 
requirements (see Appendix 4):  
CG5: "After Arcelor the management structure was completely overturned – the partnership 
of commonly-minded people was fully dissolved, and the new team of “salaried” managers has 
taken over." CG2: "the process was to try to coordinate the strategic process and try to make a 
rule for strategic process, try to create the rules... after 6 months we prepared some 
instruction regarding strategy... Every strategic plan must be the same." 
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A highly decentralised management structure also meant that business units did 
not communicate much between themselves; hence there were few 
opportunities to identify synergies and common development targets:  
BUE1: “There was very little communication between business units. Effectively, the only 
opportunity for communication were the semi-annual conferences – one in July after the 
“metallurgists’ day”, and one in December”.      
Also importantly, corporate management of now-public ―core‖ and ―non-core‖ 
assets was formally separated.  
CG1: “After the IPO of steel and mining assets and the “breakaway” of the former partnership, 
the management of “core” and “non-core” assets was more clearly separated. 2006 as a 
“milestone” year. End of partnership, separation of steel and mining assets from others”. 
This process was not unequivocal and quick, and definitely not without 
controversy. At least, some members of the top team considered the increased 
influence of the corporate centre as a liability: inefficient at best, value-
destroying in the worst case. Loss of entrepreneurship and self sufficiency at 
the business unit level was the price to pay for increased interference:  
CGUE1: “For example, originally I could do all job myself, all sort of restructuring, blah-blah-
blah. Then, when SNA started to generate more cash, then I should agree somehow with a 
person in Moscow, who has never been in the United States, whom I put in such and such 
position in that company. So, a person, having no ideas about American laws, applications, 
productivity, was a deciding person. Same thing, I should agree for investments with chief 
investment officer, spending money with Noskov, etc, etc. So, and gradually my function 
became…it moved from doing restructuring work to a function of an umbrella of protecting 
people in the United States and letting them go, using most of my time for negotiations with 
Corporate Centre people. So this is the moment strong bureaucracy appeared. So in very 
important things business units lose a lot of motivation, drive, entrepreneurship and 
leadership for change. It was replaced by authority of corporate centre”.  
At the same time, another opinion was that although there was some 
centralisation and the corporate centre was becoming more powerful, its 
influence did not really increase much until the financial crisis:  
208 
BUE1: “In terms of the corporate centre influence, it was always very small. The main activity 
was around the review of business plans by the CEO.  The participation of corporate centre in 
strategy process was very limited, not even financial targeting. Only in one case over the 2006-
2010 we were asked to increase the EBITDA plan slightly, in other cases we were taking our 
internally calculated figures to the discussion and received approval”. 
Strategy process itself was also gaining more formality, although this is not 
obviously stated in all interviews. The legacy and idiosyncrasies of concrete 
business units played a big role: 
CG6: “Division which put a really deep strategic process was Severstal Resource when they 
thought in which other minerals they could diversify. That was the process at the beginning 
and then they moved along this process, I think it was the first formalized strategy process, 
which we had inside the company... that was when Nicolay Zelensky came, that was in 2008, 
maybe it started 2007”. CG1: “However, the major Power Machines (energy equipment 
manufacturer) company has a well-structured and approved set of business planning and 
strategy discussions with the key shareholder set in advance for the whole year”. 
The progress was arguably slower at the wider corporate level compared to the 
business units: 
CG6: “I actually think that more or less ad hoc process for the group and also inside OAO 
Severstal after 2000 until last year, so until 2009 when we cannot finalize the process which 
has already started under Vadim in 2008, but it was actually finalized, discussed with everyone 
and finished in 2009. I think that is the first time that for Severstal, for the steel and mining 
business we could go through, we could perform a kind of strategy process, when we did say 
what we did want to achieve, which kind of returns we wanted to have and what do we need 
to do in all kind of staff.”  
It is interesting that rapid growth was indeed seen by some interviewees as the 
main reason for the absence of a clearly defined strategy process: 
BUG1: “If you have a company that just bought 5 different assets within 2-3 years, you cannot 
expect that company to have formal processes which you want… I think that was a natural 
development for Severstal and at some stage management to be aligned we need more formal 
strategy and that organically starting development". 
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The movement towards a more formalised strategy process and, at the same 
time, a more involved and powerful corporate centre, is by no means a unique 
or unexpected phenomenon. As was noted above, the external environment 
and a new status of a public company called for a more transparent and unified 
structure, including common reporting, common planning and review process, a 
search for synergies and an introduction of elements of common strategy.  All 
this is a function of the corporate centre and demands its involvement. 
Moreover, the move towards formalization and ―professionalization‖ of 
organisational processes as corporation grows, matures and becomes more 
complex was observed and documented in other settings (Mintzberg and 
Waters, 1982). Nevertheless, the company still was very far away from 
definitive centralisation. Business units continued with a very high level of 
discretion in their strategy process - for example, the centre did not introduce 
financial targets until 2009.  
Breakthrough in the Trend for Raising the Corporate Centre’s Role – 
2008 Financial Crisis 
Movement towards centralisation became more pronounced as the financial 
crisis of 2008 suddenly put extreme pressure on company earnings and 
balance sheet security. The corporate centre introduced explicit financial targets 
for the first time in corporate history (see Appendix 4): 
BUR1: “After the crisis started we received a task - Russian steel release $ 500 mln from a 
cashflow… and now the situatiuon repeats, they tell us: "Guys, on the basis of our forecast 
results for the Russian steel there is a target of $ 600 million and try to keep within limits." This 
was the last time, never took place before 2009”. 
The result is not only technical financial targeting, but also the higher degree of 
corporate centre control and involvement also in strategy: 
CG3: “The corporate strategy department had started to participate in decision making along 
with CherMK strategists since 2009. Forecasting, before Malanichev, was done by Rumin and 
me in CherMK. Right now, the largest participation from the corporate centre comes as setting 
a vision where we shall invest our money - in Russian Steel, M&A, resources etc.” 
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It is possible that the ―natural‖, but slow movement toward higher centralisation 
was accelerated by the crisis and the associated need to introduce more 
financial discipline and focus as resources quickly became much more 
constrained than before:    
CG6: “The bigger the company becomes, the more difficult it becomes to make ad hoc 
decisions. Probably the first time when you are confronted with the need to formalise it is 
when you are limited in resources and you have to make a decision whether you should go 
into this or this.”  
Financial targeting, combined with deeper involvement of the corporate centre 
in the business units‘ strategy formulation, introduction of corporate strategy 
and strategic targets completed the next stage of corporate development. 
Practically, introduction of corporate strategy (i.e. corporate priorities) implied 
the introduction of externally-imposed limits on the business units‘ discretion in 
their development plans. We might interpret this as an attempt to focus the 
business units‘ attention on efficiency improvement which became much more 
important than creativity in external expansion:  
CG3: “For the first time in history of Severstal, the strategy was communicated to top 
management in December 2009 and I think everybody suddenly acknowledged, that we have a 
strategy, not just a vision, or vector of development… Strategic targets – are now under 
consideration…”  
In this new shape, which the company is still engineering, the company is 
moving to a more ―standard‖ configuration for a corporation of this size and 
scope. This new configuration is closest the Goold and Campbell‘s (1987)  
―strategic control‖ configuration which implies a significantly higher role for the 
corporate centre compared to the ―financial control‖ one.        
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
- A significant role was discerned regarding the importance of the main 
shareholder/CEO‘s leadership and personal traits play a very big and 
important role in strategy process – the most important characteristic of 
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strategy process in the given context. The phenomenon of the overarching, 
fully involved owner-manager is well-explored in the context of 
entrepreneurial companies. However, we normally associate this kind of 
management style with businesses which are much smaller in size. (e.g. 
Miller, 1983; Mintzberg, 1978; Mintzberg at al, 1998). Besides, researchers 
have not explored before in detail this phenomenon in the Russian/CIS 
context due to a short business history and legacy of  privatising big 
businesses which are normally controlled and run by energetic and engaged 
―first generation‖ owners.   
- ―Leader-focused decentralisation‖ – the phenomenon observed in its 
classic shape in early 2000s. It encompasses two dialectically opposed 
phenomena which co-exist in a mutually reinforcing configuration. 
Elements of leader-focused decentralisation: 
o  A highly decentralised strategy process, absence of corporate 
financial or strategic targets, very high discretion given to and 
initiative coming from business units. Creativity of business units 
is thus unconstrained by any financial or strategic frameworks or 
requirements. Here we return to the concept of “strategy as 
liability” - entrepreneurs do not want to limit opportunities by 
committing themselves to any particular course of action, i.e. strategy 
(Mintzberg & Waters, 1982). It is also in line with demand for strategic 
flexibility which is a capability particularly valuable in the emerging 
market context (Khanna & Palepu, 2000).  
o Control over the “final” decision making in the hands of a small 
circle of corporate top managers. Deep (if unstructured) 
personal involvement of the CEO in detailed discussions with 
the team members.  A very close circle of top managers must, in the 
end, approve all strategic decisions. Control and decisionmaking is 
facilitated by a very in-depth personal involvement of the  main 
shareholder in operational and strategic details during the review 
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process. Effectively, we are observing substitution of unifying 
strategy and/or strong bureaucracy for a strong “personality”. 
We can consider this approach a unique capability since such 
practice is very difficult to imitate by competitors because of very 
tough requirements of time and emotional resources from the 
CEO/shareholder and his small top team, given the size and 
complexity of businesses under management.  
o A very small and non-intrusive corporate centre. No rules or 
―corporate bureaucracy‖, but also no consolidation, unifying visions 
and very little communication between business units. Besides, 
members of the top team combine their corporate responsibility with 
the roles as leaders (curators) of business units - a certain ―merger‖ 
of corporate and business roles. 
- A very small and lean entrepreneurial ―partnership‖ was concentrating all 
strategic decisions at the Stage I. Crisis of “leader-focused 
decentralisation” and partnership system due to personality issues, 
increased company size and a new demand for transparency after a failed 
merger with Arcelor and the rising role of capital markets in Russian 
business in general.  
- In the wake of the leadership crisis, slowly growing centralisation and 
―professionalisation‖ (as an alternative to entrepreneurship) of the 
management system, gradually increasing the role of the growing corporate 
centre. This evolution is logical as a response to the growing importance of 
public markets with a new demand for transparency and better control over 
the rapidly growing corporation. It is also in line with observations of similar 
corporate stories in other contexts (e.g. Mintzberg and Waters, 1982) for a 
growing and maturing entrepreneurial corporation.  
- Accelerated involvement of the corporate centre, tighter control, including 
introduction of financial targets for business units and formulation of formal 
corporate strategy (for the first time in company history) after the 2008 
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financial crisis struck. Newly emerged extreme resource constraints 
challenged the previous management model. Introduction of financial 
targeting and emphasis on corporate strategic priorities, possibly, was an 
attempt to improve discipline and focus the business units‘ attention on 
efficiency in times when survival became a much bigger priority relative to 
growth.   
- Ad-hoc, opportunistic strategic decision making process (in line with 
previous research), especially in the Stage I was combined with a consistent 
long-term orientation in company planning and strategic thinking (contrary to 
earlier research findings in the Russian context) - “long-term focus without 
a long-term strategy”. Most probably, the ad hoc decision making process 
was the result of the volatile environment and demand for strategic flexibility 
(as suggested by other studies). Besides, presence of a long-term strategy 
would inevitably inhibit ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ since the latter 
requires absence of pre-determined strategic frameworks imposed from the 
corporate level. We might explain long-term orientation by the capital-
intensive industry and, perhaps, idiosyncrasies of the main shareholder‘s 
personal traits - he might associate himself with the long-term prosperity of 
the business rather than with purely maximising financial gains. In this 
context it also interesting to note that long-term orientation was not 
considered by at least two interviewees as ―typical‖ for the management of 
other big companies in Russia.   
As a next step, the author should further explore these conclusions in the 
second empirical project, in an iterative process suggested by Langely (1999). 
Of particular interest are those conclusions which contradict or add new 
perspectives to the previous research. In this case, the phenomenon of leader-
focused decentralisation certainly deserves a special look since it arguably lies 
outside of existing models of the corporate centre‘s role in strategy process and 
provides an example of a strong and involved owner-manager in a non-typical 
context of a big multi-business corporation.   
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IMPLICATIONS FOR THE EMPIRICAL PROJECT II  
Exploring the Phenomenon of Leader-Focused Decentralisation 
The key elements of leader-focused decentralisation emerging from Empirical 
Project I: 
- A highly decentralised strategy process, absence of corporate financial or 
strategic goals; very high discretion given to and initiative coming from 
business units. 
- Control over the ―final‖ decision making in the hands of a small circle of top 
managers. Deep personal involvement of the CEO; discussions with the 
business units‘ teams involve very granular attention to details. 
- Small and lean corporate centre; minimum corporate rules or bureaucracy; 
absence of unifying strategy for disjointed business units.  
The first empirical project helped to formulate the key traits of leader-focused 
decentralisation as they were emerging from the interviews. These traits 
included a number of unresolved questions or paradoxes that require a deeper 
and more detailed look. The following questions to the Empirical Project II will 
help address the emerging paradoxes and untangle the nature of the 
phenomenon: 
- Leadership role in encouraging initiative and aligning interests. The process 
implies that business units are responsible for generation of strategic ideas, 
investment projects and business development options. That requires from 
the business units‘ leaders a very high level of initiative and mental self-
sufficiency, which is not easy to achieve in any organisation. Arguably, given 
the deficit of high quality managerial resources in the Russian environment, 
this problem becomes even more pronounced. The question (or paradox) 
becomes how this need for initiative may exist in the environment of a strong 
leader making all final decisions. There might be something in the nature of 
this leadership which works to encourage this initiative and align it with the 
wider interests of the corporation. An interesting note from the first part is the 
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CEO‘s insistence on finding consensus, seeking full alignment with his 
―close circle‖ of partners in Stage I.    
- The role of personal traits of the leader in strategic decision making. In 
particular, what is the role of the “pilot” management model (highly granular 
and close engagement, attention to small details) in the CEO’s 
communications with the business unit teams and how does it facilitate (or 
hinder) leader-focused decentralisation? Successes and limitations of a 
particular corporate centre configuration (i.e. ―partnership‖, a very small and 
lean corporate centre) seem to be closely related to the leadership model 
and even personal traits and interests of the CEO and top team members. 
The ability and willingness on behalf of the CEO to involve himself 
personally and engage in granular discussions is one of the key elements of 
this configuration. Exploring the role of these idiosyncrasies seems to be an 
interesting theoretical and practical task. In the Russian context, it also has 
important political/social implications since such level of personal 
commitment in combination with long term focus creates an image of a 
caring and involved big business owner rather than a short-term profit 
skimmer.  
- Overall strengths and weaknesses of “leader-focused decentralisation” as 
they are perceived by the process participants. Some advantages became 
quite apparent from the first part: a very small and low-cost corporate centre, 
strategic flexibility of a decentralised process and absence of constraining 
―strategy as liability‖. Some deficiencies were also apparent: overloaded top 
management at the corporate end, a nontransparent management structure, 
and lack of unifying logic and synergies between the business units. This 
question deserves a more careful exploration because it has a particularly 
high practical relevance.  
Focus of the Empirical Project II (DBA Project 3): 
Actors: Business units (their top teams) and CEO/decision makers in the 
corporate centre. 
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Process: Strategy process. In the Severstal world, strategy process involves 
structured ―business plan reviews‖, taking place from one to 3-5 times a year 
(depending on a business unit), including the discussion of markets, financial 
and operational forecasts, development options and investments. There are 
indications which one should explore and discuss in more detail - strategy 
issues in any setting such as operational meeting, results review and M&A 
discussions. That would mean that given the relatively unstructured and ad-hoc 
strategy process (although gradually evolving), strategy discussion is not limited 
to any particular part of the corporate calendar or organisational routine.  
Since meetings are the main mode for interaction, our focus may be on what is 
going on at these meetings and how the CEO leadership is projected to solve 
the apparent paradox of decentralisation and strong leadership.  
Time period:  
 The ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ was arguably most pronounced in the 
early part of the research period, namely 2000-2005. Later, the growing size of 
the corporate centre and the increasing involvement of corporate ―bureaucracy‖ 
was inevitably making the organisation less ―leader-focused‖, although we do 
not see any indications that his role became less important or that his 
leadership style has changed. Therefore, in the second empirical project 
interviews will explore the phenomenon of leader-focused centralisation 
throughout the whole research period (2000-2009), but, where possible, the 
study will give priority to evidence from the earlier part (2000-2005).  
DISCUSSION OF RELIABILITY, VALIDITY AND 
GENERALISABILITY 
We can analyse the quality of the first stage of the research through the lenses 
suggested by Easterby-Smith et al (2002) for the assessment of relativist 
research: 
Validity: Has a sufficient number of perspectives been included? 
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The author made every effort to include as broad a set of perspectives as 
possible. The interviewees included representatives of the corporate centre and 
business units, representatives of all geographic regions and major business 
units within the company, as well as major functional lines. In terms of positions 
within the company, initially the author planned to interview representatives of 
top teams in the corporate centre and business units, since this is in line with 
the more ―traditional‖ view of the strategy decision-makers (Mintzberg et al, 
1998). The interviews supported this assumption which highlighted quite 
unequivocally that only a close circle of Board-level managers participated in 
real decision-making, both at the business unit and corporate level. During the 
pilot interview the author discussed the list of prospective interviewees at the 
high levels of hierarchy and this was confirmed by the interviewee. However, he 
also suggested that a number of junior employees (―manager-level‖ in the 
Severstal white-collar hierarchy) who had been seasoned veterans of the M&A 
and strategy departments, with first-hand exposure to strategic decision-
making, might be included. The author decided to add three such employees 
into the interviewees list to achieve better representation across the company 
hierarchy. Also, the author added one interviewee in the position of Department 
Head  over the course of empirical work. He was included because of his deep 
involvement in the establishment of both business unit and corporate business 
planning techniques, which the author identified as an important part of the 
company strategy process.  
Reliability: Will other observers reach similar observations?  
Recognising social constraints related to the author‘s current employment with 
the company, the author also ensured that former employees participated in the 
inquiry (three out of twelve participants). As discussed above, the author was 
careful not to bring into discussion anything coming from his own work 
experience, adopting a position of a ―well-informed outsider‖ who has done 
significant research about the company from open sources and approached an 
interview with a good understanding of company asset structure, history and 
management – as much as one could derive from the open sources.  
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Generalisability: What is the probability that patterns observed in the sample will 
be repeated in the general population? 
Clearly, one cannot generalize a one-company case study to the wider 
population. The purpose of this qualitative, explorative research is, first of all, to 
initiate a pioneering enquiry into the world of strategy-making in Russian 
corporations, explore key traits and suggest a research framework to lay ground 
for further investigations. However, even within the framework of this study, it is 
possible to extend the research scope to further companies and hence improve 
the reliability of the results of the study.   
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 ―Buffett has made a fine art of keeping this kind of distracting noise at bay: he says he even limits his 
contacts with managers of businesses in which he invests, preferring to assess their companies' financial 
records — a more neutral source of information‖ 
 
Guy Spier, ―Lunch with Warren Buffet‖ 
 
Chapter 4 
4. Project III. A Deeper Look: The Role of CEO 
Leadership and Personal Traits in Shaping the Strategy 
Process 
DATA COLLECTION AND ANALYSIS 
Introduction to the Empirical Project II (DBA Project III) 
The purpose of Project II is to further develop the initial insights into the 
specifics of strategy process in Severstal, a multi-business emerging market 
company. Empirical Project I explored the strategy process and helped to 
formulate the principal elements of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖, the 
approach to strategy making adopted Severstal.  
The key elements of leader-focused decentralisation emerging from Empirical 
Project I include: 
- A highly decentralised strategy process; absence of corporate financial or 
strategic goals; very high discretion given to and initiative coming from 
business units. 
- Control over the ―final stage‖ of decision making in the hands of the 
CEO/majority shareholder and a small circle of top managers; deep personal 
involvement of CEO; very granular attention to details in the discussions with 
business units‘ teams. 
- Small and lean corporate centre; minimum corporate rules or bureaucracy, 
absence of unifying strategy for disjointed business units (particularly 
relevant for the first period).  
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- As the company developed, matured and grew in size and complexity, the 
roles of the actors evolved and the strategy process became more 
structured and systematic. The company introduced financial and strategic 
goals at the corporate level. The overall influence of the corporate centre 
increased. However, the preeminent role of the leader as the ―final‖ decision-
maker was preserved. Business units still have a very high discretion and 
bottom-up initiative is very much encouraged and seen as the main driver 
and the key source of strategic ideas.      
Interview analysis highlighted that the key elements of strategy-focused 
decentralisation are closely related to the leadership role and personal traits of 
the company CEO and majority shareholder. Therefore, the role and impact of 
the CEO‘s personal traits will be the centre of the empirical investigation in 
Project II.  The author will explore this impact primarily through a more detailed 
look at the nature of interactions between the company leader/CEO and the top 
team. These interactions, as seen from the point of view of the process 
participants, will be the subject of study in Project II.  The author formulated the 
following questions for Empirical Project II to explore in more detail the impact 
of CEO personal traits, associated questions and emerging apparent 
paradoxes: 
- Leadership role in encouraging initiative and aligning interests. The strategy 
process implies that business units are responsible for generation of 
strategic ideas, investment projects and business development options. That 
requires a very high level of initiative and mental self-sufficiency from the 
business units‘ teams. This is not easy to achieve in any organisation. 
Arguably, given the deficit of high quality managerial resources in the 
Russian environment, this problem becomes even more pronounced. The 
question (or paradox) becomes how this high level of initiative may exist in 
the environment of a strong leader making all final decisions. There might be 
something in the nature of this leadership which works to encourage this 
initiative and align it with the wider interests of the corporation. A related 
interesting note is the CEO‘s insistence on finding consensus, seeking full 
221 
alignment with his ―close circle‖ of partners in Stage I. This push for 
alignment is also worth further investigation since it is one of the principal 
elements of the overall atmosphere for discussions.    
- The role of personal traits of the leader in strategic decision making. In 
particular, what is the role of the ―pilot‖ management model (highly granular 
and close engagement, attention even to small details) in the CEO‘s 
communication with the business units‘ teams? How does it facilitate (or 
hinder) leader-focused decentralisation? Successes and limitations of a 
particular corporate centre configuration (e.g. ―partnership‖, a very small and 
lean corporate centre) seem to be closely related to the leadership model 
and even personal traits and interests of the CEO and top team members. 
The ability and willingness on behalf of the CEO to involve himself 
personally and engage in granular discussions is one of the key elements of 
this configuration. Exploring the role of these idiosyncrasies seems to be an 
interesting theoretical and practical task. In the Russian context, it also has 
important political/social implications since such level of personal 
commitment in combination with long term focus creates an image of a 
caring and involved big business owner rather than a short-term ―profit 
skimmer‖.  
- Overall strengths and weaknesses of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ as 
they are perceived by the process participants. Some advantages became 
quite apparent from the first part: a very small and low-cost corporate centre, 
strategic flexibility of a decentralised process and absence of constraining 
―strategy as liability‖. Some deficiencies were also apparent: overloaded top 
management at the corporate headquarters, nontransparent management 
structure and roles and lack of unifying logic and synergies between the 
business units. This question deserves a more careful exploration because it 
has a particularly high practical relevance.  
To answer these questions, Project II will explore the interactions between 
business units (their top teams) and CEO/top decision-makers in the corporate 
centre and look in a structured way at the strengths and weaknesses as people 
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in the company perceive them. The role of the CEO‘s leadership in steering the 
process, promoting initiative and aligning interests in the team is the main 
subject of the enquiry.  
Interview Analysis  
Interviews Sampling, Recording and Conduct  
Overall research methodology and interview sampling, conduct and analysis 
methodology replicated the one described for Empirical Project I. The only 
exception was that there was no special focus on the temporal perspective 
since Empirical Project I analysed this in detail. As per the adopted 
methodology of an in-depth, contextually-embedded longitudinal case study, 
Empirical Project II focuses on the particular element of organisational context 
which was of special importance in the initial enquiry – the role of company 
leadership and influence of the figure of CEO and majority shareholder on the 
strategy process. This is part of an iterative and responsive approach to data 
collection pertinent to the inductive, explorative research, when new, important 
areas of inquiry may emerge over the course of the research (Strauss and 
Corbin, 1998).     
Like in the Empirical Project I, the author based the interviewee selection on 
non-probability-related sampling techniques, justifiable for the explorative and 
inductive types of research (Saunders at al., 2007). Like in Empirical Project I, 
the author based the sampling on a number of objective and subjective criteria. 
First, an interviewee should have been involved in strategy-related activity as 
either a member of a top team in a corporate centre or business unit, or as a 
―strategy professional‖ from a Strategy and M&A department. The pilot interview 
and the Empirical Project I confirmed the assumption that, in Severstal‘s case, 
only the top team members are involved in strategy-related discussions. For 
ethical and bias-related purposes, all current or former direct reports of the 
author were excluded from the sample. 
 Another highly important methodological consideration was the imperative to 
include a sufficient number of different perspectives to improve external validity, 
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as required by the ―critical realist‖ epistemological approach (Easterby-Smith et 
al., 2002). For example, in contrast to the previous project‘s interviews, two of 
the eight interviewees in Empirical Project II came from outside of Severstal as 
such: they worked in a business in a different industry which belonged to 
Severstal‘s CEO as his private holding. Since the CEO plays an active role as 
an executive chairman for that business, it was interesting to add this 
―Severstal‘s outsider‖ point of view to the spectrum of views on the 
CEO‘s/shareholder‘s role. Finally, once the above considerations of relevance 
and diversity of views were fulfilled, the author used a subjective judgement to 
evaluate ease of access and opportunity for a high-quality, open and detailed 
dialogue.  
Overall, eight interviews have delivered a rather broad representation of 
different views, functions and regions and brought the author to the saturation 
point when the arguments started to repeat themselves, demonstrating that he 
had collected a sufficient number of perspectives.  Of the eight interviews, four 
were with the representatives of business units and four with the 
representatives of the corporate centre, including one corporate officer who 
recently moved from a business unit role and hence could comment from both 
perspectives. All interviewees were new to the study, i.e. they did not participate 
in Empirical Project I. Although it was becoming increasingly difficult to enlist a 
sufficient number of top-team members who regularly interact with the company 
leader, it was beneficial not to resort to follow-up interviews with previous 
interviewees to ensure that the results of the second empirical enquiry were 
truly independent of the first one. This independence makes the second enquiry 
more credible as an instrument in reinforcing/refuting the conclusions of the first 
empirical study and clarifying remaining uncertainties (Strauss and Corbin, 
1998).  Combined with the first project, the overall number of interviews totalled 
nineteen, which was considered by Sias et al (2004) as a sufficient number to 
reach a saturation point. 
Unfortunately, due to idiosyncratic circumstances, it was not possible to conduct 
a full-fledged interview with the opposite side of interactions – the company 
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CEO. These circumstances included a very high level of the CEO‘s overload in 
the time of writing and his focus on learning some practical outcomes of the 
study, rather than contributing to its quality. However, the author did have a free 
discussion of the interview results with the CEO. That discussion took place in a 
business and practical, rather than academic context, but its brief summary is 
included in the discussion of results for information purposes.   
Interestingly, the author captured six out of the eight interviews for Empirical 
Project II through interview notes, i.e. three quarters of interviewees declined 
the author‘s request to tape and transcribe an interview. Of the eleven 
interviews for Empirical Project I, the author taped and transcribed eight. This 
probably was the result of the nature of the interview questions and the 
difference in the interviewees‘ attitude to confidentiality. For the first project, 
questions concerned mostly organisational processes, whilst for the second 
project, the questions specifically addressed the role of CEO. Arguably, the 
interviewees perceived the discussion of the CEO/majority shareholder as more 
sensitive than the discussion of business processes. Therefore, the majority of 
interviewees viewed taping as more sensitive and risky.  
Data Analysis  
Table 24 summarises the conclusions from the data analysis.  
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Table 24. Summary of Conclusions of Empirical Project II 
Topic 
(Thematic Category) 
Conclusions Informing the Research Questions 
Step 1. Setting the scene: Elaborating upon the conclusions of Project I, further exploring the characteristics of 
“leader-focused decentralisation” 
Strategy process centralisation 
- Roles of the corporate centre 
and business units  
 
 
 
 
 
- Role of the corporate financial 
and strategic objectives 
Strategy process is relatively centralised and level of centralisation has increased recently. Very 
high role of business units in generation of strategic ideas and options, development of 
regional/business strategies: 
- The system has become more centralised over the last 2-3 years  
- Despite growing centralisation, business units actively participate in generation of strategic 
options and ideas  
- Bottom-up initiatives form the backbone of company‘s strategic development 
- Business units‘ self-sufficiency is higher for organic growth decisions, whilst corporate centre 
plays a higher role in M&A.  
Financial objectives are clearly defined and provided from the corporate centre. Elements of 
strategic objectives are defined through corporate vision and investment allocation priorities 
(mining vs. steel, regional allocation of emerging markets vs. developed, etc). Both financial and 
strategic objectives were introduced over the last 2-3 years, but did not exist before: 
- No financial or strategic targets, opportunistic and unsystematic approach to strategy in the 
earlier period of corporate development 
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- Movement towards a more structured approach over the last 2-3 years. Specific financial 
targets are clearly defined. There is a universal recognition that corporate strategic priorities 
now exist and this has made the company stronger.  
- There is a certain disagreement on whether financial and strategic objectives are provided 
top-down or bottom up. Most of the respondents think this is mostly top down, but business 
units are also involved in the process. 
Responsibility for decision making 
and the role of the CEO and top 
team 
Final strategic decisions are made by the CEO. Direct communication between CEO and 
business units, unsystematic/modest involvement of corporate centre officers: 
- CEO is the main driver and key decision maker in the strategy process.  
- The strategy process itself is a reflection of the CEO's personal attitude and approach to 
decision making. It evolves in line with the CEO's ―personality‖, as a set of characteristic 
long-term traits.  
- The role of top team in the corporate centre is either unclear or seen as 
secondary/advisory compared to the decisive role of the CEO. 
- Level of corporate team involvement depends on business unit: in Russian Steel, there is 
little involvement of the corporate centre apart from the CEO. 
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Step 2. A more detailed look at the role of CEO leadership and personal traits in shaping the strategy process 
Characteristics of strategic 
discussions with CEO 
The CEO plays a leading, crucial role at the strategic interactions: Interviewees emphasise that 
he is leading the meetings, asks the majority of questions and has a "controlling stake" in 
decisions.  
The style of the meetings and strategic discussions reflects the CEO's personal preferences, 
such as close personal attention to details: Strategic discussions are usually relatively well-
structured (although there is a division on that point), but they are universally considered as very 
long and focused on details. 
Significant issues are associated with the style of meeting and the CEO‘s personal involvement: 
- Excessive focus on details may mean inefficient time allocation, as a factor constraining 
efficiency of decision making.  
- The CEO's frequent overload may create serious issues and reflect on the quality of 
decisions. 
- Very high role of the CEO means that it becomes an issue for the whole corporation if 
(when) he becomes overloaded.  
- The specifics of the CEO‘s approach to discussions may be challenging/ demotivating for 
managers from overseas, for example in the US and Italy, but are better perceived by 
Russian managers. 
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Encouraging initiative and aligning 
interests within the top team 
 
Initiative from below is encouraged. However, to be successful, initiatives should correspond to 
the CEO's vision and priorities.  
- All interviewees emphasise that initiative is very much encouraged and welcomed.  
- Discussions are conducted in an open and comfortable manner; everyone can express 
his or her opinion. The CEO is interested in hearing diverse arguments. 
- However, to go through an initiative should correspond to the CEO's general, high-level 
vision on current priorities.  
- Presenters of initiatives may not always show a balanced picture and may "push" for pet 
projects too aggressively.  
The CEO aims to achieve consensus and alignment in the team, promotes open discussion and 
allows people to express their opinion. He is keen to explain his own reasoning behind strategic 
decisions.  
- CEO's inclination to seek consensus and buy-in from all the team members is seen as a 
personal trait of the CEO (he even gets "surprised" when somebody is not "in line" with 
the prevailing view).  
- CEO doesn‘t like disagreement within the team and aims to get to apparent consensus, 
even if this consensus is not quite real.  
- To push for consensus, the CEO carefully explains his own reasoning behind a decision 
and that brings people on his side. 
 
The CEO‘s push for apparent alignment may present a problem since many observers have 
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noted that top managers may be reluctant to raise an issue that contradicts the CEO's strong 
view at the moment. Interestingly, the CEO's interest in consensus seems to be focused on the 
very top team and does not extend to the middle management, which is seen as an issue. 
“Pilot” strategic  management 
model in action - attention to 
details and high granularity of 
discussions 
The CEO is normally very focused on details in strategic discussions. This is a reflection of his 
―personality‖ - deep personal curiosity. It also serves as an instrument to keep the management 
team alert and focused on details in presentation of strategic options: 
  
- Generally, the CEO/shareholder is inclined to look at details, although it depends on 
whether he is personally interested in a topic.  
- High level of detail is the reflection of the CEO‘s personal interest and curiosity, but it is 
also a vehicle to teach management that it is important to track the details. One 
interviewee suggested such focus on details may also reflect lack of trust between the 
CEO and the management team. He tries to establish tighter control by keeping an option 
to question any figure or detail at any moment.  
- High personal involvement of the CEO is part of the model of a small and lean corporate 
centre with minimum internal bureaucracy and direct communication between business 
units and the decision maker. There is a bigger potential role for the corporate centre in 
this area – corporate officers with business units could prepare the discussions with the 
CEO in advance which should take less time than going into detail at the CEO's personal 
meetings with business units.   
 
Practically, too much focus on small details also has some clearly negative implications: 
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- There is a suboptimal allocation of managerial time - strategically important issues may 
not receive adequate attention.   
- Sometimes too much time devoted to detailed research means that a strategic opportunity 
may be lost to competitors.  
- Management team may become demotivated by the requirement to present too detailed a 
business case when it is not relevant due to high uncertainty and a long planning horizon.   
Step 3. Participants’ Perception of Strengths and Weaknesses of the “Leader-focused decentralisation” strategy process 
Strength-Weakness I. Adaptive and 
agile decision-making system with 
strong business units/weak 
corporate centre and overreliance 
on CEO  
 
 
 
Strength:  
Direct communication with  the CEO and majority shareholder and high role of business units 
create an adaptive and agile decision making system. This is an important strength for a 
diverse and growing corporation.  
 
- High role of "close-to earth" business units, direct communication with the CEO create an 
adaptive, non-bureaucratic and agile decision making system. On balance, this is good for 
a diverse and growing company like Severstal since too centralised decision making 
would be too slow and costly. 
- Direct access to the owner of the business can solve issues of any level of complexity; 
there is a comfortable consistency of dealing with the same person.  
 
Weakness: 
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Overreliance on the CEO and weak corporate centre create significant issues for decision- 
making:  
- Direct connection and overreliance on CEO decisions becomes an issue when he is 
overloaded. 
- Business units‘ strategies remain disjointed and unconnected to each other. 
- Expertise of the corporate centre is underutilised since decisions are discussed directly 
between the CEO and business units; unclear authority of the corporate centre. There is a 
need for stronger corporate expertise in addition to CEO's personal involvement.   
- Mental constraints of the CEO and top team (implied supremacy of steel assets) may 
reduce efficiency of decision-making. 
Many interviewees highlight weaknesses of the system, but for the majority, agility and 
adaptiveness more than make up for possible weaknesses. 
Strength-weakness II. Raising 
sensitive issues: Constructive 
atmosphere for strategic 
discussions, but reluctance to 
question the prevailing CEO’s 
opinion  
 
Possibility to raise sensitive issues and engage in an open dialogue with the CEO proved to be a 
very controversial issue.  
On the one hand, there is an open and constructive atmosphere, expressing views and 
suggesting initiatives is encouraged. Some respondents maintained that raising any issue is 
possible:  
- There is a universal recognition that the CEO encourages initiative and open atmosphere 
and makes sure that there is a possibility to raise different views and express opinions.  
- Some interviewees state directly that raising sensitive issues is easy and there is a 
straightforward, open atmosphere.  
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Besides, there is strong focus of the CEO on building alignment and shared understanding of 
decisions within the top team.  
The CEO has a strong authority and top team members may be reluctant to contradict the 
CEO/shareholder and highlight risks/issues associated with his decision. Difficulty of 
raising sensitive questions and focus on one man's opinion is a significant problem and 
historically has led to suboptimal decisions and value-destruction:  
- Since the CEO has a high authority, team members may be concerned about appearing 
in contradiction with the CEO's view.  
- Team members may not be fully prepared to discuss difficult topics because they feel 
pressure from (and on) an overstretched and exhausted CEO which makes fully open 
discussion more difficult.  
- There is an insufficient level of trust between the top team and CEO.  
- There is lack of initiative from the top team members since they prefer waiting for the 
CEO's opinion before expressing their views. Interestingly, the same interviewee may 
speak about an open and trustful atmosphere and ,at the same time, complain that the top 
team is complacent; their main idea is to "keep the CEO happy". Therefore, there is not 
enough challenge and scrutiny of strategic decisions. Interestingly, according to this view, 
middle managers do raise difficult issues and are better prepared to discuss them.   
The possibility to raise sensitive issues with the CEO proved to be a very controversial issue. 
There was an almost 50:50 distribution of opinions.    
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Strength-Weakness III. Excessive 
focus on details  
 
The CEO's focus on details is a reflection of his ―personality‖, an inherent long-term trait. 
Excessive focus on details distracts the CEO's and executives' attention from more important 
issues, makes meetings too long and tiresome, demotivates personnel and makes the overall 
system less efficient. This characteristic explains the CEO‘s lack of trust and inability to delegate.  
There were some comments that attention to details is a positive moment for the business, but 
the majority of comments maintained that excessive attention to details is a weakness. On the 
other hand, this is just a natural extension of the CEO‘s ―personality‖ and hence should be 
tolerated.   
Weakness I.  High pressure on the CEO from his roles as executive, wealth manager and participant in political 
affairs. This puts high pressure on  the CEO personally and on his team. This overload negatively 
impacts the quality of decisions.  
Weakness II.  
 
Decision-making is concentrated at the top; there is little communication with and involvement of 
middle management. Top team and CEO are rather closed; there is a need for more 
communication with the rest of the company. 
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DISCUSSION  
This section will discuss the conclusions of interview analysis and relate them to 
the questions and paradoxes inferred from Empirical Project I (see Appendix 5 
for a detailed description of key takeaways).  
Step 1. Setting the Scene: Elaborating upon the Conclusions of 
Project I, Further Exploring the Characteristics of “Leader-focused 
Decentralisation” 
Overall, Project II interviews have further supported the key conclusions of 
Project I:  
- High role of business units in strategy process, particularly in generation 
of strategic initiatives. However, ―final stage‖ decision-making is firmly 
concentrated at the CEO level.  
- Very unstructured and ad-hoc process in the beginning and emergence 
of elements of financial and strategic control over the last two to three 
years 
- Control of the final decision-making in the hands of the CEO/majority 
shareholder. Attention to details and high personal involvement.  
These conclusions are elaborated in more details below: 
Strategy Process Centralisation: Roles of the Corporate Centre and 
Business Units, Corporate Financial and Strategic Objectives 
Among interviewees, there is strong agreement that: 1) the system has become 
more centralised over the last 2-3 years, but 2) nevertheless, business units 
actively participate in the generation of strategic options and ideas and they 
come up very actively (in some cases, even "aggressively") with bottom-up 
initiatives. Interestingly, the business units‘ self-sufficiency is more pronounced 
in organic growth decisions, whilst the corporate centre plays a higher role in 
M&A:  
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CG9: “Strategic options are mostly driven from below, from the business unit level. A good 
example *is the+ mining business’s initiative to invest into gold. It was a completely bottom-up 
initiative, created by the strategists from mining divisions. They thought it’d be an excellent 
idea and pushed it through very aggressively. So, if a project it pushed through well enough – it 
will likely go through.” BUU1: “Well, the main idea generators are business units – those who 
run the business… Gradually since 2-3 years ago we were driving to more concrete planning, 
started direction-setting, driving the decisions… So, to summarise, before there was no 
centralised strategy because there was not any precise planning, neither from below, not from 
above.”   
Clearly defined financial objectives (margin, return on capital, profit targets) 
have emerged over the last 2-3 years. Strategic objectives exist in the form of 
―strategic visions‖ and relatively flexible investment allocation priorities (mining 
vs. steel, regional allocation of emerging markets vs. developed, etc). The 
company introduced both financial and strategic objectives over the last 2-3 
years only. In the earlier periods, there were no explicit corporate financial or 
strategic targets. The company mostly made strategic decisions on an 
opportunistic and ad-hoc basis in the direct discussion between business units 
as generators of projects and the corporate centre as the final decision maker. 
Therefore, the constraining elements of ―strategy as liability‖ were not part of the 
strategy process:  
CG8: "The corporate centre provides some financial and strategic objectives [from the past] 
one or two years. With clear objectives on margins, ROCE, return payback period and other 
criteria. When I arrived in 2007-08, there was a lack of vision. To me that was an opportunistic 
approach. Now we have a sense of where we want to go; we may not get there at the end one 
hundred percent, but we go. There is good idea where we want to go. I understand it. It is very 
clear to me."  BUG2:  "Now we have a clear objective for the whole company, discussed and 
approved at the corporate level (and, hopefully, there is a system of long-term motivation for 
it). We have a unifying strategy for the corporation as a whole... Overall, the system has 
become more orderly and more structured, with clearer responsibilities. Centralisation has 
increased, but that was positive, smart centralisation in the right things."   BUU1: "[At the 
earlier stages] the role [of the corporate centre] was not very formal. Before that we had a 
rather disjoined, sporadic approach. Each business unit had a different strategy. We had a five-
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year plan, but we didn’t have comprehensive, applied operational planning from the corporate 
level. We did not have any precise, articulated targets; we certainly did not have an articulated 
understanding what every part of the business has to do… We had a more organic, case-by-
case approach. Gradually, since 2-3 years ago, we were driving to more concrete planning, 
started direction-setting, driving the decisions… So to summarise, before there was no 
centralised strategy because there was not any precise planning neither from below nor from 
above.” 
The strategic goals are defined in rather general terms, so the constraining 
influence of strategy is limited:  
CG8: “The corporate role is to define overall strategy, corporate strategy. As far as strategic 
initiatives are concerned, I am more familiar with M&A deals. For M&A, the majority of the 
deals are originated from the business units, sometimes also from the corporate centre.” 
BUU1: “But this *strategy+ is only a general principle, otherwise business units have a high level 
of discretion and freedom to think about their development.” 
As  previously discussed, the emergence of financial and strategic targets, and 
the introduction of corporate strategy appeared to be a reaction to growing 
external and internal demand for a clear strategic vision, inefficiencies of a pure 
ad-hoc process in a large and complex corporation, and as a response to the 
economic crisis which demanded a more disciplined and focused approach.  
According to one interview, it was also a result of a learning process in the 
company‘s communication with its bigger international peers: 
BUU1: “Well, we saw how other companies do this *strategy+, like Arcelor did it, for example. I 
remember when we were doing the valuation; we had a lot of discussion that we need a 
unified plan, a strategic plan to present for the valuation.”  
Interestingly, the definition of the level of centralisation proved to be a rather 
contentious issue. Interviewees called the system both centralised and 
decentralised, bringing in very similar illustrations and examples to support their 
opinion. One could argue that different respondents viewed the "level of 
centralisation" very differently depending on such factors as their background 
and knowledge of company history. However, there is an almost universal 
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agreement that the strategy making system has become more centralised and 
structured over the last 2-3 years. Therefore, different views and definitions may 
be related to the fact that all changes are relatively recent and the system is not 
yet fully established, and its current pattern is not yet fully recognized by all 
participants.  
The Importance of the CEO Role in Strategic Decision-Making  
Final strategic decisions are made by CEO personally. There was a direct 
communication between the CEO and the business units, but an 
unsystematic/modest involvement of the corporate centre officers: 
CG7: "Final decisions on strategic issues, overall budget approval are made by the CEO. “Local” 
discussions are made by business units within the approved budgets and with situation-
specific/patchy participation of corporate centre officers". BUR3: "Shareholders make final 
approval for all, more or less, significant investments. I don’t see any evolution in this 
management approach." 
The CEO is the main driver and key decision maker in the strategy process. 
The strategy process itself is a reflection of the CEO's personal attitude and 
approach to decision making. It evolves in line with the CEO's ―personality‖ (as 
perceived by the interviewees):  
CG10: "Strategy-making process is first of all defined by CEO, it is a reflection of his personality. 
Correspondingly, the process was developing and growing reflecting also his personal 
evolution". 
The interviewees use the term ―personality‖ as a subjective term describing the 
CEO‘s approach to exercising his leadership role. This definition may not 
necessarily refer to ―personality‖ as a set of ―distinctive, fundamental 
characteristics of an individual‖ (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007). Therefore 
we can‘t make general conclusions about the overall ―personality‖ of CEO on 
the basis of these relatively narrow observations. An appropriately more narrow 
term characterising the CEO‘s impact on the strategy process and decision-
making would be ―personal traits‖ (such as deep personal curiosity and 
meticulous attention to details), which would refer to a ―fixed or reasonably 
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constant element of personal character that remains reasonably constant 
across different contexts‖ (Kakabadse and Kakabadse, 2007). According to the 
findings, the CEO‘s personal traits play a major role as enabling (and 
constraining) characteristics which define and ultimately make possible some of 
the fundamental elements of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖. The term 
―personality‖ when used in the discussion of the research findings refers to the 
respondents‘ subjective opinion.    
 The role of the top team in the corporate centre is either unclear or seen as 
secondary/advisory compared to the decisive role of the CEO: 
CG7: “Globally, the corporate centre plays a role of a “consultant”, with the exception of 
certain support functions, such as PR or Legal.” BUG2: "Strategic issues are first discussed by 
the business unit top team and the final approval of all projects is, of course, in the hands of 
our sole decision-maker – the CEO. Usually we ( the business unit team) communicate with 
him directly; there is little work in between, for example with corporate centre, etc. The CEO 
“feeds every piece of data through himself”, there is relatively little involvement of the 
corporate team, as far as I can see." CG9: “…also depends on a business unit –the  corporate 
team, with the exception of the CEO himself, participates very little in review of organic 
growth in the Russian Steel unit. Otherwise, the CEO plays a decisive role in decision making on 
strategy… the Management Board acts more as a forum for discussion and exchange of views. 
Decisions are, I’d say, 80 or 90% determined by the CEO himself.”    
To summarise, the key traits of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ were 
confirmed by a different set of interviews in Empirical Project II: 
- A highly decentralised strategy process in the beginning. The company 
introduced corporate financial and strategic goals fairly recently, in the 
aftermath of the global economic crisis. However, their introduction, although 
seen as a movement to ―smart‖ centralisation, did not alter dramatically the 
key premise of the system: very high role of business units, that remain the 
key drivers of strategic development, generators of strategic options. 
Bottom-up initiative is encouraged and expected as the main driver and 
source of business ideas.      
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- Small and lean corporate centre, minimum corporate rules or bureaucracy, 
absence of unifying strategy for disjointed business units. Despite some 
movement towards higher decentralisation, introduction of corporate 
strategic priorities and financial hurdles, the role of the corporate centre 
officers, apart from the CEO, remains rather unclear and nontransparent to 
many interviewees. There are remarks that the corporate centre top team 
remains passive and not very visible in the company. Business units‘ 
strategies remain disjointed and uncoordinated.   
- The pre-eminent role of the leader as the ―final‖ decision maker. Control over 
the ―final stage‖ of decision making is in the hands of the CEO/majority 
shareholder. Deep personal involvement of the CEO in strategic discussions 
remains the defining feature of the decision making system. These 
discussions involve careful attention to granular details. Remarkably, in the 
earlier period of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖, a small circle of top 
managers around the CEO apparently played a much higher role than the 
current corporate centre top team. Nowadays, despite movement to higher 
decentralisation, the corporate centre remains rather ―invisible‖; all attention 
and responsibility is focused on the figure of  the CEO. It is then unsurprising 
that the CEO‘s overload emerges as a significant issue that has a direct 
impact on the quality of strategic decisions, as will be discussed below.      
Step 2. A More Detailed Look at the Role of CEO Leadership and 
Personal Traits in Shaping Strategy Process  
This section will discuss the outstanding questions, idiosyncrasies and 
paradoxes of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ emerging from the empirical 
Project I.  The purpose is to explore this phenomenon in more detail, attempt to 
explain apparent paradoxes and analyse strengths and weaknesses of this 
rather peculiar approach to strategy making. On the practical side, the  ultimate 
ambition would be to identify strengths, potential risks and recommend areas for 
improvement of the strategy making system in Severstal.  
The questions addressed in the section include the characteristics of strategic 
discussions, the role of the CEO in encouraging initiative and aligning interests 
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and overall impact of the CEO‘s personal traits and preferences on strategy 
process, in particular, his dominance in decision making and obsessive 
attention to details. In other words, this section will focus on the fundamental 
reason, the most important characteristic and the main strength of ―strategy-
focused decentralisation‖ – the role of the creator and owner of strategy 
process, the company CEO. The section will conclude with the summary of 
identified strengths and weaknesses of this style of strategy making and a 
discussion of practical implications for future development.   
Characteristics of Strategic Discussions with the CEO 
As discussed above, strategy-related meetings are the main instrument in 
strategic decision-making in Severstal. Therefore, understanding the style and 
particularities of these discussions is important for proper understanding of the 
process itself.  
One of the most defining characteristics of strategy meetings is the role of the 
CEO. Interviewees emphasise that he leads the meetings, asks the majority of 
questions and has a "controlling stake" in strategic decisions. In other words, 
the style of the meetings confirms the ultimate importance of the CEO figure in 
the strategy process: 
CG8: "He asks vast majority of the time, like of the two hours, 1 h 58 min – Alexei, 2 min – 
someone else”… BUG2: “He has “implicit” 50% stake in every decision, that is, all depends on 
him". BUR4: "Strategic discussions are regular but shareholder is available for extraordinary 
meeting if there is a need to discuss. Meetings are usually well-structured but always start 
late". 
Another interesting observation is that the style of the meetings and strategic 
discussions reflects the CEO's personal traits and preferences, such as close 
personal attention to details: 
CG10: “The CEO is very focused on the discussion of details, shows great interest in discussing 
small aspects and details. It defines the whole discussion. He may look through and discuss 
every page of a 100-page presentation, if he has time and interest. Possibly, such focus on 
details is explained by his personal traits – curiosity, first of all. Otherwise, it is difficult to 
241 
understand why would he need it”. CG7: “CEO himself is not a very systemic person. 
Sometimes we don’t discuss the most important, high-level questions. Like for example in the 
strategy discussion we didn’t spend time to discuss strategic scenarios for the industry, how it 
will evolve, etc. This is strange and not logical”. 
Strategic discussions are usually relatively well-structured, although 
interviewees are divided on that point: 
BUR3: “The agenda of such a meeting (we call them board meetings) is set in advance for a 
year. They are divided into results reports and strategic discussions and go in a very structured 
way, according to a presentation. Our meetings are regular. They usually start with a delay. We 
try to stick to the agenda which is helped by the structure of presentations.” CG9: “Meetings 
on strategy are usually rather short and not very well structured. Presentations/messages are 
not always well-prepared; often they are one-sided and sometimes don’t take into 
consideration risks. Time allocation is not very efficient.” 
Meetings are almost universally considered as very long and often focused on 
unnecessary details, which may be demotivating: 
CG8: “After that, in the discussion itself, they may be discouraged because meetings are too 
long and not enough prepared before.” CG10: “We invest a lot of energy and efforts into 
preparation of these strategic business plans, and we have to prepare to the most detailed 
discussions. So, these discussions are usually very long and very boring since you have to wait 
for hours as they discuss different matters, waiting for your turn that may never come.” BUG2: 
“Still, we leave these strategic discussions mostly motivated because we like what we do; the 
CEO usually approves our suggestions “in general.” Demotivation comes from the excessive 
attention to details; the CEO is a man of such scale that he could have spent his time much 
more efficiently.”  
Excessive focus on details may mean inefficient time allocation, as a factor 
constraining efficiency of decision-making and time allocation:  
CG7: “CEO himself is not a very systemic person. Sometimes we don’t discuss the most 
important, high-level questions. Like for example in the strategy discussion we didn’t spend 
time to discuss strategic scenarios for the industry, how it will evolve, etc. This is strange and 
not logical”. CG9: “I remember one meeting when we spent a couple of hours to discuss an 
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investment of $10-15 mln. into some small extension of the coal company PBS.  And we 
discussed in details many other deals. There was a decision of principal importance about our 
company Y, which involved possible default of some of our operations, and that was left to late 
in the night, when it was of course difficult to discuss anything effectively. Such things happen 
rather often”. 
In addition, low spirits/time constraints of the CEO may have an adverse impact 
on the quality of meetings. Since decisions are focused on the CEO, it becomes 
an  issue for the whole corporation if he becomes overloaded:  
CG7: “All decisions focused on the CEO – he becomes overloaded, effectiveness suffers, 
suboptimal decisions can be made. Not very systemic decision-making. Quality of decision- 
making depends on his personal interest, on the level of his [CEO] involvement, how much 
time he can afford.”  
Interestingly, the specifics of the CEO‘s approach to discussions may be 
challenging/demotivating for managers from overseas, for example in the US 
and Italy, but are better perceived by Russian managers: 
CG8: “... for example starting meetings on time. It is a stupid thing, but when you say you start 
at 10 and you start at 1 pm for people it may be demotivating. Second, here you have short 
meetings, for them to have long meetings for 10, 12 hours is challenging for people in Italy, in 
the US. And finally, they may not understand sometimes whether a certain decision is made or 
not. So decisions may not be well-communicated. It may be difficult for them. In 2007-2008, I 
saw lack of trust, I observed it very clearly in the US. The local team did not understand him.” 
Encouraging Initiative and Aligning Interests within the Top Team 
All interviewees emphasise that the company very much encourages and 
welcomes bottom-up initiative. Employees conduct discussions in an open and 
comfortable manner and everyone can express his or her opinion. The CEO is 
interested in hearing diverse arguments:   
BUR4: “Shareholder welcomes initiatives; I’d say the initiatives are very encouraged.” BUG2: 
"He [the CEO] is open to a dialogue, considering his level of authority. He is careful with 
making quick decisions, likes to listen. BUR3: "Positive attitude to initiatives. He reviews all 
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initiatives with interest, but may occasionally challenge someone rather strongly if there is 
something he would not like. CG8: "Yes, I think first of all it is encouraged; everyone can 
propose his ideas to Alexei, to a strategic committee. This is a positive thing; we are very open- 
minded in that." 
However, to go through an initiative should correspond to the CEO's general, 
high-level vision on current priorities. The CEO (?) communicates this vision in 
very broad terms so that it leaves subordinates with  the opportunity for 
creativity and taking initiatives. A good example is discouragement of ―growth‖ 
initiatives in the time of economic crisis, when it was time was to focus on 
rationalising existing businesses: 
CG7: "Initiative from below is very much encouraged. However, it has to be in line with the 
“party line” to go through. The  CEO has his own vision of the world, and the initiatives have to 
be oriented towards his visions. But mostly – he supports the initiatives; he is very open to 
them.” BUR3: “It really depends on the mood and general situation – for example, when there 
was a crisis we felt it was better not to come up with development initiatives. Now, as the 
crisis is over, we feel again if there are investments on the agenda." 
There are also issues related to the presentation style of the initiative providers. 
The presenters of initiatives may not always show a balanced picture and may 
"push" for pet projects strongly: 
CG8: “But everyone often wants to push through his idea, not showing strengths and 
weaknesses objectively, but just pushing it through to have it accepted.”  
This approach may be considered a natural consequence of the system where 
projects effectively compete for funding in the mind of the CEO and corporate 
top team. In this environment, the task of business units is to present as 
attractive case as possible, whilst the mission of the corporate team is to 
construct an effective screening and approval mechanism. Presumably, since 
realisation of strategic ideas lies mostly on the shoulders of business units 
themselves, they should have a reasonable confidence in the project success. 
Hence, involvement of business units in both options generation and realisation 
serves as a balancing act, providing an advantage over top-down hierarchical 
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command and control systems favoured by classical schools of corporate 
strategy (e.g. Andrews, 1971).  Overall, this system is in line with the ―strategy 
as a resource allocation‖ mechanisms described by Bower (1970) and 
Burgelman (1983).     
There are many comments on a very constructive and comfortable climate for 
strategic discussions: 
BUR4:  “The discussion is normally very smooth and natural, not questions and answers, but a 
usual, good, intellectually rich business conversation.” CG8: “The CEO asks everybody’s 
opinion; he is rather democratic. There is enough time for everybody to express an opinion.”  
BUG2: “He is open to a dialogue, considering his level of authority. He is careful with making 
quick decisions, likes to listen.” 
This is clearly one of the most important features of the system that ensure its 
ongoing competitiveness. Direct dialogue and rapid, agile decision-making, 
almost by definition have to rely on open dialogue and opportunity for everyone 
to express her opinion. The  interviewees view the CEO's inclination to seek 
consensus and buy-in from all the team members as a personal trait of the CEO 
(he even gets "surprised" when somebody is not "in line" with the prevailing 
view). The CEO doesn‘t like disagreement within the team and aims to reach 
apparent consensus, even if this consensus is not quite real. To push for 
consensus, the CEO explains his own reasoning behind a decision and that 
brings people on his side: 
 CG9: "The CEO prefers to see alignment and consensus in the team. I think it is a personal 
thing – he prefers everyone to be aligned; this is satisfying for him personally. He is trying to 
convince everyone, even if there is only one person who disagrees. This is part of his personal 
style." CG7: “On consensus, he is always trying to achieve consensus and alignment, 
considering, of course, his position as the main shareholder, etc. But he listens to people, asks 
their opinion, lets them speak, asks detailed questions and challenges them. He usually 
explains his opinion, the reasons why a certain decision was taken, tries to find common 
ground." BUG2: “…But once he is convinced of something, he will push it through a dialogue, 
collect allies, in a sense making sure people buy into his vision. Inside his mind, he is rather 
uncomfortable with conflict." 
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Too strong a push for consensus may, of course, present a problem since many 
observers have noted that top managers may be reluctant to raise an issue that 
contradicts a CEO's strong view at the moment:  
CG7: “Top management is usually reluctant to raise really sensitive questions, probably 
because they find it difficult to appear in contradiction with the shareholder. Some strategic 
issues, such as North American assets acquisitions in 2008 were not probably discussed 
properly because raising any issues related to risks would go against the prevailing point of 
view in the team and the shareholder.” CG8: "I think sometimes generally people don’t 
present bad news. I think people most of the time put negative aspects in presentations and 
expect Alexei to find it himself, not letting him know the news directly. They prefer Alexei to 
look at the data and find out the negative aspects himself. Well, I don’t know perhaps, maybe 
they are scared. Perhaps this means they are not fully prepared to discuss with him difficult 
topics.” BUU1: "We can overlook something when we start from only one vision. One example 
is the acquisition of North American assets – some people were firmly against that, but since 
the CEO really wanted to grow in North America, all precautions were brushed aside, and 
finally those people who were against that had to vote pro, since the CEO was clearly in 
support. It turned out to be a horrible decision.” 
One interviewee suggested that alignment is not as important as a professional 
opinion of a person responsible for an area under discussion. However, the 
same interviewee highlighted that the CEO is uncomfortable with disagreement 
and prefers to delay a decision if there is one: 
BUR4: "Alignment and consensus are not a very big issue. What matters in a concrete field is 
the opinion of the “owner” of this process, responsible manager. This is what really prevails. If 
there are disagreements, we can take it for further work. So one may say that if there is lack of 
consensus, the issue is usually postponed till next meeting for further work. Sometimes they 
don’t get accepted just as well".    
We can interpret the CEO‘s desire to see a consensus and alignment in the 
team, which is consistently mentioned in interviews through Project I and II, as 
another of his personal traits which have a significant impact on the process. 
This may well be the case, although team alignment and consensus are, 
logically, important elements of effective functioning in the conditions of a very 
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small and lean corporate team ―hand-managing‖ a complex and rapidly growing 
enterprise. There is simply no time for friction, and there are very few corporate 
policies and instructions to regulate and structure the decision making process.  
In these conditions, good mutual understanding and trust become prerequisites 
for success. Indeed, one interviewee from the Project I put it very vividly:  
CGUE1: “Before that time, before the beginning of … before January 2006, okay, all decisions, a 
hundred percent of decisions were taken by the partnership of five people.  So, to make it 
more clear, before January 2006, any decision of the group was ……..by one of five of us. So, 
nobody else could take it, and all of the decisions were sort of distributed between five of us, 
so any of the five of us could take a decision, okay, which was then one hundred percent 
recognised and approved by the five others, even though the person did not tell others. We 
had very good confidence in each other; there was no need for [functional specialists] people 
to interfere...”  
Effectively, encouragement of initiative and open discussion to an extent 
contradicts the CEO‘s desire to see full consensus and alignment, since 
obviously raising issues and highlighting risks may seem at odds with 
everybody‘s alignment. The key to solving these issues is the clear separation 
of the discussion stage, when all opinions and concerns are welcome, and the 
decision stage (once a decision is taken, everyone rallies around the flag). 
Arguably, the CEO is most often doing a fine job in separating these moments 
since common opinion (90% of interviewees) maintains that there is a good 
atmosphere for discussions, or, even, that discussions may be too long and too 
detailed. A very important part of the CEO‘s approach to alignment is the fact 
that he is taking time and effort to explain why he has taken a certain opinion: 
CG8: “Personally, he likes to convince people around the table. They may not be totally 
convinced, but when he is asking them again, they may pretend to be fully convinced at the 
end, finally.  Maybe he thinks about himself that he didn’t convince people around the table. 
He likes to convince people, normally. This is a personal thing, maybe.  He is always a bit 
surprised when somebody not necessarily fully agreed with his position. I don’t know. You 
remember that South African project and Thomas said he disagrees, and he was surprised – 
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why do you disagree, Thomas? Of course, sometimes somebody like Kulichenko raises his 
reservations; he is always, I’d say, a little bit upset.” 
Thus, the decision style is far away from authoritarian and capricious. The 
leader is genuinely trying to explain the rational and build a consensus on the 
basis of conscious shared understanding, rather than on  simple loyalty to an 
organisation or its CEO. This approach certainly brings its fruits since 
interviewees state that they are quite comfortable with most of the decisions:    
CG8: “Personally, I feel motivated most of the time because internally I agree with the CEO’s 
decisions; he has a very good rational. For one reason- yes, he explains his rational very well. I 
understand why he made these decisions and I agree with almost all of them.”    
“Pilot” Strategic Management Model in Action  
The author identified the CEO‘s focus on details as one of the strongest 
manifestations of Severstal‘s strategy making process. The limitations of this 
trait are aptly reflected in the ―pilot vs. astronaut‖  metaphor suggested by one 
of the Project I interviewees. The CEO pays such careful attention to details that 
he only sees what is immediately in front, focused on the pilot‘s desk at every 
moment. This is in contrast to the ―big picture‖ seen by an astronaut who has 
enough time to reflect on what‘s going on in the space around him on the way to 
orbit. Personal attention to details, and an ability at any moment to initiate a 
―deep dive‖ into granular constituents of a strategic proposal, is an essential 
instrument for maintaining discipline and control in the conditions of 
unelaborated internal processes of checks and verifications and small/non-
existent corporate bureaucracy. This is an essential instrument to keep control 
on the quality of business proposals. This is also a heavy load on the CEO and 
the top team since this approach naturally takes considerable time and 
managerial effort relative to standard high-level strategic discussions.  
The Project II findings confirm that the CEO is very focused on details in 
strategic discussions, although this focus may vary depending on his level of 
interest and time constraints. The study participants interpret this focus as a 
reflection of his fundamental traits, charachteristics of his ―personality‖, which 
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apply to his reaction in every context, not only a narrow business setting. The 
most widely mentioned trait is his deep personal curiosity and interest in 
production processes, markets development, operational practices and other 
details which make up the discussion of strategic projects: 
BUG 2: "Overall, this focus on details is probably explained by the CEO’s personal curiosity and 
desire to understand all what’s going on. The corporate centre could play a bigger role here; 
corporate officers could discuss these details before it lands on the discussion table with the 
CEO." CG8: "It’s good that the CEO wants to focus on details, because the devil is in details. But 
sometimes it’s necessary to focus on the important parts of the discussion. You need to focus 
on details for ten minutes, fifteen minutes. He may stay on details for an hour or more."  
BUR3: “Level of detail varies; I’d say it is ad hoc. The approach is rather non-systematic; 
depends on what he was dealing with recently. But generally, I’d say there is an inclination to 
look at details. This is mostly based on character, personal traits. Every detail has a value.” 
CG10: "Discussion of business plans, strategic options may become very detailed; depending 
on what will catch the CEO’s attention he may pick a topic and go into great details, very deep 
granularity." 
Some of the interviewees went further and attempted to look deeper than 
personal curiosity and a details-conscious character.  In direct confirmation to 
the findings of Project I, one of interviewees suggested that it serves as an 
instrument to teach management that it is important to track the details:  
BUR4: "I think he is doing it first for himself, to satisfy his own curiosity and get to know more 
intimately the drivers of the business. And also to teach the management team that such 
things require a careful look; there are no items too small to look at. Another example is the 
CAPEX programme. In the past we were looking at CAPEX from a relatively wholesome 
perspective. This year he asked us to give [in depth details] – how much, into which plants, 
into what equipment, why do we need it, etc. when we presented it; he looked at it relatively 
briefly and approved. So the important thing for him was to make sure that we have looked at 
it ourselves."                  
Another interviewee suggested that such focus on details may also reflect lack 
of trust between the CEO and the management team. He tries to establish 
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tighter control by keeping an option to question any figure or detail at any 
moment:  
CG7: "The CEO is very focused on the discussion of details, shows great interest in discussing 
small aspects and details. He may look through and discuss every page of a 100-page 
presentation, if he has time and interest. Sometimes he is too engaged with details, so that it is 
difficult to see the whole picture –  the forest is not seen behind the trees.  Possibly, such focus 
on details is explained by his personal traits – curiosity, first of all…Another possible 
explanation is that he doesn’t quite trust his subordinates fully." 
Therefore, it is clear that high personal involvement of the CEO is part of the 
model of the small and lean corporate centre with minimum internal 
bureaucracy and direct communication between business units and the decision 
maker. Attention to details, although clearly part of the CEO‘s personal code, is 
an important institutional ingredient of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖. It 
serves as a substitution for precise rules and a structured bureaucratic ―check 
and control‖ processes, as a simple but effective instrument for control and 
discipline, as a vehicle to improve the CEO‘s understanding and confidence in 
business projects brought in by business units.  
Practically, too much focus on small details may mean that: 
- There is a suboptimal allocation of managerial time - strategically important 
issues may not receive adequate attention:  
BUR3: “His sometimes excessive attention to details makes the discussion rather tiresome 
at times. Like, “well, here it’s started again.” It makes no sense to discuss details if you 
don’t have a clear big picture. We often get into details whilst we don’t have clarity on 
strategy yet. That is rather perplexing and definitely quite inefficient.” 
- Sometimes too much time devoted to research and details means that an 
opportunity may get lost:  
BUU1: “The value of the deal was simply ridiculous, especially from today’s perspective: 
$9-11 million dollars, if you can imagine that. We discussed for days the pros and cons, and 
what are the details; spent a lot of resources to investigate that. And then when we finally 
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were prepared to make a deal, another side exercised the right of first refusal and bought 
that. I think that was a very inefficient undertaking …But it was driven by the CEO’s vision 
and interest. Too detailed look. It was demotivating at the end.” 
- Management team may become demotivated by the requirement to present 
too detailed a business case when it is not relevant due to high uncertainty 
and a long planning horizon:   
CG10: “That is ok if we speak about a one-year plan, or about two years, but beyond that it 
becomes really tedious and worthless since you can’t see the market and operations that 
far in such details. That concerns organic growth projects since the business plan is all 
about CAPEX, organic growth. But the strategic business plan discussion, when it becomes 
so enmeshed with details, becomes totally divorced from real life. In 5 or 10 years we will 
have completely new assets, new markets…” 
Also on the practical side, there is an argument that the company needs a 
bigger role for the corporate centre beyond simple CEO involvement: 
BUR3: “Actually, I think there are areas for improvement here. A world-class corporate centre 
with good understanding of our business would help. A great strategist in the helm, to provide 
us with an alternative vision, [could] apply some pressure and have a serious, detailed 
discussion; professional auditors and HR service for the top teams in all the businesses. A 
strong GR would also help.”  
Arguably, as a company matures and grows, ad-hoc personal involvement 
should give way to a more structured processes involving corporate oversight 
beyond the CEO‘s personal involvement. Corporate officers could do more 
preparatory work in the discussions with the CEO in advance, which should 
mean that they spend less time at the CEO's personal meetings with business 
units. Overreliance on (unavoidably) an overstretched CEO creates serious 
systemic risks for a company of the size and complexity of Severstal. This 
paper will discuss these questions in more detail in the section on strengths and 
weaknesses of Severstal‘s strategy process system.    
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Step 3. Participants’ Perception of Strengths and Weaknesses of the 
“Leader-focused Decentralisation” Strategy Process 
This section will discuss strengths and weaknesses of Severstal‘s strategy 
process as they were described in the interviews by process participants. The 
particularity of the strategy process is such that we often see the same traits as 
both strengths and weaknesses, inseparable from each other like two sides of a 
coin. The study identified three such ―strengths-weaknesses‖, directly related to 
the idiosyncrasies of Severstal‘s strategy-making process.   
Strength-Weakness I. Adaptive and Agile Decision Making System 
with Strong Business Units and Direct Access to the Key Decision 
Maker/ “Weak” and “Underutilized” Corporate Centre and 
Overreliance on CEO personal involvement 
A strong role of "close-to- earth" business units, flexible interactions and direct 
communication with the CEO create an  adaptive, non-bureaucratic and agile 
decision making system. On balance, the majority of interviewees viewed this 
as a strength for a diverse and growing company like Severstal:  
CG7: "On balance, high discretion of business units and agility of decision-making is overall a 
good thing for a growing, global company with diverse markets and businesses, like Severstal. 
Business units understand their markets and customers better, can see concrete reactions 
from the market, so the system is more adaptive. Decision-making system is quick and can 
produce decisions very quickly". CG9: "Another example of decision-making is about our 
investments into a gold company X. Head of the gold division came up saying there is an 
opportunity to acquire a controlling stake, but it had to be made very urgently. So he made a 
presentation, we had a brief discussion, and at the end we made a decision in 30-40 minutes.  
It was made so quickly because it is in our nature, but also because there was a good trust in 
Gold business management’s ability because of their good track record. So we were able to 
make a decision quickly, although  we knew very little about this company before". BUR4: "A 
great advantage of him [CEO/shareholder] is that he is very flexible – if there is an urgent 
decision to be made, M&A deal or something, he makes himself available for a meeting or for 
a conference call very quickly".  
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Direct access to the owner of the business can solve issues of any level of 
complexity; there is a comfortable consistency of dealing with the same person. 
Normally the CEO is very ―available‖ and readily available if the company 
requires an urgent decision: 
BUR3: "Direct approach – you have access to the owner of the business and can solve issues of 
any level of complexity. This is a great strength… consistency – we are dealing with the same 
person so we have plenty of time to adapt and to learn his way. Little friction in the system." 
On the other hand, interviews highlight a few important negative sides of the 
system. Business units‘ strategies still remain unconnected to each other. 
Expertise of the corporate centre is underutilised since the CEO and business 
units discuss decisions directly, with an unclear authority of the corporate 
centre:  
CG7: “Experts at the corporate centre are not always involved (since communication is direct 
between the initiative provider and CEO). Since business units generate strategic options and 
corporate centre is supposed to check them and verify, but often fails to do so because of the 
unclear authority, the system often produces suboptimal decisions". BUG2: However, 
strategies of different business units are disjoint, this is an area of concern. This can be 
attributed to the legacy of the supremacy of steel assets. BUR3: There is no a strong, industry-
focused expertise above us to challenge our strategy. I see it also as a weakness”.  
Mental constraints of the CEO (implied supremacy of steel assets) may reduce 
decision-making: 
BUG2: “Historically, the objective was to buy as much steel as possible and raw materials 
(mining) were a supporting story… Mental supremacy of steel in the heads of top corporate 
officers and business units’ leaders makes the whole process disjointed.” 
Moreover, there is recognition that dependence on one person and lack of 
institutionalised expertise from the corporate centre creates risks for the quality 
of decision making and for company performance in general. For example, this 
may become a practical challenge also if the CEO is too busy or overstretched:  
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BUU1: “I think the centralisation of decision making is a good thing, but sometimes we can be 
very slow in decision making because the CEO is too busy, or he just asks all the time for more 
details. There is a need for a stronger corporate expertise in addition to the CEO's personal 
involvement.” BUR3: “Depending on one person, even though the contact is very close and 
easy, is a potential risk to a company.” CG9: “Another issue is that the CEO is hugely 
overloaded: he combines the duty of a company CEO with his social and political obligations as 
a shareholder in a number of large businesses. This overload has an impact on the quality of 
decisions.” BUU1: “I think the main issue is still, as it has always been, about the level of 
delegation. We need to retain flexibility because this is an important strategic asset. On the 
other hand, small deals with small details, like in cases of  the Modul  acquisition or PBS 
extension mentioned earlier should be decided at a level below the CEO.”    
To summarise, many of the interviewees view the agile decision making system 
with direct communication between business units and the final decisionmaker 
as a clear strength. This is particularly relevant for a rapidly growing, 
entrepreneurial company. However, some interviewees mention that lack of 
institutionalised corporate involvement and overreliance on one person create 
significant risks and inefficiencies. Moreover, focus on one person‘s vision 
means that the company becomes a hostage to established mental maps and 
constraints of the CEO, limiting the quality of strategic decisions. Interviews 
indicate dangers and negative effects from overstretch and loss of agility, which 
may lead to lower quality of decisions and loss of agility. There are signs that 
these risks are already materialising or will start to materialise in the near future, 
since they are explicitly mentioned in a number of interviews as current or 
potential threats.      
Strength-Weakness II. Raising Sensitive Issues: Constructive 
Atmosphere for Strategic Discussions, but Reluctance to Question the 
Prevailing CEO’s Opinion 
Personal relationships with the CEO and moral climate around strategic 
discussions proved to be the most contentious issue. Of the eight interviews, 
three mentioned only strengths in this area, three others found both strengths 
and weaknesses and two more highlighted weaknesses only. As discussed 
above, the interviewees mentioned encouragement of initiatives, conducive 
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climate for strategic discussions and the CEO‘s relentless focus to details as 
enabling factors which assured good quality decisions and the constructive 
attitude of participants.  
However, interviewees mention the associated risks and weaknesses almost as 
often as the strengths. There is a clear distinction between the strength of a 
―generally‖ good atmosphere and dialogue and weakness related to the 
difficulty of contradicting the CEO‘s vision. Interestingly, they are quoted in the 
same interview almost consequentially: 
CG10: “Overall, we have a rather cooperative, open system. There is opportunity for 
discussion; decisions at the top usually make good sense. Decisions on some issues can be 
made very quickly, if necessary… The biggest problem I see is that we don’t have a process 
itself… Really, few discussions, everyone sits there and waits for the shareholder’s opinion… 
For example, I stood up and offered some ideas, whilst other people hide and don’t do it. But 
in order for your ideas to be heard, you need to be aligned with the CEO in terms of key values, 
with his vision. If you are in line with these values, then it’s ok; if not, then people may feel 
frustrated and become afraid of raising their voices.”   
There is a nearly universal recognition that the CEO encourages initiative and 
open atmosphere, ensuring that there is a possibility to raise different views and 
express opinions. Some state directly that raising sensitive issues is easy and 
there is a straightforward, open atmosphere: 
BUR3: “Openness, straightforward and open dialogue. This is an advantage and I aim to 
maintain the same openness and sincerity within our team." CG9: "Since initiative is welcome 
and there is always a spirit of open discussion, I personally feel ok with the great majority of 
decisions. Not sure about others. I think the CEO is always open to difficult and sensitive 
questions; he never skips a discussion." BUR4: "He may be carried away by something 
interesting to him, may start an unconnected discussion, but that is normally very interesting. 
He is also very polite, not like some shareholders of other companies, as we hear from their 
managers.  It is ok to raise sensitive questions with him; it is important for us to know his 
opinion and correct our activity accordingly." 
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However, others comment that it may be difficult for the top team to raise really 
sensitive questions for the following reasons:  
- Since the CEO has high authority, they are concerned about appearing in 
contradiction with the CEO's view:  
CG10: "The top team is complacent; their main idea is to keep the CEO happy. Not enough 
challenge and scrutiny of strategic decisions." 
- Team members may not be fully prepared to discuss difficult topics because 
they feel pressure from (and on) an overstretched and exhausted CEO 
which makes fully open discussion more difficult:  
BUR3: “Usually it is easy to raise all sorts of issues, including sensitive or difficult ones. But 
that again depends on the mood of the shareholder. If he is in a good mood, and generally 
not very tired, not exhausted, I can discuss all questions. If he is not in a good mood, it 
should better to set them aside or you can get too much pressure on your shoulders.”  
- There is an insufficient level of trust between the top team and the CEO. 
Therefore, there is not enough challenge and scrutiny of strategic decisions. 
Difficulty of raising sensitive questions and focusing on one man's opinion is 
a significant problem and historically has led to suboptimal decisions and 
value-destruction. Interestingly, the same interviewee may speak about an 
open and trustful atmosphere and, at the same time, complain that the top 
team is complacent. Their main idea is to "keep the CEO happy". Also, 
middle managers do raise difficult issues and are better prepared to discuss 
them:   
BUU1: "We can overlook something when we start from only one vision. One example is 
acquisition on North American assets – some people were firmly against that, but since 
CEO really wanted to grow in North America, all precautions were brushed aside, and 
finally those people who were against that had to vote pro, since CEO was clearly in 
support. It turned out to be a horrible decision”. 
A good climate for strategic discussions is a necessary requirement for success 
in the environment of direct communication and relatively unstructured, person-
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focused and the quick process of decision making. As can be inferred from the 
vast majority of interviews, the Severstal CEO‘s approach provides this climate 
through a combination of a carefully nurtured open and constructive 
atmosphere, attention to new initiatives, search for alignment and a careful 
explanation of the CEO‘s position. However, the very nature of the system, 
which is focused on the figure of  CEO and the majority owner, risks developing 
the ―yes-man‖ culture and avoidance of contradiction. This becomes a highly 
practical risk as the CEO gets overstretched and cannot spend enough time to 
engage in a high-quality dialogue. Another constraining characteristic 
mentioned in one interview is low level of trust between the CEO and the top 
team which makes raising sensitive issues a bigger challenge for the team 
members.     
Strength-Weakness III. Excessive Focus on Details  
Most respondents viewed the relentless focus on details as a weakness. Of the 
five interviewees who mentioned this feature, four considered it in an 
exclusively negative light, whilst only one found in it both positive and negative 
moments.   
According to the interviewees, too much time may be spent on insignificant 
questions and details, driven by the CEO's personal interest. They highlight that 
whilst such granularity is fine for short-range planning,  it becomes worthless for 
longer-term strategic discussions:  
BUG2: "The biggest weakness is the depth of his penetration into “operating” (as opposed to 
“strategic”) details. This is bad for him – he should not spread thinly the weight of his 
authority, his “50%” stake in all decisions. This is bad for us since we have to correct some 
insignificant detail for 10-15 times, provide reasoning, etc – this is very tedious and distracts 
from the real work. This penetration into details does not create additional value because at 
long, strategic horizons such details can not be measured adequately and, therefore, they are 
ultimately uncontrollable." 
The interviewees often interpreted the CEO's focus on details as a reflection of 
his ―personality‖, personal curiosity and hunger for knowledge. We can also 
257 
explain it as lack of trust and insufficient level of delegation. Arguably, the worst 
part of the story is the demotivating effect on the top team. Team members feel 
that the company and the CEO don‘t make the best use of their time, feel bored 
and excluded:  
BUR3: "His sometimes excessive attention to details makes the discussion rather tiresome at 
times. Like, “well, here it’s started again.” It makes no sense to discuss details if you don’t have 
a clear big picture. We often get into details whilst we don’t have clarity on strategy yet. That 
is rather perplexing and definitely quite inefficient." CG10: "That is ok if we speak about a one-
year plan, or about two years, but beyond that it becomes really tedious and worthless since 
you can’t see the market and operations that far in such details... strategic business plan 
discussion, when it becomes so enmeshed with details, becomes totally divorced from real life. 
In 5 or 10 years we will have completely new assets, new markets."  
In this case, interviewees may be missing the real point of granularity by 
focusing on their own experiences. A one-person-focused, ―hand-managed‖ 
system with few intermediate checks and balances may not exist if that person 
does not immerse himself with the details, at least from time to time. Otherwise, 
it would be difficult to maintain proper control and discipline within the process. 
However, interviewees are probably right in their assumption that attention to 
details and curiosity are the CEO‘s personal traits. Had it not been the case, 
focus on details would be extremely difficult to maintain for a busy and, in fact, 
highly overloaded executive. The volume and passionate emphasis of negative 
feedback means that there is a need to find a proper balance between the 
demand for granularity, limits of forecasting power and efficient time allocation. 
Other Weaknesses 
Two interviewees specifically highlighted ―multiple-source‖ pressure on the CEO 
from his roles as executive, wealth manager and participant in political affairs. 
This overload has a negative impact on the quality of decisions: 
CG8: “He *CEO+ has to demonstrate a good management and a good investment portfolio. He 
has to think about good management, shareholder value and maybe some political moments. 
He has to invest a lot of mental energy; secondly it takes him more time and energy to decide 
258 
because he has to align many positions when he makes a decision. So, it costs him and the 
team a lot of effort and a lot of time. It becomes very difficult as the company grows in size.” 
CG9: “Another issue is that the CEO is hugely overloaded: he combines the duty of a company 
CEO with his social and political obligations as a shareholder in a number of large businesses. 
This overload has an impact on quality of decisions.” 
Besides, other interviews mentioned occasional ―overstretch‖ as an actual or 
potential threat, for example, when they discussed the difficulty of raising 
sensitive issues. This may be difficult when the CEO is too tired and has 
something else on his mind: 
BUR3: "Usually it is easy to raise all sorts of issues, including sensitive or difficult ones. But that 
again depends on the mood of the shareholder. If he is in a good mood, and generally not very 
tired, not exhausted, I can discuss all questions. If he is not in a good mood, it is better to set 
them aside or you can get too much pressure on your shoulders.”    
This not very well-articulated issue may not be considered as Severstal-specific. 
There are quite a few business owners who combine their duties as ―wealth 
manager‖ with responsibility of company executive. A little more ―country-
specific‖ is mentioning of ―political responsibilities‖ in the context of time-
consuming activities. Without going into much detail on that weakness, we may 
conclude that the issues of overstretch and reliance on well-being of one central 
person is a real and important business issue for the decision making system 
found in Severstal.  
Another specific weakness mentioned in one interview concerned the fact that 
the decision making is concentrated at the top. There is little communication 
and involvement of middle management. The top team and CEO are rather 
―closed‖ from the rest of the company. There is a need for more connection to 
the rest of the group: 
CG10: “The CEO usually seeks consensus among the top people, such as a head of a relevant 
business unit, CFO, some others.  He doesn’t really care about other people. I think this is a 
problem since we need to have not only  TOP-10, but also a wider circle, at least TOP-100 
aligned around our vision… As I said, since decision-making is so concentrated at the top, there 
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is insufficient communication and alignment with the middle management, they don’t get the 
message and so on. The top team should be more visible, they should be more decisive.” 
We can view this as another constraining feature of ―leader-focused 
decentralisation‖ since only a relatively closed circle of top managers can 
conduct direct dialogue, which is in the heart of this system, and there is little 
involvement of middle management into decision making. Presumably, their 
indirect role is still high since they participate in the preparation of strategic 
decisions for the top to discuss, but their direct participation in strategic 
discussion itself is relatively limited.  
There is an indirect confirmation of this in the remark about the reduction in the 
number of ―direct correspondents‖ made at the CEO‘s initiative recently: 
CG8: “In 2009-2010 we have a smaller team with a stronger trust level. Now he [the CEO]  
communicates with 5-10 people at the business unit, rather than with 30. It’s impossible to 
build trust with 30 people in the room. Alexei has chosen personally all the people he is now 
sitting with at the table, and he got rid of others. One of the aspects here is the fact that he 
has almost exclusively Russians next to him.. 
One could argue that a leader-focused strategy-making system ―by definition‖ 
may only involve a limited number of top people, thus constraining creative 
potential of a wider corporation (Floyd and Wooldridge, 2000). The question of 
middle-management involvement in strategy process and communication with 
the key decision maker in the context of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ 
deserves a deeper exploration in further, more detailed studies on the subject. 
As discussed above, the interviews have effectively presented only one side of 
the story – the process participants on the corporate and business unit level. A 
detailed and careful analysis of the ―opposite‖ perspective - the perspective of 
the leader - remains among the most interesting and natural extensions of this 
study.  The author managed, however, to have a brief and practically-focused 
discussion with the CEO whilst presenting him with the summarised results of 
the previous interviews. The CEO made a few comments that may be of 
relevance to the study according to the author‘s notes after the meeting: 
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- He agreed with all the conclusions characterising the strategy process in 
Severstal (i.e. with the characteristics of ―leader-focused 
decentralisation‖ as they are drawn below). 
- He reiterated that the decentralised generation of ideas, agility in 
decision making and a high role of business units are a great asset and 
differentiate Severstal from its competitors, particularly the traditional 
―Western‖ corporations with slow and bureaucratic decision making. 
- He agreed with the identified weaknesses, especially the risks 
associated with the process‘s focus on one person and potential 
overstretch. According to him, overstretch was a crude reality and there 
was a clear need to undertake specific action to adjust the CEO‘s 
workload and create a more ―distributed‖ decision making system.  
 
Although not nearly as comprehensive as other interviews, the CEO‘s remarks 
still lend some support to the study‘s main conclusions. Most importantly, they 
highlight the study‘s practical relevance. On the one hand, the significance of 
the enquiry into the ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ is supported by the CEO‘s 
reference to Severstal‘s decision making system as a serious competitive 
advantage. The CEO‘s recognition that identified risks are real and serious and 
require urgent attention to support the study‘s external validity and practical 
significance.  
 
The author designed the study as qualitative and exploratory and hence, we 
require further, more elaborative and quantitative research before making any 
generalising conclusions. The study results may still start playing a practical role 
in the idiosyncratic context of Severstal. Its conclusions may serve as a starting 
point in addressing the risks and making further steps in the development of a 
strategic decision-making system in the company.  
SUMMARY OF CONCLUSIONS 
The key conclusions of Project I concerning the characteristics of ―leader-
focused decentralisation‖ were confirmed and elaborated: 
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-  The ultimate role of the CEO and key shareholder in strategic decision 
making. Direct control over the ―final‖ strategic decisions: 
o The general role of the CEO in the strategy process is very visible at 
the strategy-related meetings. He is leading the discussion, speaks 
most of the time, asks the majority of questions and has a "controlling 
stake" in strategic decisions.  
o The style of strategic discussions reflects the CEO's personal 
preferences, such as close personal attention to details; strategic 
discussions are relatively well-structured, although there is a division 
on that point, but also universally considered as too long and 
tiresome. 
- Despite movement towards higher centralisation and better structuring of the 
decision making process over the last few years, the fundamental 
―decentralisation‖ traits of Severstal‘s strategic decision making system 
remain in place:  
o Very high role of business units in the generation of strategic ideas 
and options. Bottom-up initiatives form the backbone of the 
company‘s strategic development. 
o Direct communication between business units and the CEO; relatively 
modest role of intermediaries and the corporate centre team.  
o Bottom-up, practice-oriented and detail-focused approach to strategic 
decisions. 
- Nevertheless, it is important to highlight that the strategy process has far 
evolved from the purely ad-hoc, opportunistic approach of the early 2000s. 
Interviews highlight that the strategy process has become more structured 
and purpose-oriented. There is a clear strategic vision and the company 
introduces corporate strategic priorities and financial targets. Nevertheless, 
as discussed above, we can conclude that the key elements of ―leader-
focused decentralisation‖ have so far successfully survived this transition. 
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However the question remains: to what extent is this approach going to 
remain competitive and even feasible going forward? Rising company size 
and complexity, growing management overload and risks of reliance on one 
person in strategic decision making raise serious questions about the 
sustainability of this strategic management model- the model which extends, 
of course, much beyond the strategy-making process as such.  
The role of the company leader is particularly important in this context since the 
CEO/majority shareholder personally defines the ―rules‖ and atmosphere of 
strategic discussion and hence, overall strategy process. Along with the key 
characteristics of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖, Project I identified a number 
of interesting idiosyncrasies, questions or even apparent paradoxes associated 
with the role and importance of the leader. Project II analysed these questions 
in more detail.  
The study identified two areas of major impact of CEO leadership and personal 
traits: 
1. The role of the CEO as a strong leader making all final decisions 
encourages initiative, promotes creativity and aligns interest in the 
environment: 
o The CEO creates a very open and constructive atmosphere for 
strategic discussions, and welcomes diverse opinions.  
o Initiatives should correspond to the CEO‘s vision that is defined in 
general terms so that it doesn‘t constrain the team‘s creativity.   
o The CEO carefully explains his vision and rational for strategic 
decisions and aims to achieve alignment, buy-in and sense of 
ownership in the top management team. 
o The CEO‘s high profile and authority, combined with push for 
consensus, create issues with raising sensitive issues or highlighting 
risks.  
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o This risk of poor decision quality becomes particularly acute if there is 
an insufficient level of trust between the CEO and the top team.    
2. The role of the CEO in implementing a ―pilot‖ management model: high 
personal involvement, relentless focus on details and high granularity of 
strategic discussions: 
- The CEO is inclined to look at granular details even when long-term 
strategic decisions are involved. 
- High level of detail is the reflection of the CEO‘s personal interest and 
curiosity, but also a vehicle to maintain control over the quality of 
strategic plans and proposals.  
- High involvement of the CEO, substitution of a bureaucratic machine 
for personal immersion reflects the philosophy of a small and lean 
corporate centre with direct communication between business units 
and the final decision maker.  
- ―Pilot‖ model is very time-consuming and may lead to overstretch of 
the CEO and the top team.  
- Excess focus on details may lead to suboptimal time allocation, loss 
of agility and inadequate attention to strategically important issues. 
 
Interviewees highlighted a number of perceived strengths and weaknesses of 
the process. We may view both strengths and weaknesses as continuation, a 
logical consequence of ―strategy-focused decentralisation‖ since they are very 
closely related to its key features, such as attention to details or focus of all 
decisions on one person. 
Perceived strengths: 
- Small and lean corporate centre, direct communication between initiative 
providers (business units) and the final decision maker. As a result, agile 
and adaptive decision making system and low-cost, non-intrusive corporate 
centre. 
 
264 
- Open, constructive and comfortable environment for strategic discussions. 
The leader is interested in hearing diverse arguments and viewpoints. 
- Constant focus on building consensus and alignment within the team. To 
achieve alignment, the leader ensures that his reasoning behind a taken 
decision is well-explained and shared by the top team. As a result, generally 
good motivation of the team members.  
 
Perceived weaknesses: 
- Risks associated with (over)reliance of the strategy process on one person, 
weak and ―underutilised‖ corporate centre. This risk is aggravated by high 
pressure on the leader from his multiple roles as executive and wealth 
manager.  
- Relentless focus on relatively small details is extremely time-consuming and 
may distract attention from strategically important questions. Overstretch of 
the leader is one of the prime causes for the loss of efficiency and focus on 
the system which depends so much on the energy and involvement of one 
person.    
- Strong authority of the leader combined with ongoing time constraints and 
chronic overstretch may present a problem since top managers may be 
reluctant to raise sensitive issues and contradicts leader‘s current view.  
- Concentration of decision making on the very top level; little direct 
involvement and poor communication with middle management on strategic 
discussions. 
The conclusions of Empirical Project II have helped to further refine and enrich 
the notion and characteristics of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ – the 
approach to strategy making investigates the enquiry into strategy making in 
Severstal. The text below summarises the conclusions from both empirical 
projects. 
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Characteristics of “Leader-focused Decentralisation” in Severstal: 
Summarising the Conclusions from Empirical Projects I and II 
This section summarises the key characteristics of leader-focused 
decentralisation, as well as the mental journey in the development of the 
―leader-focused decentralisation‖ concept, starting from the existing theoretical 
frameworks and through the evolution of empirical results as they were 
produced in the Projects II and III. The literature review in Project I highlighted 
the central dilemma of the ―activist‖ vs. ―detached‖ corporate centre and 
identified two well-developed theoretical concepts of the corporate centre‘s role 
in strategy process (Ward et al, 2005; Goold and Campbell, 1987, 1993 a). 
These theoretical models (―typologies‖) described ―ideal types‖ of corporate 
centre roles, identified differentiating characteristics which we can use in 
describing these types and suggested areas (e.g. levels of corporate centre 
involvement, strategy-setting processes and means of corporate control). 
However, these studies were conceptual in nature and provided only high-level 
case studies as a way of illustration, calling for more evidence-based empirical 
investigations into the complex phenomenon of the corporate centre in varying 
contexts. Indeed, the authors of the models suggest that although each style 
has strengths and weaknesses, to be value-creating it must fit the conditions 
facing the business. One can extend this argument further – by exploring the 
unexplored contexts and firms‘ reaction to these contexts, we may not only 
improve our knowledge about the links between contexts and typologies, but 
also enrich the models themselves. For example, the strategy literature in the 
emerging markets highlighted the phenomenon of widespread and highly 
successful diversified conglomerates which seemed to prosper and grow in that 
particular environment (Claessense et al, 1999; Khana and Palepu, 2000), 
contrary to the evidence on conglomerates‘ performance from the Western 
context (Berger and Ofek, 1995). Scholars discussed institutional specificities of 
emerging markets as the actual reason for the successful ―conglomeritisation‖, 
drawing upon both institutional theory, transaction costs and resource-based 
approaches (Wright at al, 2005), as well as corporate governance-related 
issues (Claessense et al, 1999). This is a good illustration of high context-
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dependence of strategy practices and processes (Pettigrew, 1992) and the 
necessity to challenge conventional wisdoms and theories by placing them into 
new, previously unexplored contexts.  This study attempted to address the 
apparent lack of relatively in-depth, empirical investigations of actual roles of the 
corporate centre in the highly specific and interesting context of a major, owner-
managed company in the post-privatisation era, operating in a volatile, but 
generally highly conductive environment of Russia in 2000-2008.  
The author employed characteristics of varying models/typologies of corporate 
centre roles as a starting point and as background questions for the empirical 
part of the research. Naturally, the basic research question referred to the 
overall roles of the corporate centre and business units and the nature of 
corporate involvement in strategy process. Project II highlighted an interesting 
and dialectic approach to strategy process which combined a high role of 
bottom-up initiative, avoidance of formal targets and constraints, high discretion 
of business units with a very hands-on, involved leader playing the role of the 
―final‖ decision maker in all strategic, and partly operational issues. The 
involvement was deep if unsystematic, particularly at the earlier stages. This 
approach has shed a new light on the apparently clear-cut dilemma of corporate 
centre involvement. Here, the centre leaves high discretion to business units, 
meeting the theoretical demand for ―responsiveness‖ (De Witt & Meyer, 2004), 
but also keeps tight control and involvement through the ongoing execution of 
leadership by the company CEO-owner. Again, we cannot describe this 
approach, in its ―pure‖, early-stage form, by either simplistic, detached, financial 
targets-based ―financial control‖ corporate style (Goold and Campbell, 1987; 
Ward et al, 2005), nor by its conceptual opposite, ―strategic control/strategic 
planning‖ styles which imply direct, elaborated and involved corporate centre 
roles. It means that we should extend existing theoretical models to incorporate 
a wider spectrum of attributes, including leadership styles that can facilitate 
elements of both involved and detached management styles.  
However, we can use Warde et al‘s (2005)  more flexible and conceptually rich 
typology to place the ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ within the earlier 
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theoretical context.  Here the corporate centre influences business units‘ 
strategy indirectly, through alignment around a strong vision and corporate 
values. Ward et al warn that actual strategy process may, in fact, vary in this 
configuration depending on context. Company-wide strategy process can be 
more or less formal, orientation may be both short-and long-term, but the key 
feature and the main instrument for control would still be the ―provision of 
meaning‖, sense of unity and values executed through company-wide strategic 
initiatives from the centre. Here, leadership, rather than abstract procedures 
and processes are leading the show. Indeed, the very definition of corporate 
centre roles includes highly leadership-dependant characteristics: ―provide 
strong unifying vision and values… promote sense of unity within the 
corporation‖. 
One of the fundamental conclusions of Project II was precisely the exceptionally 
high importance of leadership and leader‘s personal traits in shaping the 
strategy process in Severstal. In leader-focused decentralisation, the 
leadership‘s role in shaping strategy is both direct and indirect. Its direct 
influence in executed through a formal control over the ―final‖ decision making. 
An indirect role, arguably much more important, lies in the creation of a 
conductive atmosphere for strategic dialogue, where bottom-up initiative 
experimentation and bold thinking are both expected and actively encouraged. 
Business units‘ teams are empowered through a high level of trust and 
discretion even in the decision structure which implies the ultimate role of the 
leader in shaping the process and outcomes. The leader goes a long way to 
establish a conductive and trusting atmosphere, carefully explains his own 
thinking and works to develop consensus and alignment within the team.  
Another interesting ―leadership‖ characteristic of leader-focused centralisation, 
which we can interpreted as a unique ―delivery channel‖ of corporate control, is 
the ―pilot‖ management model. Again, from the theoretical perspective of Ward 
et al (2005), this model combines both direct and indirect control mechanisms. 
Direct mechanism is, of course, the very fact of the CEO‘s personal involvement 
in the lengthy and in-depth strategic discussions. Indirect mechanism stems 
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from the CEO‘s ability and willingness, ―from time to time‖, to dig into highly 
granular, specific details of a particular project of process. This ability serves as 
a disciplining mechanism for the top team which can always expect such a 
―deep dive‖, and hence keeps itself ready and able to defend every detail of the 
plans that they bring. Such an approach may become a truly essential means of 
direct and indirect control in the environment which demand high flexibility and 
minimal corporate-induced bureaucracy in the strategic discussion.  
Empirical projects II and III provided a full-fledged, comprehensive discussion of 
both ―process‖ and ―leadership‖ aspects of leader-focused decentralisation. The 
study identified the ―process‖ characteristics on the basis of a ―configurational‖ 
theoretical paradigm of strategy process research combined with the conceptual 
characteristics of the corporate centre role.  The ―leadership‖ side of the 
concept, explored in detail in Project III, formulated the nature of leadership 
involvement, leadership style, its connection to the leader‘s personal traits and 
their role in keeping the overall strategy process going. It has also identified the 
strengths and weaknesses of this leadership as they were perceived by process 
participants.  
A traditional discussion of the corporate centre role in academic literature 
focuses on the ―level‖ of corporate centre involvement in business units‘ 
management. The corporate centre may be either an ―activist‖ shaper or 
―detached‖ shareholder leaving strategy to business units (some ―intermediate‖ 
combination of both attributes is also possible, but normally deemed a-priori 
difficult as it is ―stuck in the middle‖). From this perspective, leader-focused 
decentralisation offers a new way of looking at the corporate centre 
phenomenon by building a dialectical synthesis of these theoretically 
constructed ―opposites‖. As a mechanism which solves the corporate centre 
dilemma, leader-focused decentralisation offers a highly informal, flexible, 
simple and low-cost mode of corporate involvement and control which keeps 
corporate bureaucracy at the minimum and promotes business units‘ initiative, 
self-sufficiency and responsiveness.  In leader-focused decentralisation, we can 
interpret the leadership‘s role in strategy process as both direct and indirect 
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means of involvement (Ward et al, 2005). Its direct influence in executed 
through a formal control over the ―final stage‖ decision making and close 
personal involvement with details in strategic discussions. An indirect role, 
arguably much more important, lies in the creation of a conductive atmosphere 
for strategic dialogue, where the company both expects and actively 
encourages bottom-up initiative experimentation and bold thinking.  
The characteristics of leader-focused decentralisation cannot be seen in 
separation from the context of the emerging markets and its demands. Strategic 
flexibility allows the company to benefit from the diverse opportunities for 
business expansion in the specific environment of high volatility and 
underdeveloped market and public institutions (Uhlenbruck et al, 2003). In 
―leader-focused decentralisation‖, strategic flexibility was preserved through the 
―decentralisation‖ component which primarily concerns the areas of ideas 
generation and the unconstrained nature of the business units‘ strategic 
thinking. The corporate centre and its leader maintained tight control of the 
decision-making by approving all major strategic decisions. At the same time, 
the CEO purposefully encouraged bottom-up initiative and creativity through 
leadership and did not impose constraining top-down strategic or financial 
constraints to the business units. 
The concept of leader-focused decentralisation allows us to open new horizons 
and expand contribution to practice beyond the simplistic theoretical concepts of 
―either‖ activist ―or‖ the detached corporate centre. Although highly useful as a 
first-step conceptual distinction aiming to rationalise and comprehend complex 
organisational phenomena, such an opposition may become counterproductive 
if applied uncritically and without due attention to both external and internal 
idiosyncrasies. By polarising the range of conceptual options, academic science 
risks becoming detached and irrelevant to the practice of strategy (Whittington 
and Cailluet, 2008), or may even create a negative impact as practitioners learn 
to think in simple theoretical constructions introduced at university courses on 
strategy. To avoid the dangers associated with inclination to create polarised 
alternatives, a dialectic approach, which combines elements of both opposites 
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and synthesises them at the next, more comprehensive and nuanced level, is 
often useful in strategy studies (De Witt and Meyer, 2004). We can view leader-
focused decentralisation as such as an empirically-based synthesising concept 
of a strategy process in a multi-business firm that encompasses elements of 
decentralisation, bottom-up initiative and in-depth control and involvement by 
the central leadership.   
Leader-focused Decentralisation in a Nutshell 
The ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ approach to strategy making in a multi-
business group combines decentralised, bottom-up, business units-led 
generation of strategic proposals and initiatives of which the company leader, 
and a small circle around him,are the ―final‖ decision makers. The leader is 
personally involved in both strategic and operational details, controls the 
strategic agenda and makes all final strategic decisions whilst remaining closely 
engaged in a direct, detailed dialogue with business units.  
In its ―pure‖ form, which Severstal can track through the early 2000s-2006, we 
can describe leader-focused decentralisation by the following key 
characteristics: 
- A highly decentralised and flexible strategy process, ad-hoc approach to 
strategic initiatives. Absence or vague formulation of explicit corporate 
financial/strategic goals ensures a very high discretion of business units, 
securing a high level of initiative and unconstrained creativity. Creativity of 
business units is unconstrained by ―strategy as liability‖, i.e. by any financial 
or strategic frameworks or requirements.  
- Control over the ―final stage‖ of decision-making in the hands of a highly 
authoritative CEO/company leader and a small circle of top managers.  
- Small and lean corporate centre, minimum corporate rules or bureaucracy, 
very few/no ―intermediate steps‖ or barriers between business units and the 
―final‖ decision maker.  
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- ―Pilot‖ management model - deep personal involvement of the CEO, 
granular attention to details in the strategic discussions with business units. 
Attention to details is a crucially important instrument enabling the CEO to 
control the content and quality of decisions in the absence of a strong 
corporate bureaucracy.  In-depth personal involvement in operational and 
strategic details facilitates control during the review process. One can 
consider this approach a unique capability since such practice is very 
difficult to imitate by competitors because of very tough time requirements 
and emotional resources from the CEO/shareholder and his small top team, 
given the size and complexity of businesses under management.  
- Personal attention of the CEO/company leader to creating a favourable 
climate for bottom-up initiatives, promoting constructive and open 
environment for strategic discussions and ideas-sharing. Emphasis on 
building top team alignment and buy-in despite the high role of the leader 
ultimately making all final decisions. 
This particular type of a corporate centre was developing in the distinct context. 
We can characterize the external environment in Russia at the time as highly 
volatile and uncertain, but it also presented unique business development and 
growth opportunities. The second part of the 2000s brought a more stable 
country context, increasing importance of financial markets and transparency 
and an unprecedented economic boom in the steel and mining industry which 
was followed by an abrupt and severe crash in the wake of the 2008 financial 
crisis.     
A crisis of ―leader-focused decentralisation‖ and a partnership system occurred 
by 2005-2006, as a result of personality issues in the top team, increased 
company size and complexity and a new demand for transparency after a failed 
merger with Arcelor and the rising role of capital markets in Russian business in 
general. In the wake of the leadership crisis, Severstal started moving towards 
higher centralisation and ―professionalisation‖ of their management system. 
However, the system retained its defining features and associated strengths 
and weaknesses: 
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- Tighter centralised control, including introduction of financial targets for 
business units and formulation of formal corporate strategy for the first time 
in company history after the 2008 financial crisis. One can interpret the 
introduction of financial targeting and an emphasis on corporate strategic 
priorities as an attempt to focus the business units‘ attention on efficiency 
improvement and disciplining anti-crisis measures. The strategy process 
itself became somewhat more structured and systematic.  
- However, the company preserved the preeminent role of the leader as the 
―final‖ decision. Business units still have a very high discretion and the 
company encouraged a bottom-up initiative which was the main driver and 
the key source of strategic ideas, although the corporate centre started 
playing a more important role in the development of external (inorganic) 
growth options.   
- The evolved system retains the key perceived strengths of agility, flexibility 
and direct access to the final decision maker. However, it also has serious 
perceived weaknesses and constraints including overreliance on the energy 
and involvement of one single person, suboptimal allocation of managerial 
resources, disjointed business strategies and lack of unity and inefficiencies 
related to occasional overstretch and loss of focus by the company leader.        
In conclusion, it is important to emphasise again that this particular approach to 
strategic decision making is only possible if its fundamental traits coincide with 
the leader‘s personal style and preferences. Indeed, it is not a coincidence that 
such fundamental attributes of the system, such as high personal involvement 
of the leader, focus on details and push for team alignment, are universally 
interpreted by interviewees as the CEO‘s personal traits. Had he not been 
comfortable with this management style, it would hardly be possible to carry this 
incredible burden of responsibility. In addition, such a system is probably only 
possible if the roles of the CEO and (majority) owner are combined. It is difficult 
to imagine such enormous responsibility in the hand of a ―hired‖ CEO in a 
standard corporate structure of checks, balances and internal controls.  
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Historically, the foundations of such approach were laid in the period when 
young, curious and extremely energetic managers assumed ownership of big 
enterprises amid underdeveloped marker institutions, a mistrusted legal system 
and poor protection of property rights. To assume direct control and focus all 
decisions on one person or a close partnership at the helm was then a natural 
choice. However, gradually the external conditions improved and companies 
became much bigger, much more profitable and considerably more complex. 
With the new conditions, company leaders could only develop and maintain the 
old system as long as the company leaders have enough energy and interest in 
detailed, hands-on management.  
 
It remains to be seen how the system will respond to the challenges of growing 
size and complexity, changing external environment and overstretch of the top 
team. Judging by the number of weaknesses raised in the interviews, the 
system is currently far from the position of sustainability. A careful look would 
reveal that its weaknesses are merely a continuation of its strengths; therefore, 
they can only be addressed by reforming the basics of the overall system. The 
first signs hint that we will see a typical evolution of an entrepreneurial company 
toward a more structured, rules-based and bureaucratic organisation with more 
external controls and less reliance on the genius of one man (Mintzberg, 1978). 
Overreliance on the efforts of one person calls for a stronger and more involved 
corporate centre, introduction of intermediate corporate procedures and 
checkpoints. Of course, this also means lower self-sufficiency of business units, 
longer decision making and, as a consequence, inevitable loss of agility and 
flexibility. Alternatively, the company could preserve the old system if  the CEO 
receives a strong reinforcement in the shape of a close circle of trusted 
executives with whom he can share his enormous responsibilities. However, 
this solution presumes a very high level of trust and partnership-like style of 
relationship. These conditions are extremely difficult to fulfill in practice. 
Moreover, as we know from history, the partnership model also bears inherent 
risks. It did not survive beyond 2006 because of an accumulated overstretch 
and diverging interests of the former partners.   
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That the system has lived through at least ten years of unprecedented change 
and volatility also implies that the company management was prepared to carry 
the associated burden and devote their lives to this extremely time-consuming 
service. This assiduous and tireless service, close personal involvement in the 
day-to-day management of a complex, growing and overall very successful 
businesses stays in sharp contrast to the popular caricature view of an 
―oligarch‖ owner of a big Russian business. Such a lifestyle would be most 
unnatural for a hedonist only interested in skimming a short-term financial rent 
of a heavily exploited natural resource business.       
 
Finally, such an approach is not alien to the management style favoured in 
Russian political history. A long tradition of super-centralisation of power in the 
hands of an all-encompassing leader dates from post-medieval Russian history 
ever since the rise of the centralised Muscovite state began in the 14th century. 
Inclination for ―hand management‖ of complex systems and allocation of 
enormous direct executive power in the hands of one person is also quite a 
modern trend in the most recent history of post-Soviet Russia (Petrov et al, 
2010). A strong, charismatic, father-like figure of a leader involved in detailed 
management of the business is a common feature of many successful Russian 
business groups of the 1990s and early 2000s (Kets de Vries et al, 2005). This 
cultural background facilitated the creation of a system which was so much 
focused on the figure of the company leader. However, the young Severstal 
CEO in the 1990s pioneered a local management innovation when he created a 
leader-focused system which relied on a decentralised bottom-up initiative 
rather than on a more traditional centralised bureaucracy. Hopefully, this 
description of the results of this approach to strategy-making will add a new 
perspective to our knowledge of the variety of strategy processes in multi-
business groups.   
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APPENDICES 
Appendix 1 - Key takeaways from the literature 
Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
Strategy Process 
Strategy 
process 
concept: 
summary of 
academic 
approaches 
Mintzberg and 
Lampel (1999)  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Hutzschenreute & 
Kleindienst 
(2006) 
 - Both process and content-related 
definitions of strategy schools; eclectic 
view of the field with important 
contributions from other disciplines; 
need for comprehensive 
―configurational‖ approach to strategy 
process, structure and context 
research 
 
Mostly process-related concepts of 
strategy involved; recognition of the 
significant role of ―human factor‖ 
brought by process participants; 
inclusion of ―practice‖ perspective 
 Review, 
analysis and 
categorization 
of existing 
theories  
Strategy as 
―design‖; early 
conceptual 
writers on 
strategy 
Andrews (1971) - Strategy is a deliberate and 
analytical process owned by CEO; 
the process is relatively simple   
Conceptual 
and 
prescriptive 
Strategic 
Planning 
 
Ansoff (1965) 
Mintzberg (1991; 
2000) 
Miller & Cardinal, 
(1994) 
Wittington & 
Cailluet (2008) 
 
- Strategy process is deliberate and 
conscious  
- Clear separation of ―formulation‖ 
and ―implementation‖ 
- Emphasis on formal procedures, 
routines, and analytical tools 
- Corporate planners as key 
figures; the process is 
administered by CEO and top 
team 
- Modern emphasis on the role of 
strategic planning as a 
mechanism for information 
exchange and alignment over the 
strategic agenda 
Conceptual 
and 
prescriptive 
 
Few case 
studies, mostly 
cross-sectional 
analysis with 
special focus 
on the impact 
of process on 
performance   
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Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
Emergent 
strategies, 
Learning and 
Incrementalism 
 
Mintzberg & 
Waters (1985) 
Stacey (1993) 
Quinn (1978) 
 
- Emerged as a response to  the 
view of strategy as ―deliberate, 
analytical and directive ‖ process 
- In reality strategy process is most 
often a process of small 
incremental steps, testing, 
experimentation and learning  
- Emergent strategies emphasize 
learning while acting and gradual 
convergence of different 
processes into a distinct pattern 
(strategy) 
- Due to environment complexity, 
organisations need to employ 
careful step-by-step approach, 
gradually adapting organization 
to the new situations 
Conceptual 
and descriptive 
Strategy 
process as a 
political 
phenomenon 
 
Pettigrew (1978) 
Allison (1971) 
 
 
- Strategy process is contextually 
embedded in organisations and 
hence prone to political activity – 
a dynamic system of 
interpersonal bargaining and 
compromise in the conditions of 
uncertainty, competing goals, 
differing perspectives and limited 
resources 
- Strategies may be driven by 
political as much as by ―rational‖ 
factors 
- Strategies resulting from a 
political process tend to be 
emergent rather than deliberate 
because political process is 
essentially a search for a 
compromise. 
Conceptual 
and empirical 
case studies  
Upper-echelon 
perspective 
Iaquinti & 
Frederickson, 
1997; Bowman 
and 
Kakabadze,1997 
- Important role of top 
management teams (TMT) in 
strategy process (similar in spirit 
to ―deliberate‖ schools, especially 
the design and planning school) 
- Of key interest impact of TMT 
demographics and nature of 
relationships on the process and 
outcomes 
Mostly cross-
sectional 
enquiries or 
empirical case 
studies leading 
to generalized 
conclusions 
and 
implications for 
practice 
288 
Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
Strategy as a 
dialectical 
process of co-
evolution of 
strategic 
initiatives and 
company‘s 
concept of 
strategy    
Bower (1970), 
Bower and Doz 
(1979) 
Burgelman 
(1983) 
Fajoun (2002) 
- Placed in the context of large 
diversified firms , emphasizes the 
role of middle management 
- Company strategy evolves as 
―strategic initiatives‖ initiated 
bottom-up contribute to the 
gradual evolution of the ―official‖ 
company strategy  
-  ―Structural context‖ set by 
corporate management serves as 
a selection and screening 
mechanism that strives to ―fit‖ 
emerging  strategic initiatives into 
the prevailing concept of strategy   
Case studies 
leading to a 
conceptual 
model 
Strategy 
process as 
iterated process 
of resource 
allocation 
Bower & Noda 
(1996) 
 
- Strategy as an iterated process of 
resource allocation by top 
management to the business 
unit/middle management level 
- Big role for strategic 
experimentation and past 
performance in determining 
outcomes  
Case study 
leading to a 
conceptual 
model 
Strategy As 
Practice 
perspective  
 
Jarzabkowsky 
(2005) 
Wittington (2003; 
2006) 
 
- Practice approach to strategy is 
focused on the day-to-day flow, 
routines and attributes of 
strategizing activities 
- Managerial agency, situated 
action and strategy stability as 
key types of issues  
Conceptual 
and 
descriptive; 
employs both 
longitudinal 
case studies 
and cross-
sectional 
analysis 
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Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
Methodology of 
strategy 
process 
research 
 
Chakravarthy & 
Doz (1992) 
Pettigrew (1992) 
Dess, Lyon & 
Lumpkin (2000) 
Fredrickson 
(1983) 
Jarzabkowsky 
(2005) 
 
– Strategy process can‘t be studies 
as a separate phenomenon, 
divorced from the organisational 
and external context 
– Holistic approach - need for a 
comprehensive analysis involving 
many levels of contexts through 
the investigation of recurring 
patterns in strategy process  
– Strategy process is also 
embedded in the past 
– Strategy process is constrained 
by external environment, but it 
also shapes the environment 
because of the role of human 
action  
– Longitudinal comparative case 
study as the key method 
– Methodologies for 
operationalization of strategy 
process characteristics 
– Emerging field of strategy-as-
practice research with a distinct 
methodology with attention to 
context and detail (ethnographic 
approaches, self-reports, 
discussion groups, practitioner-
led research) 
Methodology 
studies 
Strategy 
process and 
organisational 
context 
 
Droge, Miller & 
Toulouse (1988) 
Ketchen, Thomas 
& McDaniel 
(1996) 
Covin & Slevin 
(1997) 
 
- Strategy process/content and 
context mutually evolve in a 
reciprocal manner 
- Organisational structure and 
team members attributes have a 
significant and direct impact on 
strategy process characteristics 
- Strategy process may also serve 
as mediator between 
organisational context and 
strategy content  
Cross-sectional 
case studies as 
key method to 
analyze the 
relationships 
between 
chrachtaristics 
of process, 
context and 
performance 
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Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
Participants in 
strategy 
process 
 
Bloodgood (2001) 
Papadakis & 
Barwise (2002) 
Droge, Miller & 
Toulouse (1988) 
 
- According to the early works, 
strategy is created by a CEO or 
at most a close circle at the top 
- Later it was demonstrated that 
many activities may be performed 
by lower-level managers and 
even external professionals 
- Significant role of middle 
management as sources of new 
ideas and strategic 
experimentations  
- Evolving pattern of corporate-
business unit strategy teams 
interaction 
- Personal characteristics of 
decision-makers have significant 
impact on strategy process 
Cross-sectional 
as well as 
longitudinal 
case studies 
Entrepreneurial 
context 
Miller (1983) 
Mintzberg & 
Waters (1982) 
- Entrepreneurial nature of 
company management exerts 
very significant, and in many 
cases decisive impact on strategy 
process and content 
- Particularities of entrepreneurial 
strategy-making 
Case studies of 
entrepreneurial 
companies; 
entrepreneurial 
strategy-
making as a 
conceptual part 
of many 
strategy 
process 
models  
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Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
Strategy and 
structure 
Chandler (1962) 
Galbraith & 
Nathanson 
(1979) 
Miller (1987)  
Bower (1970), 
Bower and Doz 
(1979) 
Burgelman 
(1983) 
 
 
- Contrasting perspectives of 
―Structure follows deliberately 
chosen strategy‖ and ―Strategy 
follows structure‖ or, at least  
‖Strategy is shaped by structure‖ 
- Both perspectives find empirical 
support depending on data 
interpretation 
- More elaborate concepts 
emphasize dialectical role of 
strategy-structure relationship  
(structure as mediator between 
autonomous and infused 
strategic behaviors; strategy 
process as a mediator between 
context and content; ―Structural 
context‖ as a tool for selection of 
emerging  strategic initiatives ) 
- Conclusion: strategy 
process/content and context 
mutually evolve in a reciprocal 
manner. Strategies do determine 
organisational structure and 
context and are in turn embedded 
in the particular organisational 
contexts. The nature and shape 
of this ongoing relationship in 
different phases of corporate 
development   
Case studies 
leading to 
conceptual 
models; 
prescriptive 
models 
Strategy 
process and 
external 
context 
 
Al-Bazzaz, 
Grinyer & Yasai-
Ardekani (1986) 
Droge, Miller & 
Toulouse (1988) 
Ketchen, Thomas 
& McDaniel 
(1996) 
Covin & Slevin 
(1997) 
 
- Significant role for external 
environment in shaping strategy 
process 
- Environment uncertainty, hostility 
and (un)stability as most widely 
mentioned characteristics having 
biggest impact 
- Most often academics undertake 
simultaneous investigation of 
relationships between external 
and organisational context and 
strategy process, often relating it 
to performance outcomes    
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Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
National context 
 
Hayachi (1978) 
(surprisingly, at 
this stage only 
one(!) paper on 
the impact of 
national context 
was found) 
 
- Particularities of Japanese 
national context led to a 
substantial transformation of 
prevalent in 1970s ―strategic 
planning‖ practices  
- There was a reluctance to 
―programme‖ the way to stated 
objectives; the nature of strategy 
process was very much ―bottom-
up‖ and based on informal 
coordination  
Case study 
Time 
Perspective Of 
Strategy 
Process: 
 
 
 -  
 
 
- 
 
 
 -  
Strategic 
change 
Quinn (1978). 
Miller & Friesen 
(1980).    
 
- Strategic change, including 
change of strategy process can 
be revolutionary (abrupt shifts of 
large magnitude in a relatively 
short period of time) or gradual 
(slow and incremental pace of 
small changes over extended 
period of time 
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Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
Configurations 
 
Mintzberg et al 
(1998) 
Miller (1987) 
 
1. Most of the time organisations 
exhibit a relatively stable 
configuration of characteristics 
(structure, strategy content and 
processes and leadership 
embedded in a particular context)  
2. These periods of stability are 
occasionally interrupted by 
shorter periods of transformation 
(―quantum change‖ view of 
organisational transformation – 
Miller, 1987). 
3. ―Configurations‖ of changing 
states over time may produce a 
certain pattern that could be 
summarized in a certain way, for 
example as ―life cycle‖ of an 
organisation. 
Key questions: 
- What is the pattern of 
organisational transformation and 
how do the processes of change 
and continuity relate to each 
other? 
- How organisations come about 
change and how do the manage 
to maintain status quo?  
- How organisations, contexts and 
strategies jointly develop over 
time?‖ 
 
Key conclusion in relation to strategy 
process: 
- Different views of strategy 
process (entrepreneurial 
creativity, formal planning, 
emergent learning, etc) would 
adequately explain actual 
processes, but only for particular 
periods of time   
 
Conceptual 
papers and 
multiple case 
studies leading 
to empirical 
models of 
configuration 
 
Elaboration of 
methodology 
for longitudinal 
studies of 
evolution in 
organisational 
attributes, 
including 
strategy 
process 
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Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
Strategy 
Process Case 
Studies 
Mintzberg & Rose 
(2003) 
Mintzberg (1978) 
Mintzberg & 
McHugh (1985) 
Mintzberg & 
Waters (1982) 
Pettigrew (1987) 
 
- Longitudinal case studies, mostly 
in configurational tradition, 
looking at joint co-development of 
organisational structures, 
contexts, strategies and 
leadership over time 
- Key aim is to provide a 
comprehensive description of 
patterns in organisational 
development 
- Strategy process (―strategy 
formation‖) remained a key focus 
in most of the studies 
- The purpose is to provide a 
variety of examples of strategy 
process formation in different 
organisational contexts 
(entrepreneurial firm, public body, 
traditional corporation, etc) 
Longitudinal 
case studies 
leading to 
conceptual 
insights and 
models 
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Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
Models of 
Strategy 
Process 
 
Hart (1992) 
Mintzberg (1973) 
Shrivastava & 
Grant (1985) 
Miller & Friesen 
(1978) 
Burgelman 
(1983) 
 
- Five empirical models of strategy 
process include such 
charachteristics as process 
participants and their roles and 
charachteristics, organisational 
structures and attributes, roles of 
objectives and influence of 
external environment  
- Of the four identified models, 
those originating from 
configurational approach (Miller & 
Friesen, 1978 
- and Mintzberg, 1973) are the 
most comprehensive and well-
developed. Of these two models, 
the one offered by Mintzberg 
offers more conscious, imitable 
and easy-to-operationalize 
process charachteristics and can 
be successfully employed in the 
DBA project as source of 
methodology and subject of 
empirical testing  
- Burgelman‘s model of strategy 
process in a large diversified firm. 
Autonomous strategic behavior 
induced by entrepreneurial 
activity of business units over 
time can challenge status quo 
and redefine corporate strategy. 
Organisational context is used by 
top managers as a calibrating 
mechanism that limits deviations 
from current strategy concepts 
but can be overcome by powerful 
strategic initiatives. 
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Research  
area 
Key 
papers 
Key 
propositions 
Prevalent 
methodology 
The role of the 
corporate 
centre on 
strategy 
process of 
multi-business 
companies 
 
Henderson 
(1979); Hedley 
(1977) 
Prahalad and 
Hamel (1990) 
Raynor and 
Bower (2001) 
Two clearly contrasting perspectives: 
- Shareholder-style  corporate 
centre, demanding financial 
results and caring about 
diversification of corporate 
risks through asset portfolio 
adjustments 
- Active, value-creating 
corporate centre, ―mover and 
shaper‖ of the total company 
strategy, fully involved into 
the organisation of the 
business, supplying strategic 
initiatives, staying in constant 
strategic dialog with business 
units 
 
Models of the 
corporate 
centre’s role in 
multi-business 
groups 
Goold and 
Campbell (1987, 
1993 a,b) and 
Goold et al 
(1994); 
Ward, Bowman 
and Kakabadze 
(2005) 
 
- Generic models of the 
―strategic management 
styles‖ and ―corporate 
configurations‖ describing 
different roles foe a corporate 
centre 
- Models focus on content as 
well as process side of 
strategy; description of 
strategy process is distinct 
but fairly general 
Case studies 
leading to a 
prescriptive 
model; 
prescriptive 
model 
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Appendix 2 - Interview Protocol 
 
INTERVIEW DEBRIEF  
(sent in advance to every prospective interview participant) 
 
Research topic 
The role of corporate centre in strategy-making process of a major diversified 
corporation in a distinct context of an ―emerging market‖ (Russian) environment.   
Purpose of the study 
The purpose of this study is to explore how strategy-making process developed in 
Severstal historically, with a particular focus on the role played by the corporate centre. 
- Company scope: Severstal and a related ―Severstal Group‖, a multi-business 
group, initially diversified from a single post-privatization steel-making plant into a 
number of both related and unrelated business; later transformed into an 
international steel and mining company clearly separated from unrelated 
businesses belonging to a majority owner. 
 
- Strategy scope:  Formation of corporate strategy of a parent company and role and 
involvement of corporate centre in the formation of business strategies of business 
units. 
 
- Time span: from the first acquisitions and formation of multi-business structures in 
1999-2000 through the creation of a metals and mining company to aftermath of 
the 2008 financial crisis.  
 
Confidentiality 
Anything that will be said over the interview or corresponding discussion will be treated 
in strict confidence and will be used only for the purposes of the research. The detailed 
results of the research will only be shared to the Thesis examination panel at Cranfield 
University whose members are bounded by confidentiality agreement. Identity of 
interviewees will not be recorded or disclosed to anyone, including the examination 
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panel. The only information available to the public will be the thesis itself, which will 
include literature review, methodology description and discussion of the overall results. 
You can withdraw from the research any time and for any reason. You can also omit 
any question you may not wish to answer. Any commercial or otherwise sensitive data 
will be removed/substituted by your request. The author, been an active employee of 
Severstal involved in strategy making, will also undertake relevant precautions to make 
sure that sensitive data does not appear in the transcript.   
Approach and interview purpose 
The study will employ semi-structured interviews as its key research method. The 
purpose of the interview is to explore your view on the nature of strategy process in 
Severstal, the respective roles of corporate centre and business units, how the process 
developed historically, what were the drivers of its development.  The following list of 
questions  highlights some of the characterizing areas which were picked from previous 
academic literature on the topic. The interview is expected to be open-ended, without a 
strictly pre-defined structure or an exhaustive list of questions, so you may feel free to 
bring in additional topics not covered by the preliminary list of questions. Pending your 
permission, the interview will be taped, transcribed and analyzed, drawing conclusions 
relevant to the research question. Alternatively, the interviewer can be limited to 
making hand-written notes.  
 
INTERVIEW QUESTIONS  
The basic research question:  
How did the role of corporate centre in the strategy-making process evolve in Severstal 
over the ten year period: since its emergence as a multi-business corporation and until 
the aftermath of the global economic crisis of 2008?    
 
Semi-structured interview: key topics  
I. Participants in strategy process 
Who is engaged in corporate strategy–making in Severstal? At the corporate 
level? At the business unit level? 
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How is strategy-making organized? What are the formal and informal 
organisational structures devoted to strategy-making (departments, working 
groups, committees)?  
II. Nature of process: deliberate vs. emergent 
What are the driving forces in Severstal strategy-making?  
What were the key objectives set for the company? How these objectives were 
reflected in strategy? 
Can strategy process in Severstal (at different stages) be described as primarily 
structured, intentional and explicitly formulated vs. informal, intuitive and 
opportunistic?    
III. Strategy process temporal development 
What are the key stages in company development from first acquisitions in 
2000-2001 to the latest moment of your stay within the company? 
How did the nature of company strategy and strategy-making process evolve 
over time?  Can you identify any particular stages?  
Can we identify what was the influence of the external environment on the 
strategy process, including macroeconomic environment, industry cycle, 
general business climate evolution in Russia?  
IV.  Corporate centre role  
What is the degree of centralisation of strategy process, to what extent 
corporate centre was involved in shaping business strategies of business units? 
Which means are employed to make sure that business units fulfill corporate 
objectives?  
In particular, was corporate centre role built primarily around: 1) setting and 
controlling financial performance targets only 2) setting corporate objectives 
while leaving business-level strategy to business units and 3) centralizing 
strategy in the centre and closely managing the strategy process? 
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Appendix 3 - Interview analysis: an illustrative example  
Interview - CGEU1 
The transcribed interview was carefully reviewed and key concepts informing the 
research questions were identified throughout the text. Here the concepts are defined 
as ideas, characteristics and personal conclusions of interviewees informing us about a 
particular phenomenon relevant to the research. Each concept was highlighted in the 
interview text and provided with relevant quote and comment/analysis by the author 
explaining, when necessary, where he concept came from and how it can be 
interpreted or developed. The concepts were further assembled under five major topics 
(categories) emerging from the review. These categories are broadly in line with the 
main research questions. The categories, concepts, quotes and comments from the 
interview were assembled together in the Excel program. A summary of key 
conclusions and learning points from the interview completed the interview analysis.  
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Topic (Category) Concepts/explanation informing 
the research questions 
Comments and analysis 
Diversification and 
expansion  
 
Rational for decisions on:  
1) Diversification 
2) Internationalization 
3) Upstream integration 
 
 
 Opportunistic approach to strategic 
decisions 
 
 Influence of government on 
strategic decisions 
 
 Absence of formal or  informal 
shared vision and well-defined 
strategic objective for the company 
– again, opportunism… 
 
 Expansion and diversification driven 
by perceived management 
capabilities (―we are good in 
turnaround of troubled assets‖) 
 
Opportunistic, case-based approach to acquisitions in the first part of the 
covered period (2000-2006) is manifested throughout the interview. As a 
typical example, an automotive company UMZ was perceived as attractive 
("quite important and interesting") and had debts owed to Severstal - 
hence, was a feasible target. The decision was characteristically made 
during the 2-hour waiting for a taxi in the Paris airport. No formal goal or 
vision was set ex-ante.   
 
Decision to expand followed the completion of internal optimization 
(―turnaround‖) at CherMK and belief in ―turnaround capabilities‖ which 
could be applied universally. Lack of funds to expand in the steel industry 
in the home market as the reason for opportunistic diversification at home 
and going abroad in steel. 
 
In one case, acquisition was the result of government‘s concern for the 
future of socially important coal company and desire to pass it to a 
powerfull, socially responsible company.  
 
Upstream integration was the only cited clear strategic priority (reason? – 
why it was important?). A dedicated organisational structure ("corporate 
center" – Severstal Group) was created early to serve the intended 
expansion.  
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Strategy-making team  Entrepreneurial, informal decision-
making in a small top team - 
"partnership" – at the initial stage 
 Opportunistic approach to strategic 
decisions 
 Very small corporate center strategy 
team, playing a support role for the 
"chief strategist" 
 Opportunism; very little formal 
strategic analysis and planning to 
support decision-making at the top 
 "Overstretch" of the small top 
management team as company 
became bigger put a brake on the 
development 
In the first part of the period (2000-2006), all strategic decision-making was 
done among a small team of 5 top-managers. This ―partnership" was very 
entrepreneurial in its decision-making. 
 
Strategy department was first introduced in 1994 at CherMK evolved into a 
large organisation of 120 people. By 2000 it was mostly engaged in 
operational planning at the business unit level. On the corporate level, the 
strategy-making activities of the ―partnership‖ was supported by a small 
team reporting to the Chief Strategist. Its functions were mainly devoted to 
M&A, there was little formal strategic analysis and planning to support 
decision-making at the top. 
 
As the top team became increasingly involved in operational management 
of ever bigger and more complex web of assets, a crisis of the 
entrepreneurial management model emerged. From early 2006, it changed 
to a ―professional managerial‖ one, but with the CEO role and leadership 
as strong as before.  
Role of corporate center 1) Push for a more decisive role of 
Corporate Centre; resistance of 
Business Units to centralisation 
 
2) Corporate standards as means 
of ensuring best practice 
dissemination and conformity 
 
3) Selective involvement of 
corporate centre strategy 
In the early stages of the group, the push from the CEO for a more 
"decisive" role was meeting an opposition from the business units. To 
resolve the dilemma, universal standards in key management spheres 
were introduced with the help of corporate university. The progress of their 
introduction was slow and iterative, with prolonged discussions and search 
for consensus 
 
Business units held initiative in the budgeting process, but were challenged 
by CEO. It was characterized as "unusual" approach, since most business 
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function in different lines of 
business 
 
4) Financial targets were not set 
ex-ante but discussed and 
approved during the process of 
budget review and challenge 
 
5) Very deep and detailed, hands-
on involvement in  operational 
issues, first of all by the CEO 
personally 
 
- More involvement of corporate 
centre from early 2006;            
Change of "entrepreneurial 
partnership" in "professional 
managers" structure by early 2006 
 
6) Overseas assets: 
 
o High self-sufficiency of 
overseas subsidiaries in the 
initial stages 
o More intervention from the 
corporate centre in operational 
management over time   
o Less motivation and leadership 
in business units as the 
authority of corporate centre 
increased 
owners preferred to set strict financial targets. Weak control of financial 
performance post-acquisition.  
 
Involvement of corporate centre in strategy affairs was very selective from 
the onset: "chief strategist" was involved with some businesses (steel) and 
not with the others (mining). However, the CEO was personally heavily 
involved not only in strategic, but also operational details of business units‘ 
management.  
 
Significant change in the corporate centre role from early 2006 followed the 
change of ―management paradigm‖. As business became more 
professional and less entrepreneurial, the ―power‖ and interference of 
corporate centre with business units became more manifested. The most 
important driver for the changes in management structure and corporate 
centre role were considered the "internal relationships dynamics" between 
the CEO and overstretched, ever-more-distant top team members. 
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Strategic decision-making 
process (nature of) 
- Opportunistic approach to strategic 
decisions, case-by-case resource 
allocation process 
 
- Absence of formal or  informal 
shared vision and well-defined 
strategic objective for the company 
 
- Expansion and diversification driven 
by perceived management 
capabilities (turnaround of troubled 
assetes) 
 
- Long time horizon, long-term 
orientation (albeit deemed "not 
typical"); relatively short expected 
payback period 
 
Strategy process in the initial stage (2000-2006) can be characterized as 
capability-driven, opportunistic expansion, based on the personal role, 
intuition and perception of a small number of top-managers. Extremely 
opportunistic ad-hoc process of resource allocation. 
 
Long horizon of strategic thinking, unlike with most of the other Russian 
players and contrary to what was observed in previous studies (Carr, 
2007). Expected payback 4 years, extended to 6-7 years after 2006. 
 
The approach changed after early 2006, but it is not apparent how 
decision-making was charachterized at the second stage (2006-2009), 
apart from the ever stronger personal role of the CEO.  Apparently, one of 
the reasons why Severstal  became public company is because CEO was 
looking for the way to replace the former partnership team with 
independent Board of Directors which could  become such a sounding 
board with experience and expertise and replace the former partners.   
Role of external environment - Little apparent role of hostile but 
gradually improving external 
environment 
 
- Certain government influence on 
strategic decisions  
External environment was not seen as playing a major role, unlike the 
management patterns and CEO's policy and personal preferences. 
Government involvement was limited to only one case (can be seen as 
strong but unsystematic and not necessarily unfriendly, since the company 
decided to pursue vertical integration thereafter). 
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Summary and key conclusions: 
Strategy-making process: 
- Was driven by CEO personal traits and leadership style. Major changes in company 
management were attributed to changes in personal relationships with the CEO.  
- Was very entrepreneurial and opportunistic, particularly in the first part of the period 
(2000-2006), with a trend towards higher formalization and ―professionalization‖ in 
the second part (2006-09). Opportunistic and emergent nature of strategy-making 
in Russia and other emerging economies in transition was noted in many previous 
studies This demands more emergent and iterative approaches, with less regard to 
formal planning (e.g. Carr, 2007; Gurkov, 2009). 
- Was very simple in the first part of the period, based on the personal decisions of 
the five top team members. 
- Particularly in the earlier stages, was to a large extent driven by ―turnaround 
capabilities‖ which were perceived to be both strong and universal in terms of 
industry applicability.   
- Was long term oriented, with relatively long expected payback period. It is seen as 
an ―unusual‖ practice, in stark contrast to the conclusions of previous studies of the 
Russian context, such as Carr, (2007).  
Strategy-making team: 
 Consisted of 5 top team members making all important decisions in the first part of 
the period. Very small, technical role of support staff, little formal analysis or 
planning.  
 Was diverted to the wider management team, mostly from the functional directors 
at the second stage.  
 The former ―partnership‖ system collapsed when the company became too big to 
be managed in the old way. Members of ―partnership‖ with responsibility from 
business units could not perform dual roles of BU operational and corporate 
strategic management as they became ―overstretched‖ and out of touch with the 
details of corporate agenda.    
Role of the corporate centre: 
 Was subject to continuing controversy and tensions throughout the period. 
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 At all stages, particularly at the initial ones, included very heavy and deep 
involvement of CEO in both strategic and operational aspects of business units‘ 
management, with very fine granularity of management.   
 At the same time, as far as the wider corporate centre is concerned, in the initial 
period there was a considerable ―freedom‖ of business units from interference of 
small corporate bureaucracy (but not from personal attention of CEO and top 
management team!). Even introduction of unified ―standards‖ was slow and 
consensus-based. Entrepreneurship and leadership was encouraged, particularly 
at the overseas business units.   
 In the second part of the period, there was considerably more interference from 
corporate functions. There were no apparent goals or limits set for this interference 
but business units‘ discretion was severely limited (the effect of this limitation was 
perceived as having more negative than positive effects). 
Role of the external environment: 
 The hostile but gradually improving external environment was as not seen as 
playing a major role, unlike in the previous studies (Grant, 2003). A significant but 
non-systematic role of government in strategic decisions.   
It should be noted that the dynamic, time-dependent aspect of strategy process was 
very visible in the interview. Two distinctive periods with remarkably different top team 
composition, nature of decision-making process and role of the corporate centre were 
identified. It is interesting that although the interviewee is able to name the exact month 
which marked the step change, he nevertheless called the whole process 
―evolutionary‖, implying that the reasons for changes were accumulated over a long 
period although they were realized relatively quickly.    
This change was driven by CEO‘s decision and attributed to 1) growing complexity and 
scale of the company which made old ―entrepreneurial‖ system implying strong 
personal role difficult to sustain and 2) changes in personal dynamics between CEO 
and ―old‖ top team members due to their ―overload‖ with multiple tasks.   
Interestingly enough, the interviewee noted a number of times that in some aspects, 
such as long-term orientation and determination of financial goals through strategic 
dialog the company practices were remarkably different from ―standard business 
practices at the time. This raises the question of company perceived uniqueness which 
should be explored in further research.  
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Other additional topics for further exploration emerging from the interview include: 1) 
triangulation of the change period – transition from one strategic management model to 
the other 2) role of CEO‘s leadership style and top team relationships in shaping 
strategy process and 3) role (if any) of external environment evolution, which turned out 
to be surprisingly small according to the current interview.  
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Appendix 4 – Summary of Project II interviews analysis  
  
Topic
Concepts/charachteristics 
informing the research 
questions
Selected quotes Comments and analysis Conclusions
CGUE1 CG1 CG2 CG3 CG4 CG5 CG6 BUE1 BUR1 BUR2 BUG1 Total %
S
u
p
p
o
rt
+ + + + + + + + + + + 11 100%
CG5: "The Managing Board at the time consisted of five people, the five “partners” -  Mordashov, 
Shvetzov, Makhov, Noskov and Kruchinin . Makhov and Shvetsov were the main sources of new 
ideas and moves, although Shvetzov was more inclined to go into practice... he was the main driver of 
the Auto deal...  he was also overseeing the Metiz (metalware) downstream business...  Vadim 
Makhov was first more engaged in corporate affairs – introducing Balanced score card in 
Cherepovetz in early 2000s, Corporate University, corporate IT service..." CG1. Before 2006, the 5 
people were making all the important decisions - Mordashov, Shvetzov, Makhov, Noskov and 
Kruchinin, with the leadership of the key shareholder   BUE1. The top management of the Group of 
companies (without much differentiation between steel&mining and other businesses at the initial 
stages ) was represented by the Management Board of 5 people (Mordashov, Shvetzov, Makhov, 
Noskov and Kruchinin). ZAO “Severstal Group” was created in 2002 as a formal vehicle (officially 
called “management company”) to manage the collection of assets belonging to the key shareholder 
and his partners .   CG3: CEO was constantly involved in decision-making and was the final decision-
maker is all things, went into much details. Right now we have very similar system, as in early 2000's.                                              
Creation of an entrepreneurial "partnership" entrusted 
with all decision-making    
_________________________________
The core of decision-making in Severstal: CEO 
(Mordashov) and "triumvirate" (Makhov, Noskov, 
Shvetsov). However, occasional swap of roles. 
'Austronaut' and 'pilot' distinction comcept: CEO 
assuming a more 'hands-on' role while top team tries to 
remain at the higher level in decision-making
 _________________________________
As corporate center was created, it included a small 
top team of five people, which the interviewee called 
“partners”. They shared responsibilities and could be 
involved in the management of concrete businesses of 
functions at businesses, or could be more focused on 
building corporate infrastructure
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CG5: "After Arcelor the management structure was completely overturned – the partnership of 
commonly-minded people was fully dissolved, and the new team of “salaried” managers has taken 
over."                                                                        CGUE1: "Because the meetings with Moscow 
headquarters were such that I could fly to US only for three days than I must return back than I must 
fly to Italy, fly to Cherepovets, do something for Corporate University, meet with banks for M&A 
meeting… so  I was a listener and not the active leader, not the champion in this case And it seems 
this is what happened with many of us. So I think that was the problem of the size and the problem of 
the management model because the other alternative was to give more freedom and so I could focus 
on Severstal International, again the problem for 2 or 3 years, for 2 years I’ve been asking to create 
it...."                                                         CG1 The transfer from “partnership” to the wider decision-
making team was driven by 1) loss of “drive” by many members of the partnership, divergence of 
interests between them and the key shareholder 2) necessity to consolidate steel and mining business 
and separate it from management point of view after the Arcelor case and IPO  - it was not possible 
to manage all assets from one center in the same way as it was done before 
 Overhaul of top management structure, substitution of 
“partners”by professional management. After IPO the 
new, independent Board of Directors was supposed to 
play a role of “discussion partner” with the key 
shareholder. Divergence of interests among the 
members of the former partnership and separation of 
core and non-core – reasons for the transformation of 
the management team.  
_________________________________                            
Change in corporate structure was facilitated in order 
to bring new expertise and replace entrepreuners with 
managers. 
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BUE1: "CEO personally was the key driver and an absolute decision-maker in strategy process."   
BUG1: "I think in our organization our CEO personality has very significant influence on process... on 
setting-up priorities for organization… where we should develop geographically, etc, that pretty much 
depends on the position of our leader and CEO. Options are generated by M&A team members, 
they alwayse come from the market"                                                  CG6: "...he <CEO> always 
worked until they had a unite with his opinion. He was not at ease with taking even a majority decision 
and especially minority decisions were always on him.  So he would always argue as long as there 
would be a bridge to the other side’s opinion. And the others would sooner or later give up."  CG5: 
"The key shareholder made all final decisions , but he was looking for a common consensus, 
essentially, no decision was made if there was no real, or apparent consensus."CG2: " There was 
some kind of “triumvirate”, Mr. Makhov, Mr. Noskov and Mr. Shvetsov. Shareholder and 
“triumvirate… And sometimes if you ask somebody: who are you – pilot or astronaut? It’s a different 
role in the strategic process… The pilot should rule airplane, he doesn’t have any horizon, huge 
horizon and he can see just staffing under hi, trees, you know? And shareholder, from my point of 
view, should be like astronaut. And sometimes I notices that “triumvirate” would like to be astronaut 
and shareholder decides to be pilot... "
Ultimate role of CEO in decision-making, Board 
playing a supporting role 
__________________________________                                  
Decisive role of CEO, explicit mentioning of his 
"personality" as a factor in strategic choices  
__________________________________
 Five people-strong partnership (mentioning of only 3 
"triumvires" in addition to the shareholder) were 
involved in decision-making.Ultimate role of CEO but 
his decisions were influenced by partners' opinions
 __________________________________                                                         
CEO and corporate officers responsible for strategy 
and M&A were seen as the key generators of strategic 
priorities   
N
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A1. Top management team at 
the "corporate center" - early 
period. The partnership of 5, 
CEO leadership
A2. Top management team at 
the corporate center. Impulse 
for change after 2006
A3. Roles of the team 
members. CEO leadership
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Interviewees
Very small partnership team (5 
people) in the beginning, making all 
important decisions for a diverse 
and rapidly growing group of 
businesses.  Combining corporate 
functions and business units 
management duties. Partners 
sometimes focus on global 
development, whereas CEO goes 
into much details ("pilot vs 
austronaut" image). 
A group of professional top-
managers and members of board 
of directors replace partnership 
post-IPO. "Overstretch" and "loss 
of drive" by the smallmanagement 
team, as the company was 
growing. Failed merger with 
Arcelor revealed inconsistencies 
and fallacies of the former system, 
including lack of coherent strategy 
for a diverse group of businesses. 
In business units, decision-making 
was concentrated among a very 
small circle of top managers
Ultimate role of CEO - making all 
final decisions. At the same time, 
large influence from "partners" 
initially. CEO seeks at least a 
formal consensus in the 
"partnership" model. High role of 
corporate "professional" 
management in ideas generation. 
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CG3: "CEO was constantly involved in decision-making and went into much details. Right now we 
have very similar system..."  BUR1: "A.A.Mordashov went into much details during each meeting I 
participated, Russian Steel directors also discuss those details. Managers from corporate centre also 
participate in those meetings from time to time, and ask some questions. It gives me impression, that 
they role is survellaince". CG2:  "And sometimes me it looks like, if you ask somebody: who are you 
– pilot or astronaut? It’s a different role in the strategic process… The pilot should rule airplane, he 
doesn’t have any horizon, huge horizon and he can see just staffing under hi, trees, you know? And 
shareholder, from my point of view, should be like astronaut. And sometimes I notices that 
“triumvirate” would like to be astronaut and shareholder decides to be pilot ".  BUR2: "Alexey talks 
both about very detailed, concrete issues and very general ones  during the same presentations. "Why 
we should buy his type of equipment that could cost 1.000.000$, for example, in 2014 rather or 
2015 and that kind of question could be discussed for two hours or something like that. " 20% of the 
most important parts [discussed in-depth]  for three hours, and 80% to go for  the last hour...because 
of this we had a very good advantage because we could easily discuss all the preferences and he 
could find out maybe some small opportunities. But at the same time the negative to that was that he 
was very unregulated ... we could easily go into depths in the very first part of the first stage  that’s 
was the way and then we could say OK for the whole day."
Deep involvement of CEO in strategic discussions; 
apparently small role for other team members                                                        
__________________________________
CEO push for consensus in decision--making among 
the top partners team, even if this is only apparent, not 
real consensus. 
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CG1: There was also relatively little analysis in the acquisition stage, little “deep research” into the 
businesses. Decisions were made on an intuitive, opportunistic basis. About thirty investments were 
made out of hundreds they looked through – and all that over a very limited period of time and with 
the force of three senior and a small number of more junior members of a committee. There was very 
little “physical” ability to comprehend such a number of diverse projects, let along the new 
technologies which were the basis of many projects...The discussions of investment proposals and 
business plans were relatively ad-hoc and unstructured, for the non-core businesses they took place 
about once in a month.  CGUE1 : "The second was Ulyanovsky Auto because they had a lot of 
debts in front of us, it was quite important and interesting company at that time and the price was very-
very low. When Ulyanovsky Automotive was acquired - I remember discussion in Paris while we 
were waiting in a long line for a taxi… so it was discussion with Vadim Shvetsov, and the result was if 
you don’t acquire the Zavolzhsky Motorny Zavod the Ulyanovsk plant could die. So we decided right 
there in Paris that we wanted to acquire the two companies".    CG5: "The approach was very 
entrepreneurial and opportunistic, there was no a clear strategy. From communication standpoint, 
there was no clear, coherent, assured strategy."  CG6:     Strategy formulation, strategy development 
was a very informal process, or not a formalized process, which in principle resided with people not 
so much with functions. So I think it was more and it would be faithful to say that it was ad hoc 
process. It was very much ad hoc process receiving opportunity and basically making decisions and 
whether to go for it or not, most of them failed because there was no real formal strategic plan for 
process yet. Of course there were deep discussions about issues, but mostly even without 
involvement of external experts or internal experts.  Nor even formalize how much money which part 
would return etc., but do we think that it was the kind business we could create value or not. I think 
that was the main kind of thinking.       
Opportunistic approach: example - a company was 
perceived as "generally" attractive ("quite important 
and interestind") and owed debt to Severstal - hence, 
was a feasible target
_________________________________
Absense of concrete and coherent asset portfolio 
strategy, opportunistic and ad-hoc moves as 
opportunities presented themselves. No formalized 
financial or strateguc targets.        
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BUR1: There is a number of days, especially  in the first half of the year (March, and June) when we 
had to approve our strategic plan and strategic investment program. In June, we had to approve it at 
the highest level with a parent copmany. Then there was a kind of pause, and closer to the November-
December, this process has been renewed for next year. At all meetings, one way or another, (with 
A. Mordashov once a month at least)  we raised the question about the strategy. Formally, the first 
half of the year - 3-4 meeting, when we showed the presentation. CG1: However, the major Power 
Machines (energy equipment manufacturer) company has a well-structured and approved set of 
business planning and strategy discussions with the key shareholder set in advance for the whole year 
– although, of course, there was significantly less time spent on this business compared to the steel 
and mining".
But: regular strategy discussions, relatively well-
structured process at CherMK, Power Machines
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B1. Nature if decision-making. 
Impact of CEO
B2. Approach to decision-
making.  The role of strategic 
objectives and opportunism.
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Deep involvement of CEO in all 
decision-making, CEO's "deep 
dive" (attention to details) in all 
issues: pilot vs. austronaut.
Decision-making underpinned by 
his leadership style and personality
Generaly -  opportunistic, ad hoc  
approach to strategic decisions - 
very pronounced in the beginnig, 
more formal structured at the end. 
Intuitive, opportunistic and quick 
decision-making, little time 
devoted to formal research and 
analysis. However, Russian Steel 
Business Unit (CherMK) had 
always been preparing business 
plan for a period of 10 years and 
had more formal approach to 
decision-making
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CGUE1: "First of all time horizon for myself was about 50 years plus in terms of taking decisions or 
whenever expected short term gains we expected long-term value creation. Saying 50 years meaning 
could be 20-30-10 whatever.. Now, the second thing was what return in investment we expected. 
The return in investment between 2000 and 2004-5 was 4 years, so if it was more than 4 years paper 
we did not invest, between 2000 and 2006 the return in investment gradually moved to 6-7 years."        
BUR1: Classically business plan has always been for a period of 10 years, since Makhov became 
responsible, because classical theory of metals suggests that the normal investment projects in the 
metallurgical industry have payback period of 5-7 years. When we talk that in the steel industry 
project will be recouped over a couple of years, we just lie to ourselves. In order to feel the effects of 
a new investment activities, the payback period of which is 5-7 years, we should plan for 10 years, 
because for 5 years, we will see only a negative NPV.   CG3: "Strategic business plan, pre 2008 - it 
covered 10 years, post 2008 - 5 years, because [in times of financial crisis] why do we need a 10-
year plan if we don’t know if we will survive? "
Long horizon of strategic thinking (albeit deemed "not 
typical" for Russia), unlike with most of the others. 
Payback – average 4 years, extended to 6-7 years 
after 2006.
_________________________________
Long time horizon before 2010; was reduced from 10 
to medium-term 5 years after the crisis because of 
increased uncertainty. Long-term strategic planning 
even in very difficult 1997-98
 ________________________________
Reference to a "classical theory", nature of metals 
industry as an explanation for the length of the strategic 
outlook
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CG1: "The discussions of investment proposals and business plans were in those days relatively ad-
hoc and unstructured, for the non-core businesses they took place about once in a month... there was 
significantly less time spent on this business compared to the steel and mining." BUE1: "The assets 
were picked on expectations of a good financial performance and opportunity to make good overall 
returns, but there were no any specific financial targets set ex-ante. There was however a feeling that, 
by “throwing” relatively little money on many businesses, we can get such a stellar performance from 
one of them that it’d pay back for a dozen of unsuccessful others. But there were at the same time 
businesses which were promising tens rather than thousands of percent return per year, and they were 
considered as well if they seemed “interesting. Later we started becoming a bit more disciplined, but 
not very much so" CG2: "It was very funny situation. Our target should be, capacity should be about 
100’000’000 tonnes - that was first discussed in 2005, 2006. And the next year we say ok, it’s no 
good for us, because we have to be in different area… then we decide: it’s no good – and this looks 
like opportunism"  CG3: "from 2008-2009, we had to start  careful planning, optimizing cash flow, all 
expenses: taking into account that we have sales volume decrease, we have to cut CAPEX etc.". 
CG6: “Division which put a really deep strategic process was Severstal Resource when they thought 
in which other minerals they could diversify. That was the process at the beginning and then they 
moved along this process, I think it was the first formalized strategy process, which we had inside the 
company... that was when Nicolay Zelensky came, that was in 2008, maybe it started 2006-2007”. 
Unsystematic decision-making, little analysis, no 
financial/strategic goals set - especially for non-core 
assets ______________________________                                               
Slow evelution of decision-making process towards 
higher formality, both at the corporate and business 
unit level. Sharp increse in planning and target-setting 
discipline after the financial crisis of 2008
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CGUE1: "In fact, I believe, that was driven by, number one, the belief that we are the best in terms of 
management experience and expertise, and we can create value by introducing the same restructuring 
principles to other companies that we applied at Severstal. So, it was our big desire to show we are 
the best, we can turn around even the most difficult cases. This is one of the central topics I 
remember. For Auto, for Kuzbass coal... but for also overseas acquisitions. That was number one. 
Why outside of steel? ...it was simply an emerging opportunity. No big rational."  BUR2:"on the 
higher level I do think that a lot of our assets, our international ones are also very much linked to 
understanding of possible verges in Russia , of various natural risks, and that’s why the decision to go 
to this market of that market was caused by the fact that we had two legs – one leg is in Russia and 
<...> international markets"
Believe in turnaround capabilities 
_________________________________
Moving international as one of the means to reduce 
risks of external environment, in particular risks 
associated with Russia
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Expansion abroad: turnaround 
competences achieved in Russia 
seen as an engine for growth. 
Confidence in Severstal 
management competences as a 
stimulus to expand internationally
Long-term orientation in strategic 
outlook -  at least 5-10 years 
(considering volatile environment), 
apparently in contrast to other 
Russian corporations
No clear financial targets or 
expected returns on inestment, 
initially. Investment done on 
potential attractiveness of the 
project. Investment decision-
making was spontaneous, without 
any consistent rationale behind 
major decisions. The situation had 
started to change, first at the 
business unit level since 2006-
2007.
B3. Desion-making and plannig 
horizon
B4. Decision-making evolution 
over time
B5. Expansion abroad. Drivers 
behind it.
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CGUE1: "it’s quite interesting, because foreign assets, when they were purchased, they were loss-
making assets. And therefore originally, and they were at  distance from Russia... I was given a lot of 
authorities to do things.  But over time, as soon as cash flow became positive, and EBITDA grew, my 
authorities were gradually eaten by the Corporate Center." "...originally I could do all job myself, all 
sort of restructuring, ... then I should agree somehow with a person in Moscow, who has never been 
in the United States... So, a person, having no ideas about American laws, applications, productivity, 
was a deciding person... So this is the moment strong bureaucracy appeared. So in very important 
things business units lose a lot of motivation, drive, entrepreneurship and leadership for change. It was 
replaced by authority of corporate center. Which did not provide real leadership." 
High self-sufficiency of overseas subsidiaries in the 
initial stages 
_________________________________                                             
More intervention from the corporate center in 
operational management over time  
_________________________________                         
Less motivation and leadership in business units as the 
authority of corporate center increased
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+ + 2 100% CGUE1: "The Kuzbass acquisition was because we did not have sufficient coal from Vorkuta" Completions of value chain as the reason for expansion
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CG1: "The asset portfolio composition was not based on any apparent strategy and included most 
diverse businesses, from agriculture-related to tourism and from a bank to a major energy equipment 
manufacturer. " BUE1: "The top management of the Group of companies (without much 
differentiation between steel&mining and other businesses at the initial stages ) was represented by the 
Management Board of 5 people (Mordashov, Shvetzov, Makhov, Noskov and Kruchinin). ZAO 
“Severstal Group” was created in 2002 as a formal vehicle (officially called “management company”) 
to manage the collection of assets belonging to the key shareholder and his partners . "
Gradual transfer from loose diversified corporation to a 
more focused and structured  one. Separation of 
management roles for steel and mining and non-core 
assets before IPO 
_________________________________                        
No differentiation between steel&mining and unrelated 
businesses at the early stages  
_________________________________                        
Key shareholder was the main investor  and 
beneficiary in a widely divergent portfolio of “non-
core” businesses. 
_________________________________                         
Severstal Group – managing company for all assets, 
was in fact formally established in 2002 (and informally 
since about 2000). After IPO, Severstal Group was 
dissolved, and the top team (CEO and his deputies) 
formally assumed positions back in Severstal proper. It 
was explained by the requirements of transparency. 
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Overseas assets reflect the general 
situation of Business Unit's attitude 
towards Corporate Centre and 
resistance to change. High self-
autonomy at early period,  
increasing corporate centre 
intervention at latewr stages (after 
2006)
Diversification of portfolio was 
intuitive and outside of any ex-ante 
set standards. Nature of business 
wasn't important initially. More 
focused post-IPO period, 
acknowledging importance of 
relationships with external 
investors. Separation of 
steel&minig business from non-
core operations in 2006
B7. Expansion into mining. 
Drivers behind it.
Upstream integration as a strategic 
priority
B8. Privers of portfolio 
diversification of portfolio
B6. Expansion abroad - 
approach to strategic decision 
making in ovrseas subsidiaries, 
involvement of corporate center
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CGUE1: "Basically, they presented their budget for approval within this budget. Mordashov 
challenged them and was trying to set up higher targets whatever targets they put originally...Second 
thing happened was that basically how resources allocated was – there was some money on the cash 
account, and Severstal Auto come for some projects ..steel works or iron works come for some 
projects until the money are there. If the money are no longer there, then there is no finance. So it was 
mainly opportunistic, I would say". CG3: "I think that no one saw the need  for a big corporate 
strategic machine" BUE1: "In terms of the corporate center influence, it was always very small. The 
main activity was around the review of business plans by the CEO.  The participation of corporate 
center in strategy process was very limited, not even financial targeting. Only in one case over the 
2006-2010 we were asked to increase the EBITDA plan slightly, in other cases we were taking our 
internally calculated figures to the discussion and received approval . " BUR1: "We have proposed, 
they approved, and so we did it. Again, perhaps because the corporate center was busy forming 
another part of the holding."
Financial targets were not set by the corporate ex-
ante; budgets were  discussed and challenged during 
the review process 
_________________________________                       
Minimalist corporate center. Initially, role of business 
plan was for cash planning purposes only.  Little 
communication between companies within the Group 
_________________________________                        
Possibly, the corporate center was more focused on 
external expansion rather than on the review of existing 
businesses
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CGUE1:  "Mordashov was pushing  for a decisive role of Corporate Center, active role. The 
business units, CherMK, Severstal  Auto and others were fighting for their independence " "the 
resolution finally I offered was the compromise way of creating the corporate university, which was 
creating standards in each area for the Group ... So, during three or four years it was very major 
work that created this kind of standards. ..  "So this is the moment strong bureaucracy appeared. So 
in very important things business units lose a lot of motivation, drive, entrepreneurship and leadership 
for change. It was replaced by authority of corporate center."         CG2: " the process was to try to 
coordinate the strategic process and try to make a rule for strategic process, try to create the rules... 
after 6 month we prepared some instruction regarding strategy... Every strategic plan must be the 
same"
Corporate standards as means of ensuring best 
practice dissemination and conformity             
_________________________________                        
Push for a more decisive role of Corporate Center; 
resistance of Business Units to centralization  
_________________________________                       
Resistance by BU’s to observe the standards 
suggested by corporate center, lack of authority of 
corporate center officers
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BUG1:  "... starting from 2008 it was becoming more formal, we started to receive guidance, what 
should be our KPI’s, what should be our priorities"BUR2: "We are now receiving the 
macroeconomic forecast and various scenarios from the corporate centre, and I think that’s the job of 
the corporate centre" BUE1: 'In terms of the corporate center influence, it was always very small. 
The main activity was around the review of business plans by the CEO. " "The control after financial 
side became a little more tight during the crisis, for a very evident reason ..."  
Financial targets set by Business Units; budgets  
discussed and challenged during the review process 
only  _________________________________
Minimalist corporate center importance at early 
2000's. No  financial targets set. Participation in 
budget and investment review only. All initiative coming 
from the business unit. 
_________________________________
Role of corporate center is still more informal, without 
clear set of targets at earlier stages [2006-2007], 
however correction into BU's planning becomes more 
often. Becomes more evident and specific with KPI's 
and financial goals set from 2008  
_________________________________
Currently the role of corporate centre is focused on 
assumptions provision, forecasting, coordinating 
activities, supporting BUs. 
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Emerging importance of corporate 
centre since its creation. Rising but 
still selective involvement of 
Corporate centre into different 
lines of business. More orderly 
work of corporate center, 
improved governance: separation 
of management of "core" (public) 
and "non-core" businesses. 
Unifying standards – were 
imposed by , the corporate to 
ensure dissemination and 
conformity. Puss for universal 
standards  met considerable 
resistance from Business Units. 
C3. Role of Corporate Centre. 
Significant increase in 
involvement in the crisis-struck 
world
Gradual increase in the role of 
corporate center over time, big 
shift in late 2008-2009 -  time of 
the global financial crisis. Tighter 
control from corporate center, 
financial goals set fior the first time 
in company history. Corporate 
centre becomes a controlling body 
step-by-step: approves CAPEX 
decisions, budgeting, sets financial 
targets and KPI's. Autonomy of 
business units is diminished
Low operational/institutional role 
of Corporate Center in the 
beginning. Very little corporate-
level initiative in management of 
existing businesses. Effectively, 
corporate center was not fully 
separated from business units since 
"partners" were involved in both 
capacities. Business Units were 
almost fully autonomous with their 
own budgeting, CAPEX decisions, 
EBITDA targets etc. Corporate 
centre acted  as a review body  - 
approving strategic decisions (in a 
rather iterative and unsystematic 
manner) as far as existing assets 
were concerned; was more  
focused on external expansion
C1. Role of Corporate Centre. 
Early period.
C2. Role of Corporate Centre. 
Emerging importance.
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CGUE1: "Vorkuta, it was very interesting and intriguing story because in early 2000 government 
being pushing us to take it, to take it almost for free , even forgiving some debts of Vorkuta, 
restructuring some debts, because...  Vorkuta took the credit from the government, and so the 
interests on this credit became more then what government was not paying to Vorkuta. So, that was a 
creation of debt, frankly speaking. Now, we were ….…to do it because of very high costs, you 
know Vorkuta high costs, mono-company town, we looked at it as the opportunity and it was plenty 
of coal, small coal mines,...  realized that we don’t have resource for coal and coke, so, we slowly-
slowly-slowly started to consolidate the package of shares..."CG2: "Vorkuta – it’s a good case... It 
was request from the government, not to buy it, but to make it healthier. Sometimes, sometimes 
governments asks to… you have to buy."  CG6: "Government involvement was never a topic. We 
were confronted from many things, that’s why Aleksey moved abroad – it was a way to save his 
money etc. . I think, the government looked positively at kind of the things... But I think the 
government in Russia is much more concerned about who can come in..."
High role of government on one-off basis, proposals 
business cannot refuse. Theoretically, exit strategy 
existed. Issues of FDI into Russia was a more 
important topic for a government
N
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0 0%
S
u
p
p
o
rt
+ + + + 4 80%
CGUE1: "Yes I do remember some discussions of should we go abroad, should we protect some 
capital but frankly these decisions were no, its safe and good environment, no problem so no actions 
with them."                                CG1: "We always wanted to diversify from Russia because of local 
risks, etc,  but that was not the most important factor in strategic decisions. "
External environment was not seen as playing a major 
role, unlike the management patterns and CEO's 
priorities____________________________
Little apparent role of hostile but gradually improving 
"Russian" external environment
N
o
t
- 1 20%
BUR2: "on the higher level I do think that a lot of our assets, our international ones are also very 
much linked to understanding of possible events in Russia , of various natural risks, and that’s why the 
decision to go to this market of that market was caused by the fact that we had two legs – one leg is 
in Russia and in ... international markets" 
Moving international as one of the means to reduce 
risks of external environment, in particular risks 
associated with Russia
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+ + + + 4 80%
CG5 :"The collection of businesses was very diverse. I approached the main shareholder with a 
question – how can we position this group to the market, how can we explain the strategy behind it - 
But there was never an answer to it, in fact, he was not interested in explaining the strategic logic. 
“We live in a very fast-changing world, so why do we need a strategy if the market is changing so 
quickly ?”.  BUE1: "As far as the external environment is concerned, we had extremely favourable 
environment in 2004-08 which was very complimentary for opportunistic moves. There was an 
illusion that the money are endless and there is no need for any specific strategy or strategic goal, the 
company was focused on opportunistic expansion.  "
Volatile external environment promoted opportunism 
and prevented formulation of explicit strategy by CEO 
_________________________________                       
Cheap and available money stimulated opportunistic 
decision-making and push to make deals. Deals for the 
cash, not cash for the deals 
_________________________________                       
Highly favourable environment in 2004-08 was 
conductive for opportunistic, entrepreneurial decision-
making and aggressive expansion without a specific 
strategic goal
N
o
t
- 1 20%
BUR2 :"...we tried to think where different customer groups will go to, and what will be the steel 
industry in Russia in 2010: would it be Vaz or Gaz who will take 10% of the market or it would be 
Volkswagen and Renault who would rule the market. "
Long-term horizon in strategic planning and strategic 
thinking, taking into account defferent scenarios of 
macro environment
Footnote:
+ The interviewee provided evidence in support of the main conclusion on the topic
- The interviewee provided evidence contradicting the main conclusion on the topic
+/- 
If the cell is left blank, the interviewee didn't mention this topic in an interviw
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Favourable external environment 
facilitated opportunism. High profit 
margins and growing demand 
globally gave confidence, so 
strategy planning, contingency 
analysis was neglected and 
opportunism prevailed
Certain (rather limited) government 
influence on strategic decisions in 
Russia, in the form of non-binding 
“suggestions” or as a 
“background” thought about 
company priorities. 
Russia-specific country risks - 
generally not a major factor in 
strategic decisions
The interviewee mentioned both supporting and contradicting evidence 
D1. Influence of Government 
on strategic decision-making
D2. Influence of country-
specific risks on strategic 
decision-making
E3. Influence of external 
environment on strategic 
decision-making
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Topic
Concepts/charachteristics 
informing the research 
questions
Selected quotes Comments and analysis Conclusions
CG7 BUG2 BUR3 CG8 CG9 CG10 BUU1 BUR4 Total %
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+/- + +/- + + + +/- 5.5 80%
 BUG2: "Strategy process is becoming more centralized. Now we have common strategic guidelines 
coming from the center. Business units are leading in the development of their regional/business unit 
strategies. Company relies on business units in their strategy development". BUG2: "Actually, I think there 
are areas for improvement here. A world-class corporate center with good understanding of our business 
would help. A great strategist in the helm, to provide us with an alternative vision, apply some pressure and 
have a serious, detailed discussion..." CG8: "I’d say we are rather centralized in strategy specifically, 
centralized model in our group. I will speak about M&A because I know it better. Because, why, the 
decisions are taken at the corporate level, because there is corporate strategy are doing screening, 
business units are doing screening. But at the end there is a process, according to me, that allows 
corporate to control and analyze... Sometimes initiatives may come from the business units but at the end 
decisions are taken at the corporate". CG9: "Strategic options are mostly driven from below, from the 
business units level. As a good example – mining business’s initiative to invest into gold. It was a 
completely bottom-up initiative, created by the strategists from mining divisions. They though it’d be an 
excellent idea and pushed it through very aggressively. So if a project it pushed through well enough – it 
will likely go through". BUU1: "Well, the main ideas generators are business units – those who run the 
business". 
N
o
t
+/- +/- +/- 1.5 20%
CG7: "The strategy creation process is highly decentralized, business units have a very high degree of self-
sufficiency. They are responsible for generating strategies, strategic options and implementing them. 
Globally, corporate center plays a role of a “consultant”". 
S
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+ + + +/- + +/- 5 70%
CG8: "Corporate center provides some financial and strategic objectives since one or two years. With 
clear objectives on margins, ROCE, return payback period and other criteria.When I arrived in 2007-08 
there was lack of vision, to me that was an opportunistic approach. Now we have a sense of where we 
want to go, we may not get there at the end 100%, but we go. There is good idea where we want to go, I 
understand it, it is very clear to me".  BUG2:  "Now we have a clear objective for the whole company, 
discussed and approved at the corporate level (and, hopefully, there is a system of long-term motivation 
for it). We have a unifying strategy for the corporation as a whole... Overall system has become more 
orderly and more structured, with clearer responsibilities. Centralization has increased but that was a 
positive, smart centralization in the right things".   BUU1: "[At the earlier stages] he role [of corporate 
center] was not very formal. We had a five-year plan, but we didn’t have a comprehensive, applied 
operational planning from the corporate level. We did not have any precise, articulated targets, we 
certainly did not have an articulated understanding what every part of the business has to do… We had a 
more organic, case-by-case approach. Gradually since 2-3 years ago we were driving to more concrete 
planning, started direction-setting, driving the decisions… So to summarize before there was no centralized 
strategy because there was no any precise planning neither from below nor from above". 
N
o
t
- +/- +/- 2 30%
BUR4: "The shareholder does set some targets since recently. For example, he stipulated what kind of 
EBITDA margin we need, as a target for the next few years. This happened last year for the first time. 
Before that we never had any ex-ante targets, set I advance. Before we first created our own forecast, 
discussed it with the shareholder and came to some conclusion as a result of this discussion". 
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+ + + + + + + + 8 100%
CG7: "Final decisions on strategic issues, overall budgets approval are made by the CEO. “Local” 
discussions are made by business units within the approved budgets and with situation-specific/patchy 
participation of corporate center officers". BUG2: "Strategic issues are first discussed by the business unit 
top team and the final approval of all projects is of course in the hands of our sole decision-maker – CEO. 
Usually we (business unit team) communicate with him directly, there is little work in between, for example 
with corporate center, etc. CEO “”feeds every piece of data through himself”, there is relatively little 
involvement of corporate team, as far as I can see". BUR3: "Shareholder makes final approval for all more 
or less significant investments. I don’t see any evolution in this management approach". CG8: "Here is only 
one guy who can make the decisions, its CEO, shareholder. Everyone is bringing him ideas, initiatives, and 
at the end like in every group its his decision to push it or not". CG10: "Strategy-making process is first of 
all defined by CEO, it is a reflection of his personality. Correspondingly, the process was developing and 
growing reflecting also his personal evolution". BUU1: "Of course, CEO has the leading role there. He 
makes the decision, after discussion with business units and corporate team. Corporate team also has 
some role. They work with the divisions, prepare the documents, etc. The CEO and the corporate team sit 
with the division team, look at their ideas, different options, plans, adjust them to bring in line with the 
general vision, corporate visions". 
N
o
t
Interviewees
Level of centralization proved to be a contentious issue: 
respondends called the system both centralized and 
decentralized, bringing in very similar illustartions to 
support their opinion. It could be argued that "level of 
centralization" is judged very differently by  respondends 
depending on their background, knowledge of company 
history, etc. There is however an almost universal 
agreement that: 1) the system has become more 
centralized over the last 2-3 years and 2) business units 
actively participate in generation of strategic options and 
ideas, they come up very actively (in some cases, even 
"agressively") with bottom-up initiatives. Interestingly, 
business units self-sufficiency is more pronounced in 
organic growth decisions, while coprorate center plays a 
higher role in M&A. Level of self-sufficiency varies for 
different business units, higher independence of Russian 
steel division. Overall the Project II interviews confirm 
the key conclusions of Project I. 
A clear distinction between earlier period (absense of 
financial or strategic targets, opportunistica and 
unsystematic approach to strategy) and recent movement 
towards a more structured approach over the last 2-3 
years. Specific financial targets were clearly defined. 
There is a universal recognition that corporate strategic 
priorities now exist and this has made the company 
stronger. Interestingly, learning from other companies is a 
one of the reasons for introducing corporate-level 
strategic objectives and defining coprorate strategy.  
There is a certain disagreement on whether financial and 
strategic objectives are provided top-down or bottom 
up. Most of the respondends think this is mostly top 
down, but business units are also involved in the process. 
CEO is the main driver and key decision-maker in the 
strategy process. Moreover, the strategy process itself is 
a reflection of CEO's personal attitude and approach to 
decision-making. It evolves in line with CEO's 
personality. The role of top team in the corporate is either 
unclear or seen as secondary/advisory compared to the 
decisieve role of CEO personally. Level of corporate 
team involvement depends on business unit: in Russian 
steel, there is little involvement of corporate center apart 
from CEO.
Strategy process is relatively  
centralized and level of 
centralization has sharply 
increased recently. High role of 
business units in generation of 
strategic ideas and options, 
development of 
regional/business strategies
Financial objectives are clearly 
defined and provided from the 
corporate center. Elements of 
strategic objectives were 
introduced in the shape of 
corporate vision for  
investment allocaiton priorities 
(mining vs. steel). Both 
financial and strategic 
objectives were introduced 
over the last 2-3 years only. 
Final strategic decisions are 
made by CEO. 
Unsystematic/modest 
involvement of corporate 
center officers, direct 
communication between CEO 
and business units
Strategy process has become more centralized recently. 
Main strategic decisions are made at the corporate level, 
but business units are the main generators of new ideas. 
________________________________
Real decisions are driven from business unit level. An 
example of bottom-up strategic initiative is Mining 
division’s initiative to invest in gold  
________________________________
In M&A, both business units and corporate center are 
involved in screening, but corporate center makes final 
decision. Initiatives in M&A field come from both 
business units and corporate center while capex/organic 
growth mostly comes from business units level
Since 2007-2008, corporation has introduced strategic 
objectives, unifying strategy and provides macro-level 
forecasts to support business plan development  
________________________________ Opportunistic 
approach to strategy by 2007-08, clear vision for the 
future emerged by 2010. Corporate center provides 
financial objectives 
________________________________  Financial 
targets are set mostly bottom-up, with discussion and 
challenge of business units’ proposals. Opportunistic 
approach, no comprehensive planning at the corporate 
level, no articulated targets. Since 2-3 years ago there 
was a drive to more concrete planning, direction-setting 
and more centralized strategy 
_________________________________
Shareholder does not set specific financial or strategic 
targets. Business units are encouraged to think about 
“leadership concept"
Shareholder must approve all significant financial and 
strategic decisions.                 
_____________________________                                                               
Direct communication between business units and CEO, 
little involvement of corporate center in between. CEO 
wants all the data to go through himself. Management 
Board is also involved, but decisions are nevertheless 
predominately driven by CEO.                                                   
______________________________  CEO makes the 
decisions and plays a leading role. Corporate team and 
CEO work with the divisional teams on strategy 
development
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BUR3: "The agenda of such meeting (we call them Board meetings) is set in advance for a year. They are 
divided into results reports and strategic discussions and go in a very structured way, according to a 
presentaiton. Our meetings are regular. They usually start with a delay. We try to stick to the agenda which 
is helped by the structure of presentations. The style has changed a bit over time, it became a bit more 
structured". CG8: "He asks vast majority of the time, like of the two hours 1 h 58 min – Alexei, 2 min – 
someone else". BUR4: "Strategic discussions are regular but shareholder is available for extraordinary 
meeting if there is a need to discuss. Meetings are usually well-structured but always start late".
N
o
t
- - 2 35%
CG7: Strategic discussions and decision-making: usually the discussion are very long, at times tedious. 
They are normally not very well structured, efficiency might be improved. Sometimes there is a lot of empty 
talk, non-systematic approach to decision-making. CEO himself is not a very systemic person. Sometimes 
we don’t discuss the most important, high-level questions. Like for example in the strategy discussion we 
didn’t spend time to discuss strategic scenarios for the industry, how it will evolve, etc. This is strange and 
not logical. 
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+ + + + + + + 7 90%
CG7: "Initiative from below is very much encouraged. However, it has to be in line with the “party line” to 
go through. CEO has his own vision of the world, and the initiatives have to be oriented towards his 
visions. But mostly – he supports the initiatives, he is very open to them. On consensus, he is always trying 
to achieve consensus and alignment, considering of course his position as the main shareholder, etc. But he 
listens to people, asks their opinion, lets them speak, asks detailed questions and challenges them. He 
usually explains his opinion, the reasons why a certain decision was taken, tries to find common ground". 
BUG2: "He [CEO] is open to a dialog, considering his level of authority. He is careful with making quick 
decisions, likes to listen. He has “implicit” 50% stake in every decision, that is, all depends on him.But 
once he is convinced of something, he will push it through a dialog, collect allies, in a sense making sure 
people buy into his vision. Inside his mind, he is rather uncomfortable with conflict". BUR3: "Positive 
attitude to initiatives. He reviews all initiatives with interest but may occasionally challenge someone rather 
strongly if there is something he would not like. It really depends on the mood and general situation – for 
example, when there was a crisis we felt it was better not to come up with development initiatives. Now as 
the crisis is over, we feel again if there are investments on the agenda". CG8: "Yes, I think first of all it is 
encouraged, everyone can propose his ideas to Alexei, to a strategic committee. This is a positive thing, we 
are very open minded in that". CG9: "CEO prefers to see alignment and consensus in the team. I think it is 
a personal thing – he prefers everyone to be aligned, this is satisfying for him personally. He is trying to 
convince everyone, even if there is only one person  who disagrees. This is part of his personal style".
N
o
t
- 1 10%
BUR4: "Alignment and consensus are not a very big issue. What matters in a concrete field is the opinion 
of the “owner” of this process, responsible manager. This is what really prevails. If there are 
disagreements, we can take it for further work. So one may say that if there is lack of consensus, the issue 
is usually postpones till next meeting for further work. Sometimes they don’t get accepted just as well".    
All interviewees emphasize that initiative is very much 
encouraged and welcome. Discussions are conduscted in 
an open and comfortable manner, everyone can express 
her opinion. CEO is interested in hearing diverse 
arguments.  However, to go through an initiative should 
correspond to CEO's general, high-level vision on current 
priorities. Also, presenters of initiatives may not always 
show a balanced picture, may "push" for pet projects too 
aggressively. CEO's inclination to seek consensus and 
buy-in from all the team members is seen as a personal 
trait of the CEO (he even gets "surprized" when 
somebody is not "in line" with the prevailing view). CEO 
doesn’t like disagreement within the team and aims to get 
to apparent consensus, even if this consensus is not quite 
real. To push for consensus, CEO explains his own 
reasoning behind a decision and that brings people on his 
side. This may present a problem since many observers 
have noted that top managers may be reluctant to raise an 
issue that contradicts CEO's strong view at the moment. 
Interestingly, CEO's interest in consensus seems to be 
focused on the very top team and does not extend to the 
middle management, which is seen as an issue
Strategic discussions are 
usually relatively well-
structured but may be too long 
and tedious. Time allocation 
may not be very optimal: too 
much time spent on small 
details. Meetings style reflects 
CEO's personal preferences, 
such as close personal 
attention to details. Crucial role 
of CEO at the meetings. 
CEO's frequent overload may 
create serious issues and 
reflect on the quality of 
decisions. 
Strategy meetings, like the overall  decision-making 
process, are the refleciton of CEO's personality. There is 
a division on whether they are more structured or 
unstructured, but they are universally considered as very 
long and focused on details. Excessive focus on details 
may mean inefficient time allocation, as a factor 
constraining efficiency of decision-making. Very high role 
of CEO personally is a defining feature of the meetings: 
interviewees emphasize that he is leading the meetings, 
asks majority of questions, has a "controlling stake" in 
decisions, etc. Low spirits/time constraints of CEO may 
have an adverse impact on the quality of meetings. Since 
decisions focused on CEO – it becomes issue for the 
whole corporation if he becomes overloaded. The 
specifics of CEO’s approach to discussions may be 
challenging/demotivating for managers from overseas, for 
example in US and Italy, but are better perceived by 
Russian managers
Strategic meetings are set in advance and well-structured. 
Shareholder’s approach evolved to become more 
structured over time                                                   
______________________________                                 
CEO personality is reflected in the content of discussions. 
Unsystematic approach by CEO sometimes leads to 
suboptimal focus of strategic discussions        
________________________________ Strategy 
meetings are normally not very-well structured and ill-
prepared. Time allocation is not very efficient                                     
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Initiatives are encouraged, but to get support have to be in 
line with CEO's loosely defined vision/feelings. This vision 
is communicated in very broad terms so that it leaves 
opportunity for creativity and initiative by subordinates.   
______________________________                                                   
CEO usually tries to find consensus and alignment.  This is 
part of his personal profile. He is careful to listen to what 
people have to say and provide a good feedback on his 
opinion, about the reasons for his decisions. CEO 
encourages discussion and wants to hear different 
opinions                                           
_______________________________  
CEO is open to a dialog and listens to what people have 
to say      _______________________________                           
Shareholder does not like disagreement.  Always seeks a 
consolidated decision or postpones the project           
_______________________________     Presenters of 
initiatives don’t show a balanced picture but aim to put 
them through                                         
________________________________   CEO usually 
seeks consensus among the top people in his team, but 
there is little involvement among middle management. 
_______________________________      Alignment is 
not very important. If there is disagreement, the issue is 
sent for further work, gets postponed till next meeting or 
does not get accepted
Initiative from below is 
encouraged. However, to be 
successful initiatives should 
correspond to  CEO's  vision 
and priorities. CEO aims to 
achieve consensus and 
alignment in the team, 
promotes open discussion and 
allows people to express their 
opinion. He is keen to explain 
his own reasoning behind 
strategic decisions. 
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CG7: "CEO is very focused on the discussion of details, shows great interest in discussing small aspects 
and details. He may look through and discuss every page of a 100-page presentation, if he has time and 
interest. Sometimes he is too engaged with details, so that it is difficult to see the whole picture – “forest is 
not seen behind the trees".  Possibly, such focus on details is explained by his personal traits – curiosity, 
first of all. Otherwise it is difficult to understand why would he need it. Another possible explanation is that 
he doesn’t quite trust his subordinates fully". BUG 2: "Overall, this focus on details is probably explained 
by CEO’s personal curiosity and desire to understand all what’s going on. Corporate center could play a 
bigger role here, corporate officers could discuss these details before it lands on the discussion table with 
CEO". BUR3: "But generally, I’d say there is an inclination to look at details. This is mostly based on 
character, personal traits. Every detail has a value". CG8: "It’s good that CEO wants to focus on details, 
because the devil is in details. But sometimes it’s necessary to focus on the important parts of the 
discussion. You need to focus on details for ten minutes, fifteen minutes. He may stay on details for an hour 
or more".  CG9: "I think people are generally ok with this style, they have adapted to it. Although the 
newcomers usually don’t like it and see it as too intrusive, not good usage of time. But they get accustomed 
over time as well". CG10: "Discussion of business plans, strategic options may become very detailed, 
depending on what will catch CEO’s attention he may pick a topic and go into great details, very deep 
granularity". BUR4: "I think he is doing it first for himself, to satisfy his own curiosity and get to know more 
intimately the drivers of the business. And also to teach the management team that such things require a 
careful look, there are no items too small to look at. Another example is CAPEX programme. In the past 
we were looking at capex from a relatively wholesome perspective. This year he asked us to give a very 
high detalization – how much, into which plants, into what equipment, why do we need it, etc. when we 
presented it, he looked at it relatively briefly and approved. So the important thing for him was to make 
sure that we have looked at it ourselves".                 
CEO is focused on the discussion of details, especially is 
he has time and personally interested in a topic. 
Sometimes excessive focus on details doesn’t allow to see 
the big picture ______________________ ______   
CEO expects to see a high level of details. If details are 
not there, even inherently good ideas may not be well-
perceived.                      Excessive attention to details 
demotivates people and makes for inefficient use of 
CEO’s time  ________________________________                                                              
CEO's focus on details may become excessive, too much 
time devoted to digging into small details         
________________________________                              
CEO goes in ot details if he is not confident in a decision. 
Sometimes too much time devoted to research and details 
means that an opportunity may get lost                         
________________________________   Attention to 
details reflects shareholder’s personal curiosity but it is 
also a vehicle to teach management that it is important to 
track the details
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CG7: "On balance, high discretion of business units and agility of decision-making is overall a good thing 
for a growing, global company with diverse markets and businesses, like Severstal. Business units 
understand their markets and customers better, can see concrete reactions from the market, so the system 
is more adaptive. Decision-making system is quick and can produce decisions very quickly. Experts at the 
corporate center are not always involved (since communication is direct between the initiative provider and 
CEO). Since business units generate strategic options and corporate center is supposed to check them and 
verify, but often fails to do so because of the unclear authority, the system often produces suboptimal 
decisions". BUG2:  "In terms of initiative, we have high freedom of initiative on the one hand. On the other 
hand our initiative is limited because we are required to supply at least 50% of our production to captive 
steel assets. In this respect we are centralized and our self-sufficiency in terms of strategic initiatives is 
limited..." BUR3: "Direct approach – you have access to the owner of the business and can solve issues of 
any level of complexity. This is a great strength. here is no a strong, industry-focused expertise above us to 
challenge our strategy. I see it also as a weakness. Depending on one person, even though the contact is 
very close and easy, is a potential risk to a company. Consistency – we are dealing with the same person 
so we have plenty of time to adapt and to learn his way. Little friction in the system". CG9: "Another 
example of decision-making is about our investments into a gold company X. Head of the gold division 
came up saying there is an opportunity to acquire a controlling stake, but it had to be made very urgently. 
So he made a presentation, we had a brief discussion, and at the end we made a decision in 30-40 
minutes.  It was made so quickly because it is in our nature, but also because there was a good trust in 
Gold business management’s ability because of their good track record. So we were able to make a 
decision quickly, although  we knew very little about this company before". BUR4: "A great advantage of 
him [CEO/shareholder] is that he is very flexible – if there is an urgent decision to be made, M&A deal or 
something, he makes himself available for a meeting or for a conference call very quickly". 
Since Business units are closer to the markets and 
customers, the decision-making system is quick and agile                                               
Little expertise of the corporate center involved in 
strategic discussion since decisions are discuss directly 
between the CEO and Business units 
______________________________                                
On the one hand, initiative of business units is encouraged. 
On the other hand, initiative is constrained by mental 
constraints in CEO's and top team minds, implied 
supremacy of steel over mining                                            
Very quick decision-making when necessary, very agile 
and non-bureaucratic decision-making. It was possible 
because there was a good level of trust to the business 
unit  
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BUG2: "However, strategies of different business units are disjoint, this is an area of concern. This can be 
attributed to the legacy of the supremacy of steel assets. Historically, the objective was to buy as much 
steel as possible and raw materials (mining)  was a supporting story… Mental supremacy of steel in the 
heads of top corporate officers and business units’ leaders makes the whole process disjoint". BUR3: 
"There is no a strong, industry-focused expertise above us to challenge our strategy. I see it also as a 
weakness. Depending on one person, even though the contact is very close and easy, is a potential risk to 
a company". BUU1: "I think the centralization of decision-making is a good thing, but sometimes we can 
be very slow in decision-making because CEO is too busy, or he just asks all the time for more details". 
Strategies of diverse business units are still disjoint, 
despite the growing centralization of strategy. Part of the 
reason may come from the mental supremacy of steel 
assets in the minds of the top team.         
________________________________                   
Strong expertise is absent at the corporate leve – 
unsatisfied need for a competent challenge aside from 
shareholder’s.            
________________________________
The process of strategic decision-making can be too slow 
if CEO is busy or asks for more details              
High role of "close-to earth" business units, direct 
communication with CEO create  adaptive, non-
bureaucratic and agile decision-making system. This is on 
balance is good for a diverse and growing company like 
Severstal. Too centralized decision-making would be too 
slow and costly. Direct access to the owner of the 
business  can solve issues of any level of complexity, 
consistency of dealing with the same person, but may 
present a challenge if CEO is too busy or overstretched. 
On the other hand, business units strategies remain 
disjoint and unconnected to each other. Expertise of the 
corporate center is underutilized since decisions are 
discussed directly between the CEO and Business units, 
unclear authority of corporate center. There is a need for 
a stronger corporate expertize in addition to CEO's 
personal involvement.  Mental constraints of CEO and 
top team (implied supremacy of steel asets) may reduce 
efficiency of decision-making 
Generally, shareholder is inclined to look at details 
although it depends on whether he is personally interested 
in a topic . One idea is that CEO goes in ot details if he is 
not confident in a decision. High level of detailization is 
the result of CEO’s personal interest and curiosity but it is 
also a vehicle to teach management that it is important to 
track the details. One interviewee suggested such focus 
on details may also reflect lack of trust between the CEO 
and management team: he tries to establish tighter control 
by keeping an option to question any figure or detail at 
any moment. High personal involvement of CEO is part 
of the model of small and lean corporate center with 
minimum internal bureaucracy and direct communication 
between business units and the decision-maker. There is 
a bigger role for corporate center in this area – corporate 
officers with business units could prepare the discussions 
with CEO in advance which should that less time should 
be devoted to details at CEO's personal meetings with 
business units.  Practically, too much focus on small 
details may mean that 1) there is suboptimal allocation of 
managerial time - strategically important issues may not 
receive adequate attention  2)  sometimes too much time 
devoted to research and details means that an 
opportunity may get lost. 3) management team may 
become demotivated by the requirement to present too 
detailed business case when it is not relevant due to high 
uncertainty and long planning horizon.   
Adaptive and agile decision-
making system with strong 
business units and direct 
access to the key decision-
maker/weak corporate center 
and overreliance on CEO 
personality 
CEO is normally very focused 
on details in strategic 
discussions, although this varies 
from time to time depending on 
his level of interest and time 
constraints. This is a reflection 
of his personality - deppe 
personal curiosity. It also 
serves as an instrument to keep 
management team alert and 
focused on details in 
presentation of strategic 
options. Occasionlly, too  
much focus on details distorts 
strategic picture and may 
demotivate management team
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+/- +/- + + +/- + 4.5 56%
CG7: "Raising difficult questions is both easy and difficult. Top management is usually reluctant to raise 
really sensitive questions, probably because they find it difficult to appear in contradiction with shareholder. 
Some strategic issues, such as North American assets acquisitions in 2008 were not probably discussed 
properly because raising any issues related to risks would go against the prevailing point of view in the 
team and the shareholderYounger, high-potential middle managers do raise issues and appear prepared to 
discuss challenges". BUG2: "Everybody has a voice, cash-generating initiatives are always welcome. 
Regarding capacity to raise sensitive issues, it depends on whether such an issue touches upon some 
“legacy” problem, such as the efficiency in an influential business unit, or the mental construct of steel 
supremacy over mining, etc." BUR3: "Usually it is easy to raise all sorts of issues, including sensitive or 
difficult ones. But that again depends on the mood of the shareholder. If he is in a good mood, and 
generally not very tired, not exhausted, I can discuss all questions. If he is not in a good mood, it should 
better set them aside or you can get too much pressure on your shoulders. Openness, straightforward and 
open dialog. This is an advantage and I aim to maintain same openness and sincerity within our team". 
CG9: "Since initiative is welcome and there is always a spirit of open discussion, I personally feel ok with 
great majority of decisions. Not sure about others. I think the CEO is always open to difficult and sensitive 
questions, he never skips a discussion". CG10: "Overall, we have a rather cooperative, open system. 
There is opportunity for discussion, decisions at the top usually make good sense. Decisions on some 
issues can be made very quickly, if necessary". BUR4: "He may be carried away by something interesting 
to him, may start an unconnected discussion, but that is normally very interesting. He is also very polite, not 
like some shareholders of other companies, as we hear from their managers.  It is ok to raise sensitive 
questions with him, it is important for us to know his opinion and correct our activity accordingly".
________________________________  
There are some areas where it is difficult to raise sensitive 
questions with CEO. It is easier to discuss an issue where 
CEO has some opinion already, otherwise it may take a 
long time to make a painful but necessary decision.     
________________________________  
Raising difficult questions and issues is usually not very 
difficult but it depends on circumstances and shareholder’s 
mood. Sometimes it is better to put them aside.  
________________________________
CEO is open to difficult and sensitive questions and never 
avoids a discussion Overall the atmosphere for strategic 
discussion is very open and decisions can be made very 
quickly if necessary               
______________________________       
It is easy to raise sensitive questions with the shareholder. 
It is important to know his opinion
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CG7: "Inability to raise sensitive issues is a huge drag on the company. Therefore, failure to raise them 
means stagnation in company development in the best case and destruction of shareholder value on the 
worst case". BUR3: "Sensitive issues can be raised, but it depends on shareholder's mood and how 
exhausted he is". CG8: "I think sometimes generally people don’t present bad news. I think people most of 
the time put negative aspects in presentations and expect Alexei to find it himself, not letting him know the 
news directly. They prefer Alexei to look at the data and find out the negative aspects himself. Well, I 
don’t know perhaps, may be, they are scared. Perhaps this means they are not fully prepared to discuss 
with him difficult topics. Because Alexei is in the double capacity – as a CEO and shareholder, so he has 
double pressure. He is in charge of management of his investments and is in charge of managing his 
portfolio. And other people around him also feel this pressure". CG10: "Top team is complacent, their 
main idea is to keep the CEO happy. Not enough challenge and scrutiny of strategic decisions". BUU1: 
"We can overlook something when we start from only one vision. One example is acquisition on North 
American assets – some people were firmly against that, but since CEO really wanted to grow in North 
America, all precautions were brushed aside, and finally those people who were against that had to vote 
pro, since CEO was clearly in support. It turned out to be a horrible decision.  Also we can miss some 
opportunities because the one strong vision may not allow us to look at different directions".
Top managers avoid raising difficult topics, probably 
because they are reluctant to contradict the shareholder. 
Younger middle-managers are eager to raise questions 
_______________________________  Difficulty of 
raising sensitive questions is a significant problem and 
historically has led to suboptimal decisions and value-
destruction                                                        -----------
-------------------------------------     People are 
reluctant to present bad news to CEO, expect him to find 
out himself. Team members may not be fully prepared to 
discuss difficult topics because they feel pressure from 
(and on) CEO  .                                          The top team 
is complacent and shows little initiative 
_______________________________                                                     
Focus on one vision (CEO’s)  may not allow the company 
to look at different opportunities. It is difficult to go against 
CEO’s vision once he has made up his mind, and this may 
at times lead to very inefficient decisions
Interviewees have divergent views on the climate for 
discussion. On the one hand, there is a universla 
recognition that CEO encourages initiative and open 
atmosphere, makes sure that there is a possibility to raise 
different views and express opinions. Some state directly 
that raising sensitive issues is easy and there is a 
straignforward, open atmosphere. However, 
othercomment that may be difficult for the top team for 
the following reeasons: 1) Since CEO has a high 
authority, they are concerned about appearing in 
contradiciton with CEO's view 2) team members may not 
be fully prepared to discuss difficult topics because they 
feel pressure from (and on) overstretched and exhausted 
CEO which makes fully open discussion more difficult 3) 
there is insufficeint level of trust between the top team and 
CEO. Interestingly, same interviewee may speak about 
open and trustful atmosphere and at the same time 
complain that top team is complacent, their main idea is 
to "keep the CEO happy". Theresfore, there is not 
enough challenge and scrutiny of strategic decisions. 
Difficulty of raising sensitive questions and focus on one 
man's opinion is a significant problem and historically has 
led to suboptimal decisions and value-destruction. 
Interestingly, middle managers do raise difficult isssues 
and are better prepared to discuss them.  
Raising sensitive issues: 
constructive atmosphere for 
strategic discussions but 
reluctance to question the 
prevailing CEO’s opinion.                                                    
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+/- 0.5 10%
CG8: "It’s good that CEO wants to focus on details, because the devil is in details. But sometimes it’s 
necessary to focus on the important parts of the discussion. You need to focus on details for ten minutes, 
fifteen minutes. He may stay on details for an hour or more". BUU1: "I think that details is also a personal 
thing, if there is something which he is interested in, he may want to discover more". 
CEO's focus on details is good in itself but may become 
excessive                          Focus on details may be a 
personal trait of CEO
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BUG2: "The biggest weakness is the depth of his penetration into “operating” (as opposed to “strategic”) 
details. This is bad for him – he should not spread thinly the weight of his authority, his “50%” stake in all 
decisions. This is bad for us since we have to correct some insignificant detail for 10-15 times, provide 
reasoning, etc – this is very tedious and distracts from the real work. This penetration into details does not 
create additional value because at long, strategic horizons such details can not be measured adequately and 
therefore they are ultimately uncontrollable". BUR3: "His sometimes excessive attention to details makes 
the discussion rather tiresome at times. Like “well, here it’s started again”. It makes n sense to discuss 
details if you don’t have a clear big picture. We often get into details while we don’t have clarity on 
strategy yet. That is rather perplexing and definitely quite inefficient". CG9: "I think the main issue is still, as 
it has always been, about the level of delegation. We need to retain flexibility because this is an important 
strategic asset. On the other hand, small deals with small details, like in cases of Modul acquisition or PBS 
extension mentioned earlier should be decided at a level below CEO". CG10: "That is ok if we speak 
about a one-year plan, or about two years, but beyond that it becomes really tedious and worthless since 
you can’t see the market and operations that far in such details. That concerns organic growth projects 
since business plan is all about capex, organic growth. But strategic business plan discussion, when it 
becomes so enmeshed with details, becomes totally divorced from real life. In 5 or 10 years we will have 
completely new assets, new markets".
Excessive focus of details by CEO personally: 
demotivates top team, wastes executives’ time and 
distracts CEO’s attention form more important issues                                         
Excessive focus on details coming from CEO’s 
personality         
________________________________                          
Attention to details may be excessive, tiresome and may 
distract attention from important strategic issues                            
________________________________ Insufficient 
level of delegation from CEO to a level below is an issue                                
CEO's focus on details is fine for short-range planning but 
becomes worthless for longer-term strategic discussions                  
________________________________          Too 
much time may be spent on insignificant questions and 
details, driven by CEO's personal interest, that may 
become demotivating                          
Too much focus of details is mainly a weakness for the 
CEO, business units and for the overall system efficiency. 
Too much time may be spent on insignificant questions 
and details, driven by CEO's personal interest. It is fine 
for short-range planning but becomes worthless for 
longer-term strategic discussions  It may distract attention 
from important strategic issues, lead to suboptimal 
allocation of time and even demotivae management team. 
CEO's focus on details is a reflection of his personality. It 
may also be explained by lack of trust and insufficient 
level of delegation.
Excessive focus on details:  
distracts CEO's and 
executives' attention from more 
important issues, makes 
meetingsctoo long and 
tiresome and makes the overall 
system less efficient
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CG8: "He [CEO] has to demonstrate a good management and a good investment portfolio. He has to 
think about good management, shareholder value and may be some political moments. He has to invest a 
lot of mental energy, secondly it takes him more time and energy to decide because he has to align many 
positions when he makes a decision. So it costs him and the team a lot of effort and a lot of time. It 
becomes very difficult as the company grows in size". 
Significant pressure on CEO and team members from the 
fact that CEO has to balance responsibility as general 
manager, shareholder and arguably as a participant in 
political affairs _______________________________ 
Minimalist corporate center. Initially, role of business plan 
was for cash planning purposes only.  Little 
communication between companies within the Group 
S
tr
en
g
th
s
0 0%
W
ea
k
n
es
s 
h
ig
h
li
g
h
te
d
 i
n
 t
h
e 
in
te
rv
ie
w
+ 1 100%
Decision-making is concentrated at the top, little 
involvement of middle management           
________________________________   
The top team could be be more visible and active, a better 
communication and feedback system is required
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+
-
+/- 
If the cell is left blank, the interviewee didn't mention this topic in an interviw
The interviewee provided evidence in support of the main conclusion on the topic or describes a strength of a 
particular phenomenon
The interviewee provided evidence contradicting the main conclusion on the topic or described a weakness of a 
particular phenomenon
CG10: "Besides, as I said, since decision-making is so concentrated at the top, there is insufficient 
communication and alignment with the middle management, they don’t get the message and so on. The top 
team should be more visible, they should be more decisive". 
Decision-making is concentrated at the top, there is little 
communication and involvement of middle management. 
Top team and CEO are rather closed, there is a need for 
more communication with the rest of the group
Significant pressure on CEO and team members from the 
fact that CEO has to balance responsibility as general 
manager, shareholder and arguably as a participant in 
political affairs
Decision-making is 
concentrated at the top, little 
involvement of middle 
management
High pressure on CEO from 
his roles as executive, wealth 
manager and participant in 
political affairs. This puts high 
pressure on CEO personally 
and on his team. This overload 
has a negative impact quality of 
decisions
The interviewee mentioned both supporting and contradicting evidence or gave examples of both strengths and 
weaknesses in the interview 
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Appendix 6 – A brief history of Severstal  
Severstal operational and financial highlights  
The group of companies related to Severstal and its main shareholder, Alexey 
Mordashov, exhibited many classical features of similar ―integrated business 
groups‖ which made up the core of the Russian economy in the 2000s (Pappe 
and Galukhina, 2009)1. Like in most other cases, its growth started from a 
―core‖ industrial enterprise operating in the export-oriented natural resources 
industry. Severstal engaged in an overall rather active expansionary policy in 
the 2000‘s, going through two distinct stages. In Stage I, 2000-2006, the IBG 
was engaged in active diversification, building up a relatively diverse portfolio of 
assets; however, most of them were still one way or another related to the main 
enterprise, either through a value chain or as financial services providers – 
hence, an ―integrated‖ business group. In Stage II, after the November 2006 
steel and mining company IPO at the London Stock Exchange, the Severstal 
separated the management of ―core‖ and ―non-core‖ assets and divested a 
number of ―non-core‖ assets altogether. At a new stage, the company made 
significant investments into new ventures, this time totally unrelated to the now-
public ―core‖ business, but they made the majority of new acquisitions in the 
core business of the metals and mining company Severstal.  
Overall, the ―core‖ business of metals and mining has always made up the 
majority of earnings, investments and commanded most public attention.  By 
the end of 1999, Severstal consisted of a Soviet-era steel giant in Cherepovets 
and two iron ore production and enrichment facilities in Karelia which supplied 
the Cherepovets Steel Mill with it key raw materials. In 2000-2002, the company 
acquired two major coking coal assets, the traditional Cherepovetz supplier, 
Vorkutaugol, based in Northern Russia and the strategically less significant 
                                                          
1
 This section will employ the term “integrated business group”, or “IBG Severstal” as suggested by 
 Pappe and Galushkina (2009) for similar consortiums. It will be used to define the group of companies 
affiliated with the main Severstal shareholder, Alexey Mordashov. For all practical purposes, these 
companies, either “core” steel-related  or “non-core”,  were part of the overall history of Severstal as a 
“multi-business” corporation. In contrast, the name “Severstal”, without the “IBG” attachment, will 
refer to the steel and mining company only.   
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―Kuzbassugol‖ based in the South of Western Siberia. The company later sold 
this to ArcelorMittal in early 2008. In late summer 2008, right before the global 
crisis struck, Severstal acquired a mid-sized coking coal company in the United 
States.   
On the steel side, the expansion was focused on overseas markets: acquisition 
of a steel plant in the US Midwest in 2004, the Lucchini Group with assets in 
Italy and France in 2005, and three consecutive acquisitions of standalone steel 
plants in the US in spring and summer 2008.         
Thanks to a combination of acquisitions and investments in organic growth, 
Severstal has demonstrated a robust growth in its production profile in mining 
and particularly steelmaking (see the charts below). Steel production was 
growing at an average rate of 12% until 2008 and decreased sharply in 2009 
compared to 2008 because of the sharp slowdown in global demand.   
 
Source: Severstal data 
The growth in business profitability was much more impressive. Rising volumes 
and the unprecedented boom in raw materials and steel markets, boosted 
Severstal‘s profitability at an astounding rate of over 40% annually on average 
between 2002 and 2008. The impact of the 2008 financial crisis was very 
serious. The company EBITDA collapsed by over 85%, bringing it to the 2002 
level, whilst its net debt increased by over a billion dollars. The strong shock 
prompted significant changes in both strategy content and process.    
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Source: Severstal data 
As a way to structure the growing business, Severstal established a three-
divisional structure in 2007. Although the contribution of overseas assets in 
revenues was significant, it was much smaller in terms of earnings. The bulk of 
earnings has consistently been provided by the Russian steel assets which 
have further increased their contribution in ―crisis peak‖ 2009.   
Severstal Divisional Highlights: Contribution to Revenue and EBITDA, % of total  
 
 
Source: Severstal data 
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“Diversified” Business Portfolio and Assets Structure 
The first significant non-steel related diversification effort started in 2000-2002. 
The company acquired three automotive plants: Ulyanovsk Automotive Plant 
and the related Zavolzhskiy motor plant and the Naberezhnie Chelny mini-car 
plant. These companies made up the newly formed ―Severstal-Auto‖, which 
became at the time the fourth largest car producer in Russia by production 
volume (Pappe and Galukhina, 2009). Another relatively major venture was the 
creation of ―Severstal-Trans‖, a logistics business mostly involved with railcars 
and seaport terminals. This business partnership, a 50:50 joint venture with a 
number of private shareholders outside of Severstal, quickly became one of the 
three largest rail operators in Russia.  
The company made a number of smaller-scale investments in the early 2000s, 
including the creation of a plywood business, the establishment of an insurance 
company (a captive bank was established even earlier), investments into a retail 
project and certain media assets. However, the dominant logic of ―classical‖ 
expansion along the value chain (cars as a ―downstream‖ derivative of steel 
production, logistics and financial services as an essential component serving 
the steel operations) was evident at the time. The figure below shows the 
approximate structure of IBG Severstal‘s assets before the 2006 reshuffle (as of 
year end 2005): 
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Source: Severstal 
A decisive event which had a profound impact on the destiny of Severstal and 
its affiliates took place in 2006. The international expansion of Severstal aimed 
at rapid international growth from the already highly profitable Russian base. 
The ultimate objective was to transform Severstal into a major international 
player. The most daring bet in the international expansion was the ultimate 
defeat in the headline-capturing ―battle‖ for European steel major, Arcelor, in 
2006. Arcelor, trying to protect itself from a hostile takeover bid by an 
international steel group, Mittal Steel, announced that it would consider 
acquiring a majority stake at Severstal in exchange for a 32% ownership in 
Arcelor for Mr. Mordashov. As a result, Severstal could become a part of the 
largest steelmaker in the world and Mordashov could have a blocking stake in 
the newly created company. However, Mittal Steel was able to improve its bid 
and Arcelor gave up the merger with Severstal in favour of a merger with its 
original suitor.  
Following these dramatic events, IBG Severstal initiated an international IPO in 
2006 and engaged in a management and assets reshuffle. In 2006, the 
company sold both Severstal-Auto (―Sollers‖ from 2008) and Severstal-Trans 
(―N-trans‖ from 2008) to their management, reflecting a shift in strategy and 
dissolution of the previous management model. For a brief period, the business 
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essentially ―came back to its roots‖ and was almost exclusively based around 
steel and steel-related raw materials. Note that the steel and raw materials 
industry was at the early stages of demand and pricing boom (discussed 
below), so the external environment was quite conducive for the ―core‖ 
business.  
The second wave of diversification started after 2006. The company acquired a 
controlling stake in ―Power Machines‖, the leader and near-monopolist in the 
Russian energy machine-building, from the state-owned energy monopoly RAO 
UES. Investments into a completely new line of business – gold mining – 
started in 2007. Remarkably, they were executed through Severstal‘s steel and 
mining company, to the surprise of the financial markets.  
The figure below shows the Severstal (steel and mining) structure as of 2009:  
 
Source: Severstal 
Severstal Russian Peers 
Major Severstal competitors in Russia are NLMK, Evraz, MMK, Mechel. All 
these companies, as well as Severstal, have shown significant improvement in 
profitability since the early 2000‘s. The 2009 financial crisis send EBITDA back 
to pre-boom levels. The collapse was particularly astute for Severstal which 
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registered negative net profit on the back of losses and write-downs related to 
poor performance of its newly acquired international assets.  
 
 
Source: Companies‘ data 
 
Source: Companies data  
In 2004-2007 all Russian steel companies listed their shares on international 
stock exchanges. Their shares demonstrated excellent performance in 2005-
2006 and particularly in 2007-2008, as steel and raw materials markets 
achieved their all-time highs. Interestingly, the collapse in Q3 2008 seemed to 
be more pronounced for Severstal and its Russian peers compared to the 
global steel index, arguably reflecting a total run for ―quality‖ and away from 
emerging markets prevalent in the peak of the crisis. By Q1 2009, nearly all 
Russian steel companies saw their market value collapsing to the historically 
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lowest levels, reflecting the scale and magnitude of the shock caused by the 
crisis to the steel industry.    
 
Source: Bloomberg 
 
Steel and Steel-related Raw Materials: The Long Boom and Quick 
Collapse 
The boom in profitability and market capitalisation was by no means unique to 
the Russian steelmakers. The decade between 2000 and 2009, despite its ups 
and downs, was a time of rapid growth in demand for steel and its key raw 
materials. Rapid urbanisation and industrialisation of China and other emerging 
markets, combined with a reinvigorated, debt-led demand for housing in the 
developed world created a fertile ground for rapid rise in global demand.   
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Source: Severstal 
The rise in global steel demand was reflected in similar expansion of the key 
raw materials.  
 
Source: Severstal 
As far as the domestic market is concerned, Russian steel demand remained 
relatively stable until about 2004 when the much-improved external demand for 
key commodities gave rise to a real housing and infrastructure boom. The 
demand also contracted extremely sharply in 2008, although the boom 
continued in first half of the year, and in 2009, reflected the overall seriousness 
of the economic reaction to the externally-imposed crisis.     
331 
 
Source: Severstal 
Steel, and particularly its raw materials, are capital-intensive industries, with 
long lead-times and construction costs for new capacities. It takes between 
three and five years to construct a new steel plant, and even longer to conduct 
exploration and develop all necessary infrastructure for a coking coal or iron ore 
project. This, combined with the fact that the best and easily accessible iron ore 
and coking coal projects were already developed in previous periods, meant 
that the supply response to rampant demand was relatively slow, giving way to 
rising margins and prices, as the charts below demonstrate.     
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Coking coal prices started growing from 2004, following the sharp rise in steel 
price. Interestingly, higher lead-times and longer inertia of raw materials 
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investments, combined with a higher concentration among raw materials 
producers, facilitated a relatively more robust performance of raw materials 
prices. Steel prices have increased by a factor of three between 2003 and 2008, 
and by 70% between 2003 and 2009, whilst coking coal cost in 2008 five times 
its value in 2003, and was still more than 300% more expansive in 2009 
compared to 2003.    
 
Source: Bloomberg 
The price for iron ore demonstrates a similar pattern, with expanding margins 
for premium product (iron ore pellets). Like for coking coal, despite the 2009 
recession, the contract prices have still more than tripled between 2000-2009.   
 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Appendix 7 – Russian Economic and Institutional Environment 
in 2000-2009  
Russian Economic Journey, 2000-2009 
The period between 2000 and 2008 was an era of active growth and radical 
transformation for the Russian economy. At the same time, the impact of global 
economic and financial crisis was particularly strong as the country faced 
double shocks of falling export prices and collapsing capital inflows, the key 
drivers of its previous economic boom.  
Russia has undergone significant changes since the collapse of the Soviet 
Union, moving to a more market-based and globally-integrated economy. The 
country essentially completed its transition to market and corresponding painful 
structural adjustments by the end of the 1990s. The positive impact of the 1998 
rouble devaluation further facilitated subsequent economic growth, rising prices 
for Russia‘s key exports, including oil, gas and metals and sound economic 
management. Russia enjoyed a budgetary surplus in every year between 2000 
and 2008 and accumulated the world‘s third-largest foreign currency reserves 
by the end of that period. Increased political stability was a welcome change 
relative to the highly volatile 1990s. Vladimir Putin assumed his new office on 
December 31,1999, and left it in May 2008, presiding over a long period of 
uninterrupted economic expansion.  
In the 2000s, Russia's economy saw its dollar-nominated GDP nearly doubling, 
climbing from 22nd to 11th place among the world‘s largest economies. It 
ranked sixth in terms of purchasing power parity-adjusted GDP (www.imf.org). 
The economy made real gain of an average of seven percent per year2. In 
2007, Russia's GDP exceeded that of 1990, meaning it had overcome the 
devastating consequences of the long recession in the 1990s. On a per capita 
basis, Russian GDP reached US$11,500 in nominal and $16,000 in real terms 
by 2008, making it a middle-income country. At the same time, Russia also was 
                                                          
2
 Unless stated otherwise, all data in this section is taken the Russian State Statistical Service 
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one of the hardest-hit countries in the aftermath of the 2008 economic crisis, 
with the economy contracting by almost seven percent in 2009.  
 
Source: Rosstat (Russian State Statistical Service) 
 
Source: Rosstat (Russian State Statistical Service) 
In the second part of the period, economic growth was increasingly driven by 
rising commodity prices, which also greatly augmented the country‘s balance of 
payments. Oil remained the key commodity for the country and booming oil 
prices have made a decisive contribution to rising exports and balance of 
payments between 2000 and 2008, and particularly after 2003.    
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Source: Bloomberg 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
Although the industrial production increased by 75% between 2000-2008, it was 
Russia‘s internal market which arguably benefited the most from the economic 
boom. Real incomes more than doubled and the dollar-nominated average 
salary increased eightfold from $80 to $640. The volume of consumer credit 
between 2000–2006 increased 45 times, and during that same time period, the 
middle class grew from 8 million to 55 million, an increase of seven times. The 
number of people living below the poverty line also decreased from 30% in 
2000 to 14% in 2008.  
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Source: Rosstat (Russian State Statistical Service) 
 
Source: Rosstat (Russian State Statistical Service) 
Inflation remained a problem, however, as the government failed to contain the 
price increase. From 1999–2007, inflation was kept within the forecast ceiling 
only twice, and in 2007 the inflation exceeded that of 2006, continuing an 
upward trend at the beginning of 2008. 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Institutional Environment 
The institutional environment, however, remained relatively problematic for the 
business climate in Russia. Despite substantial growth in nearly all economic 
indicators, poor institutions contained overall country competitiveness, high 
bureaucracy and red tape, difficult tax regulations and the relatively poor state 
of many infrastructure elements (see the next chart). Signs of improvement, if 
any, were volatile and incoherent. These conditions created a challenging and 
volatile background for doing business in the country.  
 
Source: Global Competitiveness Report, World Economic Forum 
Interestingly, despite (or perhaps because of) economic success, corruption, a 
traditional hurdle for economic activity in Russia, remained on the rise 
compared to the situation in other countries of the world, according to 
Transparency International.   
             
Source: Transparency International 
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To summarise, in 2000-2009 the economic climate and external environment 
were overall very favourable and conducive for business expansion. At the 
same time, the overall business climate remained challenging and volatile. It 
was heavily dependant on the external conjuncture as evident from the 
excessive impact of the economic crisis in 2009. Even in the absence of 
external shocks, there were significant issues associated with the local business 
climate, as evidenced by Russia‘s place in the global competitiveness rankings. 
However, for those who were able to overcome internal challenges and stand 
up to volatility, the environment presented multiple and exciting opportunities for 
development and growth.  
Rising Importance of Capital Markets and Access to Foreign Capital 
The early 2000s were also the time when foreign investment inflows started in 
earnest in Russia. Investments have accelerated after 2005 on the back of an 
overall economic boom, rising commodity prices and a growing interest of 
Russian businesses in receiving external funding for their growth.   
 
Source: Rosstat (Russian State Statistical Service)  
Generally, foreign strategic investors had acquired assets in the majority of 
industries and sectors of the Russian economy, including pharmacy, IT, media, 
advertising and, of course, natural resources. The table below presents the 
largest acquisitions from the period between 2000-2008:  
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Acquirer Target Industry Year Deal 
size ($bln) 
ConocoPhillips Lukoil (20%) Oil &Gas 2004-2006 7,5 
BP TNK-BP 
(50%) 
Oil &Gas 2003 6,8 
E.ON OGK-4 Power 2007 3,9 
Société Générale Rosbank Banking 2006-2008 2,4 
Enel OGK-5 Power 2007 2,2 
PepsiCo Lebedyanskiy Beverages 2008 1,4 
Axa RESO-
Garantiya 
Insurance 2007 1,2 
KBC Absolutbank Banking 2007 1 
Renault AvtoVAZ 
(25%+1 
share) 
Automotive 2008 1 
Allianz ROSNO Insurance 2001, 2007 0,77 
Source: Pappe and Galukhina, 2009 
 
Rising importance of capital markets was also reflected in the rampant growth 
of the domestic stock market. 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
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Debt markets arguably played an even more important role compared to equity 
markets. Growth in debt funding skyrocketed after 2003, as Russian 
corporations were opening for themselves to cheap foreign debt financing to 
fund the exciting investment opportunities within the country. The Russian debt 
structure shifted from an equal amount of external private and government debt 
in the late 1990‘s, to the absolute dominance of private debt over government 
debt in Russia‘s external debt structure. 
 
Source: Bloomberg 
